JUDGMENT P. K. TRIPATHY, J. — The aforesaid two Civil Revision peti¬tions have been filed against identical orders passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rourkela on 10.4.2003 in Civil Suit No. 114 of 2002 and Civil Suit No. 115 of 2002 respectively. Plaintiffs in Civil Suit No. 114 of 2002 and in Civil Suit No. 115 of 2002 are opposite party members respectively in Civil Revision Petition No. 222 of 2003 and 225 of 2003. The claim advanced by both the plaintiffs in their separate suits against the defendants/petitioners being on the self-same cause of ac¬tion, a common argument was advanced by the parties while arguing on the civil revisions at the stage of admission. Therefore, this common judgment shall abide the result in both the civil revi¬sions. 2. At the time of argument, petitioners has produced xerox copies of the plaints in the each of the Civil Suits (described as Money Suit). Learned counsel for the opposite party also produced for perusal the xerox copy of the Instructions to Ten¬ders. Correctness of the said documents being conceded by the rival parties, they were accepted for perusal and therefore, the lower Court records of the civil Suits were not called for. 3. Petitioner is a Government of Orissa undertakings and the opposite parties are the Private Contractors undertakings contract works. A Tender was floated on 6.3.1999, vide Tender Call Notice No. 13872,inviting offers form intending Contractors relating to construction of Lift Irrigation Project at Arba Jharabahal in the district of Sundargarh. According to the stipu¬lations in Clause-12 of that Tender, along with the Tender paper, Contractors applying for the job were to deposit Earnest Money amounting to 1% of the quoted value for the particular work. While mentioning about the method in which and the manner in which such Earnest Money was to be deposited, in Clause 12 (3) of that Tender it was stated that, “The earnest money deposit of unsuccessful tenders will be returned within 90 days from the date of opening of tender.” After opening of the tenders since the contract was not given to any of the plaintiffs in the afore¬said two suits, therefore, in accordance with the above quoted Clause 12(2) of the Tender the Earnest Money Deposit (in short, ‘E.M.D’) was to be refunded. In that respect, when the defendant/petitioner delayed the matter and subsequently made part payments, after due legal notice each of the plaintiffs filed the aforesaid suits claiming for refund of the E.M.D. money along with damages. Both the suits were filed at Rourkela. After re¬ceipt of the summons, petitioner entered appearance in both the suits and filed application purporting to be under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, ‘C.P.C.’) on the ground that the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Rourkela has no jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the stipulation in Clause 26 of the Terms of the Tenders. That terms read as hereunder : “Any dispute as regards to the contract of this tender, the decisions of the Managing Director, Orissa Agro Industries Corpo¬ration Ltd., shall be final, conclusive and binding on both the parties. Suits if any arising out of this contract shall be filed by either party in Court of law situated in Bhubaneswar and/or Cuttack in the State of Orissa”. 4. In paragraph-14 of the plaint, in Civil Suit No. 114 of 2002, plaintiff/opposite party has stated that, “That the cause of action for this Court suit arises at Rourkela within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court on 31.10.2001.......” Similarly, in paragraph-11 of the plaint,in Civil Suit No. 115 of 2002, plaintiff has stated that, “Cause of action for this suit arose at Rourkela within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court on 14.02.2002.......” 5. After hearing the parties, learned Civil Judge with due reference to the relevant averments in the plaint is and the above quoted condition No. 26, in the Tender recorded the finding that since the plaintiffs did not enter into any contract with the defendant/petitioner and when the plaints disclose that cause of action arose at Rourkela, therefore, the application under Order 7, Rule 10, C.P.C. does not bear any merit and the Civil Judge, Rourkela has jurisdiction to decide the suit. Ac¬cordingly, he rejected the applications filed by the petitioner in each of the suits. 6. Mr. Ac¬cordingly, he rejected the applications filed by the petitioner in each of the suits. 6. Mr. B. Baug, learned counsel for the petitioners refer¬ring to the above noted Clause 26 of the Tender and the ratio in the case of M/s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd., v. Rama Mishra, 2001 (I) OLR (SC)-164, argued that when the parties agree to confer jurisdiction in Courts situated at Bhuba¬neswar or Cuttack, therefore the suit is not maintainable at Rourkela, and in that respect the impugned order is illegal being contrary to the provision in Order 7, Rule 10, C.P.C. Apprehend¬ing that the opposite party may raise an issue of premature nature of the application in the absence of written statements filed by the defendants, also relied on the case of Salim Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2003 (S.C.) 759. 7. Order 7, Rule 10 C.P.C. reads as hereunder : “10. Return of plaint : - (1) Subject to the provisions of Rule 10A, the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. Explanation : - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that a Court of appeal or revision may direct, after setting aside the decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint under this sub-rule. (2) Procedure on returning plaint : - On returning a plaint, the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return,the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning it.” Rule 10A provides for Power of Court to fix a date of ap¬pearance in the Court where plaint is to be filed after its return and Rule 10B provides for power of appellate Court to transfer suit to the proper Court. Therefore, it emerges from the conjoint reading of Rules 10A and 10B that by mere disposal of an application under Rule 10 practically a suit is not disposed of but it is returned to be presented in a Court having jurisdic¬tion. In the case of R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Therefore, it emerges from the conjoint reading of Rules 10A and 10B that by mere disposal of an application under Rule 10 practically a suit is not disposed of but it is returned to be presented in a Court having jurisdic¬tion. In the case of R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt.Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2094, the Apex Court has mandated that when a Court comes to a conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit, the only course to be adopted in such circumstances is to return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court and not to dismiss the suit. In view of such position of law, Section 115, C.P.C. as amended by Act 46 of 1999, stands on the way on the question of maintainability of this Civil Revision in as much as if the application under Order 7, Rule 10, C.P.C. filed by the petitioner would have been allowed, then that would not have disposed of the suit and therefore, the impugned order becomes interlocutory and not revisable. 8. Apart from that, on the matter of exercise of revision¬al jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, the Apex Court has provided ample guidance. In the case of the Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar,Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 76, Hon’ble K. S. Hegde, J.(as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench of three Judges, propounded that, “In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the First Appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the First Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the First Appellate Court may be right or wrong; may be in ac¬cordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order.It is not the case that the First appellate Court exercised its juris¬diction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code: See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dhoni v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, (1966) 1 SCR 102 = ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ), and D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code: See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dhoni v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, (1966) 1 SCR 102 = ( AIR 1966 SC 153 ), and D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. New Delhi v.Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 = ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 ).” 9. Be that as it may, so far as the facts involved in the present cases are concerned, Clause 26 of the Tender (as quoted earlier) only oust the jurisdiction of Courts at any other places except at Bhubaneswar and Cuttack for institution of suits, if any, arising out of the contract. As rightly argued by learned counsel for the opposite party, mere filing of tender with deposit of earnest money cannot be regarded as a contract, if the offer was not accepted and work order was not given. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand argued that stipulation for depositing the earnest money and condition for refund of the same comes within the meaning of the term ‘con¬tract’ and therefore the suit for recovery of such amount shall come within the clutches of Clause 26 of the Conditions of Tender Notice. 10. It will be appropriate to refer to Section 2 of the Indian Contract, Act 1872, to resolve the above said controversy between the parties and to understand the meaning of the term ‘contract’ Section 2 reads as hereunder : “2. 10. It will be appropriate to refer to Section 2 of the Indian Contract, Act 1872, to resolve the above said controversy between the parties and to understand the meaning of the term ‘contract’ Section 2 reads as hereunder : “2. Interpretation - Clause - In this Act the following word and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a con¬trary intention appears from the context : (a) when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal; (b) when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted.A proposal when accepted, becomes a promise; (c) the person making the proposal is called the “promisor” and the person accepting the proposal is called “promisee”; (d) when, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person had done or abstained from doing, or does or ab¬stains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consid¬eration for the promise; (e) every promise and every set of promises, forming the consid¬eration for each other, is an agreement; (f) promises which form the consideration or part of the consid¬eration for each other, are called reciprocal promises; (g) an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void; (h) an agreement enforceably by law is a contract (i) an agreement which is enforceable by law at the opinion of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the opinion of the other or others,is a voidable contract; (j) a contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable”. Annotation of the above quoted provision is not required to understand the meaning of the term ‘contract’. It is clear from the said provision that a transaction to constitute as a contract must be preceeded by offering or giving a proposal, acceptance of the same by the other party, both the parties proceeding further pursuance to such offer and acceptance and to enter into agree¬ment. It is clear from the said provision that a transaction to constitute as a contract must be preceeded by offering or giving a proposal, acceptance of the same by the other party, both the parties proceeding further pursuance to such offer and acceptance and to enter into agree¬ment. In this case deposit of E.M.D. along with tender papers filed by the plaintiffs did not proceed any further nor any agreement was entered into between the parties for acceptance of the tenders. Therefore, if that proposal would have been accepted to assign the job or any particular job to each or either of the plaintiffs then that would have constituted a contract and only in that event the dispute arising out of contract would have ousted the jurisdiction of any other Court except the Courts at Bhubaneswar and Cuttack. As it appears, the defendant could not comprehend the meaning of the term contract when applied under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code, seeking a direction for return of the plaint. In other words, if the cause of action arose in part at Rourkela, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Rourkela is not ousted by virtue of above noted Clause 26 of the Tender Notice. The ratio in the case of M/s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. (Supra) is therefore not applicable in view of such distinguished facts and circumstance. 11. In the case of Saleem Bhai (supra) while in seisin of a matter under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, Hon’ble Apex Court have propounded that filing of written statement is not the condition precedent to consider an application under that provi¬sion of law. On the other hand perusal of the plaint is necessary to pass necessary order for rejection of the plaint, if it comes within the perview of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. The same analogy is to be applied in a case of consideration of the matter by the Court under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code. When on perusal of the plaint the Court below has recorded that plaints in each of the suits disclose about part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Rourkela, therefore, learned Civil Judge was correct in his approach for rejecting the applications filed under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code. When on perusal of the plaint the Court below has recorded that plaints in each of the suits disclose about part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Rourkela, therefore, learned Civil Judge was correct in his approach for rejecting the applications filed under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code. Thus in the absence of any illegality in the impugned orders both the revisions bear no merit. Accordingly, both the Civil Revisions are dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees on thousand) to be paid by the defendant-petitioner to the plaintiff-opposite par¬ties in each of the suit. Civil Revisions dismissed.