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2003 DIGILAW 576 (PAT)

Satya Narayan Singh v. State Of Bihar

2003-05-14

B.N.P.SINGH, R.S.GARG

body2003
Judgment R.S.Garg, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the correctness, validity and propriety of the letter issued by the Registrar General, High Court of Patna on 3.1.2002 whereunder the petitioner was informed that the Court having assessed and evaluated the petitioners services have been pleased not to allow the petitioner the benefit of enhancement of the retirement age from 58 years to 60 years and further informs the petitioner that the petitioner shall cease to be a member of the judicial service of the State on his completing the age of 58 years. 2. The petitioner submits that the refusal of extension for a further period of two years is patently illegal and is in the teeth of the service records and the confidential reports of the present petitioner. It is also submitted that the denial of extension to the petitioner is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the Judicial Officers having no comparative records with the petitioner have been allowed the extension and the said decision is contrary to the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play, and the order is arbitrary. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of the present writ application are that the petitioner joined the Bihar Subordinate Judicial Services on the post of Munsif on 15.5.1975 and was thereafter confirmed on 24.6.1977. Later on he was promoted to the rank of Sub Judge on 17.10.1985 and was confirmed as Sub Judge on 1.1.1990. He was promoted to the Bihar Superior Judicial Service on 15.12.1995 in the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judge and was confirmed on the said post on 1.7.1997. While posted as 2nd Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Bhabhua (Kaimur) he was served with the Registrar Generals Fax/ letter dated 3.1.2002, as contained in Annexure-3. 4. According to the petitioner, though he had earned certain adverse entries, certain files were opened against him and sometimes he was required to submit the show cause but even the totality of the adverse entries, opening of the files and notice to show cause was not such an impediment to refuse him the extension in the services. 5. 4. According to the petitioner, though he had earned certain adverse entries, certain files were opened against him and sometimes he was required to submit the show cause but even the totality of the adverse entries, opening of the files and notice to show cause was not such an impediment to refuse him the extension in the services. 5. On 29.1.1983 vide Memo No. 576- 77 adverse entries were conveyed to the petitioner; the petitioner submitted his explanation through the then District & Sessions Judge under his representation dated 24.3.1983. According to the petitioner, the said representation was self explanatory and was establishing petitioners innocence. The petitioner submits that the adverse entries communicated on 29.1.1983 were for the period prior to 29.1.1983. the said entries had become stale and the same could not be used against the petitioner after lapse of 20 years. It is also contended by him that after submission of his representation dated 24.3.1983 he was promoted as Sub Judge on 17.10.1985 and was confirmed as Sub Judge on 1.10.1990, thereafore, the said adverse entries lost their efficacy and stood nullified for all the times to come in future. 6. Vide letter no. 511 dated 11.7.1995 the High Court sought for an explanation from the petitioner in relation to the allegations made by one Sarswati Kumar Turiar made in SLP (Civil) No. 11395/1990 filed before Hon ble the Supreme Court of India. According to the petitioner, the allegations were identical to which were made against the petitioner earlier and on an earlier occasion the petitioner had submitted his representation dated 4.1.1985 to the High Court through the then District & Sessions Judge, Gaya. The petitioner submitted his show cause-cum-representation on 21.11.1995 in response to the letter no. 511 dated 11.7.1995 and sought to explain his conduct. He submitted that the explanations submitted by the petitioner in his earlier representation were accepted earlier by the High Court, and therefore, there was no cause to issue yet another notice to show cause to the petitioner. The petitioner was thereafter required to submit his explanation in view of the judicial pronouncement made by one of the Hon ble Judge of this Court on 8.3.1999 in Cr. Misc. No. 11976/98, the High Court in its order had observed that grant of bail to the main assailant Bhola Kahar in Barchhatti RS. Case No. 8/90 was wholly unjustified. The petitioner was thereafter required to submit his explanation in view of the judicial pronouncement made by one of the Hon ble Judge of this Court on 8.3.1999 in Cr. Misc. No. 11976/98, the High Court in its order had observed that grant of bail to the main assailant Bhola Kahar in Barchhatti RS. Case No. 8/90 was wholly unjustified. The petitioner submitted an explanation, as alleged, the same was considered by the Standing Committee of the High Court and was duly accepted. 7. According to the petitioner, beyond the above referred communication no other adverse remarks or allegations were communicated to him nor anything adverse to his character or conduct was found. The petitioner submits that the state entries and the entries in relation to which the explanation were sought and accepted by the High Court could not provide a foundation for refusing the extension, firstly because the entries became stale and the entries were of a very long distance of time and secondly because the representation against some of the adverse entries/remarks were already accepted. It is also the case of the petitioner that his integrity was never under cloud or doubt and was never found to be bad by his District & Sessions Judge or by the Inspecting Judges of the High Court. In his self-assessment, he is a Judicial Officer of good reputation. In the high esteem, the petitioner asserts that his rate of disposal of cases was high and was appreciated by all concerned and was never lower in comparison to those Judicial Officer, who have been granted extension. It is submitted that statements regarding rate of disposal of the cases for the period between June, 1998 to December, 2001 would demonstrably show that the petitioner is justified in his assertion. It is also contended that his judicial work, if is compared and assessed fairly with the other Judicial Officers, it would clearly appear that the petitioner would come amongst first five Judges of the Bihar Superior Judical Services. It is contended by him that he has the utility value in the judicial services, neither he is indolent nor infirm nor a person of ill-health nor is a person of doubtful integrity or bad reputation nor he is an Officer having average or poor disposal, he was entitled to extension. 8. It is contended by him that he has the utility value in the judicial services, neither he is indolent nor infirm nor a person of ill-health nor is a person of doubtful integrity or bad reputation nor he is an Officer having average or poor disposal, he was entitled to extension. 8. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Evaluation Committee did not appreciate his case properly and even in absence of adverse material his case for extension has been rejected. He submits that the Evaluation Committee was unjustified in observing that the petitioner has no utility value and is not entitled to extension of service. The petitioner is also of the opinion that his judgments are of quality and in any case there was nothing before the Evaluation Committee to form a contrary opinion. 9. To support his submissions, it is contended that one of the Hon ble Inspecting Judge visited petitioners court on 16.10.2001, watched the court proceedings and conduct of the petitioner as a Judicial Officer and had discussions with the members of the Bar including the Secretary of the Bar Association. The petitioner presumes that nothing wrong was found or reported against him.The submission of the petitioner, in fact, is that the Judicial Officer who are having inferior records in comparison to the petitioner have been retained in service and for no good reason, rather because of arbitrary approach, the petitioner has been denied the extension. Challenging the correctness of the report submitted by the Evaluation Committee and the Full Court resolution not allowing the extension for further period of two years, the petitioner submits that the order of the Full Court and report of the Evaluation Committee be set aside and his matter be remitted to the High Court for reconsideration. 10. The Respondent-High Court through the Joint Registrar (Judicial) has filed the counter. It is contended in the said counter that Hon ble the Chief Justice, Patna High Court has constituted a Nine Member Evaluation Committee including himself. The said Committee is required to consider the cases of the Officers for their extension in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India & ors. ( AIR 1993 SC 2493 ). The said Committee is required to consider the cases of the Officers for their extension in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India & ors. ( AIR 1993 SC 2493 ). It is further submitted that cases of as many as 22 Judicial Officers were considered to find out whether they have potential for continued useful service for their retention in services beyond 58 years of their age. The said Evaluation Committee considered the potential for continued useful service of these 22 Officers and while considering it also considered their character rolls, quality of judgments, general reputation regarding their efficiency, integrity and honesty in light of the principles and guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court and resolved that extension benefit be given to 11 Officers out of 22 only, the Committee was unanimous in refusing the extension in its resolution and observed that extension to the other 11 Officers for their further continuance in judicial service will not be in the public interest as they do not have potential for continued useful service. In the Full Court meeting dated 15.12.2001, the matter was discussed and the recommendations were unanimously approved and the resolution was passed that the benefit of extension of service/increase of retirement age be made available to 11 Judicial Officers only and the other 11 Officers be denied the said benefit. 11. Referring to the service records the High Court in its counter has not denied the particular dates regarding petitioners joining the judicial services, his confirmation and promotion etc. It is contended in paragraph 8 that in the year 1975-76 the petitioner was found to be a mediocre. The petitioner submits that he joined the services in the year 1975 itself, he could not do anything better than what he had done. The High Court says that in the year 1979- 80 his output throughout the year was found Consistently poor or capable of improvement. The allegation further is that due to his carelessness an accused managed to get released on a fake bail order. The petitioner submits that the bail order was received by him through proper channel and he was not unjustified in releasing the accused. The District Judge reported that the petitioner was indulged in litigation with his landlord and appeared to be dull. The petitioner submits that the bail order was received by him through proper channel and he was not unjustified in releasing the accused. The District Judge reported that the petitioner was indulged in litigation with his landlord and appeared to be dull. In the year 1983-84, the District Judge observed that the petitioner was freely mixing with the lawyers which made him controversial and the petitioner was practising casteism. Later on the District Judge for the year 1985-86 recorded that the petitioner was free from any ism. According to the High Court, the petitioner had otherwise secured good remarks. 12. It is also contended that complaints were made against the petitioner that in his capacity as Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Siwan he granted bail to the accused of his caste in a case under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. A File No. XXIX-99-1983 (Apptt) was opened. The District Judge, Siwan was required to make a confidential enquiry, after receiving the report from the learned District Judge the Hon ble J.A.D. directed that the allegation petition be filed. Yet another allegation petition was received from one Deepak Kumar that the present petitioner and other Officers were misusing their powers for their personal gains ana for torturing the said Deepak Kumar by putting him behind the bar. The said allegation petition was referred to the Special Cell for needful by the order dated 4.12.1984 of the Assistant Registrar-l. 13. Vigilance Cell File No. XXIII-8- 1985 related to the S.L.R filed against the judgment of the High Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 705/88 where the said appellant made the allegations against the petitioner that he failed to pay the rent and to harass the petitioner a case of theft against the son of the said petitioner was instituted and that by influencing another Judge Sri H. Hassan, the present petitioner got the said bail application of the said petitioners son rejected. The Supreme Court sent a copy of the S.L.P to the Chief Justice of the High Court to look into the matter. The matter was placed before the Standing Committee which in its meetings dated 28.6.1995 and 1.7.1995 resolved that explanation be called from the petitioner. The Supreme Court sent a copy of the S.L.P to the Chief Justice of the High Court to look into the matter. The matter was placed before the Standing Committee which in its meetings dated 28.6.1995 and 1.7.1995 resolved that explanation be called from the petitioner. The explanations of the petitioner and Sri H. Hassan were considered by the Standing Committee in its meeting dated 8.8.1996 and the said explanations were accepted and the matter was dropped. 14. Special Cell File No. XXII-3-1989 was opened on the basis of the allegation petition made by one Kishori Ram, who alleged that in Execution Case No. 7/88, the decree holder obtained delivery of possession by bringing the Court in collusion. The District Judge on confidential enquiry found him to be an officer of high character and integrity. The Hon ble Inspecting Judge directed that the matter be dropped. 15. Special Cell File No. XXIII-15-91 was also opened against the petitioner on a letter received from Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India wherein it was alleged that Mr. Singh, when he was the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Gaya, granted bail to Block Development Officer, a person of his own caste in matters where offences were punishable under Section 376/464 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the report of the District Judge, Gaya was placed before the Hon ble Inspecting Judge and the Hon ble Judge was pleased to drop the matter vide the minutes dated 19.7.1991. 16. Yet another petition was received from Budhijivi Samaj, Rohtas wherein it was alleged that the petitioner was taking bribe through his relations and to cite an example, Sasaran Town RS. Case No. 586/91 under Section 377 l.P.C. was referred in the allegation petition. The District Judge submitted the report saying that Sri Singh, Chief Judicial Magistrate had exercised his discretion and the District Judge was keeping a watch over the work of the said Chief Judicial Magistrate. The matter was placed before the Hon ble Inspecting Judge, who agreed with the report of the District Judge. 17. One Hira Pandey, informant of Shiv Sagar RS. Case No. 25/92 made allegations against the petitioner, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram that he had issued bail orders in favour of the accused who did not appear in his court though non-bailable warrants of arrest were issued against him. 17. One Hira Pandey, informant of Shiv Sagar RS. Case No. 25/92 made allegations against the petitioner, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram that he had issued bail orders in favour of the accused who did not appear in his court though non-bailable warrants of arrest were issued against him. The original records were requisitioned by the High Court and after perusing the recrods, the Standing Committee observed that no further action was needed. 18. On the basis of a supplementary special report of the District Judge, Motihari in connection with the conduct of the petitioner, File No. (PF) XIX-61-1996 was opened. The earlier report in this was also received and File No. XIX-62-92 was opened and was placed before Hon ble Mr. Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya. As the first file was not returned the second file was opened and was again placed before the same Hon ble Judge who was pleased to observe that since Sri Singh has been transferred from Motihari the matter be closed. Yet another Vigilance Cell File No. XXI-4-1999 was opened on strength of an extract from the copy of the inspection report recorded by Hon ble Mr. Justice RK. Deb. The Hon ble Inspecting Judge made an enquiry into the matter and ultimately the matter was dropped on 22.3.1999. 19. The High Court in its counter says that submission of the complaints time and again against the petitioner would show that his conduct was prone to complaint, he was acting in a manner which was causing apprehension in the mind of the general public and was creating the impression that he was not a good officer or acting fairly. 19. The High Court in its counter says that submission of the complaints time and again against the petitioner would show that his conduct was prone to complaint, he was acting in a manner which was causing apprehension in the mind of the general public and was creating the impression that he was not a good officer or acting fairly. The High Court has also submitted that the petitioners self-assessment would not suffice because the work is to be assessed by the Evaluation Committee and the Full Court and if the Evaluation Committee after evaluating the complete service records, character, conduct and other things including the future utility has submitted the report that extension may not be granted and the High Court on the adminstrative side accepts the reports then on the judicial side, the High Court should not interfere in the matter, it is also contended by the High Court that by not granting extension the right of a judicial Officer is not taken away, in such cases the High Court is not required to communicate its decision in this regard to the Judicial Officer because on attaining the age of superannuation, the officer would stand retired automatically. The High Court says that the case of entitlement to the exten sion benefit of each Judicial Officer is considered by the Evaluation Committee and thereafter the Full Court considers the report and the available materials, and in a system like present when the Full Court considers the matter, there is no scope of any mistake. Lastly it is contended that the High Court can make a judicial review of the decision-making-process and not of the decision itself. 20. The petitioner in his rejoinder reiterated his case and inter alia submitted that though number of files were opened against him but every time on submission of the petitioners representation/show cause, the files were closed or the matters were dropped. According to him, this would clearly show that the complaints were manufactured, those complaints had nothing to do with the reality and the order to drop the complaints would clearly mean that the High Court on the administrative side found nothing in those complaints. The petitioner submits that he is entitled to extension because of his service career and the future utility. 21. The petitioner submits that he is entitled to extension because of his service career and the future utility. 21. The parties have relied upon certain judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court in support of their respective contentions which we shall consider in the foregoing paragraphs. 22. The controversy regarding extension in the age flew from the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in the matter of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India ( AIR 1992 SC 165 ). In the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that the age of retirement for the Judges shall remain 58 years but a period of extension can be granted for further two years, thus a Judge may be allowed to work upto the age of 60 years. The matter again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of All India Judges Association vs. Union of India ( AIR 1993 SC 2493 ). Both the sides have placed reliance upon the said judgment of the Supreme Court. In the said matter, after taking note of its earlier judgment, the Supreme Court observed that any direction regarding the service conditions for the members of the Subordinate Judiciary by the Supreme Court would not be an encroachment on the powers of the Executive and the Legislature. The Apex Court also observed that the Supreme Court would be justified in prescribing minimum necessary service conditions and facilities for proper administration of justice and plea of the financial burden likely to be imposed by the directions are misconceived. In All India Judges Association-2 the Supreme Court observed that the Judicial Officers enter the services at a relatively higher age than the members of other services and the judicial service stands by itself in the matter of the age of retirement by reason of the great importance of a long experience and a mature mind in the judicial office. The Supreme Court also took note of the fact that the Country Court Judges and Metropolitican Magistrates retire at 72; also the tenure and other terms and conditions of service of the Supreme Court and the High Court Judges stand out from those relating to the administrative service. The Supreme Court further observed- it is, therefore, for the health of the administration of justice that attractive service conditions including a higher retirement age is prescribed for the members of the judiciary. The Supreme Court further observed- it is, therefore, for the health of the administration of justice that attractive service conditions including a higher retirement age is prescribed for the members of the judiciary. It observed that for the same reason it is necessary that whatever trained talent is available is utilised for as long as period as is feasible. 23. In the matter of enhancement of the age in judicial services, the Supreme Court observed that there is no similarity in the nature of the sedentary work done by the Judge and the members of the other services. The Court also observed as un der : "There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To what extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all Judicial Officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committee of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shali be made on the basis of the Judicial Officers past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters." 24. It appears that being impressed by the words used by the Supreme Court in the matter of All India Judges Association-2 wherein the Supreme Court had said that there would be compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years, unless enhancement is given, the petitioner is pursuaded to submit before this Court that in case of compulsory retirement, the petitioner is entitled to submit before the judicial forum that uncommunicated adverse entries cannot be used or utilised against him and if the adverse entries have not been communicated to him right in time denying him an opportunity of making an effective representation then such entries should not find basis for retiring the incumbent compulsorily or on the same footing refusing him the enhancement. 25. 25. For the purpose learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of J.D. Srivastava vs. State of M.P. & Ors. [ (1984) 2 SCC 8 ]. In the said matter, the Apex Court had observed that power to retire a Government servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service rule is absolute provided the authority concerned forms an opinion bona fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. It was further observed that if such decision in based on collateral grounds or if the decision is arbitrary, it is liable to be interfered with by courts. It was also held in the said matter that confidential reports relating to a remote period are not quite relevant for the purpose of determining whether an officer should be retired compulsorily or not. The Supreme Court also observed that if an Officer has been promoted subsequent to the adverse entry then such an adverse entry cannot be relied upon because the action would be arbitrary bordering perversity and would not be proper. It was also held by the Supreme Court that any adverse report in respect of an earlier period unless it has some connection with any event which took place subsequently cannot reasonably form a basis in forming an opinion about the work of the concerned Officer. 26. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Brij Mohan Singh Chopra vs. State of Pubjab ( AIR 1987 SC 948 ) and State of Haryana vs. P.C. Wadhwa ( AIR 1987 SC 1201 ). In the matter of Brij Mohan Singh (supra) the Supreme Court had observed that the adverse entries should be immediately communicated and the step of compulsory retirement is to be taken with the object to weed out the ineffecient, corrupt, dishonestor dead-wood from the government service. 27. Reiterating the principle laid down in earlier judgments it was also observed that if subsequent to the adverse entry promotion is granted to the incumbent then such adverse entry cannot be taken into consideration while forming an opinion to retire him prematurely because such adverse entries lose their significance after promotion of an employee. 27. Reiterating the principle laid down in earlier judgments it was also observed that if subsequent to the adverse entry promotion is granted to the incumbent then such adverse entry cannot be taken into consideration while forming an opinion to retire him prematurely because such adverse entries lose their significance after promotion of an employee. In fact, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the adverse entry would not be considered to be of such a great importance otherwise promotion could have been denied. The Supreme Court further observed that "It is now well settled that while considering the question of premature retirement it may be desirable to make an overall assessment of the Government servants record, but while doing that, more value should be attached to the confidential reports pertaining to the years immediately preceding such considerations. It is possible that a new entrant to a service may have committed mistakes and for that reason he may have earned adverse entries and if those entries of early years of service are taken into consideration for prematurely retiring a Government employee then perhaps no employee would be safe even though he may have brilliant record of service in later years. Old and stale entries should not be taken into account while considering the question of premature retirement; instead the entries of recent past of five to ten years should be considered in forming the requisite opinion to retire a Government employee in public interest. It would be unreasonable and unjust to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore the good entries of recent past. If entries for a period of more than 10 years past are taken into account, it would be an act of digging out past to get some material to make an order against the employee." 28. In the matter of the State of Haryana (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that "The whole object of the making a communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performances, conduct or character, as the case may be. The adverse remarks should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned,so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The adverse remarks should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned,so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The whole object of the making of adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay. In the instant case, it was communicated to the respondent, the Inspector General of Police, Haryana, after twenty seven months. It is true that the provisions of Rules 5, 6, 6A and 7 are directory and not mandatory, but that does not mean that the directory provisions need not be complied with even substantially. Such provisions may not be complied with strictly, and substantial compliance will be sufficient. But where compliance after an inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provision, such compliance would not be substantial compliance. In the instant case, while the provisions of Rules 5, 6, 6A and 7 require that everything including the communication of the adverse remarks should be completed within a period of seven months, this period cannot be stretched to twenty seven months, simply because these Rules are directory without serving any purpose consistent with the spirit and objectives of these Rules". 29. Placing very strong reliance on these observations of the Supreme Court it is vehementally contended that undisputedly certain adverse entries were not communicated to the petitioner, therefore, and as the petitioner was not afforded due opportunity of making an effective representation and as subsequent to the alleged entries promotion has been effected in favour of the petitioner, such entries could not be taken into consideration to deny the benefit of extension of service. 30. Contending contrary to the said argument, the learned counsel for the respondents, placing strong reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 305 ] submitted that the use of the words "compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years" have been explained in this judgment and the Supreme Court had observed that the words "compulsory retirement" would mean that at the age of 58 years, the man is to retire. [ (2001) 2 SCC 305 ] submitted that the use of the words "compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years" have been explained in this judgment and the Supreme Court had observed that the words "compulsory retirement" would mean that at the age of 58 years, the man is to retire. According to him, the Subordinate Judiciary is under administrative and disciplinary control of the High Court and if the High Court after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the overall performance of the incumbent comes to a particular conclusion and refuses to give the benefit of enhancement of age then such a person would stand retired at his normal service tenure of 58 years and this retirement in any case would not be a compulsory retirement. 31. In the matter of Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that "The use of the words "compulsory retirement" for the judicial officers allowed to superannuate at the age of 58 years and the expressions such as "compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 58 years according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the rules" in the decision in All India Judges Assn. case (1993) 4 SCC 288 have emboldened the petitioner to raise the plea that subsequent to the judgment in that case, the retirement of a judicial officer at the age of 58 years was not retirement in ordinary course but compulsory retirement and therefore the procedure for compulsory retirement had to be followed. Such a submission cannot be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment". 32. In relation to All India Judges Assn. case-2, the Supreme Court ob- served as follows : "1. Direction with regard to the enhancement of superannuation age of judicial officers given in the said case does not result in automatic enhancement of the age of superannuation. By force of the judgment a Judicial Officer does not acquire a right to continue in service up to the extended age of 60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. Else the judicial officers retire at superannuation age appointed in the service rules governing conditions of service of the judicial officers." "2. The direction given in the said case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing from the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government. Once the service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the direction ceases to operate." "3. The High Court may, before or after the normal age of superannuation, compulsorily retire a judicial officer subject to formation of an opinion that compulsory retirement in public interest was needed. The decision to compulsorily retire must be in accordance with relevant service rules independent of the exercise for evaluation of judicial officer made pursuant to the said case. Recommendation for compulsory retirement shall have to be sent to State Government which would pass and deliver the necessary orders." "4. If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit of extension in superannuation age he would retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules. No specific order or communication in that regard is called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State. Such retirement is not compulsory retirement" in the sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of "compulsory retirement in public interest". No right of the judicial officer is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard, it would be better advised not to use therein the expression "compulsory retirement". It creates confusion." 33. From the said observation of the Supreme Court it would clearly appear that there is sharp and pointed distinction between "compulsory retirement" and "retirement on completion of the tenure after extension of age in service and non-extension of service tenure". It creates confusion." 33. From the said observation of the Supreme Court it would clearly appear that there is sharp and pointed distinction between "compulsory retirement" and "retirement on completion of the tenure after extension of age in service and non-extension of service tenure". If the High Court finds a Judicial Officer not entitled to the benefit of extension in superannuation age, he would retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules. According to the Supreme Court any specific order or communication in that regard is not called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State. The Supreme Court pointedly said that such retirement would not be "compulsory retirement" in the sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of "compulsory retirement in public interest". The Supreme Court was candid in saying that when a Judicial Officer retires on the last date fixed under the service rules none of his right is taken away. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that paragraphs 22, 24 & 25 would show that in light of the particular facts of the said case, the Supreme Court had made those observations and the observations are not of universal application. In our opinion the argument is misconceived. In paragraphs 22, 24 & 25 of the said judgment the Supreme Court had considered the service report of the said of- ficer. In paragraph 25, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court was justified in not extending the service after taking into consideration the complete service record with requisite emphasis on recent performance. 35. it would be necessary to note that in the said judgment the Supreme Court referred to certain earlier observations made by the Supreme Court in some other judgments relating to importance of the periodical inspections of Subordinate Courts. The Supreme Court observed that the inspection should be carried out regularly so as to keep a vigil and watch on the functioning of the subordinate judiciary, the importance and significance whereon needs no emphasis. 36. The Supreme Court observed that the inspection should be carried out regularly so as to keep a vigil and watch on the functioning of the subordinate judiciary, the importance and significance whereon needs no emphasis. 36. A strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of High Court of Punjab & Haryana vs. Ishwar Chand Jain [ (1999) 4 SCC 579 ].The Supreme Court also emphasised that the power to make entries in the service records have potential for shaping the future career of a subordinate Officer but at the same time casts an obligation on the High Court to keep a watch and vigil over the performance of the members of the Subordinate Judiciary. An assessment of quality and quanity of performance and progress of the judicial officers should be an ongoing process continued round the year and then to make a record in objective manner of the impressions formulated by such assessment. In para 33 of the said judgment the Supreme Court in no undoubtful terms issued a reminder to the High Courts that the High Court should see that periodical inspections are made and on strength of the entries made in the service records, proper actions are taken. 37. In our opinion, this is high time when we must remind ourselves that if we are not answerable to anybody, we are answerable to ourselves and to the system; we are answerable to our conscience; we are answerable to our oath and we are also answerable to the confidence which the public and the Subordinate Judiciary reposes in us. While the public looks at us for dispensation of justice, the Subordinate Judiciary looks at us for privileges, protection and promotions which are due. If we fail in our duty, dont have periodical inspections and cases of the Officers are not considered right in time, the same is likely to cause heart-burning and feeling of insecurity in the subordinate judiciary. It cannot be doubted that a good officer wants his periodical inspections so that his work, honesty, character, integrity, disposal and his overall performance is brought to the notice of the High Court while on the other hand an incompetent or a bad officer does not want that he be put under the vigil of inspections. It cannot be doubted that a good officer wants his periodical inspections so that his work, honesty, character, integrity, disposal and his overall performance is brought to the notice of the High Court while on the other hand an incompetent or a bad officer does not want that he be put under the vigil of inspections. If the periodical inspections are not made, not only the Officer suffers but sometimes the channel of promotion and conferment of benefits is also bereaved. If the High Court on its administrative side has made certain guidelines relating to inspection then the said guidelines should be adhered to but in case there are no guidelines or executive instructions then a Judge would be a Judge of the situation and will have to exercise his discretion in accordance with law and service jurisprudence. We must remind ourselves that recording of the annual entry or confidential report is not an empty formality. It provides a foundation in favour of the incumbent for his promotion and grades and at the same time provides material to the High Court to assess the Officer. If the High Court on such material finds that the officer should not be promoted or continued in service or enhancement of age should not be given to him then the High Court would be justified in relying upon such reports. In any case delay in carrying out the inspections or making entries frustrates the very purpose sought to be achieved. The Supreme Courts observations that "the mental impressions may fed away or get embellished not to be restored" are the key words. We must properly appreciate the trust and hope expressed by the Supreme Court in us that such entries in confidential rolls would be made regularly so as to achieve regularity, promptness and objectivity inspiring confidence of subordinate judiciary controlled by us. 38. From the above referred judgments of the Supreme Court it would clearly appear that compulsory retirement before attaining the age of superannuation stands on altogether different footing than non- extension of the period for a further period of 2 years. The compulsory retirement can be on the assessment of the officers work and other available materials or may be in the public interest but non-extension of the service has nothing to do with the public interest. The compulsory retirement can be on the assessment of the officers work and other available materials or may be in the public interest but non-extension of the service has nothing to do with the public interest. The extension would depend upon consideration of number of the facts of which utility of the officer is of paramount consideration. In case of compulsory retirement, the court has to consider whether he is a dead-wood or a spent force but in case of extension of the period, a different question for consideration would arise, that is, whether he is still utile to the High Court or to the system in the decision-making- process. In a case where the man has to retire at a particular age then in absence of an extension he has to retire. This retirement is neither a punishment nor a penal action but is an incidence of service. The extension of the service is not a right conferred upon the Officer but is a benefit conferred upon the Officer by the High Court. 39. While considering the case for extension the overall performance during the entire service career has to be seen; communicated or uncommunicated entries can be taken into consideration; the small lapses, big mistakes or blunders all are to be judged in their true perspective. The lapses committed, the mistakes made and the blunders suffered by the Officer with his work and working have to be put in one pan of the balance while his working, his disposal quantitatively and qualitatively and his future utility are to be put in the other pan of the balance. If the utility pan weighs more then extension in service would be given to the Officer otherwise he would be asked to go home in accordance with the rules provided in the service conditions. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed his reliance on a judgment of this Court in the matter of Shyam Deo Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [ 2001 (2) PLJR 18 ]. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has made serious allegations against some Officers clearly mentioning that they are less useful and their service records were also not good and if they have been given the benefit of extension then the petitioner could not be refused the same benefit. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has made serious allegations against some Officers clearly mentioning that they are less useful and their service records were also not good and if they have been given the benefit of extension then the petitioner could not be refused the same benefit. It is to be seen from the said judgment that a Division Bench of this Court had compared the service records of the said petitioner and one Sri Thakur and ultimately observed that the petitioner comparatively was better placed and his case required re-consideration. At the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, we had called for the service records of the petitioner and the said two Officers (we are not disclosing the names of those Officers purposefully so that their identity is not disclosed to the Subordinate Judiciary and the public and the secrecy is maintained) After going through the records of the petitioner especially on comparison with the records of the said two Officers, we are also of the opinion that the petitioner can- not claim the benefit of extension. We are also of the opinion that the High Court should not just for the sake of asking start comparing the records of other officers with the petitioner before it. If such a practice is allowed, it would lead to an administrative anarchism, any Officer of the Subordinate Judiciary would make wild allegations against other Officer, would make his self-assessment, would consider himself to be the best and on loath comparison would assess others as worse/worst and would require the High Court to re-consider the entire matter on the judicial side. This is to be taken note of that the powers of judicial review are not akin to the powers of the Appellate Authority. While reviewing something on the judicial side the High Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal. It does not look into absolute correctness of the order but looks into the decision-making- process. If the decision-making-process is polluted or contaminated then the High Court on the judicial side certainty would interfere in the matter and would require the High Court on the administrative side to re-consider its decision even if the same has been confirmed by the Full Court on the administrative side. If the decision-making-process is polluted or contaminated then the High Court on the judicial side certainty would interfere in the matter and would require the High Court on the administrative side to re-consider its decision even if the same has been confirmed by the Full Court on the administrative side. It certainly cannot be doubted that the Full Court action taken on the administrative side can be subjected to judicial scrutiny and review but for true appreciation, it is to be seen that the decision is based on collateral grounds or the decision is arbitrary and, if it is found correct on the judicial side then in such a case the High Court on the judicial side would interfere in the matter. 41. In the matter of J.D. Srivastava (supra) the Apex Court was of the opinion that the materials produced before the Court on the judicial side was not against the interest of the appellant. It was also observed that the decision of the High Court was based on entries that were made about 20 years before the date on which the decision to retire compulsorily was taken. 42. In the matter of Shyam Deo Singh (supra) the Division Bench of this Court relying upon the observations in the matter of Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra) observed that so long as the opinion forming basis of the order for compulsory retirement in public interest is formed bona fide, the opinion cannot be ordinarily interfered with by a judicial forum, and that such an order may be subjected to judicial review on very limited grounds such as the order being mala fide, based on no material or on collateral grounds or having been passed by an authority not competent to do so. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the matter of Bishwanath Prasad Singh (supra), in fact opens the door for the High Court on the judicial side to appreciate the decisions made by any authority including the High Court on the administrative side. An important question for consideration in the matter would be whether the order is mala fide based on no material or is on collateral grounds or has been passed by an authority not competent to do so. 43. An important question for consideration in the matter would be whether the order is mala fide based on no material or is on collateral grounds or has been passed by an authority not competent to do so. 43. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nawal Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [(2001 (3) BLJR 1898] to say that if during pendency of the writ application the writ petitioner crosses the age of 60 years, his petition would not become infructuous but in that view of the judgment the said petitioner would be entitled to salary of two years with all admissible allowances. In our opinion, this question does not arise at this stage. 44. A Division Bench judgment of this Court in matter of Shyam Surat Ram vs. The High Court of Judicature at Patna & Ors. [ 2000 (1) PLJR 1055 ] considered the question of extension of period of service beyond the age of superannuation. In the said matter certain grounds were raised to challenge the High Courts order whereby the petitioner was not allowed to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years. The Division Bench of this Court found that the said petitioner was unable to make out a case for interference. 45. We have already considered the question that in a case of compulsory retirement, the scope of judicial review is very narrow. We would be justified in observing that in case of non-grant of extension for two years, the scope of judicial review would still be narrower. In case of compulsory retirement, the authority has to consider whether the incumbent has become a dead-wood or is a spent force and has no potential for work while in a case for grant of extension, the Court has to consider whether the man is still utile to the system, to the public and to the judiciary and whether he is still in a position to fructify. If he is a dead-wood then obviously he can be refused extension. If he is a dead-wood then obviously he can be refused extension. If the grounds to retire him compulsorily are available then on those grounds alone the extension can be refused, but even if such grounds are not available and on consideration of the overall assessment of the entire service period, the Evaluation Committee comes to the conclusion that the utility of the man for the purposes is over then he can be asked to go home and enjoy a retired life. In such a situation he cannot be allowed to say that the action of the High Court is mala fide. In the present matter the petitioner did say that the action of the High Court is bad, mala fide, arbitrary and whimsical but he has not supplied the particulars of these material allegations. In our opinion, the High Courts power on judicial side to review a subject like present is circumscribed. We are not hearing an appeal. We cannot substitute our opinion for the opinion of the Evaluation Committee or the High Court on the administrative side. We can certainly interfere in the matter if the allegations of arbitrariness, mala fides, perversity, collateral purpose and motivated action are there or the order of the High Court appears to be per se or ex facie illegal. 46. The above referred words are not uncommon to the judicial side. These words are loosely used to challenge the correctness of any order. For proving the arbitrariness it has to be shown that the action taken by the High Court is bad and no prudent man would have taken such an action. In the present matter the total and complete and fullest service records of the petitioner were considered by the Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee is not an authority which can be persuaded by good, bad or indifferent reasons or would be swayed way by whims, caprice or arbitrariness. The Evaluation Committee has to consider the totality of the circumstances, the quality and quantity of the work done and whether after the age of 58 years, the man is still useful to the system and the courts. The submission that the records of the petitioner including his antecedents are better in comparison to others, in our opinion, at this stage are not sufficient to persuade us. The submission that the records of the petitioner including his antecedents are better in comparison to others, in our opinion, at this stage are not sufficient to persuade us. We have compared the records and have found that the petitioners self assessment in comparison to others may only allow the petitioner to live in a paradise of his own but would not provide any foundation in his favour to persuade us to interfere with the order. 47. The petitioner has not made any allegations of mala fides either against the Evaluation Committee or against the Full Court. in fact, the petitioners sole case is based on the comparison and self-assessment. 48. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the orders passed by the Full Court on the administrative side is perverse or borders perversity. To hold that something is perverse, it must be shown that whatever is available in the record was not seen or whatever was seen was misread or misunderstood. In the present matter, the petitioner simply says that his records were not properly appreciated. He does not say that his records were not seen or his records were misread to misappreciate a particular fact. Though appreciation is in abstract form but gives positive outcome. How one person appreciates a thing is dependent upon his mental frame. One may see that the glass is half full and the other man see that the glass is half empty. If the empty glass is projected as full or a full glass is projected as empty, then this would be perversity. In the judicial hierarchy while hearing on appeal, the appellate court is entitled to say that the court below was unjustified in observing that the glass was half empty because it is half full. A jurisdiction is conferred upon the Appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence, to reconsider everything and record its own opinion. But in a case under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when a decision given by any administrative committee is under scrutiny, the powers are narrower and within the narrow passage the Court has to look everything. In fact, the door is not wide open but the Court on the judicial side would look from the window to find whether everything is in order or not. In fact, the door is not wide open but the Court on the judicial side would look from the window to find whether everything is in order or not. The High Court would not be justified in substituting its own findings in a case of such nature. If the High Court finds that the decision is wrong then too the High Court shall not interfere because every authority has jurisdiction to pass an order whether right or wrong. The interference can be made only if the wrong decision-making-process was adopted and the wrong process has led to an illegal or void order. 49. We are unable to find any perver sity in the matter. We are also unable to hold that the order passed by the High Court is per se illegal or ex facie illegal. The petitioner does not say that the illegality is floating on the surface of the record or is writ large or can be seen without any efforts or the decision taken by the High Court on the administrative side is so bad that no prudent man would allow it to stand. 50. No motives have been attributed either against the Evaluation Committee of the High Court. In such a situation we are unable to hold that any ground for interference is made out. The petitioner, in fact, is impressed by his self-assessment. He appears to be suffering with narcissism. All through he had been contending that his intergrity and honesty is above board, he had been doing the best. The question is not how one assesses himself, what matters is that how others assess him. When the Subordinate Judicial Officer is subjected to administrative control of the High Court then the assessment of the work and even of the Officer must be left to the jurisdiction of the High Court on the administrative side. The submission of the petitioner that in comparison with others he is a better officer, in fact, is a tainted approach. Each officer is to be judged on his work and working and is not to be compared with others. You cannot compare orange with apple. An officer may be good but if has lost his utility then for the purposes of extension he becomes bad. We are unable to understand that how a comparison is to be made between two officers. You cannot compare orange with apple. An officer may be good but if has lost his utility then for the purposes of extension he becomes bad. We are unable to understand that how a comparison is to be made between two officers. Should it be based on comparison of grading or comparison of disposal or on comparison of adverse remarks or on comparison of number of complaints or on comparison of the fact that how many files were opened against the officer. In a given case the High Court may not take cognizance of the complaints received against a particular officer but the complaints would still stand against the man. The High Court on the administrative side at a particular point of time may feel that allegations are not worth an enquiry but if there are hundreds of small allegations against a particular man then his utility would be tied in a strong rope woven by number of small threads of complaints. Ordinarily there would be no comparison between the two officers. So far as extension is concerned, it is understood by all in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court that it is not automatic, no person can claim it as a matter of right. The extension is a benefit to be extended by the High Court in favour of a particular officer after taking into consideration his full service records. In a case like that, the communicated and uncommunicated entries are to be seen. It must be noted that for punishing a man, the uncommunicated entries cannot be used because the man did not know that what adverse entry was made against nim and because of the non-communication he is denied a right of making a useful, purposeful and effective representation. For rewarding a man or granting him extension in service, the uncommunicated entries certainly can be looked into. The uncommunicated entries may be of very low importance but these uncommunicated entries which otherwise are not favourable to the officer. if are taken together, may create impediment in the way of the officer in getting the extension. 51. For the purpose of appreciation of an Officer, his service records will have to be seen objectively or subjectively will be one of the question., Whether it has to be objective relating to subject or subjective relating to the object. if are taken together, may create impediment in the way of the officer in getting the extension. 51. For the purpose of appreciation of an Officer, his service records will have to be seen objectively or subjectively will be one of the question., Whether it has to be objective relating to subject or subjective relating to the object. In our considered opinion, the appreciation has to be objective, the object being to find whether the subject is useful for future retention or extension or not. If the subject fails to reach the object then obviously it is a good-bye for him and he cannot say to the Court that he must be continued in service. One of the questions raised is that if an Officer has above board integrity and honesty then he must be given the benefit. In our opinion, integrity and honesty are not the only questions but these two objects have to be considered along with the utility. In our judicial system, one is not to worship an idol but has to take work from it. An Officer who is honest and his integrity is above board, if does not work or does not enter into a decision-making-process then he is just an idol. 52. If putting the adverse entries in the oblivion or by ignoring the same, promotions are given, then too the incumbent would not be entitled to say that the effect of such adverse entry stands washed away. The promotions are routine matter. The promotion is an incidence of service. While considering the question of promotion, the authority considers that if the small lapses or unimportant complaints are ignored, whether the officer should be given promotion or not and if it gives the promotion then for the purpose of promotion and future promotions, the effect of such entries stand washed away but the same would not be a case in the matter of grant of extension. While promotions are routine matters, the question of extension is extra-ordinary. In a case of extension, the totality is to be seen. Extension would depend upon the performance during the whole tenure of service. This is not based on one or two stray instances. The question of honesty and integrity though are important but would not be the only criteria. While promotions are routine matters, the question of extension is extra-ordinary. In a case of extension, the totality is to be seen. Extension would depend upon the performance during the whole tenure of service. This is not based on one or two stray instances. The question of honesty and integrity though are important but would not be the only criteria. If an officer says that he is honest to the core and his integrity is above board then he is simply saying that he is what is expected of him. Can we say that an officer judged to be of bad integrity and low honesty would be a good Judicial Officer? Is it not expected of every Judicial Officer to be honest to the core and having integrity above board? These are not the qualifications, these are the basic requirements. If these basic requirements are lacking, the officer, in fact, would earn the public wrath on one side and the administrative wrath of the High Court on the other side. 53. The question of non-extension in comparison to compulsory retirement would always stand on different footing. Extension, as we have already observed, is based on the overall performance of the service life including character, conduct and utility while compulsory retirement is to be considered on number of other factors. The extension is to be seen in the light of the utility of the man while the compulsory retirement is to be seen in the light of the man being un-utile or in-utile. In any case, non-extension being not a case of compulsory retirement, we are not required to say further on the subject. According to the service conditions, the incumbent is required to hold the office upto the age of 58 years and not beyond that. The two years extension though is not a grace to be given by the High Court but in fact is a benefit/ reward extended by the High Court after taking into consideration the future utility of the person. 54. In light of the aforesaid discussions we have to consider whether we are entitled to make a fact finding enquiry and make a deeper probe into the subject or have to look into the decision-making-process and that the High Court was justified in not granting the extension. We have already found that extension of the services is not a right conferred upon a Judicial Officer. We have already found that extension of the services is not a right conferred upon a Judicial Officer. The same in fact is an award/ benefit by the High Court in favour of the incumbent. If the High Court comes to a conclusion that the Officers utility is lost, he is not entitled to the extension, then we have simply to look into that material. After going through the entire records and even on comparison of the records of other Judicial Officers we are of the opinion that the High Court was not unjustified in not granting the extension. True it is that the petitioners submission is that certain files were closed but that would not denude the High Court of its jurisdiction to look into the totality of the circumstances and further that the petitioners continuance on the post would be in the public interest or not. 55. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the factual aspects, the comparative records, the arguments of the parties and the decisions of different Courts, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The petition deserves to and is accordingly dismissed. B.N.P.Singh, J. 56 I agree.