JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. By this writ petition, the Petitioner prays for quashing the order of dismissal dated 30.4.1996 (Annexure-A/14) and the order rejecting the appeal and to reinstate him to his post as Head Master of the Ching-Tam High School, Salungpham, Thoubal District with all consequential benefits. The brief facts of the case are that the Petitioner was appointed Head Master of the Ching-Tam Junior High School (now upgraded as the Ching-Tam High School) at the time of its establishment. On the recommendation of the Departmental promotion committee held on 25.11.1980, the appointment of the Petitioner to the post of Graduate Teacher at the same school was approved by the order dated 25.11.1980. The Petitioner submitted a complaint on 9.10.1995 to the Respondent No. 4 stating that 9 Assistant Teachers, 1 L.D.C. and 1 Ex-Committee member of his school had illegally collected a sum of Rs. 55,498/- for admission and other fees for the academic sessions 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 which have not been deposited to the school despite his repeated requests. The Petitioner accordingly requested the Respondent No. 4 to take necessary action against the aforesaid persons. No action was taken against them. Instead, the Petitioner received the show cause notice dated 18.11.1995 issued by the Respondent No. 6 requiring him to reply to the same on or before 25.11.1995 in respect of the following three letters, namely: (1) The Letter No. Ex/146/85/4961-63 of the Board of Secondary Education, Manipur, (2) The letter No. 46-88-90-ED(G) Pt. of the Director of Education (s) and (3) Letter No. 10/19/91-ED (TH) of the Inspector of Schools, Zone-III, Thoubal. The Petitioner in response to the show cause notice stated that he had not received the aforesaid three letters and that he had no idea about them. The Petitioner also requested the Respondent No. 6 to furnish him those letters or to explain them so as to enable him to submit show cause statement. The Respondent No. 6 neither furnished those letters to the Petitioner nor had he explained about them. Subsequently, the Petitioner was placed under suspension by the order dated 29.11.1995 of the Respondent No. 5 on the basis of those letters. The Respondent No. 6 neither furnished those letters to the Petitioner nor had he explained about them. Subsequently, the Petitioner was placed under suspension by the order dated 29.11.1995 of the Respondent No. 5 on the basis of those letters. However, a corrigendum was issued by the Respondent No. 5 on 30.11.1995 clarifying that the suspension of the Petitioner's service was in exercise of Rule No. (2) of the Government Aided Private School Teachers (Discipline, Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1975, for short). Thereafter, the Respondent No. 6 issued the memorandum dated 17.2.1996 in respect of articles of charges against the Petitioner requiring him to submit his written statement in one week. The Petitioner submitted his written statement on 23.2.96 to Respondent No. 6 with a prayer to allow him to appear in person. In his written statement, he denied all the charges levelled against him and also approached the Respondents to drop the proposed disciplinary proceeding against him. However, the disciplinary authority proceeded to hold the inquiry. In the course of inquiry, 5 P.Ws. were examined. Thereafter, by the notice dated 15.4.96, the Petitioner was asked to submit his representation against the proposed major penalties. On 20.4.96, the Petitioner submitted the said representation strongly disputing the findings of the enquiry authorities. Ultimately, by the order dated 30.4.96, the Respondents dismissed the Petitioner from service by treating his period of suspension to be in service and by allowing the School Managing Committee to recover the amount he misappropriated from his salary for the period of suspension. Aggrieved by the order, the Petitioner approached the appellate authority under Rule 6 of the Rules, 1975 to quash the order of dismissal and to reinstate to his post. The appeal was dismissed on 15.7.96 without any reason. 2. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner filed a writ petition to this Court for a direction to consider and dispose of his appeal dated 15.7.96. By the order dated 18.3.97, the writ petition was disposed of by directing the Respondent No. 7 to dispose of the said appeal within two months from the date of receipt of the order. 3. According to the Petitioner, the appeal was disposed of in the month of July, 1997 but the copy of the order or disposal whereof was not given to him despite repeated requests made by him. 3. According to the Petitioner, the appeal was disposed of in the month of July, 1997 but the copy of the order or disposal whereof was not given to him despite repeated requests made by him. It is the case of the Petitioner that in compliance with the order of Enquiring Authorities, he went to the office of the Respondent No. 4 on 8.4.96 at 11 a.m. for personal hearing alongwith four witnesses but none of the Enquiring Authorities was there and as a result, he was compelled to go back after waiting for them upto 2 p.m. In the result, according to the Petitioner, he has been denied of opportunity of being heard and as such, the impugned orders are liable to be interfered with by this Court. The Petitioner also contended that the order of dismissal dated 30.4.96 was issued in an arbitrary, malafide and bias manner in order to oust him from his service and to appoint a member of the locality of the school. The Petitioner also challenged the findings of the Enquiring Authorities on the ground of arbitrariness, bias and malafide and illegality. The Petitioner also submits that the authorities did not apply their minds before issuing the order of dismissal. He also submits that the composition of the Enquiring Authorities is also illegal in that the Enquiring Authority should consist of only one officer. Hence, this writ petition. 4. The Respondent No. 3 resisted the writ petition by filing a counter affidavit in which it is stated that the Enquiry Authority had examined his case and thereafter, the punishing authority had found the Petitioner guilty of charges levelled against him and accordingly, terminated him from service. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 23.6.1997 at Annexure-D/1. It is the case of the Respondent No. 3 that due to lack of integrity and misappropriation of huge amount of school fund, he had been suspended and terminated from service by the punishing authority after making proper inquiry. The Respondent No. 3 denies that the Petitioner was terminated from service without giving opportunity of being heard. The Respondent No. 3, accordingly, prays that the writ petition be dismissed with costs. 5. The Respondents No. 5 and 6 also contested the writ petition by filing separate counter affidavit by supporting the case of the Respondent No. 3. The Respondent No. 3 denies that the Petitioner was terminated from service without giving opportunity of being heard. The Respondent No. 3, accordingly, prays that the writ petition be dismissed with costs. 5. The Respondents No. 5 and 6 also contested the writ petition by filing separate counter affidavit by supporting the case of the Respondent No. 3. The Respondents No. 5 and 6 also pointed out that the Education Department Govt. of Manipur caused to hold an internal audit for the period between 1.3.89 and 30.9.95. The Internal Audit Officer made the audit report on 18.10.95 which is at Annexure-D/1. In the said report, it is reported in para No. 6 that a sum of Rs. 39,421/- was in accounted for and that it was detected that an amount of Rs. 2,014/- was also found short. Again, in para 12, it was pointed out that a sum of Rs. 10,808/- was retained in the personal custody of the Headmaster. In para 2 of the same report, it was also stated that he was in less accounting of Rs. 2,975/. The total amount unaccounted for as detected by the Internal Audit Officer came to Rs. 55,218/-. This fact was brought to the notice of the Respondent No. 3, who by the letter addressed to the Respondent No. 4 directed him to take immediate action against the Petitioner. The Respondents further point out that the Petitioner was examined and his statement was recorded on 3.4.1996 but he did not bring any witnesses on that day nor did he make any request for allowing him to produce the said witnesses and that on the next date of inquiry i.e. on 5.4.1996, he absented himself during the office hour. The said Respondents also deny that the Petitioner was present along with witnesses on 8.4.96 and that none of the inquiry authority was present on 8.4.96 after 2 p.m. It is stated that on 8.4.96 it was the Petitioner who was absent during the office hour and as such, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. The said Respondents also deny that the dismissal order dated 30.8.96 was issued to oust the Petitioner from service or to appoint a member of the locality of the school. The said Respondents also deny that the dismissal order dated 30.8.96 was issued to oust the Petitioner from service or to appoint a member of the locality of the school. The Respondents point out that the said A. Dhaneshore Singh was duly appointed on the recommendation of the DPC and that he is a resident of Wangjing village about 5 k.m. away from the school. The Respondents therefore, pray that the writ petition be dismissed being devoid of merit. 6. I have heard Mr. S. Jayantakumar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and also heard Mr. Th. Ibohal, learned G.A. for Respondents 1, 2 and 3. I also heard Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior Counsel for Respondents No. 5 and 6. 7. I have carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and also the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the rival parties. The point for determination in this case is whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Petitioner is denied of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It is a settled law that reasonable opportunity means giving adequate and effective opportunity to the delinquent officials to meet all the charges levelled against him. In a departmental proceeding, the scope of judicial review is very limited. this Court cannot examine the correctness of the decision reached by the departmental enquiry and as such the function of this Court is confined to seeing that the disciplinary authority acts within its bound. In other words, as long as the disciplinary authority provides adequate opportunity to the Petitioner to defend himself, the disciplinary authority does not violate any rules and that the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on evidence, the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere. In this connection, the decision rendered in the Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 , cited by Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has direct bearing on this case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment are found in para Nos. 17 and 18 which are reproduced as under: 17. A. Nilamani Singh, senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 has direct bearing on this case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment are found in para Nos. 17 and 18 which are reproduced as under: 17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority. 18. It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur: (SCC p.623, para 15) Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held, the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. Let me now proceed to examine the case of the Petitioner within the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the above cited case. As stated earlier, the case of the Petitioner is that he was not allowed to examine his witnesses. He was not furnished with copies of the statements of the witnesses. In this connection, it may be appropriate to peruse the files relating to the Departmental Enquiry. The statement of the Petitioner recorded on 3.4.96 is available at page 75 which are reproduced herein below: 1. When were you appointed as the Head Master of Ching-Tam High School? Ans. I was appointed as Head Master, Ching Tam High School in 1974 and continued upto 29.11.95 before my suspension. 2. What do you like to say about the charges levelled against you? reply article wise. Ans. When were you appointed as the Head Master of Ching-Tam High School? Ans. I was appointed as Head Master, Ching Tam High School in 1974 and continued upto 29.11.95 before my suspension. 2. What do you like to say about the charges levelled against you? reply article wise. Ans. Regarding Article 1, I admit that the records mentioned in article No. 1 are not maintained in the school except the numbers, acquittance rolls pay bill. Regarding Article Nos. 2 and 3, article. But I admit that I have collected the fees from the students. I also admit that no sanction order for expenditure is obtained from the Managing Committee regarding collection of fee and fine from the students and the direct release of money from my hand without handing over of the money to the Secretary of Chairman of the Managing Committee. I also admit that I have not obtained the signature of the Secretary of the School Managing Committee. Regarding Article Nos. 4 and 5, it is a fact that the school did not have proper cash book and ledger and no account of the school is opened in any Bank. I admit that the irregular admission of Arambam Sanjit Singh for H.S.L.C. Examination, 1995 was done. I do not admit the admission of (1) Laishram Kumar Singh, (2) Hijam Boynao Singh and (3) Thokchom Kiran Singh, who are not the student of Ching Tam High School amongst the list of 42 candidates sent up to the Board of Secondary Education. Regarding Article No. 6, I am to say that students resorted some strike and boycott. Regarding Article Nos. 7 and 8, I have to say that I have not yet handed over School records to A. Dhaneshwor Singh or the School Managing Committee. Question: 3. Do you like to produce evidence either the witnesses for examination on your behalf or any produce any document? Ans. My statement is enough I don't like to produce any witness on my behalf. 4. What do you like to say anything more? Ans. I want to be reinstated to my service, nothing more than this. From the above statements, there cannot be any doubt that the Petitioner was specifically asked by the Enquiry Authority if he wished to produce any witnesses or documents. 4. What do you like to say anything more? Ans. I want to be reinstated to my service, nothing more than this. From the above statements, there cannot be any doubt that the Petitioner was specifically asked by the Enquiry Authority if he wished to produce any witnesses or documents. The answer of the Petitioner is categorical which is that his statements is enough and he does not like to produce any witness on his behalf. This statement of the Petitioner files in the face of his allegation that he was not allowed to produce the witnesses or documents in respect of his defence. It is not the case of the Petitioner that his statements were false and fabricated document. In that view of the matter, it is difficult to hold that the Petitioner was denied of an opportunity to defend himself. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has acted in accordance with law. I have also perused the proceeding dated 8.4.96 of the Enquiry Authority wherein it was clearly recorded that the Petitioner was absent during the office hours on that day. The law is clear that there is presumption of regularity of official act. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the claim of the Enquiry Authorities that the they were present in the office when the disciplinary proceeding was held on 8.4.96 and it was the Petitioner who was absent in that proceeding. In the result. I am of the view that the findings of the disciplinary authority are reasonable, supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural irregularities or illegalities which vitiate the procedure by which the decision was arrived at. 8. In so far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, law in this regard is also well settled. In Apparel Export Promotion Council (supra), the Apex Court held that if the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or departmental appellate authority is either impermissible in law or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion an impose some other punishment of penalty. In the instant case, the Petitioner was charged with misappropriation of school funds and irregularity in admission of students for High School Leaving Certificate Examination. The charges against him have been duly proved in the Departmental Enquiry. In the instant case, the Petitioner was charged with misappropriation of school funds and irregularity in admission of students for High School Leaving Certificate Examination. The charges against him have been duly proved in the Departmental Enquiry. Considering the gravity of the charges against him, which have been duly established, the punishment imposed upon the Petitioner cannot be said to be one so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of this Court. Accordingly, in my considered view, the penalty imposed upon the petition is not liable to be interfered with by the Court. 9. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the composition of the Enquiry Authority is illegal. The contention of the Petitioner is that Inquiry Officer should be done by one officer only and that the appointment of two or more Enquiring Officers is arbitrary and ultra vires the Rules of 1975. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari s case reported in (1986) SCC 285, the Apex Court has held that a candidate appearing at the examination without protest and is subsequently, found to be unsuccessful in the examination, question of challenging the said examination would not arise. The aforesaid decision embodied the rule of estoppel. In the instant case also, there is no evidence on record to show that the Petitioner had ever made a protest against the composition of the Inquiry authority. On the contrary, there is clear evidence that he actually participated in the departmental inquiry on 3.4.1996. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, is thus squarely applicable to the facts of this case. In the result, the contention of the Petitioner in this behalf is rejected. 10. In so far as the grievance of the Petitioner regarding combination of the Enquiring Authorities and the punishing authorities, Rule 5(b) of the Government Aided Private School Teachers (Discipline, Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1975 is a complete answer to the Petitioner. This provision authorises the punishing authority to inquire by itself into the charges or to appoint an inquiry officer for the departmental proceedings. If the punishing authority decided to inquire and actually held the inquiry by itself, the question of violation of Rules 5(c) and (d) of the Rules, 1975 does not lie. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner in this behalf also has no merit. 11. If the punishing authority decided to inquire and actually held the inquiry by itself, the question of violation of Rules 5(c) and (d) of the Rules, 1975 does not lie. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner in this behalf also has no merit. 11. In the result, this writ petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed