D. P. SINGH, J. Heard Sri Vinod Swaroop, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri B. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent-workman. 2. Pleadings have been exchanged and both parties agree that the writ petition itself may be disposed off under the Rules of the Court. 3. Through the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged an award made by the Labour Court I, Kanpur dated 26th September, 1991. The facts as evident from a perusal of the award and the record of the case is that the respondent workman after being selected as Secretary by the Director of Handloom, U. P. was assigned to Nawyuwak Bunkar Audyogik Utpadan Samiti Limited, Ranipur, in Jhansi (hereinafter referred to as the Society ). The Respondent No. 1 worked in the society from 29th May, 1981 till July, 1984. The services of the respondent No. 1 were terminated w. e. f. 1-4-1985. This termination led to a reference under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court at Kanpur which registered it as Adjudication Case No. 120 of 1986. The following dispute was referred: "kya SEWAJAKON DWARA APNE SHRAMIK MITHLESH KUMAR PUTRA DEOTA DIN TIWARI, SACHIV, KO DINANK 1-4-1985 SE KARYA SE PRATHAK KIYA JANA UCHIT EVAM VAIDHANIK HAI? YADI NATHIN? TO SAMBANDHIT SHRAMIK KYA HIT LABH PANE KA ADHIKARI HAI, TATHA KIS ANYA VIVRAN SAHIT?" 4. The aforesaid reference was made by the State Government vide its order dated 15-9-1988 wherein the petitioner was shown as the employer. 5. Both the parties filed their written statements, examined their respective witnesses and also filed documents in support of their claims. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection that the reference itself was bad, inasmuch as, the necessary parties were not impleaded. The specific case set up by the petitioner was that it was not the employer of the workman and in fact the employer was the society. The labour Court after considering all the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the workman was appointed by Director of Handlooms. However, the labour Court went on to hold that since the petitioner was shown as the employer therefore, he had no jurisdiction to amend the reference. The labour Court after considering all the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the workman was appointed by Director of Handlooms. However, the labour Court went on to hold that since the petitioner was shown as the employer therefore, he had no jurisdiction to amend the reference. The labour Court further held that since in the case under Section 15 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Directorate of Handlooms, U. P. was arrayed as the employer, thus, the labour Court proceeded and decreed the claim of the workmen holding that the termination was in violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. Counsel for the petitioner has raised four submissions before me: (a) The reference itself was bad as proper parties were not impleaded. (b) The Respondent No. 1 was not a workman within the meaning of the Act and in fact no reference could have been made. (c) The department of Handlooms of the State of U. P. is a Government department and thus is not an industry. And, (d) No order of termination dated 1-4-1985 was either filed or proved before the labour Court. 6. In support of the first contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the findings recorded by the labour Court. The findings appear at page 69 of the paper book and read as follows: "patrawali KE UPLABDH KATHANO/upkathano, PATTRAJATON TATHA GAWAHON KE BAYANON KO DEKHANE SE YEH ASPASTHA HO JATA HAI KI WADI SHRAMIK MITHILESH KUMAR TIWARI KI NIYUKTI HATHKARGHA NIRDESHALAYA, U. PRA. KE UP NIBANDHAK DWARA SACHHATKAR LENE KE BAAD SACHIV KE PAD PAR HATHKARGHA NIRDESHALAYA DWARA KI GAI THI. USKI POSTING BHI NIRDESHALAYA DWARA KI GAI HAI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 7. Once the labour Court recorded a categorical finding that the Directorate of Handlooms U. P. was the appointing authority, there was no occasion for the labour Court to travel any further. A perusal of the reference order shows that the Directorate of Handlooms was not a party to the dispute and, therefore, the reference was bad. The labour Court when confronted with this objection held that it was beyond its jurisdiction to alter the reference. This approach was correct. A perusal of the reference order shows that the Directorate of Handlooms was not a party to the dispute and, therefore, the reference was bad. The labour Court when confronted with this objection held that it was beyond its jurisdiction to alter the reference. This approach was correct. After having come to the conclusion that the Directorate of Handloom was the appointing and posting authority, it could at best require the parties to have the reference amended. However, it could not further deliberate upon the dispute. The labour Court again was wrong in holding that the burden of proving that there was no relationship of master and servant between the parties to the reference was on the petitioner. Once the petitioner specifically denied existence of any relationship of master and servant the burden immediately shifts on the workman. It is well settled that a party cannot prove a negative fact. The party claiming existence of a positive fact has to prove it and especially so when the party bases its entire claim on that fact. 8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the workman was that the Director of Handloom U. P. is also the ex officio Registrar of the petitioner society. However, there is nothing on record nor any evidence has been led to prove the aforesaid fact. A person may be holding different offices and his impleadment as an Officer of the one organization will not ipse facto mean that the other organization in which he functions in a different capacity would be deemed to be represented. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that in the payment of wages case between the parties, it was held that the petitioner was the employer. The labour Court in its award has held that in the payment of wages case No. 241 of 1985, U. P. Hathkargha Nirdeshalaya was a party. This finding has not been challenged by the workman and neither copies of the order passed in payment of wages case No. 241 of 1985 has been filed. Therefore, even this contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is untenable. 9. The question can be examined from another angle. The U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 is a complete Code in itself. It has inbuilt mechanism. Even employer and employee disputes are adjudicated under the same. Therefore, even this contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is untenable. 9. The question can be examined from another angle. The U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 is a complete Code in itself. It has inbuilt mechanism. Even employer and employee disputes are adjudicated under the same. Section 121 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act empowers the Registrar to determine terms of the employment in the society. The Registrar may frame regulations including for disciplinary control of employees in a co-operative society. The Registrar in exercise of the powers has framed rules known as U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. Chapter VII deals with proceedings and appeals with regard to disciplinary control over the employees. A some what similar question arose before the Apex Court in the case of R. C. Tiwari v. M. P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. , 1997 (76) F. L. R. 383 and the Court held that in view of the special procedure provided under the Co-operative Societies Act, power of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act stands excluded. As already observed hereinabove, a complete code has been provided by the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1975 and also the regulations framed thereunder, therefore the jurisdiction under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was necessarily excluded. 10. In view of the discussions made herein above, and the conclusions reached by me, it would only be academic to examine the other contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, on both counts the reference is bad. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned award dated 26th September, 1991 is hereby quashed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .