K. A. PUJ, J. ( 1 ) THE present group of petitions are filed by the State of Gujarat, through its Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, Surat, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing and setting aside the order dtd. 29. 02. 1996 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in 89 Revision Applications being TEN B. S. 229/93 to 261/93, 317/93 to 345/93, 66/94, 114/94, 249/94 to 263/94, 275/94, 131/95, 132/95 and 151/95 to 157/95, whereby the Tribunal has allowed all the aforesaid 89 Revision Applications filed by the present respondent No. 1 i. e. Shri Sachin Udyognagar Sahkari Mandali Ltd. , Surat, quashing and setting aside the orders of Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, Surat and Deputy Collector (L. R.), Surat. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 Society was formed for the exclusive object and purpose of setting up an industrial township in the area covering the villages Sachin, Vanz, Lapore, Popada and Bhatia in Choryasi Taluka of Surat District. At the relevant point of time, the areas which the said Society sought to develop as an industrial area was in the agricultural zone and the entire lands in the said area were agricultural lands. It is the say of the petitioner that without complying with certain relevant and important statutory requirements as laid down in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the "tenancy Act"), it was not permissible for the said Society to purchase the agricultural land in the said areas from the agriculturists. It is further stated that despite this fact, the said Society upon its registration and enrolling 1700 members for allotment of proposed industrial sheds, started purchasing a huge area of agricultural lands during the period from 1980 to 1984 and started getting the possession of such lands under the Agreements for sale. The said Society has also spent about Rs. 19,96,200/= towards the registration of the sale documents. It is further stated that neither the vendors of the said agricultural lands nor the respondent No. 1 purchaser Society had sought any prior permission from the state authorities with regard to the said purchases. At the time when such purchases were made by the respondent Society, the area covering the said agricultural lands was not notified as "industrial Zone. It is further stated that neither the vendors of the said agricultural lands nor the respondent No. 1 purchaser Society had sought any prior permission from the state authorities with regard to the said purchases. At the time when such purchases were made by the respondent Society, the area covering the said agricultural lands was not notified as "industrial Zone. " ( 3 ) IT is further stated that in the year 1985, Additional Mamlatdar and ALT (Ceiling), Choryasi, had initiated suo motu inquiry under Section 84c of the Tenancy Act by issuing notices to the respective vendors of different parcels of land and also to the respondent No. 1 society for the purpose of holding an inquiry into the legality vis-a-vis Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, of the various sales, executed / effected by the vendors in favour of the said Society and also for the purpose of holding inquiry as to whether there was any breach of Section 2 (6) of the Tenancy Act. In the said proceedings, the respondent No. 1 filed its written reply and contended that in view of the provisions contained in Section 64a of the Tenancy Act, the sales were lawful and in order and that there was no breach of Section 2 (6) of the Tenancy Act and requested for withdrawal of the notices issued to the Society. However, the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT vide his orders passed on different dates had held that there was a breach of the Provisions of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act and as the parties were not agreeable for the restoration of the lands to the position obtained immediately before the sales in question, the lands in question were ordered to be forfeited to the State Government. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the said orders of the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT, the respondent No. 1 Society and other respective vendors have preferred separate Tenancy Appeals before the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, Surat / Deputy Collector (L. R.) Surat. All these appeals were dismissed and the orders passed by the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT were confirmed by the Appellate Authorities. All these appeals were dismissed and the orders passed by the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT were confirmed by the Appellate Authorities. ( 5 ) BEING further aggrieved by the said orders of the appellate authorities, the respondent No. 1 Society had filed in all 89 Revision Applications before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act and the Tribunal, vide its common judgment and order dtd. 29. 02. 1996 have allowed all these Revision Applications and quashed and set aside the orders passed by the appellate authorities. ( 6 ) IT is this common order and judgment of the Tribunal which is under challenge in all these 89 petitions. ( 7 ) MR. A. D. Oza, learned Government Pleader appearing for the petitioner in all these 89 petitions, before he addresses the Court on merits of the matter, was asked to explain as to why there is gross delay of more than seven years in preferring all these 89 petitions before this Court. In reply to this, he has drawn the attention of the Court to para 7 of the petition. It has been admitted by him that there is considerable delay in filing the present petitions. However, the said delay was neither deliberate nor intentional. It is further stated that the impugned order and judgment of the Tribunal came to be received by the office of the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, Surat on 14. 03. 1996 and thereafter it was sent to the office of the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT on 10. 04. 1996 for necessary action. It was further stated that the Collector vide his letter dtd. 16. 12. 1996 advised the Deputy Collector to take appropriate action for challenging the impugned judgment and order and for that purpose, the case papers were sent to the office of the Additional Mamlatdar and ALT on 22. 04. 1997 for further follow up action. It is further stated that due to the unforeseen heavy work load in the office of the Addl. 04. 1997 for further follow up action. It is further stated that due to the unforeseen heavy work load in the office of the Addl. Mamlatdar and ALT as also in the office of the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, in the wake of extraordinary events like floods, heavy rains, elections to the State Assembly and the Lok Sabha resulting in the drafting of the majority of work force to these unavoidable tasks, necessary actions could not be taken by the concerned authorities during the period from March 1997 to August 2001, for challenging the impugned judgment and order before this Court. It is further stated that in September 2001, by letter dtd. 13. 09. 2001, the matter was taken up with the Revenue Department, which in turn vide its letter dtd. 24. 09. 2001, advised the local authorities to expedite the filing of an appropriate writ petition before this Court and accordingly, the legal department, vide its letter dtd. 07. 09. 2002 addressed a letter to the Government Pleaders Office attached to this Court and the Govt. Pleaders Office vide its letter dtd. 13. 09. 2002 advised the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Gandhinagar to arrange to send all the concerned papers and documents for necessary action in the matter. It is further stated that the office of the District Collector, Surat by its letter dtd. 19. 10. 2002 addressed a letter to the Govt. Pleaders Office instructing the office to draft an appropriate writ petition to be filed before this Court and it was only in the Month of May, 2003 that the Govt. Pleaders Office came to be supplied with some of the background papers. However, due to the summer vacation and AGPs remaining away from head quarters, necessary action for drafting all the writ petitions could not be taken up on hand till 16. 06. 2003. It is further stated that on reopening of the Court, the papers as supplied to the Govt. Pleaders Office were perused by the concerned AGPs and it was found that the important / crucial documents such as the orders passed by the authorities below, the Revision Applications filed by the respondent No. 1 and others as also the written statements, if any, filed by the State of Gujarat before the Tribunal have not been supplied. Pleaders Office were perused by the concerned AGPs and it was found that the important / crucial documents such as the orders passed by the authorities below, the Revision Applications filed by the respondent No. 1 and others as also the written statements, if any, filed by the State of Gujarat before the Tribunal have not been supplied. Hence, on being informed by the concerned AGP, the office of the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, immediately made an application to the Tribunal on 09. 07. 2003 requesting for issuance of the copy of the said documents to facilitate the drafting of the writ petitions. Upon receipt of the copies of the said documents from the Tribunal in the second week of July 2003, the Office of the Deputy Collector, Choryasi Prant, Ahmedabad had forwarded the same to the concerned AGP in the 3rd week of July, 2003 and thereafter, the draft petition as prepared by the concerned AGP came to be received by the Office of the Deputy Collector in the 2nd week of August 2003 and after necessary vetting and approval, the finally drafted writ petitions were got engrossed and affirmed and the same are filed in the registry on 25. 08. 2003. ( 8 ) IN the above background of the matter, Mr. A. D. Oza has submitted that the delay involved in filing all these petitions deserves to be condoned in public interest as otherwise the public exchequer would be deprived of its legitimate entitlement to receive from the respondent No. 1 / original owner, a huge amount of Rs. 1,80,07,520. 30 as per prevalent Jantri, towards premium in respect of new tenure lands which the respondent No. 1 Society has purchased from the agriculturist in gross violation of the statutory provisions of the Tenancy Act. ( 9 ) AS far as the merits of the matters are concerned, Mr. Oza has submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is contrary to law and patently illegal and null and void as the Tribunal has not taken into consideration the premium payable by the seller / transferor to the State Govt. as Section 43 of the Tenancy Act makes it abundantly clear that new tenure lands cannot be alienated without prior permission of the Collector. Mr. as Section 43 of the Tenancy Act makes it abundantly clear that new tenure lands cannot be alienated without prior permission of the Collector. Mr. Oza has further submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error by accepting the submissions made on behalf of the respondent Society with regard to applicability of Section 64 A of the repealed Bombay Co. op. Society Act. The said Section is not applicable at all for two reasons, namely, the said Act has been repealed by Gujarat Co. op. Societies Act and there is no provision similar to Section 64a in the new Act. Since the respondent No. 1 is registered under the new Act, it cannot take shelter or claim exemption under the old repealed Act. Evenif the respondent No. 1 Society is eligible for such alleged exemption, Section 64 A of the old Act does not in any manner exempt the respondent No. 1 from payment of premium or seeking permission for sale, transfer etc. under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act. Mr. Oza has further submitted that the Tribunal has committed serious error of law in holding that 84c inquiry initiated by the Addl. Mamlatdar and ALT is vitiated by delay. He has further submitted that there was no delay in initiating 84c inquiry by the competent authority. He has further submitted that in S. C. A. No. 2770 of 1979, this Court has rightly held that what is reasonable time for exercise of power is a question of fact and 84c inquiry should not be equated with the "revisional power" of the revenue authorities. ( 10 ) MR. Oza has further submitted that the Tribunal has committed a grave error of law in holding that the Notification dtd. 14. 11. 1991 issued by the State Government under Section 88 (1) (b) of the Tenancy Act is retrospective in nature. As a matter of fact, the said Notification dtd. 14. 11. 1991 is prospective in its application and further submitted that all lands in question were purchased much before the issuance of the aforesaid notification. ( 11 ) AS far as delay in filing the present group of petitions is concerned, Mr. Oza has submitted that such delay is required to be condoned in view of the binding decision of this Court as well as the decision of the Honble Supreme Court. Mr. ( 11 ) AS far as delay in filing the present group of petitions is concerned, Mr. Oza has submitted that such delay is required to be condoned in view of the binding decision of this Court as well as the decision of the Honble Supreme Court. Mr. Oza has relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER V/s. N. K. JADHAV AND OTHERS, 2000 (4) G. L. R. 3577 wherein after relying on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA V/s. CHANDRA MANI, A. I. R. 1996 S. C. 1623, BALAKRISHNAN V/s. M. KRISHNAMURTHY, JT 1998 (6) S. C. 242, this Court has held that in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the delay therefore was condoned accordingly. ( 12 ) IN the case of STATE OF HARYANA V/s. CHANDRA MANI, A. I. R. 1996 S. C. 1623, the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :-"when the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to approve. The Honble Supreme Court has further observed that it was axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time, causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. " ( 13 ) IN the case of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH V/s. HARISH CHANDRA, A. I. R. 1996 S. C. 2173, the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :-"it is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking for condonation of delay is duty-bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by this Court in several cases, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit, the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. " ( 14 ) IN the case of STATE OF BIHAR V/s. SUBHASH SINGH, A. I. R. 1997 S. C. 1390, the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :-"it is known fact that in transaction of the Government business, none would own personal responsibility and decisions are leisurely taken at various levels. It is not uncommon that delay would be deliberately caused in filing appeal or revision by Government to confer advantage to the opposite litigant; more so when stakes involved are high or persons are well connected/influential or due to obvious considerations. The Courts, therefore, do not adopt strict standard of proof of every days delay. " ( 15 ) IN the case of BALKRISHNAN V/s. M. KRISHNAMURTHY, JT 1998 (6) S. C. 242, the Honble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles laid down in earlier cases and held as under :-"it is no doubt true that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court, but Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed so as to advance the cause of justice. The said Section does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. In the opinion of the Court, length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. " The Honble Supreme Court has further observed that "rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. That the words "sufficient cause" under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. " ( 16 ) MR. Oza has further relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER V/s. LILAVATIBEN KODAR RANCHHOD and ORS. That the words "sufficient cause" under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. " ( 16 ) MR. Oza has further relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER V/s. LILAVATIBEN KODAR RANCHHOD and ORS. , 2002 (3) G. L. R. 1874 wherein this Court has held as under :-"obviously, willful indifferent person cannot be helped by the Court of law when he seeks the justice for condonation of delay. Nevertheless, if the record discloses that the parties in a given case, though delay has occasioned, had not abandoned animus to question the impugned order, decision or judgment, is an important factor which should be taken into consideration for determining the genuineness and sufficiency of the ground for condonation of delay. " The Court has further observed that "apart from the ultimate anxiety of the Court while dealing with an application of condonation of delay has been, to see that ordinarily no meritorious matter is thrown overboard on the technical grounds of delay. The purpose and design incorporating the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is to see that ordinarily a substantial justice is required to be given and ordinarily, unless there are circumstances running counter to the spirit of the provision of Sec. 5, the meritorious matters are required to be dealt with and adjudicated upon on merits. It is rightly said that no party or person would stand benefited by filing appeal or application late without any reason ordinarily when he has made up his mind to challenge the impugned order, award, judgment or decision, as the case may be. There cannot be such presumption also. This proposition of law is also very well settled since long. Therefore, while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, one cannot start with presumption that party did not intend to question it. On the contrary, the presumption may be other way round. " This Court has also taken note of the fact that the State should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its Officers and in that particular circumstances, there were sufficient grounds justifying the condonation of delay in filing Appeals. It was a matter of discretion of the High Court and it cannot be said that such discretion was improperly exercised. It was a matter of discretion of the High Court and it cannot be said that such discretion was improperly exercised. " ( 17 ) MR. Oza has further relied on the decision of this Court rendered in C. A. No. 7393 of 2000 in LPA St. No. 96 of 2000 and other cognate matters on 31. 08. 2001 (Coram :- M. R. CALLA, J.) once again discussing the entire case law on condonation of delay. It has been held that "it is a case in which the officers of the Government Pleader and the concerned Assistant Government Pleaders did not pay any heed to the constant reminders and approaches made by the Revenue Department as well as the competent authorities and in such matters, when the public interest suffers and large number of cases are going to be affected to the utter prejudice of the public interest, the delay of 54 days in filing these Letters Patent Appeals can not come in the way of a party desirous of obtaining the decision on merits. " The delay was therefore condoned in the said matters. ( 18 ) MR. Oza has lastly relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. V/s. RAMESHCHANDRA JOSHI, 2002 (3) G. L. R. 2332 wherein this Court has held as under :-"even being conscious about the fact that the delay occurred in this case is 5 years and 39 days. This application could not have been entertained if it was for a different cause, but having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and keeping in mind the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag V/s. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 S. C. 1353, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case where the delay should be condoned, because by condoning delay the applicants do not stand to benefit and refusing to condone the delay is likely to result a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, whereby cause of justice is likely to be defeated. By condoning delay the highest that can happen is that the case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. " ( 19 ) AS far as the merits of the matters are concerned, Mr. By condoning delay the highest that can happen is that the case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. " ( 19 ) AS far as the merits of the matters are concerned, Mr. Oza has submitted that the reliance placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of MOHANLAL CHUNILAL KOTHARI V/s. TRIBHOVEN HARIBHAI TAMBOLI, A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 358 is uncalled for, as in that case, the notification in question was under Section 88 (1) (d) and not under Section 88 (1) (b) as in the present case. He has further submitted that the notification dtd. 14. 11. 1991 issued under Section 88 (1) (b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 is perspective in its application as all the lands in question were purchased much before the issuance of the said notification. By virtue of the said notification, the villages specified therein and the Survey Nos. mentioned in the said notification are reserved for non-agriculture and industrial development. In this connection, he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of SMT. RATNAPRABHABAI V/s. M/s. TULSIDAS V. PATEL and ORS. , 1982 (23) 2 G. L. R. 213 wherein this Court at length discussed the effect of the notification issued under Section 88 (1) (b) as amended by Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 36 of 1965. It is held therein which is as under :-"first proviso to Section 88 (1) (b) providing that no transaction in respect to land subsequently brought within municipal limits would be subject to Provisions of Sections 1 to 87 of the Tenancy Act. Second Proviso providing that if any transaction has taken place between two terminal dates of notification, such transaction will remain effective. Second Proviso applicable only if at the time when transaction takes place the concerned lands were included in the added area of Municipal limits. The Court has further held that the scope of such Provision will have to be ascertained by adopting rule of strict construction and the Court should accept that construction which advances main purpose of legislation. Second Proviso applicable only if at the time when transaction takes place the concerned lands were included in the added area of Municipal limits. The Court has further held that the scope of such Provision will have to be ascertained by adopting rule of strict construction and the Court should accept that construction which advances main purpose of legislation. It was also held that the lands at the time of transaction were not within the added Municipal limits question of exemption from Provisions of Tenancy Act would not arise and second Proviso to Section 88 (1) (b) would be out of picture in such cases as it is not meant to cover such transactions. The Court has further held that it cannot be gainsaid that the Tenancy Act has a piece of beneficial legislation meant for protection of the rights of tenants and cultivators of agricultural lands. Any statutory Provision which seeks to carve out an exception to the operation of this beneficial provision will have to be construed strictly. The first Proviso to Section 88 (1) (b) is a beneficial Provision for confirming the applicability of Tenancy Act to such agricultural lands subsequently brought within the Municipal limits and it takes to protect the tenancy rights of the tenant of such lands. The second Proviso to Section 88 (1) (b) however seeks to curtail the operation of the aforesaid beneficial provision and seeks to carve out an area of its own wherein beneficial Provision of Sections 1 to 87 of the Act would get excluded qua the transactions pertaining to concerned agricultural lands as contemplated by the second Proviso. " ( 20 ) MR. Oza has further relied on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of NAVINCHANDRA RAMANLAL V/s. KALIDAS BHUDARBHAI AND ANOTHER, A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1055 wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held as under :-"sections 43 and 88 (1) (b) of the Tenancy Act of 1948 were amended by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965, (Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 ). Both these amendments to the Principal Act came into force from 29th December 1965. However, looking to the language of the amendments both the amendments were retrospective from 1st August 1956, i. e. from the date Bombay Act 13 of 1956 came into force. Both these amendments to the Principal Act came into force from 29th December 1965. However, looking to the language of the amendments both the amendments were retrospective from 1st August 1956, i. e. from the date Bombay Act 13 of 1956 came into force. In other words, amended Section 43c and Section 88 (1) (b) with its proviso had to be read as if they were introduced in that very form from 1st August 1956. Indisputably, Survey No. 165, the land involved in this case, being situated within the revenue limits of Acher Village, was included in the area of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation from 30th May 1959. Therefore, on 1st August 1956 when the amended Sections 43c and 88 (1) (b) with its proviso as amended by Act 36 of 1965 came into force, the land being not in Municipal Corporation area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the Notification issued on 9th August, 1956, superseded by the subsequent Notification dated 14th February, 1957 in exercise of the power conferred by Section 88 (1) (b ). In no case the additional area which was included within the Municipal Corporation area after 1st August 1956 would enjoy the exemption granted by the Notification unless a fresh Notification was issued. As the land bearing Survey No. 165 did not enjoy the benefit of exemption under Section 88 (1) (b) and it was agricultural land in respect of which the respondent was tenant on the tillers day, the respondent, had, by operation of law, become the owner and was a deemed purchaser under Section 32 as amended by Act 13 of 1956. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal would have to proceed with the enquiry to determine the price as required by Section 32c. " .