ASHOK KUMAR MATHUR, CJ. ( 1 ) I had occasion to consider the opinion of my learned brother Justice Ashim Kumar Banerjee. I am in full agreement with him. As far as this case is concerned, the Division Bench was justified in calling the writ petition to be decided by, the Division Bench. ( 2 ) APART from this as a Chief Justice I have full Constitutional and inherent power to fix the roaster and to list matters either to the Single Bench or Division bench as may be considered proper in each case. In the present case I have gone through the facts and I find that it is a fit case to assign before this Division bench. This case involves abuse of process of this Court. The parties had agreed for taking up the matter by the earlier Division Bench by the order dated 24th april, 2001, they cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold. The earlier Division bench by the order dated 24th April, 2001, as reproduced by brother Justice banerjee in his order, took up the matter with the agreement of the parties and now when it does not suit the parties they have raised this objection at this distance of time. ( 3 ) HAVING regard to these facts, I exercise my Constitutional and inherent power and assign this matter to this Division Bench. Therefore, the objections raised by the respondent No. 8, supported by the appellants, is overruled and consequently the application filed by them for recalling the order dated 24th april, 2001 is rejected. ( 4 ) THE above appeals relate to an order of refusal to allow amendment of the writ petition passed on January 19, 2001 by the learned Single Judge. ( 5 ) THE reference made to the facts of this case and the parties relate to the paper book filed in MAT No. 254 of 2001. ( 6 ) INDOFER Society, the appellant No. 1 is an association of steel manufacturers in the country. The other appellants including the respondents No. 6, 7 and 8 are steel manufacturers of the Country. ( 7 ) PRIOR to 1990 the steel manufacturers of the country were selling their products within the country without any problem. The problem started in late 1990's when various other countries started dumping of steel in India at a lesser rate. The other appellants including the respondents No. 6, 7 and 8 are steel manufacturers of the Country. ( 7 ) PRIOR to 1990 the steel manufacturers of the country were selling their products within the country without any problem. The problem started in late 1990's when various other countries started dumping of steel in India at a lesser rate. The cost of imported steel was much lesser then the cost of production in India. As a result whereof the steel industry suffered serious set back. Considering such situation the Government of India enacted anti dumping law by which a guideline was framed for dumping imported steel in India to safeguard the interest of the indigenous manufacturers. The Government as and by way of further protection declared a floor price for imported steel. According to the appellants such floor price was determined by the Government taking into account the cost of manufacture of steel in India. ( 8 ) THE subject litigation relates to HR Coils (TNJ ). By a notification dated 11th December, 1998 floor price of subject HR Coils was fixed at US$ 302 per mt. By a further notification dated November 1, 1999 the floor price of the subject HR Coils was reduced to US$ 254 to be effective for two months and thereafter the floor price was treated to be withdrawn. During the subsistence of the said notification Delating to floor price the steel manufacturers made diverse applications before the appropriate authority under the anti dumping law for taking appropriate steps against various countries like South Korea, south Africa, Japan, China and Australia. Such petitions were rejected by the concerned authority on the ground that since the floor price was prevalent, no further action needed to be taken. ( 9 ) THE notification dated November 1,1999 was challenged by the appellants by way of writ petition being W. P. No. 12492 (W) of 1999. When the application was initially moved a Single Judge of this Court by order dated July 23, 1999 directed advertisement of public notice in newspaper in various metropolis so that interested parties could join the said proceedings. After the advertisements only two parties joined the said proceedings. One being steel manufacturer and the other being a trader association dealing with the subject material. After the advertisements only two parties joined the said proceedings. One being steel manufacturer and the other being a trader association dealing with the subject material. ( 10 ) ON February 16, 2000 the learned Single Judge stayed the operation of the notification dated November 11, 1999 and directed the floor price of US$ 302 per MT in terms of notification dated December 11, 1998 to continue till the disposal of the application. The learned Single Judge also directed affidavits to be filed and fixed the matter for hearing. An appeal was preferred from the said order, the Division Bench of this Court did not entertain the said appeal on the ground that since the learned Judge had fixed the date of hearing after affidavits no interference was called for. Such order was affirmed by the Apex court. ( 11 ) BY virtue of the said interim order the floor price fixed on December 11, 1998 is still in force. The present export-import policy of the Government also provided that the floor price of US$ 302 per MT would remain operative for the years 2002-07 due to interim order passed by this Court. ( 12 ) AFTER filing of affidavits the matter went to another learned Single Judge who fixed the date of hearing. When the hearing was being conducted an application for amendment was made by the writ petitioners. The amendment application was rejected by the learned Single Judge by the order dated January 19,2001 wherein the learned Judge dismissed the amendment application and fixed the matter for hearing on each and every day at 2 p. m. on and from 31st january, 2001. ( 13 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order the present appeals were filed before the Appeal Court. The parties to the proceedings more or less agreed on the issue of amendment and the amendment was allowed with a rider that the writ petition would be heard and disposed of by the Division Bench to have the proceedings expedited. When the appeal was initially moved the Division Bench by an order dated January 31, 2001 stayed the operation of the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge directed day to day hearing on and from that date. Subsequently, amendment was allowed and the writ petition was directed to be heard. When the appeal was initially moved the Division Bench by an order dated January 31, 2001 stayed the operation of the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge directed day to day hearing on and from that date. Subsequently, amendment was allowed and the writ petition was directed to be heard. The interim order passed by the Division bench on January 31, 2001 was also directed to continue. We are also given to understand that the said Division Bench (Y. R. Meena and Arunava Barua, JJ.)started hearing the matter on and from September 4,2001. The said writ petition was heard on September 4,2001, October 3, 2001, October 9,2001, October 10, 2001, October 11,2001, October 16,2001. Although we do not find the previous dates recorded in the order sheet we perused the order dated 16th October, 2001 which reads as follows:-"all the learned counsels appearing for all the parties have concluded their arguments except Mr. Bimal Kumar Chatterjee. List the matters on 22nd November, 2001 at 2 p. m. for further hearing of Mr. Chatterjee, he will advance on locus standi and jurisdiction. Meanwhile all parties will prepare the written submissions and will exchange the same amongst themselves on or before 20th November, 2001. " ( 14 ) THE matter, however, could not be further heard by the said Bench on 22nd November, 2001 as the presiding Judge was transferred to another High court. It is significant to mention that by the order dated April 24, 2001 the writ petition was directed to be heard on merits by the Division Bench on the joint prayer of all the appearing parties. The affidavits were directed to be exchanged after the date. The said order dated April 24, 2001 being relevant herein, is set out as follows:-"before arguing the appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the amendment in writ petition has been refused, all the learned counsels appearing for all the parties in the aforesaid appeals and Appeal no. 1275 of 2001 have jointly prayed that to avoid unnecessary delay all the connected matters should be heard together and there should be a common order of this Court in all connected matters, including the decision on the writ petition, which is pending before the learned Single Judge, that should also be disposed of by this Division Bench on merits. 1275 of 2001 have jointly prayed that to avoid unnecessary delay all the connected matters should be heard together and there should be a common order of this Court in all connected matters, including the decision on the writ petition, which is pending before the learned Single Judge, that should also be disposed of by this Division Bench on merits. Considering their submissions, we direct that any party if desired to file affidavit-in-opposition that be filed on or before May 04,2001, reply thereto, be filed on or before May 09, 2001. All the connected matters including the writ petition will be taken up together for hearing on May 16, 2001. Meanwhile interim order will continue. All these connected matters be treated as heard-in-part. It is also made clear that in appeal being MAT No. 1275 of 2001 yesterday we have given direction for filing affidavits and the appeal itself will be listed after six weeks. Learned counsel in this appeal are agreed to file the affidavit-in-opposition and reply thereto within the aforesaid period fixed today i. e. affidavit-in-opposition by May 04, 2001 reply, if any, by May 09, 2001. " ( 15 ) THE writ petition appeared on all successive dates before the Division Bench. ( 16 ) WHILE the writ petition was pending before the learned Single Judge the respondent No. 8 a steel manufacturer made an application before the learned single Judge for referring the matter to the Division Bench taking up public interest litigation matters on the ground that the writ petition, involved national matters and it should be tried as a public interest litigation. Such application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge and appeal was preferred from the said order the appeal was also dismissed by the Bench presided by the Chief justice sitting with Girish Chandra Gupta, J. ( 17 ) THE matter1 started appearing before the Division Bench presided over by the Chief Justice and from time to time adjournments were taken on behalf of the writ petitioners. Ultimately, we fixed the matter for hearing on 30th october, 2003. On the said date prayer for adjournment was also made which was refused by us. We started hearing of the writ petition as directed earlier. Mr. Goutam Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners made submissions on the said date. On the next day i. e. 4th November, 2003 Dr. On the said date prayer for adjournment was also made which was refused by us. We started hearing of the writ petition as directed earlier. Mr. Goutam Mitra, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners made submissions on the said date. On the next day i. e. 4th November, 2003 Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel made submissions on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioners. On that day also Dr. Rajiv Dhawan did not conclude his submission. The matter was fixed on 11th November, 2003 to accommodate dr. Dhawan. On November 11, 2003 when the matter was called on Dr. L. M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 8 and submitted that this writ petition could not be heard by a Division Bench. Referring to the order dated April 24, 2001 Mr. Singhvi submitted that his client was not a party to the said order and his consent was never taken. Moreover, by consent of parties the Division Bench did not confer jurisdiction upon themselves to hear the writ proceedings. Elaborate submissions were made by Dr. Singhvi on that date and thereafter by Dr. Dhawan appearing for the appellants, Ms. Indira Joysingh on behalf of the respondent No. 6, Mr. N. N. Gooptu (who appeared earlier for the respondent No. 8) on behalf of appellant no. 3, Mr. Bimal Chatterjee on behalf of the appellant No. 5, Mr. P. K. Mallick on behalf of Labour Union supported the contention of Mr. Singhvi. The arguments of the appellants/writ petitioners as well as supporting respondents in support of their contention that the writ petition was to be heard by the single Judge are as follows:1) By consent of parties the Division Bench can not confer jurisdiction upon themselves to hear a writ petition which is to be heard by a learned single Judge. 2) Since the writ petitions are heard by a Single Bench the parties have a right of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and as such the division Bench by hearing the writ petition can not take away such right granted to the parties by statute. 3) The writ rules of this Court do not prescribe that the writ petition can be heard by a Division Bench except habeaus corpus and public interest litigation matters. 3) The writ rules of this Court do not prescribe that the writ petition can be heard by a Division Bench except habeaus corpus and public interest litigation matters. 4) Even if the Chief Justice is the appropriate authority to assign the matters to a Bench sitting singly or in division he cannot, sitting in a Division bench exercise his administrative power to take up hearing of a writ petition which is to be hard by Single Judge. ( 18 ) IN support of these contentions the parties advancing such proposition cited the following decisions:- (i) 2000, Vol. 1, Calcutta High Court Notes, Page 649 (Ram Nath Santra and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (ii) 1969 Vol. 1, Supreme Court Cases, Page 358 (Khushro S. Gandhi and ors. vs. N. A. Guzder and Ors.) (iii) AIR 1962, Supreme Court, Page 83 (Para 9) (Jaisri Sahu vs. Rajdewar dubey and Ors.) (iv) AIR 1964, Supreme Court, Page 136 (A. Raghvamma and Anr. vs. A. Chenchamma and Anr.) (v) AIR 1972, Supreme Court, Page 51 (Para 9) (Sri Venkateswara Rice, ginning and Groundnut Oil Mill Contractors Co. etc. vs. State of Andhra pradesh and Ors.) (vi) AIR 1973, Supreme Court, Page 2131 (Paras 13 and 14) (State of rajasthan vs. Tarachand Jain) (vii) 1976, Vol-I, Supreme Court Cases, Page 852 (Para 8) [ram Jivan vs. Phoola (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. ] (viii) 1995, Vol-II (Supplementary), Supreme Court Cases, Page 539 (Para 5) (Virupakshayya Shankarayya vs. Neela Kanta Shivacharya pattadadevaru) (ix) 1988, Vol-II, Supreme Court Cases, Page 602 (Para 57) (A. R. Antulay vs. R. S, Nayak and Anr.) (x) 2003, Vol-V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 448 (State of Bihar vs. Kalika kuer @ Kalika Singh and Ors.) (xi) 1994, Vol-I, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 153 (Arun Prosad Mukherjee and ors. vs. Birendra Kumar Saha ). ( 19 ) OPPOSING such prayer of the appellant and the other supporting respondents Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the union of India and Mr. N. R. Roy Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for the revenue contended as follows:-1) The writ rules of this Court being Rules 26,28 and 53 read together did not put any bar on the Division Bench to hear a writ petition. 2) Nowhere in the writ Rules it is specifically mentioned that the writ petition should be heard by a Single Judge. 2) Nowhere in the writ Rules it is specifically mentioned that the writ petition should be heard by a Single Judge. 3) By the order dated April 24, 2001 the parties not only agreed to the hearing of the writ petition, in fact the hearing of the writ petition was almost concluded on 16th November, 2001 except the submission of Mr. Bimal Chatterjee learned counsel appearing for the appellant No. 3. Hence it is to belated for the parties to ask for a de novo hearing by the learned Single Judge. 4) The interim order passed by the learned Single Judge staying the operation of the subsequent notification of fixing of the floor price was affirmed by the Division Bench as well as the Apex Court on the ground that the final hearing of the writ petition was contemplated in the said order itself. Moreover, on January 31, 2001 the Division Bench stayed the hearing of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge which is still continuing and the parties accepted the said order. In fact the said order was passed at the instance of the appellants. 5) The appellants by making this application at a belated stage abused the process of this Court and is not entitled to approbate or reprobate. ( 20 ) IN support of their contentions the learned counsel appearing for the union of India and the Revenue cited the following decisions:- (i) 1989, Vol. II, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 433 (Sohan Lal Baid vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (ii) 1996, Vol. V, Supreme Court Cases, Page 550 [indian Bank vs. Satyam fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. ] (iii) 1996, Vol. III, Supreme Court Cases, Page 364 (Paras 29 and 30) (State bank of Patiala and Ors. vs. S. K. Sharma) (iv) 1994, Vol. I, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 152 (Para 5) (Arun Prosad mukherjee and Ors. vs. Birendra Kumar Saha ). (v) AIR 1976, Supreme Court, Page 1766 (Para 7) (Regional Manager and anr. vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey ). (vi) 2001, WBLR, Page 675 (Md. Rafiqul Islam and Ors. vs. State and Ors.) (vii)AIR 2000, Supreme Court, Page 1851 (R. Rathinam vs. State and Anr.) (viii)30 CWN, Page 885 (Bhutnath Deb and Ors. vs. Sashimukhi Brahmani ). ( 21 ) TO decide the issue let us first deal with the relevant rules. vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey ). (vi) 2001, WBLR, Page 675 (Md. Rafiqul Islam and Ors. vs. State and Ors.) (vii)AIR 2000, Supreme Court, Page 1851 (R. Rathinam vs. State and Anr.) (viii)30 CWN, Page 885 (Bhutnath Deb and Ors. vs. Sashimukhi Brahmani ). ( 21 ) TO decide the issue let us first deal with the relevant rules. ( 22 ) RULE 26 of our writ rules provides for the procedure for entertaining writ petition. It says that a Judge for the reason recorded at the hearing or at substantial stage of the proceeding may make it returnable before a Division bench or may while hearing the rule refer the same to Division Bench for hearing. This part of Rule 26 only gives power to a learned Single Judge to refer any question involved in the writ petition to a Division Bench and nothing else. It does not suggest that the writ petition is to be heard by a learned Single judge and learned Single Judge only. ( 23 ) RULE 28 stipulates that the writ application should be listed before the appropriate Bench. It does not infer that it should be necessarily before a Single judge and not a Division Bench. ( 24 ) RULE 53 provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would be made applicable in case of writ petition which are not in conflict with the writ rules and it also provides that nothing in the said rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court and as such inherent power can be exercised "for the ends of justice" or "to prevent abuse of the process of the Court". ( 25 ) APART from these three rules neither we find any other rule nor any reference was made by any of the parties. We have carefully examined the entire rule. It is only specific in rule 6 where it provides for habeas corpus matter to be heard by a Division Bench. In other cases the said rule is silent. ( 26 ) THE Chief Justice of the Court in his administrative capacity assign matters to various benches. It is long standing practice of this Court that writ petitions other than the habeas corpus and public interest litigation matters are heard by Single Judge having appropriate determination given by the Chief justice. In other cases the said rule is silent. ( 26 ) THE Chief Justice of the Court in his administrative capacity assign matters to various benches. It is long standing practice of this Court that writ petitions other than the habeas corpus and public interest litigation matters are heard by Single Judge having appropriate determination given by the Chief justice. Similarly, the appeals from various proceeding including writ proceedings are assigned to particular Division Benches constituted for the said purpose by the Chief Justice. The Division Bench having appropriate determination in writ matters take up writ appeals as per their determination given by the Chief Justice. Similarly, the instant appeal was placed before the bench presided over by Y. R. Meena, J. (as His Lordship then was) and was taken up by the said Bench. While hearing the said appeal the Division Bench thought it fit to hear the writ petition itself to prevent further lapse of time. Such is the inherent power of the Court derived from Rule 53. The Bench presided over by Y. R. Meena, J. was having appropriate determination in the subject writ appeal and appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding was also taken up by the said Bench and we do not find any breach in judicial discipline. Reference in this regard may be made to the Apex Court decision reported in the case of R. Rathiram vs. State (supra) cited by the parties. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said decision is relevant herein and is quoted below:-" (9) Every matter to be decided by a High Court is normally decided by a two Judges Bench of the High Court. For achieving expediency in disposal of cases, statutes have provided that certain categories of cases can be heard and disposed of by Single Judges of the High Court. But it must be pointed out that all matters which can be heard and decided by a Single Judge can as well be heard and decided by a Division Bench but not vice-versa, subject to statutory restrictions passed by the Legislature. It is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of a High Court to allot cases to different Judges of the high Court for disposal, subject to such statutory provisions. It is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of a High Court to allot cases to different Judges of the high Court for disposal, subject to such statutory provisions. (10) In State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand, 1998 (1) SCC 1: 1998 AIR scw 1219: AIR 1998 SC 1344: 1998 Cri LJ 2012 a three Judge, Bench of this Court has held that the Chief Justice of the High Court has a prerogative to distribute business of the High Court, both judicial and administrative. The Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the right and the power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted: which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear and also as which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. " ( 27 ) FROM the aforesaid decision it is clear that the Division Bench presided over by Y. R. Meena, J. neither breached the judicial discipline nor was incompetent to entertain the same. ( 28 ) IT would not be out of place to mention here that there is no uniform rule prevailing in the High Courts of the country to hear the writ petition. Some of the High Courts entertain writ petition by a Division Bench. Some of the Courts including Calcutta High Court entertain writ petition through Single Bench. There is no hard and first rule at least provided for in any statute (at least not shown to us) that writ petition must be heard by a Single Judge and Single judge only. Hence, the submission of the appellant and the other supporting respondents to the extent that the said Division Bench did not have jurisdiction to entertain and hear the writ petition is not tenable and is rejected. ( 29 ) THE second contention that the right of appeal under clause 15 is taken away, is also not tenable. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal from an order of a Single Judge. In case the writ petition is heard by the Single judge obviously the aggrieved party may approach the Division Bench. It does not necessarily mean that the writ petition must be heard by a Single Judge. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal from an order of a Single Judge. In case the writ petition is heard by the Single judge obviously the aggrieved party may approach the Division Bench. It does not necessarily mean that the writ petition must be heard by a Single Judge. We reiterate that the writ rules do not provide any such specific embargo on the Division Bench to take up the writ matter. Hence, the second contention of the appellants and the supporting respondents being not tenable and is rejected. The third contention that the writ rules do not provide for hearing of writ petition by the Division Bench and as such the writ petition can not be heard by the Division Bench, is an argument without any logic. Writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution are to be heard by High Court as per the mandate of the Constitution which Bench of the High Court would hear the same, is the prerogative of the Chief Justice. As I have said hereinbefore that the writ rules are silent on this question except in habeas corpus matters. It is true that the particular writ petition as per the determination of the Chief Justice in administrative capacity was to be heard by a Single Bench. At the same time appeal arising there from was to be heard by a Division Bench on that date. The concerned Division Bench was having the determination to take up instant appeal and since there was no embargo in the rule to hear the said matter the division Bench was well within its right to take up the said matter and such contention is rejected. ( 30 ) WITH regard to fourth contention that the Chief Justice should not exercise his administrative power sitting in Division Bench. In my considered opinion that since the order dated April 24, 2001 is valid in the eye of law as I have already observed the question of further assignment does not arise. In any event, the Chief Justice is the appropriate person to assign any matter to any bench in his administrative capacity. He is the Chief Justice of this High Court for the entire day whether he assigns matters sitting in a Division Bench or in his Chamber or at his residence is of no consequence. Hence, such submission being not tenable is also rejected. He is the Chief Justice of this High Court for the entire day whether he assigns matters sitting in a Division Bench or in his Chamber or at his residence is of no consequence. Hence, such submission being not tenable is also rejected. ( 31 ) A controversy has also been raised in this regard with regard to conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court one presided over by A. N. Ray, j reported in 2001, Vol. I, Calcutta High Court Notes page 649 (Ram Nath sultan vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) and other presided over by Altamas kabir. J. reported in 2001 WBLR, page 675 (Md. Rafiqul Islam vs. State of west Bengal and Ors. ). By the former judgment the Division Bench by an order refused to hear the writ petition which was originally directed to be heard by the Division Bench at the time of admission of the appeal. Paragraph 2 of the said judgment is quoted below:-"it is our clear opinion that the parties could not by consent confer upon the division Bench jurisdiction which it does not otherwise posses. A writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invariably to be heard by a Hon'ble Single Bench of this High Court in the first instance the division Bench can not dispose a writ application as a Court of first instance it can only sit in appeal. " ( 32 ) IN this judgment the Division Bench held that by consent of parties the division Bench did not confer jurisdiction as it did not otherwise possess the same. The Division Bench, however, did not consider the writ rules and such view of the Division Bench was given taken without referring to any statute or any precedent. The said decision of the Division Bench was considered by another division Bench in the case of Rafiqul Islam (supra) where the Division Bench considering the earlier decision held that the Writ Court derives jurisdiction from Constitution. However, for the sake of administrative convenience such decision is circumscribed by rules framed by the High Court. The learned judges of the Division Bench referred to Rule 26 which provides for reference of a writ proceedings before a Division Bench. The Division Bench ultimately held that the former decision was a per enquirium. However, for the sake of administrative convenience such decision is circumscribed by rules framed by the High Court. The learned judges of the Division Bench referred to Rule 26 which provides for reference of a writ proceedings before a Division Bench. The Division Bench ultimately held that the former decision was a per enquirium. The same situation arose in this Court in the case of Sohanlal Baid vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1989 vol-II, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 443, which supports the view taken by the learned Judge in the case of Rafiqul Islam (supra ). Submission was made that since the Coordinate Bench has observed otherwise in the earlier judgment learned Division Bench should have referred the matter to a larger Bench before avoiding it by saying it per enquirium. An Apex Court decision in this regard was also cited by the appellants reported in 2003 Vol-V, Supreme Court Cases, page 448. We are not going into this question and leave the same as it is in view of the Apex Court decision in the case of R. Rathiram vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra ). Assuming the writ proceeding was to be heard by the learned single Judge, in view of the Apex Court decision it can also be heard by the division Bench. ( 33 ) BEFORE we part with we must record our strong disapproval about the conduct of the appellants and the supporting respondents. The writ petition was originally moved in later part of 1999. Interim order was obtained and the same was sustained upto Apex Court. When the learned Single Judge specifically directed hearing of the matter day to day on and from 31st January, 2001 the writ petitioners approached the Division Bench for stay of the said order. Since the subject appeal was from the order of refusal of amendment on April 24, 2001 when the Division Bench directed writ proceedings to be heard by themselves, they could have disposed of the appeal by allowing the amendment which were later on done and the matter could have been remanded back to the learned Single Judge on that date and the writ petition could have been disposed by the learned Single Judge by this time. The parties invited the Division Bench to hear the writ proceedings. The parties invited the Division Bench to hear the writ proceedings. In fact the hearing was closed on 16th October, 2001 and it was only because of Mr. Bimal Chatterjee whose argument was not complete the hearing was postponed. Unfortunately, the learned Presiding Judge was transferred to another High Court and the writ petition was to be heard de novo. The hearing started on 30th October, 2003 after several adjournments at the instance of the appellants and their supporters. We heard the matters on two dates i. e. 30th October, 2003 and 4th November, 2003 on merits and then on 11th November, 2003 the hearing of the writ petition was stalled at the instance of respondent No. 8 and supported by the appellants and their supporters. The respondent No. 8 also abused the process of this Court. Respondent No. 8 initially approached the Single Judge with a prayer that the writ petition should be heard by the Division Bench as it involved public importance. However, the said prayer was rejected by the learned Single Judge and affirmed by the division Bench on January 10, 2001. On January 31, 2001 when the appeal was moved before the other Division Bench from the order of refusal of amendment the respondent No. 8 was being represented by Mr. Bhaskar Sen, learned senior counsel before the said Division Bench. However, on April 24, 2001 none appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 8 on the said date and as such the respondent No. 8 is now trying to take advantage of its own absence on the said date. ( 34 ) WE are also unable to appreciate the stand of the respondent No. 8. At one stage they made application before the learned Single Judge for transferring the matter to the Division Bench and thereafter before us contended that it should be remanded back to the learned Single Judge. ( 35 ) IF the aforesaid facts are not abuse of process of Court I am unable to find out what further abuse it could be. If we are without jurisdiction under rule 26 or 28 we are having inherent power under Rule 53 to stop this abuse of process. ( 36 ) WE are also unable to conceive of the stand of the Steel Authority of india Limited, a wholly owned Government of India Undertaking. If we are without jurisdiction under rule 26 or 28 we are having inherent power under Rule 53 to stop this abuse of process. ( 36 ) WE are also unable to conceive of the stand of the Steel Authority of india Limited, a wholly owned Government of India Undertaking. The said authority might have grievance on merits which are incidentally identical with the other manufacturers being the appellants and the respondent Nos. 6 and 8. I asked specifically to Mr. Joyanta Mitra, learned senior counsel appearing for the Steel Authority of India Ltd. whether the said respondent is supporting such prayer of transfer of the matter to the learned Single Judge in the above backdrop. We are sorry to say that the answer was some what in favour of the appellants and their supporters on this issue. ( 37 ) WE have no special inclination to take up any particular matter. However, if we accede to the request of the appellants and their supporters at this stage in this backdrop it would be a premium to latches and wrong and abuse of process committed by the appellants and their supporters. Hence, the prayer of the respondent No. 8 as supported by the appellants and the respondent No. 6 and 7 for transferring this matter to a learned Single Judge is rejected and we direct the parties to proceed with hearing of the writ petition on merits. CAN no. 9364 of 2003 filed by the appellants is thus dismissed. There would be, however, no order as to costs. ( 38 ) LET xerox certified copy of this order be supplied to the learned Counsel of the respective parties in course of the day upon compliance of all the formalities. Appeals dismissed.