Lavudi Lakya v. Secretary to Government Of A. P. , Irrigation, Command Area Development Department, hyderabad
2003-04-16
R.SUBHASH REDDY
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
R. SUBHASH REDDY, J. ( 1 ) ORDER :this Writ Petition is filed by the 16 petitioners, seeking a Writ of mandamus, to declare the action of the respondents in refusing to pay the compensation for their lands, totally admeasuring Ac. 6. 23 guntas, which was utilized for the public purpose of excavation of supplementary channel in Oandm Division of Nagarjuna Sagar Project, as illegal, and seek directions to the respondents, to pay compensation for the lands effected for such excavation. ( 2 ) FEW necessary facts for disposal of the Writ Petition are as under: The 16 petitioners, who are tribals, belonging to lambada community, were the owners and possessors of small extents of lands in thungapahad Village of Miryalaguda mandal, Nalgonda District. The extent of land owned by each of the petitioner ranges from 0. 7 guntas to Ac. 1. 10 guntas. It is their case that the respondents have excavated water channel from Amedipalli to thungapahad to supply water to the tail end ayacut lands under the Nagarjuna Sagar project canal during 1986-87. It is their case that the possession of the lands was taken with an assurance for payment of compensation. As the respondents did not respond for payment of compensation, series of representations were made and ultimately to their last representation dated 14-11-1998, the third respondent has responded by issuing letter No. DB/d2/p. I/ 1138 SE, dated 29-12-1998 rejecting the request for payment of compensation stating that there was oral consent given by the petitioners to part with their lands, without claiming compensation. It is also stated that as much as there were no objections for excavation, the canal deemed to have been excavated with their consent. Thereafter a legal notice is issued on behalf of the petitioners in which they have stated that there is no such oral consent at any point of time and it is also stated that they are small farmers and illiterates and they cannot be deprived of property in violation of their constitutional rights. As much as no further action has been taken, after the respondents have rejected the claim of the petitioners through proceedings dated 29-12-1998, they filed this present Writ petition on 23-4-1999 seeking Writ of mandamus to issue appropriate directions to the respondents for payment of compensation for their acquired lands, which they are deprived for utilization of public purpose for excavation of channel.
( 3 ) COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT is filed on behalf of the respondents without disputing the ownership of the petitioners and utilization of their property for excavation of channel. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the channel was excavated through the lands of the petitioners and the petitioners have given their oral consent to part with their lands, as they are beneficiaries of such channel. The respondents have taken assistance under the provisions of Section 23 of the a. P. (Telangana Area) Irrigation Act, 1357 fasli and stated that no compensation is payable as per the said provision. Mainly the claim of the petitioners is resisted on the ground that there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court claiming the compensation and as such, they are not entitled for any relief from this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri S. Laxma Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned government Pleader for Irrigation at length. ( 5 ) IT is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) Irrigation act, 1357 Fasli is not applicable and cannot be pressed into service, having regard to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted by him that Section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana area) Irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli will apply only in the event of construction of water course as defined under Section 3 (c) of the act, which is confined to expression field channel in the pipes not having water capacity in excess of 3 c. ft. per second. But in this case, admittedly this supplement channel is from main canal and not a field channel to bring within the meaning of water course, as defined under Section 3 (c) of the act, so as to plead that no compensation is payable under Section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) Irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli.
per second. But in this case, admittedly this supplement channel is from main canal and not a field channel to bring within the meaning of water course, as defined under Section 3 (c) of the act, so as to plead that no compensation is payable under Section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) Irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli. Further, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no delay and laches on the part of the petitioners and they have been making representations one after the other and ultimately the respondents have responded to the last representation addressing a letter dated 29-12-1998 falsely stating that there is oral consent of the petitioners and after having got issued legal notice, they have filed this Writ Petition in the month of April, 1999 and no rights are created on respondents by virtue of lapse of time and delay, since the petitioners are making representations. In support of his plea, he relied on the judgment of the supreme Court reported in M/s. Dehri Rohtas light Raiwlay Company Limited v. District board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 . It is further submitted that the petitioners are all small farmers and it is not correct that they are the beneficiaries of the channel as pleaded by the respondents and they cannot be deprived of small extent of land owned by them, otherwise than due process of law and the action of the respondents in depriving of the lands of the petitioners, otherwise than due process of law, is constitutional violation, particularly Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. In support of their plea, the learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Chittipolu Kishan v. Government of A. P. , 2002 (3) ALD 578 . Therefore, they prayed for appropriate directions to the respondents to pay compensation by issuing necessary notification under the provisions of the Land acquisition Act. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that in view of Section 23 of the a. P. (Telangana Area) Irrigation Act, 1357 fasli, no compensation is payable to the petitioners. It is further stated that at the time of excavating the channel, the petitioners have given oral consent and based on their consent only, the supplementary channel was dug passing through the lands of the petitioners.
It is further stated that at the time of excavating the channel, the petitioners have given oral consent and based on their consent only, the supplementary channel was dug passing through the lands of the petitioners. Having benefited from the channel, it is not open for them to claim for payment of compensation and he submits that there is delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this court; as such they are not entitled for any relief in a petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India. In support of his plea he relied on the decision of the Supreme court, in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 and also judgment of the learned Single judge of this Court in Gajjela Rajaiah v. Sub-Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, asifabad, reported in 1999 (1) ALT 166 . He submits that in view of the delay and laches, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief from this Court for issuing any direction for payment of compensation by entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India. ( 7 ) HAVING regard to the above pleadings and respective contentions, it is to be seen that it is not in dispute that the land of the petitioners in small extents, totally admeasuring Ac. 6. 23 guntas is utilized for the public purpose of excavating supplementary channel. Though it is stated that in view of the benefit extended by virtue of the excavation of channel, the petitioner have consented, but it is evident from the representation made to the respondents that they are not beneficiaries of the water which flows through excavated channel. It is a general supplementation channel from the main canal of Nagarjuna Sagar Project to provide good flow of water to tail end lands; as such the supplementation channel was dug is not a water course within the meaning of Section 3 (c) A. P. (Telangana area) Irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli so as to plead that the petitioners are not entitled for any compensation in view of Section 23 of the said Act. To apply the provisions of section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli, it should be the water course as defined under Section 3 (c) of the Act.
To apply the provisions of section 23 of the A. P. (Telangana Area) irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli, it should be the water course as defined under Section 3 (c) of the Act. It is evident from a reading of the provision under Section 23 read with section 3 (c) of the A. P. (Telangana Area) irrigation Act, 1357 Fasli that for field channel with capacity less than 3 c. ft. per second, no compensation can be claimed. The said provisions are applicable for the field channel within the field itself, but this supplement channel cannot be equated to a field channel within the meaning of section 3 (c) of the Act so as to disentitle the petitioners to claim compensation for their lands, which are utilized for public purpose, namely excavating supplement channel. Equally the plea of the respondents that there was oral consent of the petitioners cannot be accepted. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners are beneficiaries of the channel; as such they have orally consented cannot be accepted. From the representations submitted to the respondents, it is clear that the petitioners did not give any oral consent nor they are the beneficiaries of the channel, which was dug effecting their lands. With regard to oral consent, it is to be stated that the State and its authorities can takeover and utilize the private properties for public purpose by resorting to the methods known to law. Whenever private properties are required for public purpose, the said property can be acquired either by resorting to the provisions under the Land Acquisition act, 1894 or by written consent of such persons to part with their property, but, it is not open for the State and its authorities to say that there was oral consent to part with the lands by the owners, like the petitioners, who belong to tribal community. As such it is not open for the respondent authorities to plead that the lands of the petitioners were utilized with their oral consent, more so, when they deny the same. Further question which arise for consideration is: whether the petitioners are guilty of laches and undue delay, which disentitle them to claim relief from this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Further question which arise for consideration is: whether the petitioners are guilty of laches and undue delay, which disentitle them to claim relief from this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is true that it is well settled principle that abnormal and unexplained delay and laches will disentitle for seeking discretionary relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. In the judgment referred to by the learned Government Pleader in State of maharashtra v. Digambar (supra), it is held that the undue and unexplained delay of 20 years is fatal, to seek relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Equally, in the judgment referred to in Gajjela Rajaiah v. Sub-Collector-cum- land Acquisition Officer, Asifabad (supra), it is held by the learned Single Judge of this court that delay of 33 years is fatal for grant of relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 8 ) THE delay and laches is not a rule of law, but is a rule of practice, which depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Before examining the said issue of delay and belated claim, each case has to be examined with reference to facts and circumstances of that particular case, nature of breach alleged, length of delay, if any, how delay arose and the nature of relief claimed. In the instant case, though channel was dug in the year 1987, it is being represented to the respondent authorities from time to time by filing written representations. One such last representation dated 14-11-1998 was responded, when the claim of the petitioners was rejected by written proceedings dated 29-12-1998, which was addressed to the fourth petitioner, after couple of months, petitioners approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition. In the rejection proceedings dated 29-12-1998, representation of the petitioners dated 14-11-1998 was referred to and in the representation dated 14-11-1998, the petitioners have made a reference about their earlier representations. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no delay in the instant case and soon after rejection of the representation in the month of December, 1998, and after issuing legal notice, the petitioners approach this Court in the month of April, 1999. As such there is no delay on the part of the petitioners at all.
As such there is no delay on the part of the petitioners at all. Further, no parallel rights are created on the respondents and therefore lapse of time alone will not disentitle the claim of the petitioners. He also relied on the judgment reported in Ms. Dehri Rohtas light Raiwlay Company Limited v. District board, Bhojpur (supra ). In the said judgment, the Supreme Court held to the following effect:"the Rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case relied on its distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed.
That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed. " ( 9 ) IN view of the judgment of the supreme Court, it has to be seen in the present case that rejection for payment of compensation is communicated to the petitioners only in the month of December, 1998 and the petitioners have approached this Court in the month of April, 1999. In any event, the delay and laches alleged against the petitioners alone, cannot come in the way of the petitioners where they are continuously agitating the breach of their constitutional rights. As held by the Apex court that in absence of creation of any parallel rights to the respondents, and in the light of admitted facts in this case, lapse of time alone is not attributable to the laches or negligence on the part of the petitioners. Physical running of time alone will not come in the way of the petitioners in cases where illegality, which is manifest, where the petitioners are deprived of their property, otherwise than due process of law. The petitioners cannot be deprived of remedy on account of laches and delay alleged by the respondents. As such I accordingly hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no such undue and unexplained delay and in any event the same will not disentitle the petitioners to reject the relief sought for in this Writ Petition. This is a case where 16 petitioners, who are tribals are deprived of small extent of their agricultural land, otherwise than due process of law and in violation of their constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. As such, the petitioners are entitled for relief sought from this Court. ( 10 ) FOR the going reasons, the Writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to take steps for payment of compensation to the petitioners, to the extent of their land effected for excavation of channel, by taking appropriate steps under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
As such, the petitioners are entitled for relief sought from this Court. ( 10 ) FOR the going reasons, the Writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to take steps for payment of compensation to the petitioners, to the extent of their land effected for excavation of channel, by taking appropriate steps under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondents shall notify and issue necessary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land acquisition Act, 1894, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and take further steps for passing the Award as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as expeditiously as possible. No costs.