JUDGMENT 1. - This civil special appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1515/99, dated September 6, 1999. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Additional Government Advocate under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure red with Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Law & Judicial Department Manual, 1952 for a term of three years on retainer basis. Before the expiry of term, his appointment was terminated. The termination was made by a common order of the Government of Rajasthan dated 3rd March, 1999, whereby the appointments of several Addl. Government Advocates and Addl. Public Prosecutors were terminated and new appointments of Addl. Government Advocates and Public Prosecutors were made. The appellant being aggrieved by the order of termination filed a writ petition. The learned Single Judge by an exhaustive and elaborate judgment and order dated 6th Sept., 1999 dismissed the writ petition. 3. The petitioner not being satisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has filed the present appeal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mahesh Bora, Mr. D.R. Bhandari and Mr. A.K. Rajvanshy. We have also heard learned Addl. Advocate General for the State. 5. We find that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not, suffer from any infirmity or error. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1654 held that appointments of legal practitioners as Government Advocates must be understood as purely professional engagement till they last, terminable at the will of either party. 7. The Supreme Court also held that appointments made by public bodies cannot vest them with Additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever, made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. 8. Keeping in view the aforesaid dicta of the Supreme Court, it seems to us that the appointment of the appellant must be treated as a professional engagement, terminable by the Government at any point of time, even before the expiry of the term of three years since the Government undoubtedly has the power to terminate the appointment and engagement of a Government counsel. Besides, this power derives substance from the provisions of Section 16 of General Clauses Act, which provides that the power of appointment carries with it, the power to terminate the same, therefore, cannot be defaulted. 9. We are also of the opinion that being a special engagement a Government Advocate has no right to claim writ or order in the nature of a mandamus to continue in office, once his engagement is terminated. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant complained of violation of the principles of natural justice as no opportunity of being heard was given to the appellant the State before terminating his services prior to the expiry of the term of three years. There is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel. The appellant did not have any vested right to continue in that position. This being so there was no question of violation of the principles of natural justice. As already pointed out the appointment of the appellant being a professional engagement could be terminated before the expiry of the term of three years. 11. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the State deprived the appellant of his property by cutting short his term as Additional Government Advocate. According to the learned counsel since the property was taken away by the State without authority of law, it was a clear contravention of Article 300A of the Constitution. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The interest of the appellant, if any, to continue for a period of three years, does not constitute a right or interest in any tangible property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution. 12. It was held by the Supreme Court in Collector of South Satara v. Despande Laxman Mahadev, AIR 1964 SC 326 that right to an office held at the pleasure of the appointing authority does not constitute property. It was also held that even where the office was hereditary in nature, it did not create a right of property in case the appointing authority had the power to abolish the office or resume the office. 13. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant lacks substances and is accordingly rejected. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order to costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******