Judgment :- The unsuccessful plaintiff Association in both the courts below, have filed the present second appeal. 2. The case in brief is as follows:- The plaintiff Association filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and their office from demanding or collecting from any of its allottees named in Annexure 'A' to the plaint any additional cost for the plots allotted to them, over and above what was fixed at the time of allotment. The plaintiff is a Registered Society formed with a view to promote and protect the rights and interests of the allottees of Tamil Nadu Housing Board plots in the Scheme Area formulated by the Board under the name Mogappair Eri scheme. The defendant invited applications for allotment of plots in its Scheme area called "Mogapair Eri Scheme" in 1987-88. Allottees represented in this suit applied for such allotment and they were allotted plots by the defendant. The allotments were under four categories, namely, High Income Group I and II, Middle Income Group and the Low Income Group. The standard printed forms of lease-cum-sale agreements and allotment orders recited that the costs indicted therein were tentative. The Chairman of the defendant shall fix the final price after due conclusion of every proceedings initiated or likely to be initiated under the Land Acquisition Act by the erstwhile owners of the properties acquired and after the finality regarding the price of the land so acquired is obtained by conclusive adjudication thereon by the concerned Tribunals and after determination of the cost of the amenities, development charges etc., by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board as per clause 9 fix the final price payable by the purchaser in respect of the property. Despite the clauses, every allottee was informed and assured, though orally, by the competent officers of the defendant that within five years from the date of allotment final cost would be intimated to the allottees and sale deeds would be executed. The allottees came to know that there was no land acquisition proceedings pending or even likely to be initiated in respect of any piece of land allotted to any allottees in the said scheme area, which in its entirety comprised of a vast stretch of Eri poramboke belonging to the Government. The allottees came to know that there was no land acquisition proceedings pending or even likely to be initiated in respect of any piece of land allotted to any allottees in the said scheme area, which in its entirety comprised of a vast stretch of Eri poramboke belonging to the Government. The defendant also wrote confirming the oral promise that the title to the allotted plots would be transferred to the allottees within five years from the dates of allotment or on completion of the building whichever was later. It also added that such transfer would be so made on payment of difference in cost,if any, due to fixation of the final price of the plots. In spite of the promise and undertaking, the defendant failed and neglected to convey the plots to the allottees on completion of the five year period though they have completed the construction also. During November 1995, for the first time sent communications to the allottees stating that the cost of their plots had been fixed at almost double the original cost and demanding the payment of difference from them without furnishing any detail whatsoever. The plaintiff filed a series of writ petitions seeking relief against such enhancement and obtained interim injunction. Two writ petitions filed by two allottees were dismissed on the sole and preliminary ground that they should have invoked the Civil court's jurisdiction instead of invoking writ jurisdiction. These two allottees preferred W.A.No.623 and 624 of 1996 and they were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 25.09.1996 giving certain directions, viz., (i) It is open to the petitioners to make a demand with the Housing Board to furnish the basis on which the cost has been enhanced; (ii) The Housing Board within two weeks from the date of receipt of such demand, shall furnish the basis on which the cost has been enhanced; and (iii) It would be open to them to avail such remedy as is open to them in law. The counsel for the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant informing them of these directions and demanding the disclosure of the relevant details and basis for the enhancement in cost. The notice was personally served on the defendant on26.09.1996 itself. The counsel for the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant informing them of these directions and demanding the disclosure of the relevant details and basis for the enhancement in cost. The notice was personally served on the defendant on26.09.1996 itself. In spite of the clear directions of the Division Bench and also the notice issued by the counsel for the plaintiff, they failed and neglected to send any communication. But, on the other hand, they made publication in newspapers informing that it proposed to cancel the allotments of the allottees who did not pay the enhanced cost before 05.10.1996 and re-allot their plots to the third parties. 3. Finalisation of the cost ought to have been done within a reasonable time. The enhancement of the cost in the present case is unwarranted. There has been no increase either in the cost of development charges or in the cost of provision of amenities. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act would bar the defendant from disbursing the accrued rights of the allottees who took possession of the plots and completed construction of buildings thereon, in part performance of the agreement. In view of the express threat to cancel the allotment and evict allottees, it is just and necessary that an injunction has to be granted. The balance of convenience is also in their favour. No particular amenity has been provided or development has been made the scheme area for the benefit of the allottees so as to warrant any increase in the expenditure. Even basic amenities which sought to be provided by any welfare state to its citizens have not been done. The demand of enhanced cost from the allottees is against natural justice since such demand is vague without disclosing details that would justify such enhancement and since no opportunity was given to the allottees or their society to represent again such enhancement. Hence, the suit. 4. The defendant filed a written statement and pleaded that the suit is not maintainable since no notices served as contemplated under section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and no civil court has got jurisdiction to grant injunction in view of section 38 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. Hence, the suit. 4. The defendant filed a written statement and pleaded that the suit is not maintainable since no notices served as contemplated under section 138 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and no civil court has got jurisdiction to grant injunction in view of section 38 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. The plots at Mogapair Eri Scheme were allotted to various allottees in the year 1988 by drawal of lot, subject to terms and conditions that the cost of the plots works out at the tentative cost of Rs.80,000/= per ground and is subject to revision on account of the anticipated increase of the land cost and finalisation of development cost, provision of amenities and afterwards only the fixation of the final price will be communicated. The allotment was made on the specific understanding that these allottees shall agree to pay the final cost as determined by the Board. They were also requested to express their willingness to accept the allotment and they had accepted these conditions and paid the initial deposit within the stipulated period and also executed the lease-cum-sale agreement. The Board had fixed the final cost of the plots at Rs.1,49,400/= per ground as on 31.12.1995 and all the allottees were informed to pay the difference amount in one lumpsum on or before 31.12.1995 without interest or to pay in 60 equated monthly instalments commencing from January 1996. Some of the allottees have paid the difference in the final cost and some of the allottees have chosen to pay the monthly instalments. There is no time limit mentioned in the lease-cum-sale agreement for the fixation of final cost. The writ petitions and writ appeals were already disposed of stating that the Housing Board has undoubted authority to enhance the cost of plot and the agreement is only provisional subject to final determination. The Housing Board is ready to furnish the basis of the enhancement of cost of Mogapair Eri Scheme to each and every allottee if they made a demand with the Housing Board. The allottees have not complied with the directions given by this Court. The Housing Board is a Government Organization and a non-profit making body always keeps the welfare of the allottees. The suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. The allottees have not complied with the directions given by this Court. The Housing Board is a Government Organization and a non-profit making body always keeps the welfare of the allottees. The suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. The trial court framed 3 issues and on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-8 were marked and on the side of the defendant, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B-1 was marked. The trial court dismissed the suit and aggrieved against this, the plaintiff preferred A.S.No.61 of 2000 on the file of IV additional Judge, City Civil Court and the learned Judge after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved against this, the plaintiff Association have preferred the present second appeal. 6. At the time of admission of the second appeal, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: (1) Have not both the Courts below erred in misconstruing the terms and conditions of allotments in the suit agreement as empowering the defendant to enhance the cost several years after the date of allotment especially when no land acquisition proceedings were initiated or were pending in respect of the suit scheme ? (2) Is not the enhancement and consequential demand made by the defendant, in gross violation of Natural Justice, since no reason for enhancement is disclosed and hence in violation of Article 14 of our Constitution ? 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 8. Mogapair Eri Residents Welfare Association, a registered body, has filed the present suit against the Tamil Nadu Housing Board seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining them from demanding or collecting from any of the allottees any additional cost for the plots allotted to them over and above what was fixed at the time of allotment. The Association represented several allottees in the Scheme Area and permission under Order I Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code was also granted. The allotments were made in the year 1987-88 and it is admitted. The Chairman of the defendant shall fix the final price after due conclusion of every proceedings initiated or likely to be initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, within a period of five years. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the entire property allotted comprised in a vast stretch of Eri poramboke belonging to the Government and no piece of land was acquired. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that the entire property allotted comprised in a vast stretch of Eri poramboke belonging to the Government and no piece of land was acquired. The tentative cost was fixed at Rs.80,000/= per ground and ultimately the final cost was fixed on 31.12.1995 at Rs.1,49,400/= per ground. In fact, some of the allottees filed writ petitions before this Court and two of the allottees also preferred W.A.623 and 624 of 1996 and the learned Judge passed an order on 25.09.1996 giving some directions. The allottees can make a demand with the Housing Board to furnish the basis on which the cost has been enhanced and the Board is directed to give reply within two weeks from the date of such demand, furnishing the basis on which the cost has been enhanced and it is open to the allottees to avail such remedy as is open to them under law. On 26.09.1996 itself, the notice was personally served on the defendant calling upon them to furnish the basis for enhancement of the cost. Admittedly, no reply has been sent by any of the officials of the Housing Board giving basis for enhancement of the cost either to the Association or to any of the allottees. Now, in the written statement, a vague plea has been taken as if no communication was sent either by the Association or by the allottees demanding the particulars and if they have demanded, they are prepared to furnish the same. The plea taken by the defendant in the written statement is patently false. The typed set filed by the appellant clearly indicates that the demand has been made by the Association as per the directions given by the learned Bench and in spite of having received the same, the Board failed to furnish any such particulars. It is unfortunate that even in the written statement, no reason has been given for non-furnishing the basis for enhancement of the cost in spite of letter received by them. Now, it is no longer open to the defendant to claim that the appellant had failed to comply with the direction given by this Court. On the other hand, the defendant Housing Board alone had failed to comply with the directions given by this Court in the writ appeals. 9. Now, it is no longer open to the defendant to claim that the appellant had failed to comply with the direction given by this Court. On the other hand, the defendant Housing Board alone had failed to comply with the directions given by this Court in the writ appeals. 9. It is also seen from the records that on 25.09.1996 publication has been made in the newspapers by the defendant that they proposed to cancel the allotment of the allottees, who did not pay the enhanced cost before 05.10.1996 and also threatened to re-allot the same to the third parties. It is nothing but terrorizing the allottees of the Housing Board. When they have already moved the competent court and obtained a direction and when the allottees have called upon the Officials of the Housing Board to give basis, there is a duty cast on them to furnish the basis. But instead of furnishing any particulars, the Board has taken law into their own hands and began to threaten the allottees to cancel the allotment. It is nothing but a terrorism on the part of the Housing Board officials to terrorize the allottees and under the threat of re-allotment, they want to collect the enhanced charges without actually furnishing them the reason or basis for such enhancement. In the circumstance, the plea in the written statement that the Housing Board is working in the welfare of the allottees is only in paper and it is not translated into action. 10. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the defendant contended that there is a provision in the lease-cum-sale agreement itself that the cost already fixed is a tentative one and the final cost of the land would be determined based upon the development charges, provision of amenities and also award amount passed to the land acquisition proceedings, if any. The lease-cum-sale agreement is only a standard printed form used by the Housing Board and even in a case, where no land is acquired by the Government, the same form is used for all purposes. So far as the present case is concerned, it is practically conceded that the Government land is 76.036 acres, whereas the land acquired is only 5.17 acres. Considering the total area in the Eri Scheme, the land acquired is a negligible one. So far as the present case is concerned, it is practically conceded that the Government land is 76.036 acres, whereas the land acquired is only 5.17 acres. Considering the total area in the Eri Scheme, the land acquired is a negligible one. No doubt, only tentative cost has been fixed in the initial stage; but as and when the final cost is fixed and if any allottee wants to know the basis for such enhancement, there is a duty cast on the Housing Board to furnish particulars and the failure on their part will amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. No allottee can be kept in dark without informing him the basis for enhancement and the Housing Board cannot arbitrarily exercise its power and demand money under one pretext or the other. The plea that no land was acquired in this Scheme as stated by the appellant may not be correct since 5.17 acres of land are acquired, is clear from the records. Ex.A-2 is the document, which clearly discloses that on completion of five years from the date of allotment or on completion of the building whichever is later, the sale deed will be executed to the allottees. Now, all the allottees have completed the building in their respective plots and though it is specifically pleaded in the plaint, the same is not disputed in the written statement. Ex.B-1 has also been pressed into service. The defendant has not disclosed details according to the order of the Division Bench. The particulars of the additional cost incurred for specific development charges, provision of amenities are also not made mention of in the written statement also. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision reported in SIEMENS ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY ..vs.. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ), wherein it has been stated as follows:- "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ), wherein it has been stated as follows:- "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alterum partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law". This decision is applicable to the case on hand. 12. Reliance is also placed on CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, MADRAS ..vs.. T.N.GANAPATHY ((1990) I SCC 608) that "on account of the development charges, cost of amenities and buildings, etc., final amount has to be determined within a period of three years from the date of allotment and there does not appear to be any reason for construing the provisions differently". The analogy in this decision also can be made applicable to the case on hand. In the present case, admittedly the allotment was made in the year 1987-88; but, however, the final cost was determined only on 31.12.1995, after a period of seven years. On 26.09.1996 the allottees have called upon the Board to give the basis for enhancement and this has not been complied with for reasons best known to them. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ex.A-2 certificate stipulates a period of five years from the date of allotment and not from the date of Transfer Certificate. The transfer certificate is only a confirmation given after the completion of construction. The defendant has not filed any copy of the letter, in which the defendant is stated to have given any such details. Moreover, in reply to the specific contentions in the plaint, the defendant has not denied the allegations nor has it said in its written statement that it did furnish such details. The learned senior counsel for the defendant contended that it is a concurrent finding by the courts below and cannot be interfered with lightly. Moreover, in reply to the specific contentions in the plaint, the defendant has not denied the allegations nor has it said in its written statement that it did furnish such details. The learned senior counsel for the defendant contended that it is a concurrent finding by the courts below and cannot be interfered with lightly. No doubt, it is a settled principle; but when there are materials that there is improper appreciation either in law or on facts or the evidence, which is available has not been properly considered by the courts below, necessarily it can be interfered with. The first question of law raised is that the courts below erred in misconstruing the terms and conditions of allotments in the suit agreement. There is a clear recital in the documents that the final cost should be determined in the final stage and it has not been done in the case. The second question of law is that the enhancement and consequential demand made by the defendant is in gross violation of natural justice since no reason for enhancement has been disclosed and is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. This has not been practically considered by the courts below. In fact, there is a direction in the writ appeals and in spite of this, the defendant has failed to give the basis for enhancement. I am of the view that the Housing Board cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily and collect the amount under threat or coercion. When full particulars for the basis of enhancement were not furnished to the allottees, it is a gross violation of the directions given by this Court in the writ appeals and this being so, even in the written statement, the enhancement has not been substantiated with sound materials, necessarily this Court can interfere with in the second appeal. 14. On 17.12.1996 also, the counsel for the appellant sent a communication to the Housing Board calling upon them to produce the following particulars to evaluate the validity of the final cost; (a) A copy of the original Scheme framed for Mogappair Eri and duly approved; (b)The Development work and amenities contemplated in the Scheme together with the estimate of the cost thereof, as included in the tentative cost. c) The development works undertaken and amenities provided, year-wise, from the date of approval of the scheme together with the cost incurred therefor. c) The development works undertaken and amenities provided, year-wise, from the date of approval of the scheme together with the cost incurred therefor. (d) The total area of private land included in the scheme, as originally approved. (e) The total extent of private land actually acquired, with Survey numbers and the use to which they have been put. (f) Details of the proceedings where excess compensation was awarded together with copies of judgments and decrees therein. (g) Complete details for the cost alleged to be involved for the purpose of acquisition work. In paragraph 5 of the said letter, it is clearly stated that upon furnishing all the details, they are ready and willing to either have a discussion with the officials or the advocate to arrive at a practical solution and on arriving at a final determination, they will start paying the difference in cost, if any. In spite of this communication, there is no response from the Housing Board. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant filed a working sheet based upon the records maintained by the Board. The Award amount for the private land of 5.17 acres is Rs.2,37,491/= and it is admitted. The enhanced compensation paid for 4.29 acres of land is Rs.11,50,161/= and it is also admitted. The Government land for 76.036 acres at Rs.3,58,263/= per acre as on 31.03.1991 comes to Rs.2,72,40,886/=. The land acquisition staff cost at 12.5% comes to Rs.35,78,568/=. The interest for the award amount at 15% upto January 1989 is Rs.1,26,900/=. The interest for the project period February 1989 to March 1991 for 26 months at 15% comes to Rs.5,07,361/=. The total land cost upto March 1991 comes to Rs.3,28,41,367/=. 16. The development expenditure incurred upto 31.07.1995 comes to Rs.3,88,86,400/= and this is not disputed on behalf of the appellant. However, the Housing Board had included one more amount of Rs.1,92,92,400/= under the head "Expenditure to be incurred after 31.07.1995". No doubt, expenditure already incurred has to be necessarily met by the allottees. After 31.07.1995, there is nothing on record to show that any expenditure was incurred by them and moreover, seven years had already passed. This being so, I am of the view that the additional amount of Rs.1,92,92,400/= claimed by the Housing Board as expenditure to be incurred cannot be claimed considering the fact that it was not spent for the last seven years. This being so, I am of the view that the additional amount of Rs.1,92,92,400/= claimed by the Housing Board as expenditure to be incurred cannot be claimed considering the fact that it was not spent for the last seven years. What is the nature of expenditure, which has to be necessarily done by the Housing Board, is also not mentioned. That apart, in a welfare State, the Government has the primary duty of providing basic amenities to its citizens and when the expenditure has not been done for a period of seven years, no such amount can be claimed under this head. Hence, I am of the view that towards development cost, only a sum of Rs.3,88,86,400/= can be allowed. If that is taken into consideration, the total land cost comes to Rs.3,28,41,367/=. The development cost upto 31.07.1995 comes to Rs.3,88,86,400/=. If the land cost and development charges are taken together, the total cost comes to Rs.7,17,27,767/= only. The total saleable area was 882.547 grounds. It naturally works out to Rs.80,000/= per ground. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant also filed a letter dated 30.08.1995 addressed to the Housing Board by the Office of the Executive Engineer and Administration Officer, wherein it is stated that the guideline value for the Government land at Mogappair Eri for the year 1984-85 is Rs.10,000/= per ground and the same may be adopted in the selling price proposal. The fact that this communication was sent to the Housing Board is not in dispute. This only gives a clue that even the guideline price was only Rs.10,000/= per ground during 1984-85 and this being so, the tentative price fixed at Rs.80,000/= per ground during 1987-88 appears to be a reasonable and proper one. No new work was done in the same area after the plots were handed over to them. Under the circumstance, the demand made by the Department cannot be upheld because it would amount to an unjust enrichment by them. The final cost has been fixed as on 31.12.1995 at Rs.1,49,400/= per ground and it has not been substantiated by the defendant. It appears that the amount has been boosted on the ground of expenditure to be incurred in future by way of development cost to the extent of more than Rs.3,96,000/= and odd. The final cost has been fixed as on 31.12.1995 at Rs.1,49,400/= per ground and it has not been substantiated by the defendant. It appears that the amount has been boosted on the ground of expenditure to be incurred in future by way of development cost to the extent of more than Rs.3,96,000/= and odd. If the expenditure which has not been done for a period of seven years is excluded from the calculation made by the Department, it will clearly establish that the tentative value fixed at Rs.80,000/= per ground is proper and correct and they are not entitled to claim more than that. The claim made by the Department is an utter gross violation of natural justice and in spite of the direction given by the Division Bench of this Court coupled with the demand made by the plaintiff Association calling upon the defendant to give the basis for the enhancement, it has not been met with by the defendant for reasons best known to them. Now, they want to stick to their own stand and claim the amount arbitrarily and unfortunately the courts below have failed to consider the entire aspect in their proper perspective, which resulted in miscarriage of justice. The evidence adduced by D.W.1 and other documents have been misread and there was suppression of the material evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff and, as such, it is just and necessary to interfere with in the Second Appeal. The substantial questions of law raised by the appellant are answered accordingly. 18. For the reasons stated above, the Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed. The plaintiff Association is granted the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant and their men from collecting any amount more than the tentative cost of Rs.80,000/= per ground. It is made clear that if any excess amount is paid already by any of the allottees, it is not necessary to refund the same to them. However, in the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected CMPs., are closed.