D. H. WAGHELA, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, notice for assessment under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short the Act) is under challenge mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. ( 2 ) THE facts as far as they are relevant for the purpose of deciding the issues raised in this petition are simple and in a narrow compass. The petitioner, a public limited company, filed its return of income on 30. 11. 1996 for the assessment year 1996-97 and, inter alia, claimed depreciation @ 40% on written down value of vehicles on which such depreciation was allowed in assessment year 1995-96, and also claimed pro rata depreciation @ 20% on the additions during assessment year 1996-97. The assessing officer, by his letter dated 21. 10. 1998, asked the petitioner to furnish details regarding various points of which one was details of the vehicles on which depreciation @ 40% was claimed. In reply thereto, the petitioner stated that it was a finance company engaged in the business of leasing, the vehicles in question were given on lease and that the lessee had used the said vehicles in the business of running them on hire. It was also pointed out that there was no requirement in section 32 of the Act or in the Rules made thereunder that the owner of commercial vehicles has to use the vehicles himself for the business of hire. After such reply and hearing and disallowing several other claims, total income of Rs. 5,00,35,628/- was assessed under section 143 (3) of the Act as against the original return of income declaring taxable income as Rs. Nil. 2. 1 thereafter, a notice under section 147 of the Act is stated to have been issued in October, 2001 in respect of commission, bad debt and interest, which the assessing officer added, but the Commissioner of Income Tax deleted and the departments appeal preferred therefrom is stated to be pending. 2. 2 the impugned notice dated 20. 6. 2002 under section 148 of the Act stated that the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Surat had reason to believe that the petitioners income for the assessment year 1996-97 had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner was required to deliver within 30 days a return in the prescribed form. 6. 2002 under section 148 of the Act stated that the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Surat had reason to believe that the petitioners income for the assessment year 1996-97 had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner was required to deliver within 30 days a return in the prescribed form. After the reasons recorded under section 148 of the Act were demanded and denied and the petitioner had submitted the same NIL return, the petitioner was requested to show cause why the excess depreciation allowed to the extent of Rs. 1,70,00,000/- should not be disallowed. Accordingly, notice of hearing under section 143 (2) of the Act was also issued and hearing was fixed on 11. 12. 2002 with a request to appear with necessary explanation. Even as the hearing was adjourned to 18. 12. 2002, the petitioner approached this Court on 19. 12. 2002 by way of this petition and obtained interim relief on 20. 12. 2002. The initial injunction granted on 20. 12. 2002 only against final assessment by way of ad-interim relief has been continued and confirmed, while admitting the petition on 24. 2. 2003, into an order to maintain status quo. 2. 3 by filing an affidavit-in-reply, the respondent has stated that the contentions raised and the averments made in the petition could be raised before the Assessing Officer who would decide the same in due course. It is also contended that the depreciation claimed by the petitioner @ 40% on WDV cost of the commercial vehicles was granted by the Assessing Officer without discussing the issue in the assessment order and without looking to the provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, submitted that this was a clear case of claiming excess depreciation and was covered by the proviso to section 147 of the Act. The reasons recorded under section 148 of the Act are produced with the affidavit and the material part thereof reads as under:"3. On verification of the depreciation statement attached with the return of income, it is noticed that depreciation of Rs. 8,43,27,096 is inclusive of depreciation of Rs. 3,40,00,000 on motor vehicles (commercial) claimed at the rate of 40% on WDV/cost of Rs. 8,50,00,000. On verification of the depreciation statement attached with the return of income, it is noticed that depreciation of Rs. 8,43,27,096 is inclusive of depreciation of Rs. 3,40,00,000 on motor vehicles (commercial) claimed at the rate of 40% on WDV/cost of Rs. 8,50,00,000. As per Rule 5, the rate of depreciation on motor vehicle in the second column of the table in Appendix-1 are as under: Block of assets Depreciation allowance as per percentage of WDV III (IA) Motor cars other than those used in a business of running them on hire acquired or put to use on or after the first day of April, 1990. 20% (2) (ii) Motor buses, motor lorries and motor taxis used in a business of running them on hire. 40 % "4. The assessee is a leasing company. The assessee company has used the motor vehicles for lease and not for hiring. The assessee company is, therefore, entitled for depreciation at the normal rate of 20% on motor vehicles (commercial) and not at the higher rate of 40% as claimed and allowed while finalising the assessment. Excess depreciation on motor vehicles (commercial) has been allowed by Rs. 1,70,00,000 while computing taxable income, which has escaped assessment to that extent. "5. I have, therefore, reason to believe that income to the extent of Rs. 1,70,00,000 has escaped assessment within the meaning of sub-clause (i) of Explanation 2 inserted to section 147 of the I. T. Act. The assessee company has failed to furnish full and true particulars of income. " ( 3 ) THE burden of the arguments of learned advocate Mr. J. P. Shah, appearing for the petitioner, was that, in the facts and circumstances, the respondent lacked the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 147 of the Act and the alternative remedy of presenting the case before the assessing officer was neither an efficacious nor an adequate remedy apart from being lengthy, expensive and cumbersome. It was submitted that the assessment in the relevant year was made under sub-section (3) of section 143 and the reassessment proceedings were initiated admittedly after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. That the petitioner had not failed to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for its assessment and no income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment on that account. That the petitioner had not failed to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for its assessment and no income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment on that account. In fact, there was no escapement of income, according to the submission. Elaborating such submission, the learned counsel submitted that the then assessing officer had applied his mind to the claim of the petitioner and after considering the explanation tendered by him, allowed depreciation at the higher rate. Therefore, the respondent was acting on a mere change of opinion which could not vest the authority with the jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in CALCUTTA DISCOUNT CO. LTD. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER [ 41 ITR 1991 = AIR 1961 SC 372 ] as applied in WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] with special emphasis on the following observations:-"the existence of such alternative remedies as appeals and reference to the High Court was not, however, always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction or from continuing such action. When the Constitution conferred on the High Courts the power to give relief, it became the duty of the Courts to give such relief in fit cases and the Courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief were refused without adequate reasons. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects, or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari or prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Writ of certiorari or prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. " (emhasis supplied)3. 1 the learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. CORPORATION BANK LTD. [ (2002) 254 ITR 791 ], wherein the assessee had furnished particulars of the amount claimed as not recoverable and had also filed statements disclosing full details of the interest suspension account and it was held that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the material facts necessary for the assessment and, therefore, section 147 (a) was held to be not attracted. Similar was the fate in C. I. T. v. FORAMER FRANCE [ (2003) 129 TAXMAN 72 (SC) ] wherein admittedly there was no failure to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for assessment. ( 4 ) THE learned standing counsel Mr. B. B. Naik, appearing for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner had not only alternative remedy but it was availed also by the petitioner and that there was no reason to entertain any apprehension that all objections, including the objection regarding jurisdiction, shall not be entertained and legally adjudicated by the authority after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. He, in effect, submitted that the respondent had reason to bona fide believe that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, that such escapement was due to failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all the material facts and that excessive depreciation allowance was computed in the relevant assessment year. He, in effect, submitted that the respondent had reason to bona fide believe that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, that such escapement was due to failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all the material facts and that excessive depreciation allowance was computed in the relevant assessment year. He further submitted that adequate safeguards against abuse of the powers under section 147 were provided in the express provisions of the Act. And, it would be improper and unfair for this Court to interject at this stage, particularly in view of the recent development of the law in this regard. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in GKN DRIVESHAFTS (INDIA) LTD. v. I. T. O. [ 259 ITR 19 ] and various other judgments to which reference will be made hereafter. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to first refer to the relevant parts and clauses of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. Section 147 of the Act empowers the assessing officer, if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, to assess or reassess such income or recompute the depreciation allowance. This power is subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 and the proviso that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143, or section 147 has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action can be taken under section 147 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Explanation 2 says that, where an assessment has been made and excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance under the Act has been computed, it shall be deemed to be a case in which income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Section 147 of the Act expressly provides for reassessment not only of the income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment but also of such other income which comes to notice subsequently during the course of assessment. 5. Section 147 of the Act expressly provides for reassessment not only of the income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment but also of such other income which comes to notice subsequently during the course of assessment. 5. 1 it is clear from plain reading of the relevant provisions that the first condition for assuming jurisdiction for initiating reassessment is that the assessing officer has to have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. As elaborated by this Court in PRAFUL CHUNILAL PATEL v. M. J. MAKWANA, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [ (1999) 236 ITR 832 ], ". . . . . . . . . . . . . The words reason to believe cannot mean that the assessing officer should have finally ascertained the facts by legal evidence. They only mean that he forms a belief from the examination he makes and, if he likes, from any information that he receives. If he discovers or finds or satisfies himself that the taxable income has escaped assessment, it would amount to saying that he had reason to believe that such income had escaped assessment. The justification for his belief is not to be judged from the standards of proof required for coming to a final decision. A belief though justified for the purpose of initiation of the proceedings under section 147 may ultimately stand altered after the hearing and while reaching the final conclusion on the basis of the intervening enquiry. At the stage where he finds a cause or justification to believe that such income has escaped assessment, the assessing officer is not required to base his belief on any final adjudication of the matter". And, ". . . . . . . . His formation of belief is not a judicial decision but an administrative decision. It does not determine anything at the initial stage, but the assessing officer has a duty to proceed so as to obtain what the taxpayer was always bound to pay if the increase is justified at all. The decision to initiate the proceedings is not to be preceded by any judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry. His reasoning may be the result of official information or his own investigation or may come from any source that he considers reliable. The decision to initiate the proceedings is not to be preceded by any judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry. His reasoning may be the result of official information or his own investigation or may come from any source that he considers reliable. His reason is not to be judged by a court by the standard of what the ideal man would think. He is the actual man trusted by the Legislature and charged with the duty of forming of a belief for the mere purposes of determining whether he should proceed to collect what is strictly due by law, and no other authority can substitute its standard of sufficient reason in the circumstances, or his opinion or belief for his. Unless the ground or material on which his belief is based, is found to be so irrational as not to be worthy of being called a reason by any honest man, his conclusion that it constitutes a sufficient reason, cannot be overridden. What is, therefore, to be ascertained is, whether the alleged reason really existed, and if it did, whether it was so irrational as to be outside the limits of his administrative discretion with which the assessing officer is invested so as to be really in disregard of the statutory condition. . . . . . . . . . . " Evidently, the assessing officer purporting to exercise powers under section 147 of the Act is not a party who has to not only state but establish before anyone the so-called jurisdictional facts. 5. 2 in the case of initiation of assessment proceedings under section 147 after four years, the alleged escapement has to be on account of failure of the assessee "to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. " Therefore, if all the facts that are material and necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed by the assessee, the power and jurisdiction under section 147 cannot be exercised. And the reply to the question whether all the material facts necessary for the assessment were fully and truly disclosed or not, would depend upon the facts of each case. As held by the Supreme Court in PARSURAM POTTERY WORKS LTD. v. I. T. O. [ (1977) 106 ITR 1 ], ". . . . . . . . And the reply to the question whether all the material facts necessary for the assessment were fully and truly disclosed or not, would depend upon the facts of each case. As held by the Supreme Court in PARSURAM POTTERY WORKS LTD. v. I. T. O. [ (1977) 106 ITR 1 ], ". . . . . . . . In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority will, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. . . . . . "5. 3 reply to the question whether any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment or not is made easier by virtue of the explanation providing for a deeming fiction under which, where excessive depreciation allowance has been computed, income has to be deemed to have escaped assessment. The explanation providing for this deeming fiction has double impact - in supplying reason to believe that there was escapement of income and in justifying reassessment. ( 6 ) AS early as in 1988, the Supreme Court had, in VXL INDIA LTD. v. I. T. O. [ (1988) 173 ITR 124 ], dismissed the S. L. P. of the assessee preferred from the Division Bench judgment in L. P. A. observing as under:"whether there was any material or information in possession of the I. T. O. which is sufficient to invoke the provisions of section 147 is to be decided under the provisions of the Act itself and that could not be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has to be decided in the assessment proceeding after considering the objections raised by the assessee before the I. T. O. , the appellate or other authorities. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with liberty to the appellant to raise all questions that are open to it under law before the assessing authorities, including the question of jurisdiction or of the conditions precedent for invoking the provisions made under section 147 of the Act. "6. 1 later on, the Supreme Court observed in SRI KRISHNA PVT. LTD. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with liberty to the appellant to raise all questions that are open to it under law before the assessing authorities, including the question of jurisdiction or of the conditions precedent for invoking the provisions made under section 147 of the Act. "6. 1 later on, the Supreme Court observed in SRI KRISHNA PVT. LTD. v. I. T. O. [ (1996) 221 ITR 538 ] that enquiry at the stage of validity of notice under section 148/147 is only to see whether there are reasonable grounds for the I. T. O. to believe and not whether the omission/failure and the escapement of income is established. ( 7 ) THE relevant law and procedural aspects thereof with regard to the main issue stand practically amended and crystallised by virtue of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in GKN DRIVESHAFTS (supra ). In the facts of that case, the High Court had taken the view that the appellant could have taken all the objections in its reply to the notices issued under sections 148 and 143 (2) of the Act and that the writ petition was premature. In the appeal preferred from that order, the Supreme Court found no justifiable reason to interfere. More importantly, it is further clarified that when a notice under section 148 of the Act was issued, the proper course of action for the noticee was to file a return, and if he so desires to seek reasons for issuing the notice. The assessing officer is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. On receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file objections to issuance of notice and the assessing officer is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. Thus, the Supreme Court has not only rejected the appeal against the order holding the petition to be premature, it has consciously prescribed the proper course of action for the noticee in all such cases. This prescription is the binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 7. 1 in the facts of the present case, the petitioner being halfway through the process and now that reasons are revealed, what remains is filing of objections to issuance of notice and disposing of the same by a speaking order by the assessing officer. This prescription is the binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 7. 1 in the facts of the present case, the petitioner being halfway through the process and now that reasons are revealed, what remains is filing of objections to issuance of notice and disposing of the same by a speaking order by the assessing officer. After specific prescription of the proper course of action exactly in the present context by the Supreme Court, it would be highly improper and presumptuous for the petitioner to submit and for this Court to hold that it is an alternative remedy which is not adequate, efficacious or appropriate. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed only on that ground. In fact, after the initial injunction only against final assessment, the objections to notice under section 147 of the Act could have been submitted and decided even during pendency of the petition and the judgment of the Supreme Court could have easily been complied. ( 8 ) AFTER recording the aforesaid conclusion and deciding to relegate the petitioner to original proceedings of reassessment, any discussion of the rival submissions regarding the objections of the petitioner to the impugned notice may influence the decision of the assessing officer and cause prejudice to a party. Therefore, it would not be proper to succumb to the temptation of examining at this stage whether, even after specific query in that regard, the reply of the petitioner that, "the lessee has used the said commercial vehicles for the business of running them on hire", was, in the facts and circumstances, full and true disclosure of all the material facts necessary for assessment. And, of course, the question as to whether in fact, excessive depreciation allowance was computed, would in any case be wide open before the assessing officer. However, the contention that there was mere change of opinion of the assessing officer with regard to the depreciation allowance has to be negatived in no uncertain terms since, pursuant to the query requiring details of vehicles on which depreciation @ 40% was claimed and reply thereto as aforesaid, there is no discussion or finding whatsoever on that aspect in the assessment order for the relevant assessment year. There obviously was no opinion formed with regard to the applicable rate of depreciation allowance. There obviously was no opinion formed with regard to the applicable rate of depreciation allowance. Again, as held by this Court in PRAFUL CHUNILAL PATEL (supra), "in cases where the assessing officer had over-looked something at the first assessment, there can, in our opinion, be no question of any change of opinion. . . . . . . ". And, ". . . . . . . However, in cases where an error or mistake is detected, it can never be said that there is only a mere change of opinion. The mistake or error which is detected and which constituted a valid decision or cause to form a belief in the first assessment as a result of which the income has escaped assessment, would constitute a reason to believe that the income had escaped assessment and such cases where mistakes and errors are detected and which constitute a valid justification or cause to form a belief sought to be corrected, cannot be said to be cases of mere change of opinion. " ( 9 ) THE other contention of the petitioner that the respondent had already made up and revealed his mind on the issue and raising preliminary objection to the very assumption of jurisdiction and issuance of notice cannot serve any useful purpose, has to be stated to be rejected in view of the aforesaid discussion and the order made hereunder. The further argument, in substance, that, upon decision of the preliminary objection or framing of the assessment the petitioner would find itself on the path of statutory remedies and that virtually amounts to denial of relief through the constitutional remedy, is premature, presumptive and pre-emptive. There is before the petitioner the instance of its own case in respect of the same assessment year wherein additions by the assessing officer in reassessment under section 147 of the Act were deleted by the Commissioner, as stated earlier. ( 10 ) IN view of the above discussion, well settled legal position and conclusions, the other judgments cited at the Bar are not required to be discussed. ( 10 ) IN view of the above discussion, well settled legal position and conclusions, the other judgments cited at the Bar are not required to be discussed. It is, however, clarified that, upon dismissal of this petition and vacation of the interim relief, when the process of reassessment is restarted and preliminary objections to the impugned notice are raised by the petitioner, they shall be considered and decided in accordance with law after affording to the petitioner sufficient opportunity of being heard. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged and the interim relief is vacated with no order as to costs. I have gone through the judgement of my learned Senior Brother. For the reasons stated hereinafter, I record my dissenting opinion. 1. This petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India challenges the notice under Section-148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) dated 20th June, 2002 for the Assessment Year 1996-97. ( 11 ) THE petitioner is a public limited company. On 30th November, 1996, the petitioner filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 1996-97. The relevant accounting period is year ended on 31st March, 1996. Alongwith return of income, the petitioner had filed a statement of depreciation wherein depreciation @ 40% on the Written Down Value (WDV) of Rs. 8,50,00,000=00 had been claimed on commercial vehicles. The petitioner had also claimed depreciation on commercial vehicles worth Rs. 22,22,540=00 @ 20% because the petitioner had purchased the said commercial vehicles in the second half of the accounting period. On 21st October, 1998, the petitioner was served with a letter by the Assessing Officer calling for various details and at Serial No. 19, the said letter stated -"details of vehicles on which depreciation at the rate of 40% is claimed. "the petitioner duly replied to the said letter on 22nd February, 1999. In relation to the aforesaid query, the petitioner stated that the commercial vehicles purchased by the petitioner had been given on lease and the lessee had used the said commercial vehicles for the business of running them on hire. The petitioner also invited the attention of the Assessing Officer to the fact that the provisions of Section-32 of the Act or the relevant Rules did not require that the owner of the commercial vehicles was bound to use the vehicle himself for the business of hire. The petitioner also invited the attention of the Assessing Officer to the fact that the provisions of Section-32 of the Act or the relevant Rules did not require that the owner of the commercial vehicles was bound to use the vehicle himself for the business of hire. In support of the aforesaid contention, the petitioner placed reliance upon various decisions of the Tribunal, which have been referred to in the reply dated 22nd February, 1999. On 24th March, 1999, the Assessing Officer passed the Assessment Order under Section 143 (3) of the Act and though various additions and disallowances were made, in relation to the aforesaid item of depreciation no disallowance has been made. On 20th June, 2002, the notice under Section-148 of the Act came to be issued. On 24th June, 2002, the petitioner called upon the Assessing Officer to supply a copy of the reasons recorded. On 20th August, 2002, the Assessing Officer communicated to the petitioner that there was no statutory requirement of providing a copy of the reasons recorded before filing of the Return of Income and hence, the petitioner was called upon to furnish the Return of Income in response to the notice issued under Section-148 of the Act. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner filed the Return on 14th November, 2002, returning the same income. On 3rd December, 2002, the Assessing Officer issued a show cause notice fixing the hearing on 11th December, 2002. In the said show cause notice, it was stated that the petitioner was a leasing company and the motor vehicles had been used for leasing out and not for hiring and, therefore, excess depreciation on commercial vehicles had been allowed to the extent of Rs. 1,70,00,000=00, because according to the Assessing Officer, the correct rate of depreciation ought to have been 20% and not the higher rate of 40%, as claimed and allowed while framing the assessment under Section-143 (3) of the Act. ( 12 ) ALONGWITH the affidavit-in-reply, the reasons recorded by the respondent have been placed on record and the relevant portion thereof, reads as under :"3. On verification of the depreciation statement attached with the return of income, it is noticed that depreciation of Rs. 8,43,27,096 is inclusive of depreciation of Rs. 3,40,00,000 on motor vehicles (commercial) claimed at the rate of 40% on WDV/cost of Rs. 8,50,00,000. On verification of the depreciation statement attached with the return of income, it is noticed that depreciation of Rs. 8,43,27,096 is inclusive of depreciation of Rs. 3,40,00,000 on motor vehicles (commercial) claimed at the rate of 40% on WDV/cost of Rs. 8,50,00,000. As per Rule 5, the rate of depreciation on motor vehicle in the second column of the table in Appendix-I are as under:block of Assets depreciation allowance as per percentage of WDV -- (1) (1a) Motor cars other than those used 20% in a business of running them on hire, acquired or put to use on or after the first day of april, 1990. (2) (ii) motor buses, motor lorries and 40% motor taxis used in a business of running them on hire. ( 13 ) THE assessee is a leasing company. The assessee company has used the motor vehicles for lease and not for hiring. The assessee company is, therefore, entitled for depreciation at the normal rate of 20% on motor vehicles (commercial) and not at the higher rate of 40% as claimed and allowed while finalizing the assessment. Excess depreciation on motor vehicles (commercial) has been allowed by Rs. 1,70,00,000 while computing taxable income, which has escaped assessment to that extent. ( 14 ) I have, therefore, reason to believe that income to the extent of Rs. 1,70,00,000 has escaped assessment within the meaning of sub-clause (i) of explanation 2 inserted to section 147 of the I. T. Act. The assessee company has failed to furnish full and true particulars of income. " ( 15 ) MR. J. P. SHAH, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that where the action of the respondent-Authority was shown to be prima facie without jurisdiction, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction and powers under Article-226 of the Constitution of India and grant necessary consequential relief without subjecting the petitioner to lengthy proceedings by way of relegating the petitioner to avail of alternative remedy, resulting in harassment to the petitioner by way of incurring of substantial expenses as well as long drawn out litigation. It was contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, taking into consideration the language employed by the Proviso to Section-147 of the Act, it was apparent that the impugned notice under Section-148 of the Act had been issued after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant Assessment Year and hence, it was upon the respondent-Authority to show that firstly, income chargeable to tax had escaped the assessment for such Assessment Year; secondly, such escapement had taken place either by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to make a Return; or, thirdly, such escapement had taken place by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment of that Assessment Year. That in the present case, the second contingency regarding non-filing of return did not exist and hence, the respondent-Authority had to show prima facie that there was any failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment, which resulted in escapement of any income. That the petitioner had not only made full and true disclosure while filing the return of income, the then Assessing Officer had applied his mind to the claim of the petitioner, called for details and explanation, and after considering the explanation tendered by the petitioner granted depreciation at the rate claimed by the petitioner. That in these circumstances, the respondent-Authority was, thus, acting on a mere change of opinion only and the law was well settled that mere change of opinion after expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant Assessment Year cannot vest the authority with the jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings. In support of the submissions, Mr. Shah placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Corporation Bank Ltd. , reported in 254 ITR 791, as well as in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Foramer France, reported in (2003) 129 Taxmann 72. ( 16 ) AS against this, Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Authority, submitted that the petition should not be entertained because the petitioner was entitled to alternative remedy by way of appeal, etc. , in case an adverse order was passed against the petitioner. ( 16 ) AS against this, Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Authority, submitted that the petition should not be entertained because the petitioner was entitled to alternative remedy by way of appeal, etc. , in case an adverse order was passed against the petitioner. That even otherwise, as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. I. T. O. , reported in 259 ITR 19, when a notice under Section-148 of the Act is issued, the noticee is required to file return and thereafter, seek reasons for issuance of notice. That the Assessing Officer is bound to furnish reasons within reasonable time and on receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file objections and the Assessing Officer is bound to dispose of the said objections by passing a speaking order. It was, therefore, submitted that in the present case, the petitioner can raise its objections and the Assessing Officer was bound to deal with the same and dispose of the same. ( 17 ) AT this stage, Mr. J. P. Shah on behalf of the petitioner joined issue and submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that such a course of action could be adopted, in the present case, this Court had admitted the matter after hearing the other side on this very contention, and hence, the Court should not relegate the petitioner to such a course of action. It was further submitted that even otherwise, the respondent-Authority had already disclosed its reasons as well as given its view by way of the aforesaid show cause notice dated 3rd December, 2002 and hence, no fruitful purpose would be served by raising the same objections before the authority as the authority had already made up its mind. ( 18 ) MR. SHAH also invited the attention to the decisions of this Court in the case of Arvind Polycot Ltd. vs. Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 222 ITR 280, and Gujarat Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Assessment), reported in 245 ITR 84, to submit that the existence of alternative remedies such as appeals and reference is not always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting the authority from acting without jurisdiction or from continuing such action. Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Assessment), reported in 245 ITR 84, to submit that the existence of alternative remedies such as appeals and reference is not always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting the authority from acting without jurisdiction or from continuing such action. That when the Constitution had conferred on the High Court the power to give relief, it was the duty of the Court to give such a relief in fit cases and the Court would be failing to perform its duty if relief were refused without adequate reasons. ( 19 ) MR. NAIK placed reliance upon various decisions of different High Courts in support of the contention that where alternative remedy prescribed by the statute is available, that should be availed of as a first remedy and the Court should be approached under Article-226 of the Constitution of India only as a last resort. That the petitioner should not entertain any apprehension to the effect that the objections regarding jurisdiction shall not be entertained by the authority or that appropriate opportunity shall not be given. It was also submitted that whether there was failure on the part of the petitioner-assessee or not, would always turn on facts of the case and sufficiency of material for recording of reasons was beyond the domain of jurisdiction of the Court. It was further submitted that it was not open to the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article-226 of the Constitution of India to enter into reappreciation of evidence or facts for the purpose of determining as to whether the respondent-Authority had jurisdiction or not. The following decisions have been cited by Mr. Naik in support of the aforesaid contentions : (i) (2001) 168 CTR (Pandh) 508 in the case of Mahavir Spinning Mills Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax; (ii) (1992) 108 CTR (Ker.) 340 in the case of Kureethadam Wines vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and Anr. ; (iii) [1991] 56 Taxman (Jandk) 122 in the case of Dev Son (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India; (iv) 136 ITR 679 (Delhi) in the case of New Bank of India Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, Company Circle, New Delhi and Anr. ; (v) 250 ITR 393 (Pandh) in the case of Bal Ram Jakhar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. ; (v) 250 ITR 393 (Pandh) in the case of Bal Ram Jakhar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. ; (vi) 77 ITR 661 (MP) in the case of Deepchand Daga vs. Income Tax Officer, C-Ward, Raipur and Anr. ; (vii) 64 ITR 249 (Pandh) in the case of R. B. Seth Gujar Mal Modi and Ors. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and Anr. ; (viii) 173 ITR 124 (Pandh) in the case of VXL India Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer and Ors. ; and, (ix) 230 ITR 945 (SC) in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. U. P. Forest Corporation. (x) 236 ITR 832 (Guj.) in the case of Praful Chunilal Patel vs. M. J. Makwana/assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. (xi) 221 ITR 538 (SC) in the case of Sri Krishna Pvt. Ltd. , etc. vs. Income-Tax Officer and Ors. In light of the fact that both the sides made elaborate submissions in relation to existence of alternative remedy, and its effect, it is necessary to briefly recapitulate the law enunciated and reiterated by the Apex Court on this subject from time to time. ( 20 ) OVER and above the aforesaid case laws, we have also taken into consideration two decisions of the Apex Court - one in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, reported in 41 ITR 1991 = AIR 1961 SC 372 , and another in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 for the purpose of deciding whether it would be proper to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. (supra) while dealing with the availability of alternative remedy has stated - "the existence of such alternative remedies as appeals and reference to the High Court was not, however, always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction or from continuing such action. When the Constitution conferred on the High Courts the power to give relief it became the duty of the Courts to give such relief in fit cases and the Courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief were refused without adequate reasons. " .