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2003 DIGILAW 530 (GAU)

Director General of Police v. Hauji Yimchunger

2003-12-02

B.LAMARE

body2003
JUDGMENT B. Lamare, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. B.N. Sarmah learned Counsel for the Respondents. 2. These petitions are taken together as it relates to common order dated 19.12.2002 passed by the MACT, Dimapur and the same question of facts and law are involved. 3. In these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 115 / 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure the order dated 19.12.02 passed by the learned member, MACT, Dimapur in MAC. Case No. 152 and 153/2002 is assailed. On 17.12.86 a truck bearing registration No. NIP-1555 belonging to 6th Bn. NAP, Tizit met with an accident. In the said accident the son and the husband respectively of the claimants/Respondents late Throngsu Yimchunger (No. 66783) and Zungkum Yimchunger (No. 60793) died while they was on duty as a constable of the 6th Bn. NAP Tizit. The claimants; Respondents did not file any claim petition before the Tribunal for the death. However, on 26.8.02 claim petitions were filed before the tribunal at Dimapur which were registered as MAC Case Nos. 152 and 153 of 2002. Along with the claim petitions the claimants have also filed petitions for condonation of delay in filing the claim petitions after a lapse of about 18 years. 4. The claimmts have explained the delay for not filing the claim petitions that the claimants being a poor illiterate villagers residing in the remote village at Tizit district of Nagaland is not aware of the existence of such Tribunal and the right to claim compensation on account of the death. They only came to know about the right to claim compensation and the existence of Motor Accident claims Tribunal in the year 1998, Thereafter, they were trying to take the help of some friends to collect information from the police station within the jurisdiction where the accident took place. They could not get any information nor documents to enable them to claim compensation. They were supplied documents by the police only on 26.6.02. Therefore, after contacting a lawyer at Dimapur, they could file the present petition. The claimants also states that as there was only one claims tribunal located at Dimapur which is far away from the village of the claimants the claimants because of poverty, communication barrier, ignorant and illiteracy could not file the claim petitions. Therefore, after contacting a lawyer at Dimapur, they could file the present petition. The claimants also states that as there was only one claims tribunal located at Dimapur which is far away from the village of the claimants the claimants because of poverty, communication barrier, ignorant and illiteracy could not file the claim petitions. Besides, they also could not get the relevant documents from the police to file the claim petitions. 5. After filing of the claim petition the learned tribunal heard the parties on the issue of delay in filing the petitions and by common judgment and order dated 19.12.2002 passed in MAC Case No. 152 and 153 of 2002 the tribunal condoned the delay and admitted the claim petitions to be decided on merits. The only point for decision is therefore the delay in filing the claim petitions before the Tribunal at Dimapur. 6. By Amending Act 54 of 1994 which came into effect on 14.11.94 the period of Limitation prescribed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 was deleted. Before the amendment of the 1994 Act came into being the Sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the Act provides a period of 6 months for filing the claim petition. However, for the reasons to be recorded by the tribunal the claim tribunal may extend the period upto 12 months for filing the claim petition but in any case the tribunal has no jurisdiction or power to extend the period for filing the claim petition beyond the period of 12 months of the accident. By this Amending Act 54 of 1994 Sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the Act was deleted. Therefore, there is no period of limitation for filing the claim petition before the claims tribunal. From the statement of objects and reasons the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was passed after the various Committee like the National Transport Policy Committee, National Police Commission: Road Safety Committee, Low Powered Two-wheelers Committee and also the Law Commission have gone into different aspects of road transport. They have recommended updating simplification and rationalization of this law. Thereafter a Working Group was constituted in the year 1984 to review all the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legislation to replace the exiting Act of 1939. They have recommended updating simplification and rationalization of this law. Thereafter a Working Group was constituted in the year 1984 to review all the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legislation to replace the exiting Act of 1939. The Working Group took into account the suggestions and recommendations made by various bodies and suggested for amendment of the 1939 Act as a result of which the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 was enacted. 7. The act is a social benefit legislation and therefore the provision of the Act has to be construed in favour of the claimant to achieve the social purpose for which the enactment was made as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. The primary duty of the Court while, interpreting the provision of social legislation is to adopt a constructive approach subject to a condition that it should not violate the provision of the Act and is not contrary to the attempted objective of the Act. The Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by which Sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the Act was deleted whereby the period of limitation for filing, the claim petition was omitted has to be construed in a constructive manner liberally to achieve the object for which Sub-section 3 of Section 166, of the Act was deleted. 8. In the case of N. Balakrishnan, Appellant v. Khrishnamurthy, Respondent reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 in paragraph 13 of the judgment the Apex Court has held as follows: 13, It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. 9. In the case of Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Appellant v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Ors. Respondents reported in (2001) 9 SCC 106 in paragraph 5 of the judgment the Apex Court held as follows: 5. In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression "sufficient cause", the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. 10. In the instant case also the grounds given by the claimants is that they are illiterate villagers residing in interior village of Tizit at Mon District, Nagaland and they were not aware of the legislation granting such right to claim compensation for the death claimants' son and husband. The claimants are also poor illiterate persons and due to this various factors they could not file the claim petition immediately after the accident. Although the Petitioners came to know about the existence of Claims Tribunal at Dimapur which is the only Tribunal of the whole State they could get the documents from the police only on 26.6.02 and immediately thereafter the claim petitions were filed. It may be observed that in the State of Nagaland where literacy rate is very low and the people are mostly illiterate villagers, they are not aware of the legislation which gives right to the people to approach the Court forgetting compensation in the case like this. It may be observed that in the State of Nagaland where literacy rate is very low and the people are mostly illiterate villagers, they are not aware of the legislation which gives right to the people to approach the Court forgetting compensation in the case like this. In the State as whole there is communication barrier where many villages are not connected by road, people are simply living in the interior area and devoting their entire time to agriculture. The explanation as put forward by the claimant therefore deserves liberal consideration so that social benefit granted by the Act should be made amenable to such section of the society in the state. 11. Moreover by the Amendment Act of 1994 which came into force from 14.11.99 the period of limitation has been deleted which clearly shows that the object of the Act was to enable the people to claim compensation at any time when they came to know of such social legislation is in existence and that there is existence of such Claims Tribunal to redress their grievances. 12. The provision of Section 166 of the Act after Amendment Act of 1994 is for the benefit of the power and illiterate citizens. Therefore, the deletion of Sub-section 3 of Section 166 was made. 13. On this point we may look into the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhannalal Appellant v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. Respondents reported in AIR 1996 SC 2155 whereby the Apex Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment as held as follows: 7. In this background now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said Sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amendmg Act to show that benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166, is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.94. When Sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.94. When Sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994, Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994, in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when Sub-section (3) of Section 166, was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be received after deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166, w.e.f. 14-11-1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions can not be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. 14. The above decision of the Apex Court was also followed by this Court in the case of Rajiv Bhattacharjee and Ors. Petitioners v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2000 (1) TAC 35 (Gau.). In this case this Court has dealt with the case where the accident took place on 12.8.87 and the claim petition was filed on 31.8.96 before the claims Tribunal. This Court after considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the said case of Dhannalal, Appellant v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. Respondents (Supra) has held that the claim petition cannot be rejected although it is filed at the belated stage. 15. This Court after considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the said case of Dhannalal, Appellant v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. Respondents (Supra) has held that the claim petition cannot be rejected although it is filed at the belated stage. 15. In the case in hand as discussed and observed above sufficient cause was shown by the claimants/Respondents for their inability to file the claim petitions immediately after the accident and the same was filed only after the lapse of 16 years as the period of limitation is no more in existence after the deletion of Sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the Act and the claim petition is held to be maintainable. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no infirmity in the judgment and order dated 19.12.02 passed by the learned MACT, Dimapur and the same is upheld. These two revision petitions therefore failed and are hereby dismissed. 17. The matter is remanded back to the learned Claims Tribunal for deciding the claim petitions on merits and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The Tribunal shall dispose of the cases as early as possible preferably within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of the records. Petitions are disposed of. No costs.