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2003 DIGILAW 570 (ORI)

Somadarsan Mohanty v. Union of India

2003-09-11

L.MOHAPATRA

body2003
JUDGMENT SUJIT BARMAN ROY, CJ. — This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been styled as a Public Interest Litigation. We have heard the petitioner in person, learned coun¬sel for Union of India, learned Advocate General for the State of Orissa, Mr. S. Pal for the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred as TISCO and also Ms. Indira Jayasingh for opposite party Nos. 6 and 7). By this petition, petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the CBI to investi¬gate into allegations of kick-back of crores of rupees for with¬drawing the condition of captive use of ore extracted from the lease hold mine and for quashing letter dated 23.7.97 issued by the Government of Orissa withdrawing such condition and also for an order of injunction restraining inter alia, TISCO from selling chrome ore extracted from the said lease hold mine at Sukinda Valley etc. 2. At the very outset Mr. S. Pal appearing on behalf of opposite party No.3 being TISCO contended that the instant peti¬tion is not maintainable as a public interest litigation at the instance of the petitioner. It is contended that none of the personal rights of the petitioner, whether fundamental or legal, has been infringed. This petition has nothing to do with writ of habeas corpus or writ of quo warranto. In the petition, nothing could be stated for which it can be treated as a public interest litigation also. Hence it has been contended by Mr. S. Pal on behalf of TISCO that this petition should be dismissed at the threshold without entering into the question of merit. This case was fixed for hearing today for disposal, if possible, at the admis¬sion stage. After this question of preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the petition was raised, we have decided to hear the matter on this question first and accordingly, we heard the petitioner in person apart from aforesaid other counsel appearing for the respective parties. However, it needs to be mentioned at the very outset that no notice was issued to some of the opposite parties as the question of maintainability has been raised in this petition at the admission stage itself and accord¬ingly we felt it necessary to decide this question first before issuing any notice to those opposite parties who have not entered appearance on their own. Though some of the opposite parties, as already stated above, have already entered appearance on their own, and accordingly, we heard them. 3. The case of the petitioner in brief is that by profes¬sion he is an advocate practising law in this Court for the last 14 years. He is a public spirited citizen. He takes up the causes where substantial public interest is involved. Basic facts of the case have been culled out by the petitioner from the judg¬ment of the Supreme Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2462 , and some local newspaper re¬ports and the same have been set out in the petition. It ap¬pears therefrom that in or about 1952 said TISCO obtained mining lease over an area of 1813 hectares of land for a period of 20 years from the Raja of Sukinda for mining operation to extract chrome. Subsequently, after enactment of Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, all the rights and interest of the Raja in or over the said leased out land have been vested in the State Government. However, State of Orissa recognized the lease granted in favour of the TISCO for a period of 20 years with effect from 12.1.1953. Since the said lease was due to expire on 12.1.1973, TISCO applied for renewal of the lease which was duly granted under Section 8(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 for an area of 1261.467 hactares for a period of 20 years till 11.1.1993 subject to the condition that it would set up beneficiation plant. On October 3, 1991 little more than a year before expiry of the aforesaid lease, TISCO again applied for a second renewal of the said lease for a further period of 20 years. The State of Orissa forwarded its recommendation in favour of the TISCO to the Central Government for renewal for a further period of 10 years. On 3.6.1993, Government of India approved renewal of the lease over the entire area of 1261.467 hectares. However, due to a complaint of G.C. Munda, Member of Parliament, the said lease could not be executed by the Central Government and accordingly, the Central Government directed execution of the lease deed to be kept in abeyance. On 3.6.1993, Government of India approved renewal of the lease over the entire area of 1261.467 hectares. However, due to a complaint of G.C. Munda, Member of Parliament, the said lease could not be executed by the Central Government and accordingly, the Central Government directed execution of the lease deed to be kept in abeyance. By an order dated 5.10.1993 in supersession of its aforesaid earlier approval dated 3.6.1993 the Central Government directed renewal of lease in favour of TISCO for an area of 651 hectares. As the area of lease was reduced by the said order of approval, TISCO preferred a writ petition in this Court being OJC No. 7729 of 1993. During pendency of the said writ petition in this Court, some of the companies being Indian Charge Chrome Limited and Jindal Strips Limited also preferred two writ petitions in this Court being OJC No. 5422 of 1994 and OJC No.7054 of 1994 respectively challenging both the orders of the Central Government. This Court by a common judgment dated 4.4.1995 disposed of all those writ petitions striking down the orders of the Central Government. It further directed the Central Government. It further directed the Central Government to reconsider TISCO’s application for renewal of lease in accordance with law. In compliance with the aforesaid decision of this Court, Central Government constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of one S.D. Sharma for rehearing and reconsidering those questions with regard to the prayer of TISCO for renewal of its mining lease. On 16.8.1995, the said Committee under the Chairmanship of S.D. Sharma submitted its report recommending renewal of the lease for a reduced area in favour of TISCO. Acting on that report, the Central Government by an order dated 17.8.1995 approved renewal of TISCO’s lease over a reduced area of 406 hectares of land. It is the case of the petitioner that if the mining lease is granted in respect of 406 hectares in favour of the TISCO, it would meet TISCO’s captive requirement and accordingly the Central Government di¬rected the State Government to issue orders for the same. Simul¬taneously, the Central Government further directed the State Government to grant mining lease to four other parties namely, Indian Charge Chrome Limited, Jindal Strips Limited, Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys and Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited for the balance area of 855.476 hectares. Simul¬taneously, the Central Government further directed the State Government to grant mining lease to four other parties namely, Indian Charge Chrome Limited, Jindal Strips Limited, Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys and Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited for the balance area of 855.476 hectares. Being aggrieved by the afore¬said order of approval of the Central Government reducing the area of lease to 406 hectares, TISCO preferred an S.L.P. before the Supreme Court challenging the said common judgment dated 4.4.1995 of this Court and also against the aforesaid order of approval issued by the Central Government reducing the leasing right to 406 hectares. Further case of the petitioner is that Supreme Court by its judgment in the aforesaid case as reported in AIR 1996 SC 2462 disposed of the said S.L.P. The Supreme Court formulated as many as five issues for adjudication of the dispute between the parties. The petitioner in particular referred to issue Nos. IV and V so framed by the Supreme Court. According to him those issues are relevant for due disposal of the present petition. Those two issues read as under : "IV. Whether the Committee was justified in interpreting the concept of mineral development under S. 8(3) of Act as requiring the assessment of the captive mining requirement of different industries and the application of the principle of equitable distribution of mining leases? V. Whether the Central Government in its order dated August 17, 1995 had correctly analysed the needs and requirements of TISCO in recommending that its lease be renewed over land measur¬ing 406.00 hectares ?” 4. In the context of the aforesaid issues, the petitioner in particular referred to the observation of the Supreme Court in para 62 of its judgment with regard to the aforesaid issue No. iv which reads as under : “62. We are therefore of the view that the Committee had correctly interpreted the relevant material available for appre¬ciating the concept of ‘mineral development’ and adopting the stance that it encompassed the concept of captive mining as well as the principle of equitable distribution.” 5. He further referred to para 67 of the aforesaid judg¬ment of the Supreme Court which, according to him contains the finding of the apex Court with regard to aforequoted issue No. v. The said paragraph is quoted hereunder : “67. He further referred to para 67 of the aforesaid judg¬ment of the Supreme Court which, according to him contains the finding of the apex Court with regard to aforequoted issue No. v. The said paragraph is quoted hereunder : “67. We are therefore of the view that the Central Govern¬ment was justified in issuing its order dated August 17, 1995.” 6. From the aforesaid, it appears that the Supreme Court virtually dismissed the S.L.P. preferred by the TISCO and found nothing wrong with the order of the approval dated 17.8.1995 granted by the Central Government in respect of the TISCO reduc¬ing the area for mining lease to 406 hectares. According to the petitioner, the Supreme Court by the aforesaid judgment held that grant of lease in favour of the TISCO for an area of 406 hectares would meet the captive requirements of the TISCO. Therefore, the TISCO can operate the said mining right for its captive require¬ment only. It has no right whatsoever to sell the ores extracted by its mining operation in the aforesaid leasehold area to others whether within India or abroad. 7. In these circumstances, Government of Orissa by its letter dated 15.2.1997 made an offer to the TISCO for granting lease in its favour for an area of 406 hectares. The terms and condi¬tions of such lease were out in the said letter. Along with said letter, Government of Orissa enclosed a proforma and required the TISCO to give its reply thereto as per the enclosed proforma on or before 15.3.1997. It further stipulated that if the TISCO failed to give its reply within the aforesaid period, it would be considered that the conditions were not accepted by the TISCO and its application for renewal of lease would stand rejected. In the said letter as many as 10 conditions were stipulated by the Gov¬ernment of Orissa. Condition No. viii is the bone of contention between the parties in this petition. The said condition No. viii as stipulated in the aforesaid letter dated 15.2.1997 issued by the Government of Orissa, Department of Steel and Mines, reads as follows : “viii. The ore produced from the mine shall be used for captive purpose to enable M/s. TISCO to ensure steady supply of chrome ore to its various plants such as beneficiation plant, charge chrome plant at Bamnipal and refractory plant etc. The ore produced from the mine shall be used for captive purpose to enable M/s. TISCO to ensure steady supply of chrome ore to its various plants such as beneficiation plant, charge chrome plant at Bamnipal and refractory plant etc. It also shall fulfil the chrome ore requirement for the various conver¬sion agreements entered into by M/s TISCO to the extent possible, under Rule 27(3) of M.C. Rules, 1960.” 8. Against that condition, TISCO made representation to the State Government that condition No.viii was not stipulated in the letter of approval granted by the Central Government and hence that condition could not have been imposed and accordingly the same should be withdrawn. In response thereto, the State Government by its letter dated 23.7.1997 had withdrawn condition No.viii as quoted above. Petitioner’s grievance is that the withdrawal of condition No. viii is without justification, ille¬gal and mala fide and the same has been passed in contravention of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2462 apart from the provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereun¬der. As a result of withdrawal of the aforesaid condition No.viii, TISCO is earning hundreds of crores of rupees by selling chrome ores of 11.56 lakh of metric tonne within the country to others and exporting 3.34 lakh metric tonne of chrome ores through Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation and to other agencies. Therefore, the petitioner contends that TISCO has no right to use the chrome ores extracted from the said leasehold area for any purpose other than utilising the same in its own plants. It is also contended by the petitioner that for corrupt reasons condition No.viii has been illegally withdrawn by the State Government and he suspects that kick-backs were received for withdrawing condition No.viii. 9. In these circumstances, petitioner prayed for a manda¬mus directing the Central Bureau of Investigation to enquire into the allegations of kick backs of crores of rupees in the matter of withdrawal of condition No.viii of the letter No.1295 dated 15.2.97 and also for quashing the letter dated 23.7.1997 by which Government of Orissa had withdrawn the condition No. viii. Peti¬tioner has also asked for an order of injunction restraining opposite parties 3 to 7 and 11 from selling chrome ores extracted from the Sukinda valley inside the country or from exporting it to foreign countries. Peti¬tioner has also asked for an order of injunction restraining opposite parties 3 to 7 and 11 from selling chrome ores extracted from the Sukinda valley inside the country or from exporting it to foreign countries. He has also asked for a direction upon opposite parties 3 to 7 and 11 to sell their surplus chromes extract¬ed from the leasehold area inside the country or to export it to foreign countries through Orissa Mining Corporation. 10. Learned Advocate General for the State of Orissa has supported the case of the petitioner. Equally, Ms. Indira Jaya¬singh, learned counsel for Indian Charge Chrome Limited also supported the case of the petitioner. She contended that while granting approval in favour of the TISCO by its letter dated 17.8.1995, Central Government did not incorporate any such cap¬tive requirement clause in respect of TISCO whereas granting similar approval in respect of Jindal Strips Limited, Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited, Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys and Indian Charge Chrome Limited etc., the Central Government imposed a captive requirement clause. It is utterly discriminatory and offends against the equality clause as enshrined in Article 14. Therefore, she has supported the case of the petitioner. 11. It is equally strange that learned Advocate General of the State has also supported the case of the petitioner. It needs to be mentioned here that lease was executed and registered in favour of TISCO on 18.8.1998. The State Government itself by its letter dated 23.7.1997 had withdrawn the condition No.viii where¬by it earlier sought to incorporate the captive requirement clause in the lease. However, sometime after the lease was exe¬cuted and registered in favour of the TISCO on 18.5.1998, a new party was elected to power. Due to change of Government, perhaps the new Government so elected does not support the decision of the previous Government that withdrew the condition for incorpo¬rating captive requirement clause in the lease in favour of the TISCO. In these circumstances, learned Advocate General while appearing for the State of Orissa supported the case of the petitioner. 12. We have given the basic facts of the case above for better appreciation of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the TISCO on the question of maintainability of the petition. Mr. S. Pal, learned counsel for TISCO contended that the peti¬tioner is an advocate by profession. None of his personal rights, whether fundamental or legal, has been infringed. 12. We have given the basic facts of the case above for better appreciation of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the TISCO on the question of maintainability of the petition. Mr. S. Pal, learned counsel for TISCO contended that the peti¬tioner is an advocate by profession. None of his personal rights, whether fundamental or legal, has been infringed. This is also not a petition for writ of habeas corpus or quo warranto. None of the circumstances under which a petition can be treated as public interest litigation exists in this case. Hence the petition must be dismissed without entering into the question of merit. The State of Orissa or other private opposite parties could have challenged this withdrawal of condition No.viii in an appropriate writ petition. Nothing could prevent them from approaching the Court. It is not the case of the petitioner that the parties who were directly affected by such decision of Government in with¬drawing condition No. viii are handicapped or because of poverty or illiteracy or for such other similar reasons were unable to approach the Court. In these circumstances, this petition at the instance of the petitioner is not at all maintainable. Petitioner has no locus standi in the circumstances of the case to maintain the present petition as a public interest litigation. In this regard, Mr. S. Pal, learned counsel for the TISCO heavily relied upon a decision of the apex Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 . In particular he referred to the observa¬tions of the apex Court in the aforesaid judgment on the question as to at whose instance PIL is maintainable. He further contended that this is a matter of policy decision of the Government wheth¬er or not to impose the captive requirement clause in the lease agreement. It is not for the petitioner or for this Court to dictate as to what should be the policy decision of the Govern¬ment in this regard. According to Mr. Pal, Government of India while granting approval by its letter dated 17.8.1995 did not impose any such condition of captive requirement to be incorpo¬rated in the lease agreement. It is true that at one stage the State Government in its offer dated 15.2.1997 wanted to impose this captive requirement clause. The State Government exchanged the correspondences with the Central Government in this regard. It is true that at one stage the State Government in its offer dated 15.2.1997 wanted to impose this captive requirement clause. The State Government exchanged the correspondences with the Central Government in this regard. Though lease was executed on 18.5.1998, recently the State Gov¬ernment by its letter dated 2.6.2001 sought clarification from the Central Government again to impose such condition. This letter was issued by the State Government only on 2.6.2001 long after registration of the lease deed in favour of the TISCO way back on 19.5.1998. The Central Government by its letter dated 26.7.2001 turned down the request of the State Government to incorpo¬rate such a captive clause upon TISCO. In fact, the said letter of the Central Government dated 26.7.2001 is annexed to the coun¬ter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2 as Annexure C/2. The said letter dated 26.7.2001 is quoted hereunder : “Government of India Ministry of Mines No. 5/37/97-M.IV (Vol.II) New Delhi, Dated 26th July, 2001 To The Secretary to the Government of Orissa, Deptt. of Steel and Mines, Bhubaneswar. Sub :- Grant of second renewal of mining lease for chromite over an area of 406 ha. in favour of M/s. TISCO Ltd. - Imposition of special condition under rule 27(3) of MCR, 1960. I am directed to refer to your letter No.7022/SM. IV (G) SM/10/2K dated 2.6.2001 vide which the State Government of Orissa has suggested to impose a special condition under Rule 27(3) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) in case of TISCO chromite mine after execution of the second renewal of the mining lease. It is quite clear from the letter dated 2.6.2001 of the State Government that when the State Government had sent the proposal of grant of second renewal of the ML in favour of TISCO on 28.11.92, the State Govt. did not sug¬gest imposition of any special condition under Rule 27(3) of the Rules relating to ‘captive use’ of chromite by TISCO. State Govt. may recall that after protracted litigation between TISCO, State Govt. and others, the Central Govt. conveyed its approval for grant of second renewal of ML in favour of TISCO over a reduced area of 406 ha. vide letter No.5/22/95-M. IV dated 17.8.95 inter alia stipulating some special conditions under Rule 27(3) of the Rules contained in Appendix ‘B’ to this letter. and others, the Central Govt. conveyed its approval for grant of second renewal of ML in favour of TISCO over a reduced area of 406 ha. vide letter No.5/22/95-M. IV dated 17.8.95 inter alia stipulating some special conditions under Rule 27(3) of the Rules contained in Appendix ‘B’ to this letter. None of these special conditions related to captive consumption of chrome ore by TISCO. Hence, it is clear that at the time of recommendation of second renewal by the State Govt. or approval by the Central Govt. for grant of second renewal of ML in favour of TISCO, no special condition relating to captive consumption of chrome ore by TISCO was contemplated by the State Government. 2. From the letter dated 2.6.2001 of the State Govt., it is evident that before execution of the renewal of ML document, the State Govt. (without consulting or obtaining the approval of the Central Govt.) wanted to impose the following condition Clause viii of letter No.1295 dated 15.2.97 of the State Govt.): "The ore produced from the mines shall be used for captive purpose to enable M/s. TISCO to ensure steady supply of chrome ore to its various plants such as beneficiation, charge chrome plant at Bamnipal and refractory plant etc. including its chrome ore requirement for the various conversion agreements entered into by M/s TISCO to the extent possible under Rule 27(3) of MC Rules, 1960.' 3. Central Govt. are not aware of the background of suggest¬ing a condition requiring ‘captive use’ (letter dated 15.2.97 of the State Govt.) or its withdrawal (letter dated 23.7.97 of the State Govt.) State Govt. was well aware that no such condition can be imposed by the State Govt. without obtaining prior approv¬al of the Central Govt. Nonetheless, in February, 1997, State Govt. tried to impose a special condition regarding ‘captive consumption’ without obtaining the prior approval of the Central Govt. and then suddenly resiled from its stand in July, 1997. Now, after 4 years once again the State Govt. intends to impose a special condition under Rule 27(3) of the Rules regarding ‘cap¬tive consumption’. 4. As per the mining statute, a special condition under Rule 27(3) of the Rules is put at the time of grant of a new ML or at the time of renewal of the ML. These special conditions are mentioned in the ML deed document (Form ‘K’ of the Rules). 4. As per the mining statute, a special condition under Rule 27(3) of the Rules is put at the time of grant of a new ML or at the time of renewal of the ML. These special conditions are mentioned in the ML deed document (Form ‘K’ of the Rules). Hence, after the execution of the ML deed (or the renewal of the ML deed document), both the State Govt. (the lessor) and the ML holder (the Lessee) are bound by the terms and conditions and covenants of the ML document. The State Govt. was well aware at the time of grant of second renewal of ML in favour of TISCO in 1997 and at the time of execution of renewal of ML deed document on 15.5.1998 that TISCO was not using the chrome ore mined entirely for captive use. As a matter of fact, the State Govt. had at¬tempted to impose a condition about ‘captive consumption’ in 1997 and after discussions and negotiations with TISCO had agreed to withdraw this condition. Had the State Govt. been serious abut the imposition of this condition, they would have obtained the approval of the Central Govt. in 1997 itself, a stage at which such a condition could have been imposed, instead of executing the renewal of ML deed document without this condition and now approaching the Central Govt. for imposition of the condition. 5. After execution of the renewal of ML document, no special condition can be imposed under Rule 27(3) of the Rules. The proposal is, therefore, returned back to the State Govt. with the observation that the special condition proposed by the State Govt. relating to captive use of chrome ore by TISCO cannot be agreed at this stage after the execution of the second renewal of ML. Yours faithfully, (O.P. Kathuria) Under Secretary to the Govt. of India. Tel. No. 3388061.” 13. If the State Government long after execution of the deed was indeed aggrieved by the aforesaid response of the Cen¬tral Government, it could have very well filed a writ petition in this Court for compelling the Central Government to grant approv¬al to impose such clause of captive requirement upon TISCO yet they did not do so. Tel. No. 3388061.” 13. If the State Government long after execution of the deed was indeed aggrieved by the aforesaid response of the Cen¬tral Government, it could have very well filed a writ petition in this Court for compelling the Central Government to grant approv¬al to impose such clause of captive requirement upon TISCO yet they did not do so. It is therefore, unbecoming of Government to support the case of the petitioner at this belated stage long after the execution and registration of renewal of the lease deed in favour of TISCO. 14. Now the only question that falls for our decision is whether at the instance of the petitioner, the present writ petition is maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation ? Mr. Pal, learned counsel for the TISCO inter alia, contended that none of the parties that are aggrieved by non-incorporation of any such condition of captive use of the chrome in the renewal of the lease deed in favour of the TISCO has approached this Court. The petitioner is not at all personally aggrieved. None of his personal rights have been infringed. The parties who are, if at all, aggrieved by absence of any such condition in the renewal of the lease deed in favour of the TISCO could have easily chal¬lenged the same. None of them is suffering from any such disabil¬ity like social, economic disadvantage or poverty. The Court is not at all inaccessible to such parties and therefore, petitioner cannot take up their cause by proxy in the instant petition as a Public Interest Litigation. However, the petitioner while appear¬ing in this case in person contended that this affects the eco¬nomic interest of the nation and public in general. Therefore, the petitioner has every right to espouse national cause and the interest of the public in general and accordingly, in the circum¬stances of the case, the present writ petition is maintainable at his instance as a Public Interest Litigation though none of his personal rights has been infringed by the action of the Central Government or of the State Government. 15. The question as to when and under what circumstances, a petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation is maintain¬able has been elaborately dealt with by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S. P. Gupta v. President of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 149 . 16. 15. The question as to when and under what circumstances, a petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation is maintain¬able has been elaborately dealt with by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in S. P. Gupta v. President of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 149 . 16. It has been held by the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in the aforesaid judgment that traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. Under this rule, the Court was concerned with the question whether the applicant was a person aggrieved. According to this rule, it was only a person who suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who could bring an action for a regular writ petition. But the individual who moves the Court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the Court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the threshold, whether it is in the form of a letter addressed to the Court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in Court. Here, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta (supra) further held that as a matter of prudence and not as a rule of law, the Court may confine this strategic exercise of jurisdic¬tion to cases where legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or group of persons or the constitutional or legal right of such class or group is violated and as far as possible, not entertain cases of judicial redress. Referring to these observations of the apex Court in the aforesaid decision, Mr. Pal contended that petitioner has not made out a case in the instant petition for espousing the cause of any determinate class or group of persons. He vaguely stated that interest of the public in general or the national interest is sacrificed for non-incorporation of a clause like captive use of chrome in the renewal lease deed executed in favour of TISCO. Supreme Court further observed in this decision that whether a legal injury is caused to a person or determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or deter¬minate class of person is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Article 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in the Supreme Court under Article 32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons. Undoubtedly, by not including any such clause for captive use of the chrome in the renewal of lease deed in favour of the TISCO, only the State of Orissa or the Union of India or other opposite parties like Jindal Strips Ltd., Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd., Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys or the Indian Charge Chrome Limited or the Minerals and Metal Trad¬ing Corporation can complain that their rights have been in¬fringed, if any, and these parties are not at all suffering from any of the disadvantages as stated above by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the petitioner cannot maintain this petition to fight a battle against TISCO by proxy on behalf of the aforesaid other parties. The Supreme Court in paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment held that there is a vital distinction between locus standi ad justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable. However, it is undoubtedly true that cases may arise where there is public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission may also cause a specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. When for various social, economic and other similar reasons such a person or specific class or group of individuals are unable to approach the Court, a public spirited citizen may maintain a petition of this nature to espouse the cause of such helpless people. It is not case of the petitioner that those, who are allegedly affected by non-incorporation of any such clause in the renewal of the lease deed as to captive use of chrome, suffer from any such social, economic or similar other disadvantages nor it is the case of the petitioner that for like reasons they are unable to approach the Court for appropriate redress. 17. Again the Supreme Court in Balco Employees Union v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350 held that it will be seen that whenever the Court has interfered and given directions while entertaining public interest litigation it has mainly been where there has been an element of violations of Article 21 or of human rights or where the litigations has been initiated for the bene¬fit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to Court due to some disadvantage. In those cases also it is the legal rights which are secured by the Courts. Public Interest Litigation was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the finan¬cial or economic decisions which are taken by the Government in exercise of their administrative power. No doubt a person person¬ally aggrieved by any such decision, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the same in a Court of law, but, a Public Interest Litigation at the behest of a stranger ought not to be enter¬tained. Such a litigation cannot per se be on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court. In this case, Supreme Court further held that the decision to dis-invest and the implementa¬tion of Balco being purely an administrative decision relating to economic policy of the State and challenge to the same at the in¬stance of busy-body who is not an employee of the company nor was a prospective bidder cannot fall within the parameters of Public Interest Litigation. In the instant case before us, the petition¬er is not directly or indirectly concerned with mining operation of chrome. Therefore, he has no interest in the matter, whether direct or indirect. This is a matter of administrative decision of the Government whether or not, it should impose a condition in the renewal of the lease in favour of the TISCO as regards cap¬tive use of the chrome ore extracted from such mining operation. It is equally not the case of the petitioner that somebody’s right or other human rights have been affected adversely and that such person are unable to approach this Court. In this regard, it may be useful to refer to what has been held by the apex Court in the case of Balco Employees Union (supra) in paragraphs 79 to 88. “79. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essen¬tially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. There have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a Petitioner and enter¬tained by the Court. This aspect has come up for consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to recapitulate and re-emphasize the same. 80. What Public Interest Litigation is meant to be has been explained at length in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and another, 1981 (Supp) SCC 87. Public Interest Litigation in that case was filed relating to the appointment and transfer of Judges and it is in this connection that the question arose with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner to file the writ petition. While deciding this aspect, this Court examined as to what is the nature of the Public Interest Litigation and who can initiate the same. At page 215, Bhagwati J. observed as follows: “.... It is for this reason that in public interest litiga¬tion-litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, ‘diffused’ rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient inter¬est has to be accorded standing.....” 81. The limitation within which the Court must act, and the caution against the abuse of the same is referred to by Bhagwati J. at page 219 as follows : “24. But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the Court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or politi¬cal motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objec¬tive. Andre Rabie has warned that “political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process” and we might add, through the political process, “may try to use the Courts to further their aims”. These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the Court has to be careful to avoid. Andre Rabie has warned that “political pressure groups who could not achieve their aims through the administrative process” and we might add, through the political process, “may try to use the Courts to further their aims”. These are some of the dangers in public interest litigation which the Court has to be careful to avoid. It is also necessary for the Court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between locus standi and justifia¬bility and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justiciable. The Court must take care to see that it does not overstep the limits of its judicial function and trespass into areas which are reserved to the Execu¬tive and the Legislature by the Constitution. It is a fascinating exercise for the Court to deal with public interest litigation because it is a new jurisprudence which the Court is evolving a jurisprudence which demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the then womb of the future, are beginning to be born. 25. Before we part with this general discussion in regard to locus standi, there is one point we would like to emphasize and it is, that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific class or group of individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such member of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want.” 82. In Sachidanand Pandey and another v. State of West Bengal and others, (1987) 2 SCC 295 , V. Khalid, J. observed as follows : “61. It is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provi¬sions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self imposed restraint on public interest litigants.” 83. After referring to the decision in Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, (1991) 1 SCC 598 and other cases on the point in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, (1992) 4 SCC 305 . It was observed at page 348 as follows : “109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievances, de¬serves rejection at the threshold”. 84. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievances, de¬serves rejection at the threshold”. 84. Referring to the litigants standing in queues waiting for the cases to be listed in Courts at page 349, Pandian, J. had observed as follows : “......the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wear¬ing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time to the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system.”. 85. While dealing with a case where PIL had been filed in relation to an award of contract, the factors which the Courts have to consider have been dealt with in the following observa¬tions in Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and others (1999) 1 SCC 492 at page 502. “17. Normally before such a project is undertaken, a de¬tailed consideration of the need, viability, financing and cost effectiveness of the proposed project and offers received takes places at various levels in the Government. If there is a good reason why the project should not be undertaken, then the time to object is at the time when the same is under consideration and before a final decision is taken to undertake the project. If breach of law in the execution of the project is apprehended, then it is at the stage when the viability of the project is being considered that the objection before the appropriate au¬thorities including the Court must be raised. We would expect that if such objection or material is placed before the Govern¬ment, the same would be considered before a final decision is taken. It is common experience that considerable time is spent by the authorities concerned before a final decision is taken regarding the execution of a public project. This is the appropriate time when all aspects and all objections should be considered. It is common experience that considerable time is spent by the authorities concerned before a final decision is taken regarding the execution of a public project. This is the appropriate time when all aspects and all objections should be considered. It is only when valid objections are not taken into account or ignored that the Court may intervene. Even so, the Court should be moved at the earliest possible opportunity. Belated petitions should not be entertained. 18. The same considerations must weigh with the Court when interim orders are passed in such petitions. The party at whose instance interim orders are obtained has to be made accountable for the consequences of the interim order. The interim order could delay the project, jettison finely worked financial ar¬rangements and escalate costs. Hence the petitioner asking for interim orders in appropriate cases should be asked to provide security for any increase in cost as a result of such delay or any damages suffered by the opposite party in consequence of an interim order. Otherwise, public detriment may outweigh public benefit in granting such interim orders. Stay order or injunction order, if issued, must be moulded to provide for restitution.” 86. Lastly, we need only to refer to the following observa¬tions in the majority decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan case (supra) at page 763. “232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the Court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The Court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the Court’s jurisdiction. 233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the Court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The Courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitu¬tion casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The Courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limita¬tions to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitu¬tion casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The Courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limita¬tions to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been con¬sistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the Court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the Court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the Court itself is not above the law. 234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the Courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Govern¬ment. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the Court to go into and investi¬gate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the Court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner is filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the under¬taking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more option or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.” 87. When two or more option or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.” 87. It will be seen that whenever the Court has interfered and given directions while entertaining PIL it has mainly been where there has been an element of violations of Article 21 or of human rights or where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to Court due to some disadvantage. In those cases also it is the legal rights which are secured by the Courts. We may, howev¬er, add that Public Interest Litigation was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the financial or economic decisions which are taken by the Government in exercise of their administrative power. No doubt a person personally aggrieved by any such deci¬sion, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the same in a Court of law, but, a Public Interest Litigation at the behest of a stranger ought not to be entertained. Such a litigation cannot per se be on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely affected are unable to approach the Court. 88. The decision to dis-invest and the implementation there¬of is purely an administrative decision relating to the economic policy of the State and challenge to the same at the instance of busy-body cannot fall within the parameters of Public Interest Litigation.” 18. Again towards the end of paragraph 2 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 1739 , it has been held that : “....Even in cases filed in public interest, the Court can exercise the writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party only when it is shown that the legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of person is, by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to ap¬proach the Court for relief.” 19. In the instance case, it is not the case of the peti¬tioner that the parties who were aggrieved or affected if at all by the impugned action of the State are unable to approach this Court by reason of poverty, helplessness, or for other social or economic disadvantages. Hence, at the instance of the petitioner, the present petition is clearly not maintainable. 20. Among the private opposite parties, who were favoured with such mining lease by the State of Orissa with prior approval of the Central Government, Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. has support¬ed the case of the petitioner. According to Ms. Indira Jayasingh, learned counsel for the Indian Charge Chrome Ltd., in the lease granted in favour of her client, a captive use clause has been incorporated, but the same has not been incorporated in the case of renewal of lease executed in favour of the TISCO. In these circumstances, Ms. Indira Jayasingh while appearing on behalf of the Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. supported the case of the petition¬er. As we have already seen in the middle of 1998 lease deed was executed in favour of TISCO and other private opposite parties including Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. The writ petition was filed in this Court long thereafter on 18.8.2000. It is not the case of Ms. Indira Jayasingh that due to poverty or social or economic disadvantages, the said Indian Charge Chrome Ltd., was unable to approach the Court for appropriate redress of their grievance. It is not understood as to how in these circumstances Ms. Indira Jayasingh could support the case of the petitioner ? 21. It is an administrative decision on economic matters. It is for the appropriate Government or public authority to take a decision in such matters. The Court cannot usurp their power to interfere in such matters in the petition like the instant one unless the aggrieved party approaches the Court on the ground that their rights, whether fundamental or legal, have been in¬fringed. Apart from that, it is the TISCO which started the mining operation in that area in 1952. They are conducting mining opera¬tion in that area without break since 1952. In a sense it is the TISCO which can be said to be pioneer in mining operation in these mines situated in Sukinda valley. Apart from that, it is the TISCO which started the mining operation in that area in 1952. They are conducting mining opera¬tion in that area without break since 1952. In a sense it is the TISCO which can be said to be pioneer in mining operation in these mines situated in Sukinda valley. The said authorities including the Central Government must have had some reason for giving those benefits to the TISCO which it was enjoying since 1952. In the matter of such decision, on economic or financial matters, the Court cannot interfere in a petition filed as a public interest litigation. 22. In the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the instant petition at the instance of the petitioner is not at all maintainable as he has no locus standi to maintain the peti¬tion. 23. In the result, we are constrained to dismiss this petition. No order as to cost. L. MOHAPATRA, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.