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2003 DIGILAW 6 (CAL)

ASAN ALI MONDAL v. SARAWADDIN AHMED

2003-01-08

HRISHIKESH BANERJI

body2003
H. BANERJI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated June 13, 1997 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 4th Court, Alipore whereby the appeal preferred against the trial Court's judgment and decree allowing the plaintifffs/respondents' suit for eviction was dismissed. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF No. 1 purchased the land and structures together with Thika Tenancy right at premises No. 17, Beck Bagan Row, Calcutta, to the extent of one-third share on 26th June, 1963 from one Amir Ali Mondal by a registered deed of conveyance. Plaintiff's Nos. 2 and 3 purchased the remaining two thirds share of the structure together with land at the said premises on September 9, 1963 from Asan Ali Mondal (defendant No. 2) and one Abdul Karim Mondal. Thus, the plaintiffs became the 16 annas owners of the suit property at 17, Beck Bagan Row, Calcutta. ( 3 ) FOLLOWING oral surrender of the tenancy by the tenants, Sk. Abdul Kader and Md. Akhtar on November 7, 1963, the plaintiffs got khas possession thereof and while in such possession the suit property was "leased out" by them to one Sk. Abdul Mabood on 12. 11. 1963 for a period of five years. On the expiry of the said lease period Sk. Abdul Mabood handed over the property to the plaintiffs. While in such khas possession of the suit property there was a partnership deed between the plaintiff No. 1 on the one hand and the pro-defendants, Mosammal Haque Laskar, Sirajul Haque Laskar and Asan Ali Mondal (defendant No. 2) on the other on November 20, 1969 to carry on Bakery business in the name and style of "mondal Bakery" at 17, Beck Bagan Row for a term of three and half years. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid three defendants were licensees of the plaintiff and the said licence stood revoked with the efflux of the time of three and a half years. The defendant No. 1, Pear Ali Laskar executed a "lease deed" for running "mondal Bakery" in the suit property for a period of two and half years commencing from August 13, 1970 in favour of the aforesaid partners including the plaintiff No. 1 and the terms of the said lease expired on February 15, 1973. The defendant No. 1, Pear Ali Laskar executed a "lease deed" for running "mondal Bakery" in the suit property for a period of two and half years commencing from August 13, 1970 in favour of the aforesaid partners including the plaintiff No. 1 and the terms of the said lease expired on February 15, 1973. It is the plaintiffs' case that the defendant No. 1 or his licensees ceased to have any right to continue the bakery business in the suit premises after February 15, 1973. The defendant No. 1 paid a sum of Rs. 165/- per month according to the English calendar upto December, 1970. ( 5 ) IT is the case of the contesting defendant No. 2 that the bakery business which was started by him as sole proprietor, was converted into a partnership business. Defendant No. 2 states that the defendant No. 1 continued the business from the date of the partnership agreement till 21. 5. 1973 and on and from 22. 5. 1973 the partnership business came into the possession of the defendant No. 2. It is stated by the defendant No. 2 that the plaintiffs are in collusion with the defendant No. 1 and the properties described in B schedule property belong to the defendant No. 2 but as the articles are not in his custody he is not bound to return the same to the plaintiffs. It is the case of the defendant No. 2 that he has been carrying on bakery business as its sole properties since 22. 5. 1973 and that except the defendant No. 2 none else has any interest in the bakery business as described in Schedule B to the plaint. Under such circumstances the defendant No. 2 states that the suit filed against him is liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) THE suit however, was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents by the trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court and the substantial questions of law to be decided in the present appeal are as follows:1. WHETHER the eviction suit against the appellant and pro-respondent No. 4, Pear Ali Laskar, is bad for lack of any cause of action?2. WHETHER in view of the admitted partnership between the appellant, respondent No. 1 and pro-respondents Nos. WHETHER the eviction suit against the appellant and pro-respondent No. 4, Pear Ali Laskar, is bad for lack of any cause of action?2. WHETHER in view of the admitted partnership between the appellant, respondent No. 1 and pro-respondents Nos. 5 and 6 the Courts below erred in law in arriving at the finding that the appellant had been a licensee in respect of the suit premises?3. WHETHER the Courts below erred in law in granting eviction of respondent No. 4 and the appellant from the suit premises for non-fulfillment of any of the conditions for such eviction under the provisions of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956? ( 7 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury appearing for the appellant contends that no notice of ejectment having been duly served by all the three landlords, the suit is liable to fail on that ground alone. In support he cites the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 532 (M/s. Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha) where in a suit for eviction it was contended by the defendant that there was only one landlord who was also one of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff/landlord contended that the name of the other two plaintiffs were to be treated as surplusage and that he alone could succeed on the admission of the defendant. This Court, however, in that case held that the plaintiff/landlord could not succeed as the contract that was pleaded was different from the one that was proved in evidence and the defendant did not admit any liability but was challenging the agreement of tenancy made out as entered into by three landlords. ( 8 ) THIS decision, however, is not applicable to the facts of the present case as it is found from the evidence-on-record that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were merely given a licence to run the bakery business in the suit premises and no tenancy interest was acquired by the said licensees in the suit premises. ( 9 ) REFERRING to Exhibit 'o' it was argued on behalf of the appellant, Asan Ali Mondal that one of the owners viz. the respondent No. 1, Sarawaddin Ahmed by his letter dated 19. 5. 1969 (Ext. ( 9 ) REFERRING to Exhibit 'o' it was argued on behalf of the appellant, Asan Ali Mondal that one of the owners viz. the respondent No. 1, Sarawaddin Ahmed by his letter dated 19. 5. 1969 (Ext. O-1) wrote to the DCR (Estt.) at 11a, Free School Street, giving his consent to maintain the bakery business in the name and style of "mondal Bakery" by the appellant, Asan Ali Mondal. Mr. Roy Chowdhury contends that this letter is a strong piece of evidence showing that Asan Ali Mondal was a tenant in the suit premises. But this contention is not at all convincing inasmuch as the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, Pear Ali had all along been to the effect that they would run the bakery business as licensees and not as tenants. ( 10 ) THE contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that Ext. 'o (1)' proves that the appellant was a premises tenant under the plaintiff No. 1, Sarawaddin Ahmed in respect of the suit premises, is not sustainable as it appears from the evidence-on-record that the defendant No. 1, Pear Ali was merely given the right to conduct the business in the suit premises with Asan Ali as his agent and neither was given any interest as a tenant therein. Merely because the plaintiff No. 1 described himself as the landlord it does not follow that the occupation of the defendant No. 1 would be as a tenant and not as a licensee with Asan Ali as his agent and not to occupy the premises as a tenant. Initially, such licence was given for a period of three and half years and thereafter from 22. 5. 1969 for a further period to two and half years. ( 11 ) BEFORE the First Appellate Court the appellant tried to make out a case that by his letter dated 19. 5. 1969 (Ext. 'o') Sarawaddin Ahmed (plaintiff No. 1) as a landlord of the suit premises allowed Asan Ali Mondal to maintain the 'bakery' in the name and style of 'mondal Bakery'. ( 12 ) EXT. 'k' dated 16. 5. 1969 is an Enquiry Report wherein it was reported that Sarawaddin Ahmed, the plaintiff No. 1, had given consent to the use of the bakery by the appellant. ( 12 ) EXT. 'k' dated 16. 5. 1969 is an Enquiry Report wherein it was reported that Sarawaddin Ahmed, the plaintiff No. 1, had given consent to the use of the bakery by the appellant. The First Appellate Court disbelieved the genuineness of this document on the ground that before Sarawaddin Ahmed gave his consent by his letter dated 19. 5. 1969, it was mentioned in the Enquiry Report submitted on a prior date (16. 5. 1969) that the plaintiff No. 1 had given consent to the running of the bakery by Asan Ali. The above finding being a finding of fact the same does not call for any interference in the second appeal. ( 13 ) MR. Banerjee, appearing for the contesting respondents cites the decision in the case of Balbir Singh v. Smt. Kalawati, reported in AIR 1976 Allahabad 434 where it was held that the consequence of the failure to raise the plea of invalidity of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, at an early stage of the litigation would be waiver of the notice by the tenant. Since in the present case any tenancy has not been proved, the question of waiver of notice issued under the provision of section 13 (6) of the 1956 Act or under section 106 of the 1882 Act, is not applicable inasmuch as the defendant No. 1 has been occupying the suit premises as a mere licensee to run the bakery shop and it is the nature of occupation and not the nomenclature which would be considered in deciding whether the relationship between the parties was really that of licensors and a licensee or of that of landlords and tenants. ( 14 ) ON consideration of the material-on-record the First Appellate Court held that there was no agreement of tenancy between the appellant and Pear Ali and that their relationship was that of a licensor and licensee. It was also found by the First Appellate Court that the defendant No. 2, Asan Ali was a mere agent of the licensee Pear Ali. ( 15 ) MR. It was also found by the First Appellate Court that the defendant No. 2, Asan Ali was a mere agent of the licensee Pear Ali. ( 15 ) MR. Banerjee contends that even assuming that the defendant No. 1, Pear Ali Laskar had been a tenant, notice of suit would be treated as waived as he did not contest the suit, and none else amongst the defendants being a tenant the suit should be decreed even without service of any notice under section 13 (6) of the 1956 Act. Defendant No. 2, Asan Ali Mondal being one of the lessors is debarred from raising the pleas of non-service of notice under section 13 (6) of the 1956 Act. ( 16 ) THE second point urged by Mr. Banerjee is that Asan Ali Mondal was merely given the right to carry on the business and there was no lease of the property in his favour. The partnership stood dissolved on the expiry of the first term. Thus, there was no lease of any property but there was a licence to carry on the business which stood revoked on the expiry of the term of the licence period. In such circumstances the present appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court are affirmed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed