Judgment :- 1. The defendants, who are unsuccessful before the two courts below are the appellants in this second appeal. 2. Heard Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. For convenience, the parties will be referred as arrayed before the trial court. 3. The plaintiff, through his power of attorney agent, instituted the suit O.S. No.23/96 for recovery of the sum of Rs.67,700/= due on a promissory note, dated 14.4.93 with subsequent interest at 12% on the principal sum of Rs.50,000/=. The defendants resisted the suit. The trial court framed the following issues for consideration :- "i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of the suit claim from the defendants ? ii) Whether the suit promissory note has been fabricated by Power of Attorney Agent Sambandam ? iii) Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation ? iv) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to ?" 4. The plaintiff's power of attorney agent was examined as P.W.1 and the plaintiff was examined as P.W.2. The first defendant examined himself as D.W.1. The plaintiff marked Exs.A-1 to A-8. The defendant has not produced any documentary evidence, but Exs.C-1 and C-2 were marked as court documents. 5. The trial court on the first issue held that the institution of the suit by the plaintiff through his power of attorney, on whom power has been conferred validly, instituted the suit validly and the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of the amount due under the promissory note. On the 2nd issue, the trial court held that the suit promissory note is true and it has not been fabricated as contended by the defendants. On the 3rd issue the trial court held that the suit claim is not barred by limitation. In the result, the trial court decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 23.12.97. 6. The defendants preferred A.S. No.11/98 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore. The defendants also moved an interlocutory application for letting in additional evidence. The appeal as well as the application were taken up together. As regards the application for additional evidence, the first appellate court dismissed the application for reception of additional evidence moved by the defendants. The defendants preferred A.S. No.11/98 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore. The defendants also moved an interlocutory application for letting in additional evidence. The appeal as well as the application were taken up together. As regards the application for additional evidence, the first appellate court dismissed the application for reception of additional evidence moved by the defendants. On the point whether the suit promissory note is a fabricated one, the first appellate court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, confirmed the findings of the trial court and held that that the suit promissory note is not fabricated as pleaded by the defendants. On the 3rd point, the appellate court held that the suit claim is not barred by limitation. The first appellate court in the result confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Being aggrieved, the present second appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants advanced the following three substantial questions of law :- "(1) When once it is recognised that nomenclature of the power of attorney does not decide the nature of the power granted and the scope of the power should be gathered from the language of the document, whether the learned Principal District Judge should have held that Ex.A-3 conferred only specific powers and no power to institute the present suit ? (2) Whether the learned Principal District Judge was justified in holding that the recitals in the concluding portion of Ex.A-3, the Deed of Power of Attorney, gave P.W.1 the power to institute the present suit completely overlooking that the said recitals do not confer such power or file fresh suits as against the appellant. A general reference cannot confer any power ? (3) Whether the finding of the learned Principal Judge is perverse in holding that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration as the learned Judge failed to appreciate the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. A proper reading of their evidence would establish that passing of consideration under Ex.A-1 was not proved ?" 8. The substantial questions of law 1 and 2 could be considered together. The learned counsel for the appellants took the court through the general power of attorney executed by plaintiff T.Ramalingam conferring power on his agent G.Sambandam, through whom the suit has been instituted. The substantial questions of law 1 and 2 could be considered together. The learned counsel for the appellants took the court through the general power of attorney executed by plaintiff T.Ramalingam conferring power on his agent G.Sambandam, through whom the suit has been instituted. The learned counsel took the Court through the recitals in the general power of attorney deed dated 21.3.94 marked as Ex.A-3 and contended that the said general power of attorney has to be confined to the suits O.S. Nos.109/93, 652/92, 97/93, 553/92 and C.C. No.554/92 already pending on the date of execution of power of attorney and no power has been conferred by the plaintiff on G.Sambandam, who has been examined as P.W.1 to institute the present suit or new suits. This Court is unable to persuade itself to sustain the said contention. 9. Preamble portion of Ex.A-3 power of attorney deed refers to the pending suit and under Ex.A-3 power has been conferred to continue those suits. Apart from the said suits, a general power has been conferred by the plaintiff on his agent Sambandam to institute new suits as well general powers conferred. In this respect the following passage in Ex.A3 cannot be excluded or ignored, which runs thus :- 10. On a consideration of the said power of attorney, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court and this Court holds that the interpretation placed by the two courts below on Ex.A-3 is well considered and it is not liable to be interfered at all. 11. Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the pronouncement of Ismail, J., (as he then was) in ANANTHA PILLAI VS. RATHNASABAPATHY MUDALIAR & OTHERS reported in 1968 (2) MLJ 574 in support of his contention that the power of attorney itself must be strictly considered as giving only such authority as they confer expressly by necessary implication. The learned Judge held that an act purporting to be done under the power of attorney is being challenged being not expressly conferred with the power, it is necessary to show that on a fair consideration of the instrument, the authority in question has to be found within the four corners of the instrument either by express terms or by necessary implication. 12. Ismail, J., (as he then was), held thus :- "The general principles regarding the construction of power-of-attorney are well settled. 12. Ismail, J., (as he then was), held thus :- "The general principles regarding the construction of power-of-attorney are well settled. Powers of attorney must be strictly construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication. Where an act purporting to be done under the power of attorney is challenged as being in excess of the power, it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the whole instrument the authority in question is to be found within the four corners of the instrument either by express terms or by necessary implication. Some of the principles governing the construction of a power of attorney are : (1) the operative part of the deed is controlled by the recitals; )2) where an authority is given to do particular acts, followeed by general words, the general words are restricted to what is necessary for the performance of the particular acts; (3) the general words do not confer general powers but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for that purpose; (4) a power of attorney is construed so as to include all medium powers necessary for its effective execution. Bearing these general principles in mind the question for consideration is whether the power of attorney in this case authorised the first defendant to enter into an agreement to sell or authorised him to execute a sale deed." Applying the very principles laid down by Ismail, J., (as he then was), this Court has no doubt in its mind to hold that Ex.A-3 confers power on the power of attorney not only to continue the suits already instituted, but also to institute new suits as well and to do or carry out all things for the principal. 13. The Apex Court in SYED ABDUL KHADER VS. RAMI REDDY reported in 1979 2) SCC 601 held that what the power of attorney authorises depends on its terms and the purpose for which it is executed. 14. In TIMBLO IRMAOS LTD., MARGO VS. JORGE ANIBAL MATOS SEQUEIRA & ANOTHER reported in 1977 (3) SCC 474 , the Apex Court laid down that the most important factor in interpreting the power of attorney is the purpose for which it is executed. 14. In TIMBLO IRMAOS LTD., MARGO VS. JORGE ANIBAL MATOS SEQUEIRA & ANOTHER reported in 1977 (3) SCC 474 , the Apex Court laid down that the most important factor in interpreting the power of attorney is the purpose for which it is executed. The Apex Court also held that the power of attorney had to be read as a whole in the light of the purpose for which it was meant. In the said pronouncement the Supreme Court laid down the settled rules of interpretation applicable to interpretation of power and held thus: "i) The word used in a document has to be interpreted or in the context as a whole ; ii) The purpose of the powers conferred by the power of attorney has been ascertained having regard to the need which gave rise to the execution of the document, the particulars of the parties and the manner in which the parties themselves instead the purpose of the document ; and lastly iii) Powers which are absolutely necessary and incidental to the ascertained object to the general powers must be necessarily employed." In the above context, the Apex Court in that context held thus :- "11. We think that perhaps the most important factor in interpreting a power of attorney is the purpose for which it is executed. It is evident that the purpose for which it is executed must appear primarily from the terms of the power of attorney itself, and, it is only if there is an unresolved problem left by the language of the document, that we need consider the manner in which the words used could be related to the facts and circumstances of the case or the nature or course of dealings. We think that the rule of construction embodied in proviso 6 to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, which enables the Court to examine the facts and surrounding circumstances to which the language of the document may be related." 15. In the light of the above pronouncements of the Apex Court and the pronouncement of Ismail, J., on a consideration of Ex.A-3, this Court has no doubt in its mind that the principal, namely, the plaintiff, has conferred the authority on his agent to institute the present suit and the purpose for which Ex.A-3 was executed is clear. In the light of the above pronouncements of the Apex Court and the pronouncement of Ismail, J., on a consideration of Ex.A-3, this Court has no doubt in its mind that the principal, namely, the plaintiff, has conferred the authority on his agent to institute the present suit and the purpose for which Ex.A-3 was executed is clear. Power has been conferred by the plaintiff on the general power of attorney agent. That apart, principal himself has been examined as P.W.2 and he has affirmed the conferment of general power as well as agreeing to ratify the action taken by the general power of attorney agent. Hence, the contentions raised by the learned counsel on points 1 and 2 not being substantial questions of law has to necessarily fail. Hence, this Court affirms the conclusion of the two courts below and hold that the first two questions of law not being substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants and this Court hasten to add that sufficient authority by way of general power has been conferred by the plaintiff on his agent to institute future suits including the present proceedings and also continue further action. 16. Taking up the third substantial question of law advanced, Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the evidence of P.W.1 has been misread and this has resulted in recording erroneous finding that the promissory note is supported by consideration. According to Mr. V.Krishnan, Ex.A-1 is not supported by consideration and the evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 will not establish that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration. This Court on a consideration of the judgment of both the Courts below finds that the evidence of P.W.1 has been considered threadbare, believed P.W.1 and they have arrived at a conclusion that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration. 17.Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the appellant took the Court through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, running to ten pages. It is not for the second appellate court to reappreciate the evidence, when the two courts below have, on a consideration of the oral evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 and D.W.1 as well recorded a finding that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration. 1 and 2, running to ten pages. It is not for the second appellate court to reappreciate the evidence, when the two courts below have, on a consideration of the oral evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 and D.W.1 as well recorded a finding that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration. The learned counsel for the appellant is unable to point out any perversity in the appreciation of evidence nor it is being pointed out by the counsel for the appellant that any material portion of admission has been omitted to be considered. 18. This Court finds that the two courts have considered the evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 and have rendered a finding that Ex.A-1 is supported by consideration. The appreciation of evidence is balance and findings are well considered. Sitting in second appeal, it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence. The findings of the two courts being concurrent, sitting under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure, this Court has to examine whether the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below and findings recorded are distinguishable according to the parameters of construction for interference under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure. 19. This Court hasten to add that it is not the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the Courts below are vitiated due to perversity of reasoning or misreading of materials on record or omission to consider the evidence. 20. While examining the scope of Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure, the Apex Court in HAFAZAT HUSSAIN VS. ABDUL MAJEED & OTHERS reported in 2001 (7) SCC 189 , held that concurrent findings recorded by the trial Judge as well as the first appellate Judge on proper appreciation of materials on record should not be disturbed by the High Court, while exercising second appellate jurisdiction unless a case is made out under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with such findings, if necessary by analysing evidence keeping in view the parameters of construction for interference. 21. The Supreme Court in DUDH NATH PANDEY VS. 21. The Supreme Court in DUDH NATH PANDEY VS. SURESH CHANDRA BHATTASALI reported in AIR 1986 SC 1509 laid down that in exercise of power under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court shall not reappreciate the evidence and come to a different finding contrary to the findings recorded by the first appellate court. 22. The two courts below concurrently held that the suit promissory note is supported by consideration by believing the evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 and rejecting the evidence of D.W.1. This Court will not be justified in interfering with the said concurrent findings recorded in exercise of powers conferred under Section 100 of The Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court as well as the first appellate court have considered the entire evidence available on record and recorded a finding that the suit promissory note is supported by consideration. The findings being balanced are not liable to be interfered. 23. It is not the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that appreciation of evidence is either perverse or it is a misreading of the evidence by both the courts below. This Court finds that the two courts below have considered the evidence let in by the plaintiff and the defendants and their appreciation of evidence being balanced findings recorded being supported by reasoning and there being no perversity, the third question of law advanced by the counsel for the defendants/appellants also are answered against the appellants and it is not a substantial question of law at all. 24. In the result, there being no questions of law, much less substantial questions of law, this second appeal is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.