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2003 DIGILAW 556 (GAU)

Haliram Das v. State of Assam

2003-12-08

I.A.ANSARI

body2003
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The extension of lease made in favour of Respondent No. 4, namely Sri Budheswar Das, in respect of Gohpur Weekly (Sunday) Market is under challenge in the present writ petition. 2. The material facts, which gave rise to the present writ petition, may in a nut-shell, be stated as follows: The Gohpur Weekly (Sunday) Market, (hereinafter referred to as "the said market"), falls under the Gohpur Town Committee. The lease of the said market was granted by Respondent No. 3 in favour of Respondent No. 4 for a period of one year commencing from 1.4.2002 and ending on 31.3.2003. As the period of lease, so granted, was coming to an end, a notice inviting tender, (for the sake of brevity, hereinafter called "NIT"), dated 13.2.2003 for settlement of the said market was published fixing 6.3.2003 as the last date for submission of tender. Pursuant to the NTT, the Petitioner, amongst others, submitted his tender seeking grant of settlement of the said market. In the meanwhile, Respondent No. 4 made an application to Respondent No. 2, namely Director of Municipal Administration, seeking extension of his lease period. This application was sent by Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 3, namely, Gohpur Town Committee. As the Gohpur Town Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the Town Committee") was under supersession in terms of Section 299 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, its Executive Officer, with reference to the said application for extension made by the Respondent No. 4, sent a letter, dated 24.2.2003, addressed to the Respondent No. 2, giving a proposal for extension of lease of the said market in favour of the Respondent No. 4 for a further period of one year, i.e., upto 31.3.2004 by increasing certain percentage of the Government amount of value of Rs. 13,90,057/- fixed in respect of the said market. Acting upon this proposal, the respondent No. 2, vide letter, dated 25.2.2003, approved the extension of the said lease from 1.4.2003 to 31.3.2004 at 2% above the last lease amount of the market, whereupon the Respondent No. 3 published a notice, dated 28.2.2003, cancelling the process for settlement of the said market, which was initiated by the NTT aforementioned. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. I have perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. I have perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr. B.D. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. D. Goswami, learned Additional Senior Advocate, Assam, appearing on behalf of the State-Respondents, and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the private-Respondent No. 4. 4. Presenting the case on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. B.D. Das has submitted that grant of extension of lease of a market is governed by Rule 2 of the Rules for procedure for the sale of Pounds and Markets by Municipal Boards and Town Committees in Assam (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules") and under this Rule, points out Mr. B.D. Das, the decision of extend or not to extend the lease period shall be of the Municipal Board or Town Committee concerned and if the same is under supersession, then, by the Executive Officer appointed in terms of Section 299(2) of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956. This decision requires, further points out Mr. BD Das, that there should be application of mind by the Board/Town Committee/Executive Officer, as the case maybe, and upon application of its own mind, if the authority concerned is satisfied that such an extension is required to be given, then, the authority concerned shall submit necessary proposal to the Director of Municipal Administration, but such a proposal shall contain, according to Mr. Das, the reasons justifying such extension, the period for which the extension is to be granted and the rent of extended lease period and it will, then, remain for the Director to give or not to give approval to such a proposal. 5. In the case at hand, submits Mr. B.D. Das, the Respondent No. 3 had already issued the NIT, but the same was cancelled at the behest of the Respondent No. 2, namely, Director of Municipal Administration and even while forwarding the proposal for according approval, the Respondent No. 3 did not indicate the rent, which shall be realized during the period of extension of the lease. This shows, according to Mr. Das, that there was absolutely no application of mind by the Respondent No. 3 and he acted mechanically and at the behest of the Respondent No. 2. Thus, the proposal given by the Respondent No. 3 and the approval accorded thereto by the Respondent No. 2 are both, according to Mr. This shows, according to Mr. Das, that there was absolutely no application of mind by the Respondent No. 3 and he acted mechanically and at the behest of the Respondent No. 2. Thus, the proposal given by the Respondent No. 3 and the approval accorded thereto by the Respondent No. 2 are both, according to Mr. B.D. Das, wholly without jurisdiction, void ab initio and may be set aside. Reliance, in support of his submissions, is placed by Mr. B.D. Das on Sarat Kumar Neog v. State of Assam, reported in 1991 (2) GUJ 128. 6. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 4, has submitted that in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Court considered Rule 2 of the said rules as it stood before its amendment made in 1986 without noticing the fact that Rule 2 already stood materially amended vide Notification No. MA 208/84/17, dated 18.3.1986. Hence, the law as laid down in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), can have, according to Mr. Choudhary, no application to the facts of the present case. It is also submitted by Mr. Choudhary that in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Court was not considering the question of extension of lease; rather, what the Court was considering was whether to give lease for a period of more than one year. This according to Mr. Choudhury, did not amount to consideration of extension of lease. Hence, the law laid down in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra) does not, reiterates Mr. Choudhury, apply to the facts of the case at hand. 7. Continuing with his submission, Mr. KN Choudhury has further submitted that when a Board/Town Committee under Section 299 is under supersession, the Officer, who is appointed to perform the duties of the Committee, must obtain prior approval of the Director of Municipal Administration even on such matters for which the Board/Town Committee is competent to take a decision. Hence, the Respondent No. 3 committed, contends Mr. Choudhury, no error of law in seeking approval to his proposal for grant of extension. 8. Mr. Choudhury has pointed out that in the case at hand, the Respondent No. 3, while sending his proposal to the Respondent No. 2 for extension of the lease, has assigned cogent reasons justifying his proposal for extension, the reasons, so assigned by him, are not, emphasizes Mr. 8. Mr. Choudhury has pointed out that in the case at hand, the Respondent No. 3, while sending his proposal to the Respondent No. 2 for extension of the lease, has assigned cogent reasons justifying his proposal for extension, the reasons, so assigned by him, are not, emphasizes Mr. Choudhury, challenged by the Petitioner. Coupled with this, the Respondent No. 3 has also, further points out Mr. Choudhury, indicated in his proposal the period for which the extension was sought to be given. What he had, concedes Mr. Choudhury, not decided was the quantum of rent, which was to be realized for the extended period of lease. This minor omission on the part of the Respondent No. 3 cannot be stretched to mean,, according to Mr. Choudhury, that the proposal given by the Respondent No. 3 for extension of the lease suffered from complete non-application of mind. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the Respondent No. 2, contends Mr. Choudhury, acted within the ambit of his jurisdiction in according approval to the proposal so made by the Respondent No. 3. 9. Mr. K.N. Choudhury has also pointed out that there is no bar for any authority, which issues an NTT to cancel the same and that such cancellation cannot be illegal unless the cancellation is arbitrary. In the case at hand, the cancellation of the NTT, contends Mr. Choudhury, is for valid reasons, i.e. on account of the decision taken to extend the lease. Mr. Choudhury has further pointed out that though the Petitioner has emphasized that the question of extension was considered by the Respondent No. 3 at the behest of Respondent No. 2, there is absolutely no material on record that it was at the behest or on the dictates of the Respondent No. 2 that the proposal for extension of lease was made by the Respondent No. 3; rater, what the materials on record reveal, according to Mr. Choudhury, is that an application seeking extension was made by the Respondent No. 4 to the Respondent No. 2, but since it was the Respondent No. 3, which was to first take a decision on the question of giving or not giving of extension of lease, the said application was merely sent by the Respondent No. 2 to the Respondent No. 3 for his views and upon applying his own mind, the Respondent No. 3 felt satisfied that the Respondent No. 4 deserved to be given extension of lease and, hence, appropriate proposal for this purpose was given by the Respondent No. 3 to the Respondent No. 2. Thus, none of the authorities concerned, contends Mr. Choudhury, can be said to have acted arbitrarily, mala fide or contrary to the law. Hence, this writ petition, according to Mr. Choudhury, has no merit and the same may be dismissed. 10. As far as Mr. D. Goswami, learned State counsel, is concerned, his submission is that the orders impugned in the writ petition are completely in conformity with the provisions of law and the same may be maintained. 11. Let me, now, determine the merit of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties. While considering the merit of the rival contentions, it is imperative to point out that under Section 334 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1956), the State government may notify any area in the State as Small Town. For enabling application of certain provisions of the Act of 1956, there shall, according to Section 335, be a Committee for each such small town to be called Town committee. When an area is notified as Small Town and Town Committee is constituted, some of the provisions of the Act of 1956 automatically, in terms of Section 336, apply to such notified areas. These provisions include Chapter VIII of the said Act, which embodies, inter alia, Section 298 and 299 thereof. 12. What is now, pertinent to note is that at the time, when the Respondent No .4 applied for extension of lease and the extension was granted, Gohpur Town Committee was, admittedly, under supersession in terms of Section 299 of the Act of 1956. 12. What is now, pertinent to note is that at the time, when the Respondent No .4 applied for extension of lease and the extension was granted, Gohpur Town Committee was, admittedly, under supersession in terms of Section 299 of the Act of 1956. According to Section 299(b) read with Section 336 of the Act of 1956, all powers and duties, which may be exercised and performed by a Municipal Board or a Town Committee under the Act, shall be exercised or performed by such person/persons as tile State Government may direct. Since the Gohpur Town Committee has been under supersession, this Town Committee would mean the Executive Officer appointed by the Government for exercising and performing the powers and duties of the said Committee. As far as the Rules for Procedure for the Sale of Pounds and Markets by Municipal Boards and Town Committees in Assam are concerned, these Rules are framed under Section 148 of the Act of 1956. Rule 2 as it stood before the amendment made vide Notification No. MA-208/84/17, dated 18.3.1986, and as had been considered in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra) reads as follows: The period of the lease for a pound or market shall be one year provided that the Board may, if it thinks fit, with the previous approval of the Director of Municipal Administration let a pound or market for a term not exceeding 3 (three) years. 13. The Rule, as it stands amended since 18.3.1986, reads, now as follows: The period of lease for a pound or market shall be one year; provided that the Board may, if it thinks fit, with previous approval of the Director of Municipal administration extend the period of lease for a total period of two years but not exceeding one year at a time. 14. 14. From a bare reading of Rule 2, both before and after the amendment, it becomes transparent that under Rule 2 (as the same stands after 18.3.1986) lease for a market shall be one year; provided that the Board may, if it thinks fit, with the previous approval of the Director of Municipal Administration, extend the period of lease for a total period of two years, but not exceeding one year at a time; whereas under the Rule 2 (as it stood before 18.3.1986) the period of lease of a market was to be for one year, but the Board could, if it thought fit, with the previous approval of the Director of Municipal Administration, let a market for a period not exceeding 3 (three) years. 15. From a close reading of Rule 2, as it stood before its amendment on 18.3.1986, it becomes clear that old Rule 2, as rightly contended by Mr. Choudhury, did not speak of extension, whereas the present Rule 2 does speak of extension. However, a careful reading of even old Rule 2 would show that if the initial period of lease was to be for one year, the Board itself could have granted the lease, but if the Board decided to give, initially itself, lease for a period of more than one year, it needed the approval of the Director of Municipal Administration. At the same time, old Rule 2 also perceived that there might be a case, where after granting a lease for one year, the Board decided to extend the period of lease by another period of two years or less, then, in such cases too, the approval of the Director was necessary. Thus, even old Rule 2 perceived extension of lease beyond the period of one year and laid down that such extaision required previous approval of the Director. It cannot, therefore, be said that the old Rule 2 did not envisage extension of lease at all. 16. Thus, correct it is, as contended by Mr. Choudhury, that the Division Bench in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra) had not taken into account the amended Rule 2, when it delivered the judgment. It is also correct, as contended by Mr. KN Choudhury, that the old Rule 2 did not speak of extension. The truth, however, remains that in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the lease initially granted was for a period of one year. It is also correct, as contended by Mr. KN Choudhury, that the old Rule 2 did not speak of extension. The truth, however, remains that in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the lease initially granted was for a period of one year. When the lessee made an application for extension of the said lease period of one year, the Board forwarded the said application to the Director of Municipal Administration with its recommendations and the Director of accordingly granted approval for extension. Thus, though the old Rule 2 did not speak of extension of lease, what the Division Bench really considered in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra) was a case involving extension of lease. 17. Though it is, no doubt, true that in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Division Bench of this Court had considered old Rule 2, and had not really dealt with Rule 2, as it stands since after 18.3.1986, yet the fact remains that even in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Court was considering the question of extension of lease and not really the question of merely letting out of the market at the initial stage of the lease. This is amply clear from the following observations made in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra): The Respondent 5 Shri Utpal Saikia was granted lease of the weekly market under Dhekiajuli Municipal Board for one year (1989-90) by the Board. Sri Saikia made an application to the Board for extension of the term of the lease for another one year (1990-91). The Board forwarded the application vide letter dated 27.1.90 (Annexure C to the petition) to the Director of Municipal Administration with recommendation. On receipt of the letter, the Director purporting to exercise his powers conferred on him under Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for the Sale of Pounds and Markets by Municipal Boards and Town Committees in Assam (for short "the Rules") made an order to the effect that the period of lease was extended for one year (1990-91) @ 5% above the last year's settlement value. The order was communicated by his letter-dated 1.1.1990 to the Board. Hence, the present writ petition. 18. Now, the question, which falls for consideration is this: Is there any difference between the powers of a Board or Town Committee, on the one hand, and an executive officer appointed in terms of Section 298 of the Act of 1956? The order was communicated by his letter-dated 1.1.1990 to the Board. Hence, the present writ petition. 18. Now, the question, which falls for consideration is this: Is there any difference between the powers of a Board or Town Committee, on the one hand, and an executive officer appointed in terms of Section 298 of the Act of 1956? My quest for an answer to this question brings me to Section 299(b) of the said Act. For the sake of convenience, Section 299(b) is reproduced herein below: 299 Consequence of dissolution. When an order of dissolution has been passed under Section 298, the following consequences shall ensue: (b) All powers and duties, which under this Act may be exercised and performed by the Board whether at a meeting or otherwise shall, during the period of dissolution be exercised and performed by such person as the State Government may direct till Commissioners and Chairman are elected: Provided that the officer so appointed after dissolution of the Board shall obtain prior approval of the Director of Municipal Administration on the matter on which but for the dissolution, the decision of the Board is necessary. 19. A careful reading of Clause (b) of Section 299 shows that all powers and duties, which are exercised and performed by the Board, shall, during the period of dissolution, be exercised and performed by such person as the State Government may direct. The proviso appended to Section299(b) makes it further clear that the officer, who is so appointed, shall obtain prior approval of the Director of Municipal Administration on such matters on which the Board could have decided on its own. Thus, not only on matters on which the Board needs previous approval of the Director, but even for the matters on which the Board could have acted on its own, prior approval of the director is essential if the board/Town Committee is under supersession. 20. Thus, not only on matters on which the Board needs previous approval of the Director, but even for the matters on which the Board could have acted on its own, prior approval of the director is essential if the board/Town Committee is under supersession. 20. Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 299(b) of the Act of 1956 and the amended Rule 2 of the said Rules shows that in respect of matters on which the Board could have taken a decision, such as, giving of lease for a period of even one year, appointed officer, when the Board is under supersession, can act only with the prior approval of the Director of Municipal administration, whereas a Board can grant lease for one year without seeking approval from the Director. 21. Coupled with the above, it is also of utmost importance to note that both the old as well as the new Rule 2 use the expression "with the previous approval of the Director of Municipal Administration". The question is as to what the expression "with the previous approval" signifies? This question has been considered and answered in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra) in the following words: The question which arises now is, - what the expression 'with the previous approval' signifies? The word 'approval' means an act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another, (see Black's Law Dictionary). Therefore, the expression 'with the previous approval' signifies that there must be an act or thing which is done by one and that act or thing done is to be consented or ratified of confirmed by another. Therefore, if the lease is to be made for a period more than one year, the Board shall decide at least the period and rent which would invite Director to say that the proposal to lease is approved. (Emphasis is supplied) 22. From what has been laid down in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), it becomes amply clear that if the period of lease is to be extended, then, a decision in this regard has to be taken, first, by the Board itself and, then, the question of giving approval to the proposal for extension made by the Board will arise. From what has been laid down in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), it becomes amply clear that if the period of lease is to be extended, then, a decision in this regard has to be taken, first, by the Board itself and, then, the question of giving approval to the proposal for extension made by the Board will arise. While forwarding proposal for approval to the Director, the Board must decide, at least, the period for which and the rate at which the extension, as sought for, should be granted. 23. In the case at hand, while giving proposal to the Respondent No. 2, the Respondent No. 3 has assigned reasons for extension and has also given the period for extension of lease: however, the Respondent No. 3 has left the rent to be fixed by the director (Respondent No. 2). In the light of the law laid down in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), such a proposal is not in conformity with Rule 2 and the approval there of given by the Respondent No. 2, indicating the rate of rent at which the proposal for extension was being approved, is without jurisdiction and must be set aside. 24. Having concluded that the impugned order of extension of lease contained in the letter, dated 25.2.2003, needs to be set aside, what is, now, of utmost importance to note is that in the case at hand, it is neither averred in the writ petition nor is there any material on record to show that the reasons assigned by the Respondent No. 3 for seeking to receive approval to his proposal for extension of lease were not justified. Far from this, the Respondent No. 3, on a scrutiny of the letter, dated 24.2.2003 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), is seen to have given elaborate reasons for coming to the decision that the lessee, namely, Respondent No. 4, deserved to be given extension. This apart, the correctness of the reasons so assigned have not been challenged before me even at the time of hearing. Thus, the proposal for extension can not be said to be wholly without application of mind. It is also clear from the facts, as depicted above, that the proposal for extension has been given for a period of one year from 1.4.2003 to 31.3.2004. Thus, the proposal for extension can not be said to be wholly without application of mind. It is also clear from the facts, as depicted above, that the proposal for extension has been given for a period of one year from 1.4.2003 to 31.3.2004. What, however, the Respondent No. 3 failed to decide, as indicated hereinbefore, was the rent at which the lease was to be extended. 25. In the above backdrop, I am, now, required to consider whether the Respondent No. 4 is, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, entitled to any relief and, if so, to what relief (s)? While considering this aspect of the matter, it is imperative to bear in mind that when a statutory authority is vested with the power of discretion under a Statute, exercise of such discretion or power cannot be arbitrary. Hence, when Rule 2 of the said Rules makes provisions for extension of lease, the authority concerned, namely, the Municipal Board/Town Committee/Executive Officer, as the case may be, cannot, while considering the representation/application for extension of lease made by a sitting lessee, act arbitrarily either for granting extension or for not granting the same. Similarly, when the Director of Municipal Administration considers the question of giving approval to a decision for extension taken by the authority concerned, the discretion to approve or not to approve the decision, in question, cannot be arbitrary dealt with. 26. Keeping in view the above aspects of the law, when I revert to the factual matrix of the present case, what emerges is that the lessee, i.e., Respondent No. 4 made an application/representation for extension to the Respondent No. 2 and on being sent the said application/representation by the Respondent No. 2, to the Respondent No. 3, the latter considered the application/representation. There is nothing on the record to show that the Respondent No. 2 had directed or dictated the Respondent No. 3 to take a decision in favour of the Respondent No. 4. There is nothing on the record to show that the Respondent No. 2 had directed or dictated the Respondent No. 3 to take a decision in favour of the Respondent No. 4. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that the Respondent No. 3 applied his independent mind to the application/representation for extension and, upon such application of mind, feeling satisfied, that the Respondent No. 4 deserved to be granted extension, the Respondent No. 3 sent a proposal to the respondent No. 3 for granting of extension with reasons assigned for the decision as to why the extension was to be granted. That there was adequate and justified reasons for grant of extension is not in dispute before me. While making the proposal, the Respondent No. 3 made it clear that the extension would be granted for one year, but the rate at which the rent was to be paid was not decided by the Respondent No. 3 and the same was left at the discretion of the Respondent No. 2. 27. What, thus, crystallizes from the above discussion is that so far as the Respondent No. 4 is concerned, he made out a good case for extension of lease, but the Respondent No. 3, while agreeing that the extension deserved to be granted, committed an error of law in not deciding as to what would be the rent at which the extension had to be granted. For this omission of the Respondent No. 3, should the Respondent No. 4, as a lessee, be made to suffer? The answer to this question has to be in the negative, for, if the answer is in the affirmative, it will amount to serious mis-carriage of justice and this Court sitting as a writ Court, cannot act so mechanically inasmuch as such a hyper-technical and pedantic approach by a writ Court, is neither desirable nor justified nor is it so indicated by the decision of the division Bench in Sarat Kxmiar Neog (supra). While setting aside the impugned order for extension in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Division Bench made no observations to the effect that the application for extension made by the sitting lessee shall not be considered a new. While setting aside the impugned order for extension in Sarat Kumar Neog (supra), the Division Bench made no observations to the effect that the application for extension made by the sitting lessee shall not be considered a new. When a sitting lessee makes out a good case for extension of lease, but the authority concerned while exercising the discretion, commits an error of law, it will not be in consonance with the principles of justice to make the lessee suffer for the error committed by the authorities concerned over whose action the lessee has no control, whatsoever. Such a course, to my mind, can not be adopted by a writ Court. 28. The fall-out of the above discussion is that the Respondent No. 4, in the present case, was, indubitably, deserved to be given extension. While, however, making the proposal for extension, the Respondent No. 3 committed the error of not deciding the rent subject to which the lease would be extended. What follows as a corollary is that while setting aside the impugned order of extension, the Respondent No. 3 needs to be given appropriate directions to take a decision with regard to the rent subject to which the lease shall be extended and, then, necessary proposal shall be forwarded to the Respondent No. 2 for approval, who, in turn, shall take a decision in the matter in accordance with law. 29. In the backdrop of the conclusions reached hereinbelow, let me, now, decide whether cancellation of the NTT by the Respondent No. 3 needs to be interfered with. In this regard, it is of utmost importance to note that a notice inviting tender is nothing, but an invitation to make offer. By making an offer, no concluded contract is formed. Hence, mere cancellation of the NTT cannot be interfered with by a writ Court unless such cancellation is mala fide, with ulterior motive or arbitrary. In the case at hand, the cancellation of the NIT was on account of extension granted to the sitting lessee. Since the reasons justifying such extension are not under challenge in the present writ petition, it follows that the grounds for extension of lease did exist in the present case. What the Respondent No. 3 failed to do was to decide for itself as to what would be the rent for the extended period. Since the reasons justifying such extension are not under challenge in the present writ petition, it follows that the grounds for extension of lease did exist in the present case. What the Respondent No. 3 failed to do was to decide for itself as to what would be the rent for the extended period. What this logically means is that while the approval contained in the letter, dated 25.2:2003 (Annexure-4), given by the Respondent No. 2 to the proposal for extension deserves to be set aside, the ends of justice demand that the Respondent No. 4 shall not suffer for an act or omission on the part of the Respondent No. 3 over which the Respondent No. 4 had no control and it will be, if I may reiterate, in the interest of justice to direct the Respondent No. 3 to decide for itself the rent subject to which the lease shall be extended in favour of Respondent No. 4 and if the proposal with the period and rent having been decided by Respondent No. 3 is given to the Respondent No. 2 and if the Respondent No. 2 approves the same, then, the order of extension shall accordingly follow. 30. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, this writ petition partly succeeds. The impugned approval, dated 25.2.2003, is hereby set aside and the Respondent No. 3, namely, Gohpur Town Committee, if the same is not under supersession, or the Executive Officer, if the said Town Committee is order supersession, shall consider the rate of rent subject to which the lease in favour of Respondent No. 4 shall be extended. Whatever rate of rent is so decided by the Gohpur Town Committee or its Executive Officer, as the case may be, shall be forwarded, in the form of proposal for extension, to the Respondent No. 2, who shall be at liberty to accord or not to accord approval thereto. The exercise of this discretion must not be arbitrary or injudicious. Whatever decision is reached by the Respondent No. 2 shall be communicated, in writing, to the Respondent No. 3. The whole exercise, so directed, shall be completed within a fortnight from today. The exercise of this discretion must not be arbitrary or injudicious. Whatever decision is reached by the Respondent No. 2 shall be communicated, in writing, to the Respondent No. 3. The whole exercise, so directed, shall be completed within a fortnight from today. If the Respondent No. 4 accepts the rent at which the lease is sought to be extended, arrear rent, if any, shall be cleared by the Respondent No. 4 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order of extension. If the rent fixed in the manner, as indicated hereinbefore, is less than what has been presently fixed, the excess amount payable to the Respondent No. 4 shall be adjusted against his future dues of rent within 31.3.2004. 31. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall stand disposed of 32. Considering, however, the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.