JAYANTA KUMAR BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent appeal is against a judgment and order dated December 10, 1999 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court on a writ petition, being Civil Order No. 19764 (W) of 1995; it was filed by the respondent No. 1 herein. The appellants were respondent Nos. 3 and 6 in the said writ petition. ( 2 ) THE relevant portion of the impugned order, passed by the learned single Judge, reads as under:"in view of the discussions made hereinabove I declare the findings of the enquiry officer and the order of dismissal as null and void and I set aside and quash both the findings of the enquiry officer and the order of dismissal dismissing the writ petitioner from the service. The writ petitioner is entitled to his back wages from the date of his dismissal till he is allowed to resume his duty or until he retires from the service whichever is earlier. I direct the respondents to pay the writ petitioner his salaries from the date of dismissal till he is allowed to resume his duty or until he retires from the service whichever is earlier within six weeks from date of communication of this order. I also direct the respondents to pay the petitioner Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) as cost of this litigation. Such cost should be paid within six weeks from the date of communication of the gist of this judgment and order. " ( 3 ) ON March 7, 2000 the following interim order was passed in this appeal:"after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the materials on record we direct that the operation of the order dated December 10, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge shall remain stayed to the extent that the petitioner respondent No. 1 will not be entitled to any arrears of salary from September 5, 1994 till he had attained the age of superannuation. However, the appellant shall release all other terminal benefits, including salary if there is any due to the petitioner/respondent, within four weeks from date. However, the appellant shall release all other terminal benefits, including salary if there is any due to the petitioner/respondent, within four weeks from date. " ( 4 ) WHILE working as Pump Operator at Sarpi Unit of Shyamsundarpur Colliery of the Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd.- a Government of India Public Sector Undertaking), a chargesheet dated July 22/28, 1994 was issued against the respondent No. 1 by his employer. The contents of the said chargesheet were as follows: from the records it is evident that you are in the habit of remaining absent without leave or permission from the Competent Authority. The following chargesheets and warning letters were issued to you for unauthorized absence:1. Ref. No. Shyam/pd/cs/90/641 dated February 09, 1990. Absent from December 14, 1989 to February 09, 1990 against suspended for 10 (ten) days from March 03, 1990 to March 12, 1990. 2. Ref. No. Shyam/w. L/pd/91/02 dated January 01, 1992. Absent from October 21, 1991 to December 31, 1991 against a warning. 3. Ref. Np. Shyam/pd/cs/92/1759 dated May 15, 1992. Absent from March 06, 1992 to May 15, 1992 against 3 (three) days suspension were issued from May 15, 1992 to May 17, 1992 4. Ref. No. Shyam W. L. /pd/92/3991 dated November 14, 1992. Absent from August 10, 1992 to November 14, 1992 against a warning letter issued. ( 5 ) REF. NO. SHYAM/pd/wl/94/689 dated February 28, 1994. Absent from February 03, 1994 to February 26, 1994 against a warning letter issued. Again you are absenting from April 21, 1994 to till now. Your above act amounts to misconduct on your part as per the Standing Orders of the Company applicable to you under Sections 17 (1) (d) and 17 (1) (n), which reads (sic) as follows:17 (1) (d): "habitual late attendance and habitual absence without leave and permission or without satisfactory cause. "17 (1) (n); "continuous absence without permission and without satisfactory cause for more than ten days. "you are, hereby, asked to explain in writing within 48 hours of the receipt of this chargesheet as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you, for your above misconduct. "5. "17 (1) (n); "continuous absence without permission and without satisfactory cause for more than ten days. "you are, hereby, asked to explain in writing within 48 hours of the receipt of this chargesheet as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you, for your above misconduct. "5. In his reply dated July 29, 1994 the respondent No. 1 stated that he had remained absent from duty during the periods in question due to illness which was supported by medical reports; and that at times he had failed to inform the authorities, because he was not in a position to inform. Being dissatisfied with the reply to the chargesheet, the disciplinary authority decided to hold an enquiry and accordingly appointed an enquiry officer. The respondent No. 1 participated in the enquiry along with his defence helper. The enquiry was held on August 9, 1994. ( 6 ) THE only witness examined on behalf of the management exhibited in the enquiry the relevant office records to show that on five occasions during the period from December 14, 1989 to February 26, 1994, and again, for the sixth time, from April 21, 1994 till July 28, 1994, the respondent No. 1 had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty. The respondent No. 1 declined to cross-examine the management witness. On the other hand, in defence the respondent No. 1 examined himself. In his deposition he stated that prior to the year 1994 he had remained absent on several occasions because of sickness. Regarding his absence from April 21, 1994 he submitted a medical certificate dated July 24, 1994 issued by one Dr. (Ms.) S. Biswas (Adhikari), who was the Block Medical Officer of Health, Chandra (Ukhra) P. H. C. at Bardwan. It was stated in that medical certificate that having suffered from chronic bronchitis the respondent No. 1 had remained under treatment of said Dr. Biswas from April 21, 1994 to July 24, 1994, and he was fit to resume duty on July 25, 1994. In cross-examination he stated that having not been cured at the Colliery Dispensary he went to Dr. Biswas, although on the ground of his continuous illness the Colliery Dispensary had not suggested his treatment at any hospital. Biswas from April 21, 1994 to July 24, 1994, and he was fit to resume duty on July 25, 1994. In cross-examination he stated that having not been cured at the Colliery Dispensary he went to Dr. Biswas, although on the ground of his continuous illness the Colliery Dispensary had not suggested his treatment at any hospital. His failure to inform the authorities about his absence was sought to be justified by the respondent No. 1 by stating that besides his nephew, who was not available, there was no literate person around him, and the post-office was about two kilometers away from his quarters wherefrom he had been receiving the treatment. ( 7 ) THE enquiry officer submitted his report dated August 9, 1994; he concluded that the charges had stood established. In support of his conclusion the enquiry officer recorded the following four reasons:" (1) Sri Rajendra Singh, Pump Operator, Sarpi Unit of SSP Colliery remained habitually absent for different periods from 1990 onwards for which different punishments have been awarded. (2)) This time he remained absent from April 21, 1994 to July 24, 1994 without obtaining leave or taking permission from competent authority. (3) He, did not inform the management though he remained on outdoor treatment and there was ample scope to inform. (4) The C. S. workman did not submit any prescription or cash memo in support of his treatment from April 21, 1994 to July 24, 1994 - for about 3 months. " ( 8 ) AFTER the enquiry the respondent No. 1 made a representation dated August 11, 1994 to the disciplinary authority stating that considering the facts (a) that he was a mental patient and was under treatment of a psychiatrist at Ranchi, and (b) that he had remained absent due to illness only, his case might be considered sympathetically. However, by an order No. BA/pd/dis/2541 dated August 26/27, 1994 the General Manager as the disciplinary authority imposed on the respondent No. 1 the punishment of dismissal from service with immediate effect. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, the respondent No. 1 made a representation dated October 5, 1994 to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Eastern Coalfields Ltd. The contents of the said representation were as follows:"most humbly and respectfully I, a Pump Operator of Shyamsundarpur Colliery, P. O. Ukhra, beg of your kind favour for rejoining duty. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, the respondent No. 1 made a representation dated October 5, 1994 to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Eastern Coalfields Ltd. The contents of the said representation were as follows:"most humbly and respectfully I, a Pump Operator of Shyamsundarpur Colliery, P. O. Ukhra, beg of your kind favour for rejoining duty. I have been dismissed from service by the agent, Shyamsundarpur Colliery on August 27, 1994 as per letter No. Shyam/pd/94/2977 due to unauthorized absence though I have submitted the medical certificate from Govt. Hospital for the above mentioned period. So, I beg pardon and confess my fault and declare that I shall not remain absent without permission of the authority in future. My family consists of 6 members and I am a poor man. I have no land and property. If I be dismissed from duty then my whole family will be ruined. The education of my children have already been stopped and the family is starving. Due to non-availability of any source of living their future will be in dark. On considering the pecuniary condition of my family and stoppage of my children's education, your Honour would be kind enough to look into my prayer and consider the same sympathetically and be merciful to issue an order for rejoining the duty at your earliest convenience and I shall remain ever grateful to you. Thanking you in anticipation. " ( 10 ) IN the facts and circumstances stated hereinbefore the respondent No. 1 through his learned advocate issued a notice dated July 25, 1995 to the authorities. It was alleged in this notice (a) that copies of enquiry proceedings had not been supplied to the respondent No. 1; (b) that no opportunity had been given to him to make a representation on the findings of the enquiry officer; and (c) that the punishment order had not been communicated to the respondent No. 1. ( 11 ) THEREAFTER, supported by an affidavit dated September 25, 1995 the writ petition was filed. The contentions raised in the writ petition were same as the ones raised in the advocate's notice dated July 25, 1995. The appellants contested the writ petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition dated October 16, 1996. ( 11 ) THEREAFTER, supported by an affidavit dated September 25, 1995 the writ petition was filed. The contentions raised in the writ petition were same as the ones raised in the advocate's notice dated July 25, 1995. The appellants contested the writ petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition dated October 16, 1996. They contended (a) that the writ petition was not maintainable, as the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provided for an alternative remedy; (b) that copies of the enquiry proceedings had been made available to the respondent No. 1; and (c) that the dismissal order had been served upon him. The respondent No. 1 by his affidavit-in-reply, filed in the year 1997, reiterated his case made out in the writ petition. ( 12 ) AFTER hearing the parties, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition by the impugned judgment and order. He held that although the respondent No. 1 was admittedly a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the writ petition filed by him against the appellant No. 1 (Eastern Coalfields Ltd.) was maintainable, as it was a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and a dismissed workman of such an employer can straight-away approach the Writ Court for challenging the disciplinary action on the ground of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. He further held that the findings of the enquiry officer were vitiated by total non-application of mind, because he had not assigned a single reason as to why the medical certificate produced by the respondent No. 1, as evidence to justify his absence, did not appeal to him as a piece of credit-worthy evidence. Relying on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, the learned Judge held that the non-discussion of the evidence by the enquiry officer, and the mere recording of findings by him, were the signs of total non-application of mind by him to the case. Relying on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, the learned Judge held that the non-discussion of the evidence by the enquiry officer, and the mere recording of findings by him, were the signs of total non-application of mind by him to the case. It was further held by the learned Judge that the charge of habitual absence, amounting to misconduct under Standing Order 17 (i) (d), was not maintainable against the respondent No. 1, as for all the previous cases of unauthorized absence prior to April 21, 1994 the respondent No. 1 having already been punished either by way of suspension or by way of warning, those cases could not be reopened for maintaining a charge of habitual absence. He also held that since the other charge of continuous absence, constituting misconduct under Standing Order 17 (i) (n), failed, because the enquiry officer's findings were vitiated by total non-application of mind, the charge under Standing Order 17 (i) (d), on its own, could not survive. The learned Judge further held that the punishment order had never been served on the respondent No. 1. After holding as aforesaid, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and directed reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 with full back wages. ( 13 ) BEFORE us, the learned advocate for the appellants, besides contending the question of availability of alternative remedy before the forum established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has contended that on the fact and materials on record the learned Judge erred in arriving at the conclusions (a) that the charge of habitual absence was not maintainable; (b) that the enquiry officer's findings were vitiated by total non-application of mind; and (c) that the punishment order had not been served on the respondent No. 1. On the question of alternative remedy he has cited the Supreme Court decision in the case of Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and Anr. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 has supported the impugned judgment and order by relying on the reasons given therein by the learned single Judge. ( 14 ) WE are first taking up the contention regarding alternative remedy. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 has supported the impugned judgment and order by relying on the reasons given therein by the learned single Judge. ( 14 ) WE are first taking up the contention regarding alternative remedy. The position of law, as it stands, is that availability of alternative remedy for a cause of action is not an absolute bar to the Writ Court's entertaining a petition based thereon. Generally, the Writ Court declines to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power when an equally efficacious alternative remedy is provided by a statute. There can be no dispute that remedy provided to an aggrieved workman by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is an efficacious remedy provided by a special statute. In the absence of compelling and extraordinary circumstances, the Writ Court should not allow a workman who has suffered a punishment in a disciplinary proceeding to by-pass the fora established under the said statute, because an adjudicatory system functioning under a legislation is never pushed to the back seat by it. There is no axiomatic proposition that by alleging violation of Articles 14 and 21 a workman within the meaning of the said statute becomes entitled to challenge straight-away in the Writ Court the steps and decisions taken in the disciplinary proceeding, and by-pass the regular forum. For the same purpose a workman whose employer is a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12 does not stand on a different footing, although for the purposes indicated by the Apex Court in the case of Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees' Association, Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange v. Union of India and Anr. , seeking judicial review of his employer's decision he can move the Writ Court without first approaching the forum set up under the said statute. The writ Court's powers under Article 226 is not system destructive or supererogatory. A power of secondary judicial review is exercised by the Writ Court in cases of abovementipned nature, while the power of primary judicial review invested in the fora established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The writ Court's powers under Article 226 is not system destructive or supererogatory. A power of secondary judicial review is exercised by the Writ Court in cases of abovementipned nature, while the power of primary judicial review invested in the fora established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 15 ) OUR considered opinion on the question being as above, we are unable to agree with the learned Judge that by merely alleging infringement of fundamental rights a workman (whose employer is a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12), instead of approaching the forum set up under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 where he is supposed to go in ordinary course, is entitled to approach the Writ Court straight-away for challenging a punishment inflicted on him by his employer by holding an enquiry in a disciplinary proceeding. We do not say that the Writ Court does not have the power to entertain a petition for the same, but what we say is, it is not a right of the workman so long he does not exhaust the statutory forum; his right to seek judicial review by the Writ Court accrues only thereafter. Hence the writ petition of the respondent No. 1 should not have been entertained at all, as there was no pleading regarding the compelling and extraordinary circumstances justifying his invoking the Writ Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, and bypassing the regular forum. ( 16 ) BUT, in the instant case, we are not inclined to hold in favour of the appellants on the question of availability of alternative remedy. The writ petition was entertained in the year 1995, and at this distance of time throwing out the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the respondent No. 1 will amount to sheer injustice. Since the existence of statutory alternative remedy does not altogether oust the Writ Court's jurisdiction to entertain a petition, it is always for the respondent in such petition to agitate, at the earliest opportunity, the question of availability of statutory alternative remedy. If the respondent chooses not to agitate the question with due diligence, and allows the writ petition to remain pending for years, in such case the respondent in the writ petition should not be allowed to take the plea at the stage of final hearing of the case. If the respondent chooses not to agitate the question with due diligence, and allows the writ petition to remain pending for years, in such case the respondent in the writ petition should not be allowed to take the plea at the stage of final hearing of the case. On this question, the decision in Syndicate Bank's case (supra) cited by the learned advocate for the appellants does not appear to us to be of any relevance. In that case the award of the Tribunal was challenged by the bank in the Writ Court. Nothing touching the question of alternative remedy vis-a-vis maintainability of the writ petition had arisen in that case. Accordingly, we hold that, on the facts, the writ petition is not to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. ( 17 ) ON the question of maintainability of the charges, with respect, we are unable to agree with the views taken by the learned Judge. The charge of habitual absence, constituting misconduct under Standing Order 17 (i) (d) of the Model Standing Orders, was held by him not maintainable on the ground that for all the events of unauthorized absence, prior to the one from April 21, 1994, the respondent No. 1 had been punished either by way of suspension or by way of warning; hence those cases of unauthorized absence could not be reopened. In our considered view the reasons cannot be accepted, because a charge of habitual absence can be founded only on the basis of previous cases of unauthorized absence. In the absence of previous cases of unauthorized absence, a charge of habitual absence cannot be made at all. To boot, the previous cases of unauthorized absence had not ended with infliction of any major penalty. Admittedly, the past cases had been dealt with by infliction of short period suspensions for two occasions, and warning for three occasions. The past cases were not reopened for re-examination and enhancement of punishment. The past cases were cited only as the basis for the charge of habitual absence. Therefore, it cannot be said that the levelling of the charge of habitual absence is reopening of closed old cases. The other charge, i. e. the charge of continuous absence from April 21, 1994, constituting misconduct under Standing Order 17 (i) (n), was not held by the learned Judge as (sic) not maintainable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the levelling of the charge of habitual absence is reopening of closed old cases. The other charge, i. e. the charge of continuous absence from April 21, 1994, constituting misconduct under Standing Order 17 (i) (n), was not held by the learned Judge as (sic) not maintainable. He, however, held that the charge of continuous absence failed because of the enquiry officer's non-application of mind to the evidence on record of the enquiry. According to the learned Judge, because of failure of the charge of continuous absence the charge of habitual absence could not survive. In our opinion, the view cannot be sustained, as the two charges were sustainable independently. Besides, if on the charge of continuous absence there was any defect in the enquiry officer's findings, the right course was to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for proceeding afresh from the stage of enquiry officer's report, but not to direct reinstatement with full back wages. ( 18 ) THE learned Judge did not set aside the punishment order either on the ground that the punishment order had not been communicated to the respondent No. 1, or on the ground that he had not been given an opportunity to represent on the findings of the enquiry officer. But, the learned Judge held that the contention of the respondent No. 1, that the punishment order had not been communicated to him, was correct. In our view, both these contentions require our consideration. ( 19 ) ADMITTEDLY, the enquiry officer submitted his findings on August 9, 1994. The own case of the respondent No. 1 is that coming to know of the findings of the enquiry officer he made a representation dated August 11, 1994 to the disciplinary authority. In this representation or in his representation dated October 5, 1994 made to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director against the dismissal order dated August 27, 1994, the respondent No. 1 did not make any grievance that he had not been served with a second show cause notice accompanied by copies of the enquiry proceedings and the enquiry officer's findings. He made the grievance for the first time only in the notice dated July 25, 1995 issued through his lawyer. He made the grievance for the first time only in the notice dated July 25, 1995 issued through his lawyer. Admittedly, the respondent No. 1 had full knowledge of the enquiry proceedings and the findings of the enquiry officer against which he made the representation dated August 11, 1994, and this being the position, we do not find any reason to direct a fresh exercise of the whole thing from the stage of second show-cause notice. We are not inclined to adopt the course in the present case, particularly because the respondent No. 1 has not been able to demonstrate before us what prejudice he suffered by not getting a formal opportunity to represent against the findings of the enquiry officer. ( 20 ) WHILE dealing with the question of service of the punishment order, the learned Judge held that the allegation made by the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 12 of the writ petition about non- service of the punishment order on him was not controverted by the appellants. He further held that in their affidavit-in- opposition the appellants did not make any averment that the punishment order had been served on the respondent No. 1. By pointing out the reference number of the punishment order mentioned by the respondent No. 1 in his representation dated October 5, 1994 to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, and the one appearing on the copy of the termination order dated August 26/27, 1994, as annexed by the appellants to their affidavit-in- opposition, the learned Judge concluded that the respondent No. 1 had mentioned an imaginary reference number in his representation, and the said fact was enough to hold that the punishment order had not been served on him. ( 21 ) FROM the original records produced before us, we find that the respondent No. 1 deliberately misled the learned single Judge by suppressing material facts. The fact is that while the punishment order dated August 26/27, 1994 was issued under Reference No. BA/pd/dis/2541 by the General Manager, the agent of the Colliery issued another order being office order dated September 6/12, 1994 under Reference No. Shyam/pd/94/2977. By the office order the concerned departments of the Colliery were directed to delete the name of the respondent No. 1 from all the records with effect from August 27, 1994. By the office order the concerned departments of the Colliery were directed to delete the name of the respondent No. 1 from all the records with effect from August 27, 1994. It also appears that the punishment order was received on behalf of the respondent No. 1 by one Sanjay Kr. Singh on September 5, 1994 (sic), and on the copy of the office order the respondent No. 1 put his signature on September 15, 1994. Therefore, it is clear from the original records that the respondent No. 1 had full knowledge, of both the punishment order and the aforesaid office order. However, in his representation dated October 5, 1994, the respondent No. 1 mentioned the reference number of the said office order and the date of the punishment order. It is not such a case where a presumption is required to be drawn from the said apparent mistakes. The fact remains that in his said representation, the respondent No. 1 did not make any grievance about non-service of the punishment order on him. ( 22 ) THE learned Judge was not correct in holding that in the affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition the appellants did not make any averment about service of the punishment order on the respondent No. 1. In paragraph 20 of the affidavit-in- opposition the following averments were made:"with regard to paragraph 19 of the said petition it will be evident from the averments made therein that the order of dismissal was served on the writ petitioner. I state in particular that order of dismissal was served on the writ petitioner. Save as aforesaid, I deny the allegations contained therein each and all. "in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances we are of the view that the learned Judge was wrong in concluding that the punishment order had not been served on the respondent No. 1. ( 23 ) THE last question that remains to be answered is: whether the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are vitiated by total non-application of mind. The learned Judge held that the medical certificate dated July 24, 1994 exhibited by the respondent No. 1 was totally ignored by the enquiry officer who did not discuss the evidence and merely recorded his ipsi dixit that the charges had been proved. The learned Judge held that the medical certificate dated July 24, 1994 exhibited by the respondent No. 1 was totally ignored by the enquiry officer who did not discuss the evidence and merely recorded his ipsi dixit that the charges had been proved. The learned Judge further held that the enquiry officer not only did not assign a single reason why the evidence adduced by the respondent No. 1 had not appealed to him or had been considered not credit-worthy, but also did not apply his mind to the evidence adduced by the respondent No. 1 showing satisfactory cause for the absence in question. By relying on the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Anil Kumar's case (supra) the learned Judge held that the findings of the enquiry officer were arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 24 ) WITH due respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by him. We have already seen that in support of his conclusion the enquiry officer recorded four reasons. Admittedly, the management witness who adduced evidence regarding the several cases of unauthorized absence of the respondent No. 1 from duty, was not cross-examined by him. In his own deposition the respondent No. 1 admitted that he had remained absent without any intimation. His case was that he could not inform, as no literate person was available, and the Post Office was about two kilometers away from his quarters. The medical certificate dated July 24, 1994 was admittedly issued not by a Colliery Doctor. In the circumstances it appears that the enquiry officer based his first two reasons on the facts and materials which were undisputed; third reason on his non-acceptance of the justification given by the respondent No. 1 for his failure to intimate the authorities about absence; and the fourth reason on his assessment of the evidentiary value of the medical certificate produced by the respondent No. 1, in the absence of supporting relevant prescription and cash memos. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we are unable to hold that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer do not reflect application of mind by him to the evidence and materials on record of the enquiry. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we are unable to hold that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer do not reflect application of mind by him to the evidence and materials on record of the enquiry. It is true that he did not express in detail the mental process through which he reached the said four reasons, but for that we are unable to hold that his findings are vitiated by non- application of mind. Incidentally it may be mentioned here that in his representation dated October 5, 1994 to the Chairman-cum- Managing Director against the punishment order, the respondent No. 1 categorically admitted his guilt. Therefore, in our view mere was no just reason for the learned Judge to interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer. ( 25 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order, and dismiss the writ petition. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order as to costs.