JUDGMENT : This Judgment, according to Law, based on the legal material placed by both the parties, on Record, arises out of a Second Appeal, filed by the sole appellant, against R-1 and R-2, under Section 100, C.P.C., questioning the, validity and legality, of the adjudications made by, and set forth in para 2, infra. 2. Judgment and Decree, both, dated 18-11-1999, of the Court of the I Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, made in A.S.No.7/97, of its file, confirming, in toto, the earlier Judgment and Decree, both, dated 4-12-1996, of the Court of the XVIII Assistant Judge-cum-Addl. Rent Controller, Secunderabad, made in O.S.No.429/92, of its file. 3. Perused the material papers of the Record. 4. Arguments were heard. 5. The sole appellant in this Second appeal corresponds to the sole appellant in the said A.S.No.7/97, of the said First Appellate Court, and the sole defendant in the said O.S.No.429/92, of the file of the said Trial Court. R-1 and R-2 herein correspond, respectively, to R-1 and R-2 in that first Appeal, and plaintiffs 1 and 2 in that suit. 6. The parties are, hereinafter, referred to, with reference to their respective descriptions before the said Trial Court, in that suit, unless, otherwise, so specified. 7. The subject matter of the said suit, as also, that First Appeal, as well as, this Second Appeal, and the reliefs claimed in respect whereof, as described in the schedule of the plaint, is set forth, in brief, as under:-'Western Portion of Premises, bearing No.1-2-271, in an extent of 1800 sq. ft., situate in Sarojini Devi Road, Opposite to Minerva Complex, Secunderabad, and, bounded on its four sides, as described, in detail, in that schedule, etc.'- 8. In respect thereof, the two plaintiffs filed the said O.S.No.429/92, against the sole defendant, in the said Trial Court, inter alia, for the main reliefs as set forth, hereunder:-(a)for ejectment of the defendant, from the said scheduled premises, and for recovery of vacant possession thereof;(b)for recovery of arrears of rent for 3 months, from January to March, 1992, totalling into Rs.4,350/-;(c)for future mesne profits, as damages, for use and occupation, at Rs.6.30 ps., per square foot, for the extent of the scheduled premises of 1800 sq. feet, being Rs.11,340/-, per month, or, at such rate, as may be fixed by the Court, till delivery of vacant possession to the plaintiffs; and(d)for costs of the case. feet, being Rs.11,340/-, per month, or, at such rate, as may be fixed by the Court, till delivery of vacant possession to the plaintiffs; and(d)for costs of the case. 9. The plaintiffs filed the said suit, against the sole defendant, claiming, that, the sole defendant is the tenant in the scheduled premises, owned by them, and that, the defendant failed to vacate the same, notwithstanding the expiry of the lease period, and issue of the required notice to quit, etc., and that, hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit, for the reliefs set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph. 10. The sole defendant, while admitting the tenancy under the plaintiffs, however, urged, that, the case, on hand, is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act, and also, that, the statutory notice is not valid, etc., and that, hence, it is not liable to be vacated, from the schedule premises, and that, hence the plaintiffs are not entitled for the reliefs of his eviction, arrears of rent, damages, etc., and that, hence, the suit has to be dismissed with costs, etc., 11. After due settlement of the issues therein, the said Trial Court tried the said O.S.No.429/92, in the process whereof, it recorded the oral evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3, and D.W.1 and D.W.2 and exhibited, the documentary evidence, by way of Exs.A-1 to A-9, and Exs.B-1 to B-12, and Exs.X-1 to X-6, and, later, after due arguments there-into, finally, adjudicated thereupon, by its Judgment and the Decree, both, dated 4-12-1996, set forth in para 2, supra, as under:-(a)Directing the defendant, to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of the scheduled premises, to the plaintiffs, by 5-2-1997;(b)That the mesne profits will be decided on a separate application; and(c)Directing the defendant, to pay to the plaintiffs, the costs of the suit. 12. Aggrieved thereby, and, questioning the, validity and legality, thereof, the sole defendant filed the said A.S.No.7/97, in the said First Appellate Court, which, after due enquiry there-into, finally adjudicated thereupon, by its now impugned Judgment and Decree, both, dated 18-11-1999, as under. 13. Aggrieved thereby, and, questioning the, validity and legality, thereof the sole defendant filed the present Second Appeal, as set forth in paras 1 and 2, supra. 14. As aforesaid, the suit is filed for eviction of the defendant, from the plaint scheduled property. The tenancy between the parties is admitted. 15. 13. Aggrieved thereby, and, questioning the, validity and legality, thereof the sole defendant filed the present Second Appeal, as set forth in paras 1 and 2, supra. 14. As aforesaid, the suit is filed for eviction of the defendant, from the plaint scheduled property. The tenancy between the parties is admitted. 15. The defendant claims, that, the notice to quite, given by the plaintiff, and covered by Ex.A-3, issued prior to filing of the suit, is not valid and legal, and not according to the statutory provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, etc., and that, hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed, ipso facto on such basis, etc., 16. The main ground for the defendant, to base this defence, is that, the lease in between the parties is in respect of manufacturing purposes, and that, therefore, statutory notice to quit, giving six months time, has to be given, as prescribed by the said Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but not, 30 days, or, 15 days time, as given by the plaintiff, by Ex.A-3, etc. 17. However, neither party filed the written lease deed in this case. 18. However, as postulated in Ruling No.2, set forth in para 28, hereunder, the burden of proof, that, the lease is for manufacturing purposes, and that, hence, requires six months notice, will be cast upon the tenant, that is, the defendant, in this case. 19. However, the defendant did not file any such written lease deed, in the case, on hand.20. In another Ruling No.2, cited in para 29, infra, and relied upon for the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, it is postulated, that, such a lease for manufacturing purposes can be made, only by a registered instrument. 21. In the case, on hand, the lease is claimed for a period of five years, even according to the defendant. Hence, under Section 107 of the said Transfer of Property Act, the lease shall be by registered instrument. 22. Hence, the plaintiffs claim, that, the lease shall be construed, only, as monthly lease. 23. The plaintiffs also claim, that, even, if, the lease is for manufacturing purposes, in fact, actually the defendant did not make use of the same, for that purpose, and that, for that reason also, six months notice is not required. 24. 22. Hence, the plaintiffs claim, that, the lease shall be construed, only, as monthly lease. 23. The plaintiffs also claim, that, even, if, the lease is for manufacturing purposes, in fact, actually the defendant did not make use of the same, for that purpose, and that, for that reason also, six months notice is not required. 24. The said Trial Court, in lengthy paragraph Nos.8 to 10, of its Judgment, considered that question, by examining the oral and documentary evidence, placed in respect thereof, on Record, and, finally recorded a finding, at the end of para 10 thereof, to the effect, that, no manufacturing of corrugated paper boxes and allied products was being carried on in the scheduled premises. 25. The Trial Court, therefore, recorded a finding, that, because, the tenancy is not for manufacturing purposes, six months notice is not required, and that, the defendant is only a monthly tenant, and that, hence, the notice to quit, covered by the case, on hand, is valid and legal, etc. 26. The First Appellate Court, also, in its impugned Judgment, inter alia, recorded a finding, to the effect, that, the tenancy, covered by the case, is not for manufacturing purposes, and that, hence, the tenancy is only monthly tenancy, and that, hence, the notice, covered by Ex.A-3, is a valid notice to quit, etc. 27. So, therefore, there are concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court as well as, the First Appellate Court, inter alia, to the effect, that, the scheduled building was not made use of, for any manufacturing purposes, and hence, six months notice is not required, and that, the tenancy is only a monthly tenancy, and that, hence, the notice, covered by Ex.A-3, is valid, legal etc. these findings are based on the oral and documentary evidence placed, on Record hence, interference by the High Court, under Section 100, C.P.C., is not warranted. 28. In this context, the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant relied upon the two Rulings, set forth, hereunder:-(1)AIR 1952 S.C., 23 (Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, Dhabal Deb and another), delivered, inter alia, interpreting Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has no application to the facts and circumstances, covered by the case, on hand, set forth, earlier. It has no application to the facts and circumstances, covered by the case, on hand, set forth, earlier. Even otherwise, to some extent, it supports the case of the plaintiffs, to the extent, that where there is lease of land for building purpose, for ten years, fixing early rent, and when such lease in-operative under Law, then acceptance of yearly rent, will result in, by implication of Law, tenancy from month to month.(2)AIR 1973, S.C., 425 (Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd., v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and others), delivered, inter alia, interpreting the said Section 106 of the said Transfer of Property Act, etc., inter alia, it is postulated herein, that, in order to decide what constitutes 'the manufacturing purpose'-, the dominant purpose of the lease has to be ascertained. In fact, at the end of para 6, as also in para 7, thereof, it is postulated, that, the burden will be upon the defendant-lessee, to prove, that, the burden will be upon the defendant-lessee, to prove, that, the lease was for manufacturing purposes, etc. As already found, earlier, in the case, on hand, the defendant did not place the original lease, on Record, and even otherwise, it is an un-registered lease. So, this Ruling supports the case of the plaintiff-respondents, and not the defendant-appellant herein. 29. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondents relied upon 3 Rulings, as set forth, hereunder:-(1)AIR 1995 S.C., 2482 (Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain (dead) by L.rs.,) inter alia, interpreting the said same provisions of Law, inter alia, postulating, that, in the case, covered by that Ruling, there was an express term of contract, that, notice in writing of 15 days, only, is necessary, for termination of tenancy, etc., and that, the lease, covered by that case, was not from year to year, or, for a period extending one year, and that, therefore, even though, the lease was for manufacturing purposes, six months notice is not required, and that, 15 days notice will be sufficient, etc. The foregoing legal position substantiates the case of the plaintiff/respondents herein.(2)2001 (3) A.L.D., 80 (SC) (Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder K. Bajaj and others), delivered, Inter alia, interpreting the said same provisions of Law, Inter alia, postulating, that, where the lease for one year, or, more inter alia, for manufacturing purposes, it has to be made by a registered instrument, and that, in case, it is an un-registered lease for such purposes, then, it has to be treated as monthly lease, and, in such a case, the tenancy can be terminated by giving only 15 days time, but not six months; and(3)2002 (4) A.L.D., 508 (Oasis Bar and Restaurant and others v. P. Umabala and another), inter alia, interpreting Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Inter alia, postulating, that where the lease for running hotel business is not registered, then, it has to be construed as a monthly lease, and that, much more so, the rent agreed is to be paid monthly, and that, in such a case, 15 days notice will be valid. 30. After perusing the impugned Judgment and the Decree of the Trial Court, as well as, the impugned Judgment and the Decree of the First Appellate Court, vis-a-vis, the oral and documentary evidence covered thereby, and set forth in paras 11 supra, vis-a-vis, the Grounds of Appeal, vis-a-vis, the agreements of the learned Counsel for both the parties, vis-a-vis, the legal position postulated in the 3 Rulings, I am of the considered opinion, that, no substantial question of Law arises, to be decided in this Second Appeal, warranting interference by the High Court, in this Second Appeal, either under Section 100, or, 103, of C.P.C. 31. Even otherwise, even considering the material, as aforesaid, I am of the opinion, that, the same do not suffer from any inherent illegality, or, infirmity, or, perversity, or, abnormality, or, illegal appreciation of the material, by either of the two Courts, or, in interpretation of any statutory provision, or, document, and thereby, ipso facto, resulting in grave miscarriage of substantial justice, so as to warrant the High Court, to interfere therewith, as a special, or, exceptional, or extraordinary, case, under the said Sections 100, or, 103, of C.P.C. 32. Hence, the Second Appeal is devoid of all, factual and legal, merits, and hence, it is liable to be dismissed, in toto, as such, as is being done, hereunder. 33. Hence, the High Court doth hereby adjudicate upon the Second Appeal, dismissing the same, in toto, with costs to Respondent-Plaintiff herein.