ARUN KUMAR MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, 7th Court at alipur in T. A. No. 157/83 affirming the judgment and decree passed, by Sri Tapas Kr. Ghosh, learned Munsif, 3rd Court at Alipur in t. S. No. 175/74. ( 2 ) THIS second appeal originates from a suit for declaration along with prayer for mandatory injunction for granting arrears of pay and for rendering accounts. ( 3 ) THE facts in brief as made out in the plaint is inter alia as follows: the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant Subodh Ch. Bakshi was an employee under South-Eastern Railway, the defendants herein. He was a clerk and he retired from service with effect from forenoon of 1/11/1962. After his retirement on 15/12/1962 the District Mechanical Engineer/south eastern Railway, Chakradharpur issued a service certificate and certified his service conduct as good during the period of his service from 8/03/1930 to 31/10/1962. ( 4 ) DURING the tenure of his service according to him he was suspended illegally in may 1950 allegedly for not applying for railway pass for proceeding on transfer and chargesheet was issued against him in this regard. The said Subodh Ch. Bakshi filed a suit against the defendant Railway being T. S. No. 320/1952 in the 1 st Court of Munsif at Howrah challenging the order of discharge and the suit was decreed in his favour on 6/09/1954 and the said order of discharge was declared illegal, void and inoperative. The defendant railway preferred appeal against the judgment and decree and the learned Sub-ordinate Judge. upheld the judgment of the learned Munsif on' 27/05/1995 passed in Title Appeal No. 280/54. But the defendants did not give effect to the orders passed by the learned Munsif and that of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Howrah by reinstating said Sri Bakshi immediately after the judgment in appeal was passed. Said Sri bakshi (presently deceased) made various representations and ultimately the defendants reinstated him on 19/03/1958. He was again suspended from service from the same date that is on and from 19/03/1958. This time in the departmental proceeding said Sri bakshi was found not guilty. But he was deprived of the amount of the arrears of pay during the period of suspension for the period from 1950 to June 1959. He was again suspended from service from the same date that is on and from 19/03/1958. This time in the departmental proceeding said Sri bakshi was found not guilty. But he was deprived of the amount of the arrears of pay during the period of suspension for the period from 1950 to June 1959. His salary was not refixed and promotion and increments of salary were not given also to him for this long period of suspension. Upon the representation made by him in this regard he was given assurance of his full pay and benefits admissible to him and as such he did not institute any further suit against the defendants. The plaintiffs further alleged that the South Eastern Railwaymen's congress (Union) took up this matter and made representations to the Railway authority for redressal for the grievance of said Sri Bakshi. Thereafter sometime in March 1971 said Sri bakshi received a letter from the Chief personnel Officer by which the defendants admitted their liability in part, raising a false debit according to the plaintiff for the sum of rs. 7,736. 91. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants made certain other illegal deductions from the said amount due to him. In the said letter the Chief Personnel Officer intimated Sri Bakshi that the period of suspension could not be period spent on duty though as a matter of fact Sri Bakshi was never held guilty in any subsequent departmental proceedings or by any judgment of Court of law. The amount offered to Sri Bakshi by the defendants was too meagre and according to him this is because of debit, illegal deduction and denial of full pay, gratuity and other benefits admissible to him and as such he made further representation to the South Eastern railway through the said Union. The defendant no. 2 upon a discussion with the General secretary of the Railwaymen's Congress (Union) had agreed to refer the matter to the railway Board but subsequently he went back on his words and informed the Union by issuing a letter that the case had no merit for a reference to the Railway Board. Sri Bakshi was prevented (sic) from instituting any further suit against the defendants for realisation of his arrears of pay, gratuity etc. Sri Bakshi was prevented (sic) from instituting any further suit against the defendants for realisation of his arrears of pay, gratuity etc. But the false assurance given to her by the defendants the plaintiff No. 1 being the widow of the deceased employee she is also entitled to widow pension under this statute. According to the plaintiffs they had served a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil procedure upon the defendants on 1/03/1974 claiming the reliefs but the defendants had neglected to meet up the demands and hence this suit has been filed. ( 5 ) THE defendants contested the suit by filing Written Statement in which the defendants stated inter alia that the suit is not maintainable in its present form having no valid cause of action of the plaintiff and the suit is barred by limitation and is bad for misjoinder of parties and is hit by the Pensions' Act and for other reasons as stated in the Written statement. The defendants Railway alleged that the suit is hit by Section 22 of the Payment of wages Act read with Section 15 (3) thereof as the deceased employee (the predecessor-of the plaintiffs) was drawing less than Rs. 400/- per month as wages. The defendant Railway alleged that the deceased employee was to be under suspension as he did not carry out the order of approval and he was removed from service with effect from 22/02/1951 by the competent authority, after holding a disciplinary enquiry and giving the employee an opportunity to defend. In pursuance of the judgment and order of the Court Sri Bakshi (deceased employee) was reinstated on March 19, 1958, but he was again suspended from duty from the same date with a view to continue the disciplinary proceeding after curing the defect of the said proceeding. Upon the personal representation of the said employee the General Manager of the Railway took a compassionate view and the employee was put back to duty on and from 10/06/1959. The defendants/railway admitted that the Union made representation over the matter of the said employee and these representations were replied also. According to the defendant, the first spell of suspension of the employee Sri bakshi was from 12/05/1950 to 19/03/1958 in view of Rule 2044 of the Indian railway Establishment Code, Vol. The defendants/railway admitted that the Union made representation over the matter of the said employee and these representations were replied also. According to the defendant, the first spell of suspension of the employee Sri bakshi was from 12/05/1950 to 19/03/1958 in view of Rule 2044 of the Indian railway Establishment Code, Vol. II and the second spell of suspension from 19/03/195 8/06/1959 was ultimately ordered to be treated as "leave due" by the competent authority according to the aforesaid Rule. The money which was found to be admissible to the deceased employee under the aforesaid circumstances was advised by the Divisional personnel Officer, Chakradharpur under letter nos. B/3788 dated 23/08/1966 and 10/10/1966 to indicate the mode of payment to him but as the employee failed to communicate the same to the Railway so the said money is lying with the Railway as unpaid. The defendant/railway further stated that as the period of suspension was not treated by the competent authority as the period spent on duty so the employee was not entitled to any arrears of pay under the aforesaid Rule of the Union railway Establishment Code. Thus, the deceased, after reinstatement was transferred to the locoshed, DPS on promotion in the scale of Rs. 160 to Rs. 250/- from the initial scale (sic) of Rs. 60/- to Rs. 130/- and he was given regular increments thereafter. As the period of suspension was not treated as period spent on duty it did not count for increments for the said period of suspension and the employee was also not entitled for the same. The defendant/railway thus denied the difference of pay as per plaint case alleged that the deceased employee worked as a grainshop manager at Santrangachi from October 22, 194 3/08/1948 and that he was responsible for shortage of grain in his custody in course of his duty and as a result a debit of rs. 7736. 91 was raised against his name but only a sum of Rs. 3672. 02 was recovered from the debtor deceased employee from his salary through the monthly wages bills while he was in service. After the retirement of the deceased employee, he was entitled to a gratuity of Rs. 2880/- and this entire amount was adjusted and appropriated against aforesaid dues of the deceased leaving a balance of Rs. 1229. 89 which was recovered through supplementary bill from his other dues. After the retirement of the deceased employee, he was entitled to a gratuity of Rs. 2880/- and this entire amount was adjusted and appropriated against aforesaid dues of the deceased leaving a balance of Rs. 1229. 89 which was recovered through supplementary bill from his other dues. Thus, the defendant/railway says that no gratuity dues are payable to the deceased employee. The plaintiff No. 1 (widow of the deceased) is not also entitled to any widow pension as the revised Pension Wages providing family Pension Scheme for Railway employees came into force from 1/01/1964 that is long after the retirement of the deceased employee Sri bakshi who retired on 1/01/1962. The defendant challenged the legality, validity of the notice under Section 80 of the C. P. Code and said further that the suit is under valued and under stamped and thus pray for the dismissal of the suit after denying other material allegations of the plaint. ( 6 ) ON the above pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Judge: 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Have plaintiffs complied with Section 80 of the CPC? 3. Have the plaintiffs any cause of action for the suit? 4. Are the plaintiffs entitled to get a decree for declaration of accounts and mandatory injunction as prayed? 5. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? the learned Trial Judge framed two additional issues which are as follows: 6. Is the suit properly valued and correctly stamped? 7. Is the suit barred by limitation? ( 7 ) THE learned Trial Judge after hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the evidence on record and on consideration of all legal submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties dismissed the suit. ( 8 ) THE learned Trial Judge found the suit not maintainable. ( 9 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge the plaintiffs preferred Title Appeal No. 1567 83. The learned appellate Court below considered the submissions made by the respective parties, the evidence on record and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge and: dismissed the appeal on contest, thereby affirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif. Hence this second appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiffs being the appellants herein. The learned appellate Court below considered the submissions made by the respective parties, the evidence on record and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge and: dismissed the appeal on contest, thereby affirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif. Hence this second appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiffs being the appellants herein. ( 10 ) ON 11/05/1987 the instant appeal was heard under Order 41 Rule 11 of the C. P. Code and the Hon'ble Division Bench on that date observed that this appeal will be heard on the points of law taken in the memorandum of appeal. ( 11 ) NOW before hearing this second appeal finally substantial question or questions of law, if any, is or are to be formulated. On consideration of the pleadings, the averments and on consideration of the judgment of both the Courts below, in my opinion, only one substantial question of law is there which is to be decided and the said substantial question of law is as follows: 1. Whether both the Courts below finding the suit being without jurisdiction because of the express bar under a particular statute were correct in entering into the merits of the case and thereafter deciding that the suit and the appeal both are not maintainable. ( 12 ) HEARD the submission of the learned counsel for the respective parties. Considered the averments and also considered the judgments passed by both the Courts below. Without going into the much controversy let us see the position of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Section 15 of the said Act runs as follows:"15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. (2) Where contrary to the provisions of this act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-section (3); -provided that any application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be; provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of the six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. (3) When any application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under Section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, such after further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed- wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter: provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to: (a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment. (4) If the authority hearing any application under this Section is satisfied that it was either malicious or vexatious, the authority may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages by the person presenting the application. (5) Any amount directed to be paid under this Section may be covered- (a) If the authority is a Magistrate, by the authority as if it were a fine imposed by him as Magistrate; and (b) if the authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate. " section 22 of the said Act provides:"bar of suits.- No Court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so claimed- (a) forms the subject of an application under section 15 which has been presented by the plaintiff and which is pending before the authority appointed under that Section of an appeal under Section 17; or (b) has formed the subject of a direction under Section 15 in favour of the plaintiff; or (c) has been adjudged, in any proceeding under Section 15, not to be owed to the plaintiff; or (d) could have been recovered by an application under Section 15. " ( 13 ) ON consideration of the above statutory provisions it appears that Section 22 stands as a clear bar and/or express bar in entertaining a suit regarding a claim which comes under purview of Section 15 of the said act. In this regard reference may be drawn to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Athmanatha Swami Devasthanam v. K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar AIR 1965 SC 338 . In paragraph 13 of this decision Hon'ble apex Court has observed:"the last point urged is that when (sic) the civil Court has no jurisdiction over the suit, the High Courts could not have dealt with the cross-objection filed by the appellant with respect to the adjustment of certain amount paid by the respondent. The contention is correct. When the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit it cannot decide any question on merits. The contention is correct. When the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit it cannot decide any question on merits. It can simply decide on the question of jurisdiction and coming to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over the matter had to return the plaint. " ( 14 ) IN my view when there is an express bar under Section 22 of the Payment of Wages act, 1936 in entertaining a suit the claim of which could have been adjudged under Section 15 of the said Act the learned Trial Judge should not have gone into the merits first and should have decided the question of maintainability on the point of jurisdiction and more so when issue No. 1 as framed by the learned Trial Judge was regarding the maintainability of the suit. If any Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit that means the said Court can only see as to whether it can entertain the suit or not, if the Court is unable to entertain then the Court should immediately return the plaint. If the Court goes into the merits of the case it clearly means that the Court has proceeded on the footing that it has jurisdiction to try the suit. At the time of delivering the judgment on merit if the Court says that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit it becomes travesty of justice. When such a point is raised regarding express bar under any statute the Court should first decide whether it can entertain the suit or not and thereafter if the Court finds (rightly or wrongly) that it can entertain then only it can proceed with the suit. In my view, therefore, the learned appellate Court below also committed the same mistake and entered into the merits of the case and then observed that there is express bar and the suit is not maintainable. ( 15 ) IN that view of the matter, I set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below and direct the learned Trial Judge to return the plaint inasmuch as I also hold that under Section 22 of the said Act the instant suit is not maintainable and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. The plaintiffs/appellants are however given liberty to move before the appropriate forum if they so like and/or so advised after the return of the plaint by the learned Trial Judge. In view of the pendency of the matter for a long time, I direct the learned Trial Judge to return the plaint within a fortnight from the date of the receipt of the lower Court records. I also direct the departments to send the LCR to the Courts below forthwith. If the plaintiffs file any application before the appropriate Tribunal, it is hopefully expected that because of long pendency of the matter, the Tribunal will dispose of the application so filed as expeditiously as possible. ( 16 ) THE parties are to bear their respective costs accordingly. ( 17 ) URGENT xerox certified copy, if applied for, will be supplied to the parties expeditiously.