JUDGMENT B. Lamare, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. S. Dutta, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 2. The Respondents as Plaintiff instituted a Title Suit in the Court of Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur for declaration of title, recovery of possession and eviction over the land measuring 375 Bighas 2 Kathas and 11 Lechas and for compensation of Rs. 17,99,28,000/- from the Petitioners/Defendants. The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 2 of 2000. The Petitioners/Defendants filed their written statement and contested the suit. After hearing the parties, the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur decreed the suit as under: In the conclusion, after thorough discussion on the points raised above I pass the judgment and decree as follows: (a) The Title, rights and interest of the Plaintiff over the suit land appended in the schedule of the plaint; (b) A decree delivery of Khas (vacant) possession of the suit land after evicting the Defendants, their men and also by removing the fencing, the pillars and other structure therefrom the suit land. (c) A decree for payment of Rs. 17,99,28,000/- crores by the Defendant No. 7 to the Plaintiff, I, also award a sum of Rs. 5000/- being the cost of the suit in favour of the Plaintiff. The Defendant shall carry out this order within the time fixed by law. And no construction or any development work shall be carried out in the land of Plaintiff unless the land compensation matter is finalised. 3. After the judgment and decree was passed by the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, the Petitioners/Defendants preferred an appeal before the Deputy commissioner (Judicial) Dimapur. Alongwith the appeal the Petitioners have also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was registered as Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2003 and the petition under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 was registered as Civil Misc Case No. 1 of 2003. In the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay of 59 days was sought to be condoned by the Court. However, after hearing the parties by order dated 18.9.03 passed in the said Civil Misc. Case No. 1 of 2003 the learned Deputy Commissioner (J), Dimapur rejected the petition for condonation of delay filed by the Petitioner. Hence this petition. 4. However, after hearing the parties by order dated 18.9.03 passed in the said Civil Misc. Case No. 1 of 2003 the learned Deputy Commissioner (J), Dimapur rejected the petition for condonation of delay filed by the Petitioner. Hence this petition. 4. The grounds given by the Petitioners for the delay in filing the appeal was that although the judgment and decree was made on 20.2.2003 by the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner in the Title Suit No. 2 of 2003 the Petitioners came to know of the judgment only on 10.5.2003 when they received the letter from the senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel (Sr. CGSC) alongwith the copy of the judgment and decree. Immediately on receipt of the said letter from the Sr. CGSC urgent steps were taken by the Petitioners to take up the matter with the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and for obtaining the clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs the appeal petition alongwith the judgment and decree were sent to the higher authorities vide letter dated 15.7.03. The draft appeal was approved by the Director General of Assam Rifles by his letter dated 21.07.03 and the said letter was received by the Petitioner No. 3 on 23.7.03. Immediately on receipt of the said letter dated 23.7.03 from the Petitioner No. 3 the appeal petition was handed over to the learned Sr. CGSC to prefer an appeal and the appeal could be filed only on 5.8.03 alongwith the condonation petition. According to the Petitioners the delay was not on their part but they were not aware of the judgment and decree until they received the same alongwith the letter dated 10.5.2003 from the Sr. CGSC therefore the delay of 59 days was caused in filing the appeal. 5. Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners have taken immediate steps after receipt of the letter from the Sr. CGSC although there was some delay in obtaining clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs but the same was cleared immediately and soon after obtaining clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs the draft appeal was submitted to the Director General of Assam Rifles vide letter dated 15.7.2003 and the clearance was obtained by the Petitioner No. 3 on 23.7.2003 from the Director General of Assam Rifles. Thereafter, the matter was handed over to the Sr. Thereafter, the matter was handed over to the Sr. CGSC who took a few days to finalise the appeal petition and also to prepare the petition for condonation of delay and therefore the appeal and the condonation petition were filed on 5.8.03. The learned Counsel therefore contended that the period of delay after receipt of the judgment and letter from the Sr. CGSC was fully explained by the Petitioners in the petition for condonation of delay. Learned Counsel also contended that the Petitioners are not required to explain the period within the time for preferring the appeal. The Petitioners are to explain only the delay after the period of limitation is over. It is also contended that in the instant case, there were substantial question of law to be decided and huge area of land and compensation was involved. There were as many as 19 issues framed but the issues were not decided by the trial court, no documents were also considered by the trial court. Therefore, if the delay in preferring the appeal is not condoned, valuable rights of the Petitioners shall be deprived by the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur. 6. Mr. S. Dutta, learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the period of limitation is 30 days and the judgment and decree was passed on 20.2.03. Therefore, the period of appeal expired on 20.3.03. Learned counsel also submitted that the law of limitation applies equally to the individual as well as the Government. The Government cannot be given on different footing while considering the period of limitation. In the instant case, the blame put on the Sr. CGSC was not correct as it is the responsibility of the Petitioners to enquire with regard to the fate of the case before the trial court. The matter cannot be left purely to the learned Sr. CGSC. Even though the judgment and decree was passed on 20.2.03 the Petitioners did not care to inquire from the counsel and left the matter without being attended to till 10.5.03. This therefore shows that the Petitioners had no interest in pursuing with the case and in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Learned Counsel also contended that the Petitioners are bound to explain every day of delay after the period of limitation is over. This therefore shows that the Petitioners had no interest in pursuing with the case and in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Learned Counsel also contended that the Petitioners are bound to explain every day of delay after the period of limitation is over. In the instant case the Petitioners have failed to explain the delay so as to make sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 7. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Ors., Appellants V. Gobardhan Sao and Ors., Respondents reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 in paragraphs 9 and 12 of the judgment has held as follows: 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding much less in revisional jurisdiction unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the case shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But on thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be highly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. 8. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, Appellant V. Ramcharan (dead) by Lrs. and Ors., Respondents reported in (2002) 4 SCC 458 in paragraph 3 of the judgment has held as follows: 3. The contest before this Court has been more vehement than what is appears to have been before the High Court. It is true that sanctity attaches with the record of court proceedings. However, in the present case the question is not so much of casting a doubt on the record of proceedings maintained by the court as is on testing the bonafides of the counsel who filed his own affidavit in support of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The counsel and the Revenue Officer, who filed their affidavits, do not have any personal interest in the matter. The counsel and the Revenue Officer, who filed their affidavits, do not have any personal interest in the matter. The learned advocate appearing for the Municipal Corporation was not going to gain anything either by remaining absent at the time of hearing of the first appeal or by assigning a false cause for his non-appearance at the time of hearing. Valuable rights of the parties in an immovable property are involved. On the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have taken a liberal and not a rigid and too technical a view of the issue before it and should have condoned the delay in filing the appeal and concentrated on examining whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law worth being heard by the High Court. In our opinion, a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the High Court is made out. 9. As already held by the Apex Court in the case of the State of West Bengal, Appellant v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors. etc., Respondents reported in AIR 1972 SC 749 that it is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be available to the State. 10. The basis cause for the delay relied by the Petitioner is the letter dated 10.5.2003 from the Senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel. The said letter reads as follows: KETULHU MERUNO Opp Pilgrim School Sr. Central Govt. Standing Counsel Full Nagarjan Gauhati High Court Dimapur-797 112 Kohima Bench Phone 25442/25868 Ref.No. Date: 10.05.2003 To, The Commandant A.R.T.C. and School, Dimapur, Nagaland. The basis cause for the delay relied by the Petitioner is the letter dated 10.5.2003 from the Senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel. The said letter reads as follows: KETULHU MERUNO Opp Pilgrim School Sr. Central Govt. Standing Counsel Full Nagarjan Gauhati High Court Dimapur-797 112 Kohima Bench Phone 25442/25868 Ref.No. Date: 10.05.2003 To, The Commandant A.R.T.C. and School, Dimapur, Nagaland. Sub: Legal opinion in T.S. No. 2/2002 Sir, With regards to T.S. No. 2/2002 the judgment was pronounced on 20.2.03 and a certified True Copy of the same dated 3.3.03 was handed over to me in the last week of March, 2003 and I am enclosing the same to you with my legal opinion as under: Upon perusal of the said judgment it appears that the submissions made on behalf of the Defendants not any whisper of the documents in support of the Defendants has been reflected in the said judgment and as such in my considered opinion this is a fit case to prefer an appeal against the said judgment. Yours faithfully, KETULHU MERUNO Sr.C.G.S.C. Gauhati High Court Kohima Bench 11. A reading of the above letter will show that the judgment was pronounced on 20.2.2003 and a certified copy was ready on 3.3.03 but the same was received by the Sr. Central Govt. Standing Counsel in the last week of March, 2003. The learned Sr. CGSC did not collect the certified copy immediately which was ready on 3.3.03. He received the judgment only in the last week of March, 2003. Even then he did not forward the same immediately to the Petitioners for the whole month of April, 2003 and kept the same with him. He forwarded the same on 10.5.03 and on which date only the Petitioners came to know of the judgment. It is incumbent on the part of the Sr. CGSC to intimate the Petitioners as soon as the judgment was delivered and to keep them informed about the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment which was not done in the instant case. The judgment was intimated and conveyed to the Petitioners only on 10.5.03 with the opinion to prefer an appeal. On receipt of this letter of the Sr. CGSC and the copy of judgment the matter was taken up by the Petitioners with the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. The judgment was intimated and conveyed to the Petitioners only on 10.5.03 with the opinion to prefer an appeal. On receipt of this letter of the Sr. CGSC and the copy of judgment the matter was taken up by the Petitioners with the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. At the same time, the draft appeal was presented to the higher authorities on 15.7.03 after the clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs was obtained. The draft appeal was approved on 21.7.03 and the same was received by the Petitioners on 23.7.03. The draft appeal was immediately handed over to the Sr. CGSC for taking necessary steps to file the appeal and also to prepare the petition for condonation of delay of 59 days. Thereafter, the appeal was filed on 5.8.03. 12. In the instant case as can be seen from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner as quoted above there are high stakes and arguable points of law and facts involved and huge loss and irreparable injury would be caused to the party affected by the judgment and decree. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. (supra) in such a situation when the lis terminates either by default or inaction of the counsel which can defeat the valuable rights of such a party this Court is of the opinion that the learned Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Dimapur ought to have strike a balance before passing the impugned order. 13. Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel for the Respondents relied in the case of P.K. Ramachandran, Appellant V. State of Kerala and Anr., Respondents reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 which was also relied by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India and Ors., Petitioners V. Wood Craft Products Ltd. and Anr., Respondents reported in 2001 (1) GLT 34 and submitted that the Apex Court has held that the law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigours when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 14. 14. With due respect to the above decision referred by the learned counsel it may be observed that the words "sufficient cause" is not explained in Section 2 of the Limitation Act and the explanation with regard to the sufficient ground depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no hard and fast criteria to arrive as to whether sufficient cause has been explained. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the facts and circumstances in the case of R.K. Ramachandran (supra) it is not similarly situated as in the instant case. In that case the application for condonation of delay is for a period of 565 days and the ground given was that the office of the Advocate General was fed up with so many arbitration matters and as such the appeal could not be filed for that reason. The explanation shown in that case is not same as in the instant case. Needless to say that in the said case the delay was for a period of 565 days but in this case it is only a delay of 59 days. 15. From the explanation given by the Petitioners that they were aware of the judgment and decree only on 10.5.03 from the letter of the Sr. CGSC as quoted above it is clear that the delay was due to the inaction on the part of the Sr. CGSC in intimating the Petitioners about the judgment and decree. The delay is therefore not by the action of the Petitioners but of the counsel and in my opinion the delay in filing the appeal have been sufficiently explained by the Petitioners. 16. It may further be observed that in the instant case high stakes are involved and also important question of law and facts are to be decided. The judgment and decree involved huge area of land and also huge compensation therefore, liberal view is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay specially when the subject matter of the judgment and decree shall have huge impact on the party affected by the judgment and decree. By taking a strict view of the technicalities laid down in the law of limitation an injustice would be caused to the party affect by the judgment and decree. 17. By taking a strict view of the technicalities laid down in the law of limitation an injustice would be caused to the party affect by the judgment and decree. 17. Considering all the facts and circumstances as discussed above, I am of the opinion that the Petitioners have made sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. The appeal is remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Dimapur who shall admit the appeal and proceed to decide the same on merits in accordance with law. This petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of. Petition allowed