AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) THE important question is that the company, M/s. Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. , having gone to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter called as "the BIFR") can implement the award of the learned judge, 4th Industrial Tribunal, dated November 1, 2000, followed by the notification of the State of West Bengal, Labour Department, on July 31, 2001, or not. It is significant to note that this writ petition was filed on April 2, 2003. ( 2 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that the case after being registered with the BIFR proceeded accordingly. A prima facie view was taken by the BIFR that the unit is not viable and the company would have to be wound up. Notice was also directed to be served upon the company to show cause as to why the winding up order should not be approved. However, an appeal was preferred from such order to the Appellate Authority, i. e. , the AAIFR and the appeal was disposed of upon sanctioning a scheme of revival or rehabilitation in favour of the petitioner-company. Various modes were introduced thereunder for the purpose of payment to workers. Leave was also granted by saying that there is no bar to the mutual settlement between the workers and the management. The sanctioned scheme was sent to the BIFR for monitoring the same with the assistance of the IIBI as the monitoring agency. The BIFR is free to exercise its powers. The direction for advertisement was set aside. Now by moving this writ petition the company wants to establish that no effect of the award or publication of the award can be given when the matter is pending before the BIFR. ( 3 ) THE records regarding the case initiated at the First Labour Court, West Bengal, Calcutta, for execution of the award be transmitted to this court for final disposal in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case. Save and except giving information to the Tribunal at the time of delivering the judgment that the company had been declared a sick industrial company and there cannot be any order of reinstatement, no materials on record had been shown to the Tribunal about the hardship of the management of the company in giving reinstatement to the workman in the service. However, in considering such circumstances the Tribunal held that a lenient view should be taken in the matter of payment of back-wages. Therefore, the order of dismissal was set aside and the company was directed to reinstate the workman with immediate effect and to pay him 50 per cent. wages right from the date of dismissal down to the date of reinstatement of other employees working therein who are getting their wages monthwise. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to me, a proceeding before the BIFR is to be proceeded under the relevant provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (commonly known as "the SICA" ). From there, I find that right from the registration of a proceeding before such Board various stages are there for the purpose of coming to an appropriate conclusion about the viability of the industry. Under Section 22 therein, a provision has been laid down for the purpose of suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. All stages are given herein, i. e. , (a) state of enquiry under Section 16 ; (b) preparation and consideration of scheme referred to under Section 17; or (c) implementation of the sanctioned scheme or appeal under Section 25, etc. No step will be taken for the purpose of implementation of order, decree, etc. , passed by the court/tribunal even to the extent of execution which appeared to be coercive in nature. In Sub-section (3) therein, a very interesting proviso has been incorporated which should not be overlooked by the court. There it has been prescribed that during the period of consideration of any scheme under Section 18 or where any such scheme is sanctioned thereunder for the implementation of the scheme any settlement, award, etc. , shall be suspended or be enforceable with the leave of the BIFR or in such manner as may be specified by the Board. The important proviso thereunder is as follows :"provided that such declaration shall not be made for a period exceeding two years which may be extended by one year at a time so, however, that the total period shall not exceed seven years in the aggregate. " ( 5 ) THEREFORE, such declaration as above under the section shall remain suspended for a maximum period of seven years. This is the legislative intention. " ( 5 ) THEREFORE, such declaration as above under the section shall remain suspended for a maximum period of seven years. This is the legislative intention. Otherwise it would be absolutely wrong in thinking that the statutory liability as well as the liability of the workman will remain suspended for an indefinite period. In the instant case, I find the proceeding before the Tribunal was initiated in 1994 in spite of the fact that the case before the BIFR was registered in 1987. However, by an order dated April 27, 1995, the proceeding before the Tribunal was suspended pursuant to enquiry about the company under Section 16 of the SICA. In any event, now the award was passed on November 7, 2000, which was published on July 31, 2001. It is now well-settled that there cannot be any embargo in proceeding with the matter but a coercive action may not be taken during the pendency of the matter before the BIFR (see In the matter of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. [1997] 2 CHN 148 ). Hence, the Tribunal cannot be precluded from taking up the matter. However, the Tribunal delivered a judgment and passed an award on the aforesaid date and accordingly the same was published. Award was passed on November 7, 2000, when the proceeding before the BIFR has been initiated in the year 1987. Therefore, the same was passed after expiry of the period of thirteen years of initiation of the proceeding before the BIFR. That apart, the publication of such award was made even thereafter on July 31, 2001. Sub-section (3) of Section 22 is not limited to the sanction of a scheme but also applicable during the period of consideration of any scheme. Therefore, can it be said that by filing an application before the BIFR one can sleep over the matter and take the plea that as the scheme has not yet been finalised, therefore, no effect will be given of such order ? I am sorry to say that this is not the proper import. The proper import is that consideration of the scheme means an order is passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 17 which includes the period of making inquiry under Section 16 and satisfaction of the Board to the extent that the company has become a sick industrial company. I am sorry to say that this is not the proper import. The proper import is that consideration of the scheme means an order is passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 17 which includes the period of making inquiry under Section 16 and satisfaction of the Board to the extent that the company has become a sick industrial company. In other words, Section 18 being comprehensive includes proceedings under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Inquiry must be treated to be commenced as soon as registration of the reference is completed after scrutiny and that from that time, action against the company's assets must remain stayed as stated in Section 22 till final decisions are taken by the BIFR as per the ratio of Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank. A similar ratio is also followed by the Supreme court in Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. Therefore, the period of seven years cannot be said to be fixed only when the case is ripped up to the stage of consideration of the scheme under Section 18. It will be absurd to think that in spite of having a formal approval for taking up the matter by the BIFR one should sleep over the matter and wait for consideration of the scheme being forgetful about statutory liabilities or wages of the workmen, etc. , indefinitely. Such submission is totally contrary to fundamental right and the principles of natural justice. ( 6 ) THE other part of consideration is that the AAIFR before referring back the matter to the BIFR granted leave for mutual settlement between workers and management. Therefore, when a preexisting industrial dispute was there before the Tribunal due to failure of settlement and the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion of exclusion of 50 per cent, of back-wages along with reinstatement, can it not be said that the same is some sort of settlement with the intervention of the court. Therefore, when a preexisting industrial dispute was there before the Tribunal due to failure of settlement and the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion of exclusion of 50 per cent, of back-wages along with reinstatement, can it not be said that the same is some sort of settlement with the intervention of the court. The relevant part of Section 22 (1) of the Act is set out hereunder :"no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board, or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. " ( 7 ) THE further part is that if I take any conservative look on the basis of the judgment reported in Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [2002] 4 CHN 708, it will be seen that recovery of back-wages held to be the recovery of money. Irrespective of application under Section 22 of the Act, as discussed above, there cannot be any embargo in reinstating the petitioner in the work of the company. Even under such judgment payment of current amount was not debarred. Therefore, there cannot be any embargo for reinstatement and payment of current dues. So far as 50 per cent, of the arrear salary is concerned, the same being outcome of settlement with the intervention of the court in the form of an award there cannot also be any embargo either factually or legally to stop paying the same on the basis of the aforesaid observation of this court. Thus, I do not find any reason to allow this writ petition. The writ petition stands dismissed. However, no order is passed as to costs