JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This is plaintiffs appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below declining his prayer for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 25.11.1986 and granting him alternative relief of recovery of Rs. 74,000/- from defendant-Sain Dass now represented by his L.Rs. namely defendant-respondents No. 1, 1-A and 1-B. Both the Courts below have decided that the agreement to sell the shop in dispute dated 25.11.1986 was entered into between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-Sain Dass. It has also been found that the plaintiff-appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It has also been concluded that defendant-Sain Dass failed to perform his part of the contract. However, while granting the relief, the suit of the plaintiff-appellant was decreed by granting him the alternative relief of recovery of earnest money and liquidated damages as envisaged by the agreement to sell itself. 2. In order to put the controversy in its proper perspective, it is pertinent to make a reference to the following pedigree table :- 3. The plaintiff-appellant entered into an agreement to sell the shop in dispute dated 25.11.1986 and paid a sum of Rs. 37,000/- te defendant-Sain Dass. The aforementioned agreement was entered into on the alleged representation of defendant-Sain Dass stating that the shop in dispute was a part of property No. 109/12 Bhargav Camp Jalandhar and the same had fallen to his share. He produced memo of partition dated 21.5.1981. The sale price fixed for the shop between the parties was Rs. 40,000/- and a sum of Rs. 37,000/- was paid as earnest money with a stipulation that the balance amount would be paid before the Sub Registrar. The possession of the shop was to be delivered on execution of the sale deed which was to be executed on 25.11.1987. The plaintiff-appellant further alleged that defendant-Sain Dass got a suit filed against the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondents No. 4, 5, and 6. Kartaro Devi respondent No. 5 was also impleaded as a party. It has further been alleged that the shops adjoining the shop in dispute were sold by defendants-respondents No. 4, 5 and 6 without the consent of defendant-respondent No. 7. An alternative prayer for payment of Rs. 37,000/- as payment of damages was also made in the suit. Kartaro Devi respondent No. 5 was also impleaded as a party. It has further been alleged that the shops adjoining the shop in dispute were sold by defendants-respondents No. 4, 5 and 6 without the consent of defendant-respondent No. 7. An alternative prayer for payment of Rs. 37,000/- as payment of damages was also made in the suit. In their joint written statement defendant-respondents 1 to 3 alleged that defendant-Sain Dass was not owner of the suit property on the strength of memo. of partition dated 21.5.1981. Another memo of partition dated 5.5.1986 executed by the L.Rs. of Balaki Ram was pleaded. According to the aforementioned agreement to sell, the shops were to be sold to Ashok Kumar son of Om Parkash. Defendant Sain Dass denied the allegation that he ever represented to the plaintiff-appellant that he was exclusive owner of the shop in dispute. Similar stand was taken by defendant-respondents No. 2 to 7 in their separate written statement pleading that Sain Dass was never authorised to deal with the shop in dispute as exclusive owner. The memo of partition dated 21.5.1981 was alleged to be a forged and fabricated document. They further averred that they had filed a suit seeking a declaration that they were legal heirs of Balaki Ram and owners of the property left by Balaki Ram which included the shop in dispute. 4. Both the courts decided all the three issues in favour of the plaintiff- appellant holding that there has been a valid agreement executed by defendant-Sain Dass & on 25.11.1981 for sale of disputed shop to the plaintiff-appellant. It has further been held that the plaintiff-appellant had been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that defendant-Sain Dass had been guilty of breach of the agreement to sell. The lower appellate Court framed an additional issue as to whether defendant-Sain Dass was the exclusive owner of the suit property or he was an absolute owner on the strength of memo of partition dated 21.5.81. The report of the Civil Judge was obtained to return the finding against the plaintiff-appellant. The findings of the lower appellate Court read as under :- "11. The facts which emerge from the pleadings and evidence are that Balaki Ram was the owner of the properties bearing No. 131/12 and 119/12. The report of the Civil Judge was obtained to return the finding against the plaintiff-appellant. The findings of the lower appellate Court read as under :- "11. The facts which emerge from the pleadings and evidence are that Balaki Ram was the owner of the properties bearing No. 131/12 and 119/12. The property bearing No. 131/12 is a house in which Balaki Ram used to reside with his family. The property bearing No. 119/12 was measuring 10 x 35. The suit property measuring 10 x 10 is a part of that property. The other two shops in that property have been sold to Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi vide sale deed dated 11.5.81 registered on 21.5.81 by the legal heirs of Balaki Ram except Kartaro Devi his daughter. The other two shops are in possession of the vendees. The shop in question is in possession of Ashok Kumar who has purchased the same from all the legal representatives of Balaki Ram vide sale deed Ex. DW1/C which was executed in his favour as per the judgment and decree of the court on 30.1189. 12. Balaki Ram died leaving behind three sons namely Sain Dass, Rattan Lal and Madan Lal. He also left behind four daughters namely Swaran Devi, Pushpa Devi, Santosh Kumari and Kartaro Devi. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that all the legal representatives of Balaki Ram inherited his property after his death. 13. On 18.5.81, the legal representatives of Balaki Ram except Kartaro Devi executed sale deeds of two shops in the suit property in favour of Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi which were got registered on 21.5.81. Sain Dass had also sold those shops and is one of the signatory to the sale deeds executed in favour of Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi. 14. Here, the question that arises for consideration is if Sain Dass had been given the shop in dispute out of the suit property towards his share in the property, in that case, he had no reason to sign the sale deed and join as vendees (vendor ?) of the other two adjoining shops along with other legal heirs of Balaki Ram. The second presumption which can be drawn is that Sain Dass had not left his share in the other two shops as well, meaning thereby that there was no family arrangement whatsoever in between the parties giving the shop in dispute exclusive to Sain Dass." (Emphasis added) 5. Both the Courts below refused to consider the alleged memo of partition and granted the alternative relief of refund of money along with liquidated damages for the following reasons :- (a) the memorandum of partition dated 21.5.81 is not a settlement between all legal heirs of Balaki Ram because it was not signed by all the legal heirs/co-owners of Balaki Ram. Defendant Sain Dass and Kartaro Devi defendant-respondent No. 7 were not signatory to the aforementioned document. (b) On the same day, defendant Sain Dass sold two shops to Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi vide sale deed dated 18.5.1981 registered on 25.5.1991. All other legal heirs except Kartaro Devi respondent No. 7 signed the aforementioned sale deed. There is no mention of sale deed dated 18.5.1981 in the alleged memorandum of partition Ex. P3 dated 21.5.1981. (c) Defendant Sain Dass having sold earlier a part of his share by selling the adjoining shops so he was left with a very meagre part of his share out of 1/7th share in the property left by Balaki Ram. Moreover, a suit was filed by defendants No. 4, 5, 6 and others claiming their 1/7 share each one of them claiming their 1/7 share in the shop in dispute. Plaintiff-appellant Sudarshan Kumar was also party in that suit. The plaintiff-appellant failed to set up the agreement to sell dated 25.11.1986 executed by defendant Sain Dass or alleged partition dated 25.1.1981 in the aforementioned suit by filing counter claim. This suit was earlier in point of time having been filed on 26.11.1987 than the instant suit which was filed on 4.12.1987. (d) The suit filed by defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6 was decided vide judgment Ex. DW1/D as infructuous because by the time the suit was decided, the entire suit property bearing No. 119/12 situated at Bhargav Camp Jalandhar, had been sold. In the remaining property of Balaki Ram, all his legal heirs were declared owners to the extent of 1/7th share. 6. 4, 5 and 6 was decided vide judgment Ex. DW1/D as infructuous because by the time the suit was decided, the entire suit property bearing No. 119/12 situated at Bhargav Camp Jalandhar, had been sold. In the remaining property of Balaki Ram, all his legal heirs were declared owners to the extent of 1/7th share. 6. The lower appellate Court found that relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell the shop in dispute cannot be granted and upheld the grant of alternative relief by observing as under :- "25. In view of the above discussion, this court agrees with the findings of the learned trial Court that Sain Dass had a very meagre share in the suit property to the extent of 1/7th share. The relief of specific performance of the agreement cannot be allowed to the plaintiff in the suit property. The learned trial court has rightly declined this relief and has allowed the alternative relief. Sain Dass was not the exclusive owner of the suit property and even if he has presented himself as the exclusive owner, it does not bind the other-co-owners. Under these circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned trial court on issue No. 3-A and the declining the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. The findings of the learned trial court on issue No. 3-A is affirmed." Mr. Arun Palli, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has made two fold submission before me : (a) that the memo of partition dated 21.5.1981 cannot be brushed aside merely because defendant Sain Dass and Kartaro Devi, defendant-respondent No. 7 did not sign it. The learned counsel has submitted that the sale deed executed on 18.5.1981 and registered on 25.9.1981 in favour of Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi were also not signed by Kartaro Devi and she failed to challenge the same. In support of his submission, Mr. Palli has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mannua Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Suraj Bhan and others, AIR 1975 SC 1119. In support of his submission, Mr. Palli has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mannua Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Suraj Bhan and others, AIR 1975 SC 1119. (b) The relief of specific performance of the agreement dated 25.11.1986 ought to have been granted to the plaintiff-appellant once it has been found that the agreement has been validly executed, the plaintiff-appellant had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and defendant Sain Dass had failed to perform his part of the contract. According to the learned counsel, irrelevant considerations have weighed with both the courts below to deny the relief of specific performance of agreement to the plaintiff-appellant. He has pointed out that to camouflage, a suit was engineered by defendant-respondents No. 4, 5 and 6 against defendant-Sain Dass and the plaintiff-appellant seeking a declaration that defendant-respondents No. 4, 5, 6 and 7 along with Sain Dass and others were owner to the extent of 1/7 share in the suit property. He has argued that the conduct of Kartaro Devi, defendant-respondent No. 7 in not challenging the sale deed executed on 18.5.1981 registered on 21.5.1981 in favour of Ashok Kumari and Bimla Devi would itself show that defendant-respondent No. 7 Kartaro Devi was not averse to the agreement to sell dated 21.5.1981 and therefore, the non-signing of agreement to sell by her is not a material circumstance. 7. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and regret my inability to accept the same. It is well-settled proposition of law that an appeal under Section 100 of the Code could only be admitted if it raises a substantial question of law. A substantial question of law would be the one which involves question of general public importance that has not been settled by the Supreme Court, Privy Council or by the Federal Court. The other example of substantial question of law would be such question which affects the rights of the parties and are not finally settled by the Supreme Court, Privy Council or the Federal Court. If the question of law is settled by the highest Court or the general principle to be applied in determining that questions are well-settled and only those principles are to be applied, then such question would not constitute a substantial question of law. If the question of law is settled by the highest Court or the general principle to be applied in determining that questions are well-settled and only those principles are to be applied, then such question would not constitute a substantial question of law. This view has been taken by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Chunnilal V. Mehta v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1314. The view of the their Lordships of the Constitution Bench read as under :- "(6) ................The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." The aforementioned view has further been followed by the Supreme Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529, Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 and Pankaj Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556. 8. If the principle enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments are applied to the facts of the instant case then it becomes evident that no substantial question of law would arise because the partition deed Ex. P3 alleging family partition, cannot be regarded as family settlement as all the L.Rs. of deceased Balaki Ram did not sign it. One of the pre-requisites for a valid family settlement/family partition is that it must be signed by all the major members of the families as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Gummanna Shetty and others v. Nagaveniamma, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1595. of deceased Balaki Ram did not sign it. One of the pre-requisites for a valid family settlement/family partition is that it must be signed by all the major members of the families as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Gummanna Shetty and others v. Nagaveniamma, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1595. Even otherwise, it is an elementary principle of law of contract that unless there is valid agreement signed by all the parties, no contractual right could be conferred nor any liability could be assumed. The deed Ex. P3 failed to confer any right on defendant Sain Dass in respect of the shop in dispute. It is further evident that had the family settlement been acted upon then defendant Sain Dass would not have proceeded further for the registration of sale deed 18.5.1981 registered on 21.5.1981. No reference has been made of those two registered sale deeds in the deed of family settlement dated 21.5.1981. Moreover, the possession of the property was not delivered to the plaintiff-appellant and has been given to on Ashok Kumar son of Om Parkash in pursuance of an agreement to sell dated 5.5.1986 which is earlier in point of time than the agreement to sell entered into by defendant Sain Dass in favour of plaintiff-appellant which is dated 25.11.1986. The agreement to sell dated 5.5.1986 was entered into in respect of the shop in dispute by all the legal heirs of Balaki Ram with Ashok Kumar son of Om Parkash. In these circumstances, the alternative relief of refund of earnest money and liquidated damages cannot be said to be unwarranted. In this regard, reliance could be placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Om Parkash Jawal, (1996) 4 SCC 593, S. Rangaraju Naidu v. S. Thiruvarakkarasu, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680 and Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1. The aforementioned judgments categorically laid down that the relief of decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract is discretionary relief and depends on facts and circumstances of each case. I do not find any legal infirmity in the exercise of discretion by both the Courts below. The appeal is thus without merit and is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.