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2003 DIGILAW 601 (BOM)

SANGEETA BALAYYA BHUREWAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2003-06-20

A.B.NAIK, V.G.MUNSHI

body2003
JUDGMENT A. B. NAIK, J. :- By this Writ Petition No. 866/1995 the petitioner is challenging the order passed by the Caste Certificates Scrutiny Committee, Maharashtra State, Nashik (hereinafter referred as the committee), whereby the committee has invalidated the caste/tribe claim of the petitioner. The petitioner obtained a certificate from Executive Magistrate, Aurangabad, on the basis that she belongs to "Chhatri" scheduled tribe. On the basis of the said certificate, the petitioner secured employment in Public Works Department, Government of Maharashtra. By an order dt. 31st of December, 1989, the petitioner came to be appointed as Typist. The order of appointment dt. 31st of December, 1989, being temporary for a period of six months. The appointment order also indicates the terms and conditions. As per condition No. 4 of the appointment order, the service of the petitioner was to be continued only after the report/order from the committee. The petitioners tribe claim was accordingly forwarded to the Committee by the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Board, Aurangabad. The caste claim was then referred to the committee which was constituted as per the Government of Maharashtra, Tribal Development Department, Resolution No. CBC/l684/(291)/D-XI, dt. 23rd of January, 1985. The petitioner furnished some documents in order to prove her claim. The documents are divided in three groups; (1) documents pertaining to the petitioner, (2) documents pertaining to the petitioners father; and (3) documents pertaining to the petitioners husband. 2. It is claim of the petitioner that she married to Jitendra Balaji Potpalliwar, who belongs to "Chhatri" scheduled tribe community. She stated that her marriage is not inter caste marriage and to establish her claim, she mainly relied on the documents pertaining to her husband. We have noticed from the order passed by the Committee that in the documents which are produced by the petitioner pertaining to her father, tribe Chhatri is not mentioned there. The Committee then noticed the petitioner and she appeared with her father-in-law before the Committee. The Committee has recorded the statement of her father in-law during the course of the enquiry. The committee then analysed 14 documents which were produced by the petitioner along with the statement of her father-in-law. The Committee observed that the petitioners father-in-law has utterly failed to establish any affinity with "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. The Committee has recorded the statement of her father in-law during the course of the enquiry. The committee then analysed 14 documents which were produced by the petitioner along with the statement of her father-in-law. The Committee observed that the petitioners father-in-law has utterly failed to establish any affinity with "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. The Committee considered the information furnished by the petitioners father-in-law and, on appreciation of evidence produced by the petitioner, the Committee came to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish that she belongs to "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe and, accordingly, her claim came to be invalidated and order of cancellation of certificate issued by the Executive Magistrate came to be passed. After the decision of the Committee, the Committee forwarded the order to the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Board, Aurangabad, under whom the petitioner was working, who, in turn, by his order dt. 31st of January, 1995, terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that the certificate obtained by the petitioner has been invalidated. Being aggrieved by these two orders, the petitioner approached this Court. 3. The petition was taken up for motion hearing on 10th of March, 1995, and this Court granted Rule Nisi and protected the services of the petitioner. While granting Rule Nisi, the Court passed following order: "Rule. On the basis of the decision of the Scrutiny Committee, the services of the petitioner seem to have been brought to an end on the ground that the petitioner does not belong to Scheduled Tribe. Along with this petition, the petitioner has produced record of the husband of the petitioner, with whom she has married in the year 1989. The appointment letter at Exh.H of the petitioners husband shows that he appointed in S.T. category. Apart from this, the petitioner has also produced a certificate from the Aurangabad District Central Cooperative Bank where the husband of the petitioner is serving, in which it is mentioned that, as per the service record of the petitioners husband by the Bank the caste of the husband is shown as CHHATRI - Scheduled Tribe. The Counsel for the petitioner also states that the marriage is not an inter caste marriage. In view of this, prima facie, we feel that the petitioner is entitled for interim relief. Interim relief in terms of prayer clause (D)." 4. The Counsel for the petitioner also states that the marriage is not an inter caste marriage. In view of this, prima facie, we feel that the petitioner is entitled for interim relief. Interim relief in terms of prayer clause (D)." 4. In support of the petition, we heard Shri A. S. Golegaonkar for the petitioner and Shri Deshmukh, learned Advocate for the Committee, and Shri Rajendra Phatke Patil, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, representing the State. Shri A. S. Golegaonkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner produced several documents before the Committee and the committee has not properly appreciated the documents. The learned Counsel has accepted that the documents produced by the petitioner did not mention her tribe as Chhatri but he submitted that merely on that ground the claim of the petitioner cannot be rejected. The learned Counsel contended that the marriage of the petitioner with Shri Jitendra Balraj Pattepelwar is not inter caste marriage and her husband belongs to "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. Her husband is working in the Aurangabad District Central Cooperative Bank and he was appointed on a post reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidate and the service record of the petitioners husband shows that her husband belongs to "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, he contended that the committee was not right in rejecting the claim of the petitioner, but the claim has to be considered on the basis of her marriage with Rajendra. Learned Counsel submitted before us that the caste mentioned in the School Leaving certificate of the petitioner issued by the Supervisor Lal Bahadur High School, Khadki, cannot be considered because real caste is not mentioned but what is stated in the certificate as "Hindu Telgu". Learned Counsel contended that Telgu cannot be considered as a caste. The learned Counsel further submitted that the President of Education Board, cantonment, Khadki, has issued a death certificate, certifying that late Ballya Bhurewar, petitioners father, belong to "Chhatri" caste and he was residing at 51, New Bazar, Khadki, Cantonement, since 1951. Shri Golegaonkar, learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the certificate issued by the President of the Board has to be considered. The learned Counsel further submitted that certificate issued by Marathwada "Chhatri" is also not considered by Committee. Shri Golegaonkar, learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the certificate issued by the President of the Board has to be considered. The learned Counsel further submitted that certificate issued by Marathwada "Chhatri" is also not considered by Committee. Therefore, he submitted that the Committee only proceeded to consider the affinity test and reached to conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish that she belongs to "Chhatri" scheduled tribe. This approach of the Committee, learned Counsel commented, is not in consonance with sound judicial principles. 5. Shri Golegaonkar, learned Counsel, has raised a contention in his oral submission (though there is no specific averment in the petition), and contended that the Committee which decided the tribe claim of the petitioner was not constituted as per the directions issued by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, AIR 1995 SC 94 . Shri Golegaonkar contended that the committee which heard and decided the claim of the petitioner was constituted as per the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985. He submitted that the committee was not constituted by the State Government as per the law declared by the Apex Court, the constitution of that committee itself was contrary to law and the judgment and order rendered by the said Committee cannot be a valid judgment in the eye of law. Shri Golegaonkar further submitted that as the committee was not properly constituted, in view of the judgment of the Madhuri Patil, supra. The matter is required to be remanded after setting aside the impugned order to the committee which is constituted in terms of the directions issued by the Apex Court. In support of his contention, Shri Golegaonkar, learned Advocate, placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kishan More vs. State of Maharashtra and others, I 996(I) Mh.L.J. 175. In addition to the reported judgment in Ramesh Kishan More (supra), Shri Golegaonkar has produced before us the orders passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition Nos. 731/1996, 164/1996, 1627/1996 and 2820/1996 and submitted that in all these writ petitions, the judgment delivered by the committees which were not constituted and formulated in terms of the directions of the Apex Court were set aside and the matters were remanded for decision by the Committee. 731/1996, 164/1996, 1627/1996 and 2820/1996 and submitted that in all these writ petitions, the judgment delivered by the committees which were not constituted and formulated in terms of the directions of the Apex Court were set aside and the matters were remanded for decision by the Committee. We presently only observe that the orders produced by Shri Golegaonkar, in our humble view and with respect to the learned Judges, disposing of those petitions, cannot be treated as a binding precedence. We have noticed from all these judgments that this Court has set aside the orders of the committee and remanded the matters to the Committee on the ground that the Scrutiny Committee in those cases decided the caste claim subsequent to the judgment and decision of the Apex Court in AIR 1995 SC 94 , Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Comr., Tribal Development and the claim of social status was not decided and considered by the competent authority. With these observations, the Division Benches have set aside the order and remanded the matter to the Committee. It is very difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Advocate on the basis of the said judgments to remand the matter as, in our view, the judgments cannot be treated as binding precedents as there are only passing observations without laying down any principle of law or a proposition which can be considered to be of binding nature though all the orders are of Coordinate Bench. Normally, one Coordinate Bench has to follow the judgment of another Coordinate Bench and in case another Coordinate Bench does not agree with the said view, the procedure that is required to be followed is by placing the matter before the Honourable the Chief Justice for reference to the Larger Bench but the situation at hand is not the same. In the judgments which were rendered, there is only passing reference, without any proposition of law or laying down any principle which can be treated as binding precedent. We are not ready to adopt the said course that is adopted in the aforesaid judgments. 6. One more aspect we may mention that these orders were passed prior to the modification of the judgment and order in Madhuri Patils case rendered on 2nd of September, 1994, by the Apex Court. We are not ready to adopt the said course that is adopted in the aforesaid judgments. 6. One more aspect we may mention that these orders were passed prior to the modification of the judgment and order in Madhuri Patils case rendered on 2nd of September, 1994, by the Apex Court. We will refer to the judgment of the Apex Court, modifying the original order in Madhuri Patils case little later. 7. Coming to the reported judgment of Ramesh Mores case, on which strong reliance is placed by the learned Advocate. The facts which were before this Court in Ramesh Mores case and the points agitated and assailed are required to be noted in somewhat detail. A group of writ petitions was heard by the Division Bench of this Court at Bombay which arose against the judgment and orders passed by the Scrutiny Committee constituted as per the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985. Shri Ramesh More, a Peon working in the Collectorate, Satara, entered the service against a seat reserved for candidate belonging to Scheduled Tribe representing that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe Mahadeo Koli, on the caste certificate issued by the Executive Magistrate, Koregaon. His claim against the reserved seat was considered and appointment was given. The case of the petitioner Ramesh was referred to the Committee for scrutiny and verification of the tribe claim, Pune, as provided in Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Satara. The Scrutiny Committee comprised of Chairman/Deputy Director (R), Member, Research Officer, and Member Secretary, Research Officer vide its order dt. October, 27th 1994, cancelled the caste certificate issued in favour of Ramesh and the Committee held that Ramesh More did not belong to Mahadeo Koli scheduled community. That order was subject matter of the writ petition. Ramesh More not only challenged the order passed by the Committee but also impugned the Government resolution dt. July 17th, 1993, by which the State Government revoked the resolution dt. 8th of March, 1985, by abolishing the appellate forum. The Division Bench observed thus, "In all these petitions the challenge in substance is to the validity of the resolution No. STC 1893/M No. 13/D/10/dt. 17th July, 1993." To resume the facts of Ramesh More, the Division Bench noted that the committee which was constituted in terms of the Government resolution dt. The Division Bench observed thus, "In all these petitions the challenge in substance is to the validity of the resolution No. STC 1893/M No. 13/D/10/dt. 17th July, 1993." To resume the facts of Ramesh More, the Division Bench noted that the committee which was constituted in terms of the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, was for following purpose i.e. : "2. The Scrutiny Committee will do the following work. (i) Verify the caste certificates of the Scheduled Tribe students seeking admissions in different educational institutions at different levels. (ii) Verify the caste certificates of the Scheduled Tribes recommended by the Maharashtra Public Service Commission and different Commissions appointed by the Government for the seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. (iii) Verify the caste certificates of the Government servants according to the request/complaints made by the concerned departments/ offices. (iv) Any work entrusted by Government in respect of Scrutiny of caste certificate of Scheduled Tribes." 8. After the resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, by another resolution being resolution No. CBC/1684/(392) D-XI, dt. 8th of March, 1985, the State Government appointed appellate authority mentioned in the said resolution. The net result of the resolution dt. 8th of March, 1995, was that the order passed by the Scrutiny Committee as constituted as per Government Resolution dt. January, 23rd, 1985, were subjected to appeal to the appellate authority as constituted as per Government Resolution dt. 8th March, 1985. Thereafter, on July, 17th, 1993, the Government of Maharashtra issued another resolution being No. STC/1893/M No. 13/D-10, dt. 17th of July, 1993, revoking the resolution dt. 8th of March, 1985, by which the appellate committee which was constituted vide Government resolution dt. 2nd of March, 1985 came to be abolished. By the said resolution dt. 17th July, 1993, the pending appeals were saved and the appeals which were pending on that day before the appellate committee were to be decided by those appellate authorities within three months from the notification. This notification was challenged in Ramesh Mores case. 9. While dealing with the validity and correctness of the resolution dt. 17th of July, 1993, the Division Bench considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case. After noticing the streamlining of the procedure issued by the Apex Court in respect of the social status, the Division Bench found fault with the resolution dt. 9. While dealing with the validity and correctness of the resolution dt. 17th of July, 1993, the Division Bench considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case. After noticing the streamlining of the procedure issued by the Apex Court in respect of the social status, the Division Bench found fault with the resolution dt. 17th of July, 1993, and declared the Government resolution dt. 17th of July, 1993, as bad as the reasons revoking the appellate authority were not found valid by the Division Bench. With the result, the Division Bench ordered the State Government to constitute the appellate authority for hearing the appeals and, therefore, directed the petitioners to file the appeals. It will be appropriate to refer the observations of the Division Bench in Ramesh Mores case, which run thus: "6. The reasons given in Government Resolution dated July 17, 1993, for disallowing the challenge to the decision of the Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Verification Committee before the Appellate Authorities on the ground that work load had increased with the Appellate Authorities and hence they are not able to render decisions in appeals within a specified time limit are wholly unjustified. Administrative convenience cannot be adopted as a yardstick for abrogating the valuable right of a citizen. The students/Government servants who are seeking admissions/appointments against reserved seats lose a very valuable right. If for any reason the Scrutiny Committee decides on a point of fact against them, they have got no forum to challenge the decision. Furthermore, the Caste Certificate Verification Committee referred to above does not comprise of the experts as envisaged in Madhuri Patils case. The Apex Court was alive to the situation which was existing in the State relating to the constitution of Committee. It is for this reason that the Apex Court had to give directions for constituting the Committee and officers who were to comprise the same. As the Scrutiny Committee as contemplated by the judgment in Madhuri Patils case has not been constituted, we do not approve the decision of the State Government stated in its Resolution dated July 17, 1993, revoking the right to appeal against decisions of the Scrutiny Committee. The position which existed prior to the Resolution dated July 17, 1993 should continue till such time the State Government positions itself for complying with the directions contained in Madhuri Patils case. The position which existed prior to the Resolution dated July 17, 1993 should continue till such time the State Government positions itself for complying with the directions contained in Madhuri Patils case. At times we have found that the questions of fact adjudicated upon by the Scrutiny Committee should be reappraised by the Appellate Authority. This has also weighed with us for maintaining the position existing prior to July 17, 1993." (Emphasis supplied) As stated above, no specific contention is raised in this petition, challenging or questioning the resolution dt. 17th of July, 1993, nor there is any challenge to the decision of the Committee on the basis that the committee is not constituted in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court. Considering this aspect, we are of the view that the request made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to remand the matter to the Committee as constituted in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court cannot be entertained. What we noticed from the conclusions reached by the Division Bench in Ramesh Mores case, it has not found fault with the jurisdiction of the Committee so constituted by virtue of resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985. The Division Bench found fault with the abolition or revoking the appellate committee and only observed that the committee so constituted does not comprise of expert as stated in Madhuri Patils case. In the case at hand, there is no foundation in the petition that the committee was not constituted as per the directions of the Apex Court. Therefore, it is not possible for us to accept the request of the learned Advocate to remand the matter by setting aside the judgment of the Committee. At this stage, it will be appropriate to reproduce the directions issued by this Court in Ramesh Mores case: "(i) The State Government shall constitute the Appellate Authority for hearing appeals against orders of Scrutiny Committee in the Scheduled Tribe claim matters as mentioned in Government Resolution No. CBC-1684/(392)/D-XI dated March 8, 1985, within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. (ii) The Appellate Authority shall dispose of the appeals so preferred as mentioned in (ii) above, expeditiously, preferably within three months from taking cognizance thereof. Till the final decisions of the appeal/appeals, the ad interim/interim orders issued by this Court will remain in operation." (other directions not noted) 10. (ii) The Appellate Authority shall dispose of the appeals so preferred as mentioned in (ii) above, expeditiously, preferably within three months from taking cognizance thereof. Till the final decisions of the appeal/appeals, the ad interim/interim orders issued by this Court will remain in operation." (other directions not noted) 10. We fail to appreciate the repeated requests made by the learned Counsel that we should remand the matter to a committee constituted as per the judgment of the Apex Court. We also found from the judgment of Ramesh More (supra) that the Division Bench has not declared the judgment rendered by the Committees, as constituted by the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985 as invalid on that count, but has directed the petitioners to file appeal to the appellate committee, to be reconstituted as per Government Resolution dt. March 8th, 1985. As such we are not in agreement with the submission of the learned Counsel that the decision of the Committee is illegal. 11. At this stage we refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Madhuri Patil (1st case) to find out whether the Apex Court made any observation or issued any directions regarding validity or propriety of the order of those committees which were constituted pursuant to the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, and were functioning in the State of Maharashtra then. We have noticed that the Madhuri Patils first case arose out of the judgment and order passed by the committee which was constituted as per the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, when the committee decided the tribe claim of Miss Madhuri Patil, the appellate committee was in existence and she filed appeal to the Appellate Committee. The appellate committee dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision given by the Committee. She challenged those decisions in the High Court by filing a writ petition which was also dismissed and against the judgment and order of the High Court a special leave petition was filed. The Apex Court streamlined the procedure for issuance of the certificates of social status and its verification. In the procedure as prescribed by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case, we will find out whether there is any observation or directions about the orders passed by existing committees as constituted vide Government Resolution dt. 23-1-1985. The Apex Court streamlined the procedure for issuance of the certificates of social status and its verification. In the procedure as prescribed by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case, we will find out whether there is any observation or directions about the orders passed by existing committees as constituted vide Government Resolution dt. 23-1-1985. The guidelines issued by the Apex Court read thus: “(1) The application for grant of social status certificate shall be made to the Revenue Sub Divisional Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued by such Officer rather than at the Officer, Taluka or Mandai level. (2) The parent, guardian or the candidate, as the case may be, shall file an affidavit duly sworn and attested by a competent gazetted officer or nongazetted officer with particulars of castes and sub-castes, tribe, tribal community, parts or groups of tribes or tribal communities, the place from which he originally hails from and other particulars as may be prescribed by the concerned Directorate. (3) Application for verification of the caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee shall be filed at least six months in advance before seeking admission into educational institutions or an appointment to a post. (4) All the State Governments shall constitute a Committee of three officers, namely, (I) an Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer higher in rank of the Director of the concerned department, (II) the Director, Social Welfare/Tribal Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case may be, and (III) in the case of Scheduled Castes another officer who has intimate knowledge in the verification and issuance of the social status certificates. In the case of the Scheduled Tribes, the Research Officer who has intimate knowledge in identifying the tribes, tribal communities, parts of or groups of tribes or tribal communities. (5) Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in overall charge and such number of Police Inspectors to investigate into the social status claims. The Inspector would go to the local place of residence and original place from which the candidate hails and usually resides or in case of migration to the town or city, the place from which he originally hailed from. The vigilance officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian, as the case may be. The vigilance officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian, as the case may be. He also should examine the school records, birth registration, if any. He should also examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged in the proforma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes relating to their peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the concerned castes or tribes or tribal communities etc. (6) The Director concerned, on receipt of the report from the vigilance officer if he found the claim for social status to be "not genuine" or "doubtful" or spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed, the Director concerned should issue show cause notice supplying a copy of the report of the vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered post with acknowledgment, due or through the head of the concerned educational institution in which the candidate is studying or employed. The notice should indicate that the representation or reply, if any, would be made within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice and in no case on request not more than 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. In case, the candidate seeks for an opportunity of hearing and claims an inquiry to be made in that behalf, the Director on receipt of such representation/reply shall convene the Committee and the Joint/ Addl. Secretary as Chairperson who shall give reasonable opportunity to the candidate/parent/guardian to adduce all evidence in support of their claim. A public notice by beat of drum or any other convenient mode may be published in the village or locality and if any person or association opposes such a claim, an opportunity to adduce evidence may be given to him/it. After giving such opportunity either in person or thorough counsel, the committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient and consider the claims vis-a-vis the objections raised by the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order with brief reasons in support thereof. After giving such opportunity either in person or thorough counsel, the committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient and consider the claims vis-a-vis the objections raised by the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order with brief reasons in support thereof. (7) In case the report is in favour of the candidate and found to be genuine and true, no further action need be taken except where the report or the particulars given are procured or found to be false or fraudulently obtained and in the latter event the same procedure as is envisaged in para 6 be followed. (8) Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued to the parents/guardian also in case candidate is minor to appear before the Committee with all evidence in his or their support of the claim for the social status certificates. (9) The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably by day-to-day proceedings within such period not exceeding two months. If after inquiry, the caste Scrutiny Committee finds the claims to be false or spurious, they should pass an order cancelling the certificate issued and confiscate the same. It should communicate within one month from the date of the conclusion of the proceedings the result of enquiry to the parent/guardian and the applicant. (10) In case of any delay in finalising the proceedings, and in the meanwhile, the last date for admission into an educational institution or appointment to an officer post, is getting expired, the candidate be admitted by the Principal or such other authority competent in that behalf or appointed on the basis of the social status certificate already issued or an affidavit duly sworn by the parent/guardian/candidate before the competent officer or non-official and such admission or appointment should be only provisional, subject to the result of the inquiry by the Scrutiny Committee. (11) The order passed by the Committee shall be final and conclusive only subject to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. (12) No suit or other proceedings before any other authority should lie. (13) The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the writ/petition/Miscellaneous petition/matter is disposed of by a Single Judge, then no further appeal would lie against the order to the Division Bench subject to special1eave under Article 136. (13) The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the writ/petition/Miscellaneous petition/matter is disposed of by a Single Judge, then no further appeal would lie against the order to the Division Bench subject to special1eave under Article 136. (14) In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed is found to be false, the parent/guardian/the candidate should be prosecuted for making false claim. If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the accused, it would be regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or elections to any local body, Legislature or the Parliament. (15) As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee holding that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and confiscation simultaneously, it should be communicated to the concerned educational institution or the appointing authority by registered post with acknowledgment due with a request to cancel the admission or the appointment. The Principal etc. of the educational institution responsible for making the admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the admission/appointment without any further notice to the candidate and debar the candidate for further study or continue in office in a post." 12. Having perused the guidelines/directions of the Apex Court for providing constitution of the committee, in particular, clause No.4, the order passed by the Committee thus is made amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. With this backdrop whether we now can accept the submission that by accepting the ratio of Ramesh Mores case, supra, and direct the petitioners to file an appeal or to remand the case for fresh disposal by the committee that is constituted later on by the Government, complying with the directions of the Apex Court are the questions? The answer is no. We record our reasons by considering the developments that occurred after 1st Madhuri Patil s case. 13. We will refer to the judgment of the Apex Court whereby the Apex Court has modified the judgment of the Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commr., Tribal Development, AIR 1995 SC 94 . In the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. We record our reasons by considering the developments that occurred after 1st Madhuri Patil s case. 13. We will refer to the judgment of the Apex Court whereby the Apex Court has modified the judgment of the Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commr., Tribal Development, AIR 1995 SC 94 . In the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development, reported in 1997 (V) SCC 437, the State of Maharashtra filed an application for recalling the judgment AIR 1995 SC 94 -Madhuri Patil vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development: equivalent to (1994) 6 SCC 241 . The Apex Court modified the direction No. (iv) of first Madhuri Patils case which reads thus: "(3) As regards prayer (b) read with direction No. (iv) of the Order of this Court, we too appreciate the inconvenience caused due to vast area of the State. Therefore, instead of one committee of three officers, there will be three Scheduled Tribe/Caste Scrutiny Committees comprising of five members with quorum of three members, as suggested in para 4 of the directions, to take a decision. At Pune, Nasik and Nagpur, six Caste Scrutiny Committees for SCs, Denotified Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and the Special Backward Category in existence at Mumbai, Pune, Nasik, Aurangabad, Amravati and Nagpur would continue to scrutinise the certificates issued by the respective officers and take a decision in that behalf. In this regard, it is also suggested by Shri Dholakia, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, that in case any certificate has been wrongfully refused by the certificate issuing authority, the aforestated Committees also would go into the question and decide in that behalf, whether refusal was wrongful and in case it finds that the refusal was wrongful, they are at liberty to direct the authority to grant the certificate. (4) With regard to prayer (c) also, we feel that the Caste Scrutiny Committees for Social Welfare, Cultural Affairs and Sports Department should comprise of Additional Commissioner (Revenue) - Chairman of the Revenue Division concerned; Divisional Social Welfare Officer Member, and Research Officer as a Welfare Officer-Member-Secretary to function in that behalf." 14. (4) With regard to prayer (c) also, we feel that the Caste Scrutiny Committees for Social Welfare, Cultural Affairs and Sports Department should comprise of Additional Commissioner (Revenue) - Chairman of the Revenue Division concerned; Divisional Social Welfare Officer Member, and Research Officer as a Welfare Officer-Member-Secretary to function in that behalf." 14. We are of the view that when Ramesh Mores case was rendered, the modification of the judgment of the Apex Court was not before the Division Bench and, in our view, that, merely because the Committee is not constituted in accordance with clause (iv), the decision of the Committee cannot be declared as invalid and to remand the matter to the newly constituted committee. We have anxiously considered the judgment of first Madhuri Patils case, supra, and the second Madhuri Patils case, supra. We are of the confirmed view that the Apex Court has not declared the judgments and orders passed by the Committees which were functioning through the State of Maharashtra, which were constituted vide Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, as invalid for that purpose. As the judgment of the Committee is not invalidated nor there is direction issued by the Apex Court, whereby it is to be presumed that the order passed by the Committee constituted as per the Government resolution dt. 23rd of Jan., 1985, becomes invalid or inoperative merely because the State Government has not complied with the directions issued by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils (Ist) case vide clause No. (iv). We will now look at the submission from another view. If we accept the contention, we are reading something which is not in the judgments of the Apex Court or of this Court. If we accept this contention, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, then all those judgments/orders of the Committee constituted as per the Government resolution dt. 23-1-1985, which functioned even after the decision of the Apex Court in 1st Madhuri Patil s case till the committee, constituted by the State Government, in terms of the directions in clause (iv) (i.e. from 2-5-1994) will have to be deemed invalid and inoperative. Then it will lead to a situation, which is not even suggested, or indicated, either in Ramesh Mores or in Madhuri Patils case. Then it will lead to a situation, which is not even suggested, or indicated, either in Ramesh Mores or in Madhuri Patils case. We cannot approve the submission and it is pressed in service by the learned Advocate only to prolong the life of this litigation. Hence, the submission does not appeal to us. Hence, we are not ready to accept the contentions of the learned Advocate that, we should remand the matter to a newly constituted Committee, by following the ratio of Ramesh Mores case, supra. The ratio and conclusion reached by the Division Bench in Ramesh Mores case, supra, cannot be made applicable in the case in hand as the Division Bench was dealing with a case where the resolution dt. July 17th, 1993, was challenged and, with that background the observations are made therein but, in the case at hand, no challenges are put forth and, more particularly, the petitioner, without any demur, appeared before the Committee, led the evidence and after adverse order is passed by the said Committee, now, in oral submissions, the contention is being raised. In our considered view the ratio laid down in the case of Ramesh More (supra), is not an authority for the proposition that all judgments and orders rendered by the Committee, as constituted then, became non-est after the pronouncement of Madhuri Patil (1st case) (supra) as the basic challenge in Ramesh Mores case was to the Government Resolution dt. 17th July, 1993, and the question about validity of the constitution of the Committee, as per Government Resolution dt. 23-1-1985, did not fell for consideration of the Division Bench. In our view, thus, the judgment in the case of Ramesh More (supra), to that extent, being per incuriam, as the attention of the learned Judges who presided over the Bench was not drawn to the judgment of the Privy Council and the Apex Court to which we will refer at later stage. 15. We also noticed that the petitioner, for best known reasons to her, has not challenged the resolution dt. 17th July, 1993. Even if, for the sake of argument, we can presume that the petitioner has a right to insist that her case be heard by a particular Committee, it is accepted principle that a party has no right to insist that his case is to be heard by a particular forum. 17th July, 1993. Even if, for the sake of argument, we can presume that the petitioner has a right to insist that her case be heard by a particular Committee, it is accepted principle that a party has no right to insist that his case is to be heard by a particular forum. What we noticed from the judgment of Ramesh Mores case (supra), nowhere it is held or observed that the decision rendered by the Committee constituted pursuant to the Government resolution dt. 23rd of January, 1985, are either bad or without jurisdiction. We cannot accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that when the case was referred to the Committee, the Government resolution dt. 8th of March, 1985 was in existence where the appeal was provided and, therefore, the right of appeal was taken away. We have noticed this submission only to reject it as there is no substance in the contention. A suitor has a right of appeal as per the law governing at the time he enters the Court/Tribunal and the suitor has a right to insist that when he entered in the Court, there was an enactment which provides for an appeal and appellate forum so constituted cannot be taken away. We cannot subscribe to the view as contended by the learned Advocate in view of the judgment of Privy Council, in the case of The Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited vs. Irving, 1905 (A.C.) 369 and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jose Da Costa and another vs. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim and others, (1976) 2 SCC 917 . We reproduce paragraph No. 31 of the case of Jose Da Costa and another, supra, : "(31) Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. The first is that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Commissioner, 54IA 421 : AIR 1927 PC 242). Ltd. vs. Income Tax Commissioner, 54IA 421 : AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or implied with retrospective effect and (2) when the Court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished. (see Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 SCR 488 : AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. vs. Irving, 1905 AC 369 : 92 LT 738 : 21 TLR 513)." (emphasis supplied.) In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court (supra), we cannot accept the contention of the learned Advocate for petitioner, about non availability of appellate forum. 16. We may now refer to ,unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 690/2001 by learned Single Judge (Shri R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.) wherein, in an identical situation, which we are dealing with, arose before the learned Single who had an occasion to consider the effect of non-constituting the Committee as per the direction of the Apex Court. The learned Single Judge was dealing with a case where grievance was made that the Committee which decided the social status claim was not constituted in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court in second Madhuri Patils case. We respectfully concur with and quote the observations made by the learned Single Judge in which the learned Single Judge held thus: "(2) The impugned order is sought to be challenged firstly on the ground that the committee which scrutinised and decided the caste of the petitioner was not duly constituted in terms of the directions of the Apex Court in the matter of Kumari Madhuri Patil and another vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 94 and subsequent directions of the Apex Court in the same matter reported in (1997) 5 SCC 437 inasmuch as the committee did not comprise of the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) as Chairman of the said committee nor it contained the Research Officer - Welfare Officer as Member Secretary of the committee and, therefore, the entire proceedings are to be held as bad in law. Perusal of the impugned order discloses that the committee which was constituted to scrutinise and decide the caste claim of the petitioner comprised of 3 members namely the Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad, the District Social Welfare Officer, Aurangabad, and the District Social Welfare Officer, Osmanabad. There is no doubt that the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case decided on 2nd September, 1994, reported in AIR ]995 SC 94 had directed all the State Governments to constitute scrutiny committee of three officers, namely, (i) an Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer higher in rank of the Director of the concerned department, (ii) the Director, Social Welfare/Tribal Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case may be, and (iii) in the case of Scheduled Castes another officer who has intimate knowledge in the verification and issuance of the social status certificates. However, by further order dated 28th April, 1997 reported in (1997) 5 SCC 437 , considering certain difficulties faced by the State Government in implementing the said directions, the Apex Court had modified the said direction as under: "As regards prayer (b) read with direction No. (iv) opt the Order of this Court, we too appreciate the inconvenience caused, due to vast area of the State. Therefore, instead of one Committee of three officers, there will be three Scheduled Tribe/Caste Scrutiny Committees comprising of five members with quorum of three members, as suggested in para 4 of the directions, to take a decision. At Pune, Nasik and Nagpur, six Caste Scrutiny Committees for SCs, Denotified Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and the Special backward Category in existence at Mumbai, Pune, Nasik, Aurangabad, Amravati and Nagpur would continue to scrutinise the certificates issued by the respective officers and take a decision in that behalf. At Pune, Nasik and Nagpur, six Caste Scrutiny Committees for SCs, Denotified Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and the Special backward Category in existence at Mumbai, Pune, Nasik, Aurangabad, Amravati and Nagpur would continue to scrutinise the certificates issued by the respective officers and take a decision in that behalf. In this regard, it is also suggested by Shri Dholakia, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, that in case any certificate has been wrongfully refused by the Certificate issuing authority, the afore stated Committees also would go into the question and decide in that behalf, whether refusal was wrongful and in case it finds that the refusal was wrongful, they are at liberty to direct the authority to grant the certificate." While modifying the said direction, in the manner stated above, by order dated 28th April, 1997, the Apex Court in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said order has also observed thus: "4. With regard to prayer, (c) also, we feel that the caste Scrutiny committees for Social Welfare, Cultural Affairs and Sports Department should comprise of Additional Commissioner (Revenue) - Chairman of the Revenue Division, concerned; Divisional Social Welfare Officer - Member and Research Officer as a Welfare Officer-Member Secretary to function in that behalf. 5. With regard to prayer (d), along with the Vigilance Cell, one Research Officer/Tribal Development or Social Welfare Officer would be associated in finding the social status of eligibility of the officers. " 3. Referring to the observations in para 4 of the order dated 28th April, 1997, of the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case it was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner that, the committee should have the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) as Chairman and one Research Officer as Welfare Officer Member Secretary of the Committee. It is to be noted that the relief in the nature of requirement of Additional Commissioner (Revenue) as Chairman and Research Officer as Welfare Officer - Member Secretary to the Committee was granted under order dated 28th April 1997 in relation to the prayer (c) in the application for recalling of the order filed by the applicants in the said proceedings. Apparently, the said relief was totally distinct and separate from the relief prayer in prayer clause (b) in relation to which specific directions were given by the Apex Court in para 3 of the said order dated 28th April, 1997, as quoted hereinabove. As per the direction in para 3 of the said order, considering the inconvenience caused to the State Government in the matter of constitution of different committees with the Additional or Additional or Joint" Secretary or any other higher in rank of the Director of the concerned department as Chairman of such committees, the committees already functioning at six places, namely, Mumbai, Pune, Nasik, Aurangabad, Amravati and Nagpur were excluded from the requirement of the strict compliance of clause 4 of the order dated 2-9-1994 in Madhuri Patil s case. But for the direction issued by the Apex Court under order dated 28th April, 1997, the committees which were functioning at the above six places, could not have continued to verify and decide the caste claims in view of the specific directions issued by the Apex Court in clause 4 of para 12 of the order dated 2nd September, 1994. On proper reading of the orders dated 2-9-1994 and 28-4-1997 in Madhuri Patils case, it is apparent that though the State Government is required to have Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer of the rank higher to that of rank of the Director of the concerned department to be the Chairman of such committees, such requirement was not made applicable in relation to the committees which were in the above referred six cities and considering the same, it cannot be said that the directions issued under paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order dated 28th April 1997 would also be applicable to the committees functioning in the said six cities. Reading of the said order in any other manner would virtually amount to rendering the directions in para 3 of the order dated 28th April 1997 to be redundant. The judgment and order of the Apex Court cannot be read in such a manner as to render any direction therein to be redundant. Reading of the said order in any other manner would virtually amount to rendering the directions in para 3 of the order dated 28th April 1997 to be redundant. The judgment and order of the Apex Court cannot be read in such a manner as to render any direction therein to be redundant. Being so, the challenge to the constitution of the scrutiny committee on the ground that it does not comply with the direction of the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case dated 28th April, 1997, is to be rejected being devoid of substance" We my now refer to another judgments, of this Court in the case of Kum. Chhaya Namdeorao Binekar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 339 = 2003 Vol. 105 (1) BLR 345 where the learned Single Judge of this Court (Shri R. S. Mohite, J.) had occasion to consider similar situation regarding non compliance with the directions given by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patils case, supra. The learned Single Judge, on analysing several judgments and on the compliance by the Government regarding the directions of the Apex Court has held thus: "On an analysis of the subsequent and consequent Government Resolution passed by the State of Maharashtra, it is clear that the State of Maharashtra is in substantial compliance with the directions given by the Supreme Court e. g.: (a) the officers mentioned in direction No. 1 (with some small minor variation) have been empowered to issue Caste Certificate vide Government Resolution dated 7-3-1996; (b) the Scrutiny Committees were constituted as per direction No.4 vide Government Resolution dated 26-10-1995 as up dated by Government resolution dated 14-7-1997 and 9-9-1999: (c) the posts for constitution of Vigilance Cell were sanctioned by promulgating Government Resolution dated 15-3-1998, complying with the former part of direction No.5; (d) Direction Nos. 6,7,8 and 9 were adopted in toto by virtue of para No.5 of the Government Resolution dated 14-7-1997 (as amended by Corrigendum dated 23-7-1997), para 1(l0) of the Government Resolution dated 11-6-1998 and para 4.2 of Government Resolution dated 9-9-1999 and have thus become mandatory. 25. 6,7,8 and 9 were adopted in toto by virtue of para No.5 of the Government Resolution dated 14-7-1997 (as amended by Corrigendum dated 23-7-1997), para 1(l0) of the Government Resolution dated 11-6-1998 and para 4.2 of Government Resolution dated 9-9-1999 and have thus become mandatory. 25. It appears that while giving effect to the directions of the Supreme Court, the State of Maharashtra has not given effect to the later portion of the direction No. 5 which deals with the exact manner in which the investigation is required to be carried out by a Police Inspector and Vigilance Officer. The relevant words in direction No.5, as given by the Apex Court were as under: "The inspector would go to the local place of residence and original place from which the candidate hails and usually resides or in case of migration to the town or city, the place from which he originally hailed from. The Vigilance Officer should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian, as the case may be. He should also examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social status of the candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged in the proforma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes relating to their peculiar anthropological and ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or tribal communities concerned etc." 26. In my view, since the State of Maharashtra has not specifically given effect to this part of direction No. 5 of the Supreme Court in its Government Resolutions, as reproduced hereinabove and in its wisdom, it has left the manner of its investigation to be carried out by the Vigilance Cell to be an open question. In my view, since the State of Maharashtra has not specifically given effect to this part of direction No. 5 of the Supreme Court in its Government Resolutions, as reproduced hereinabove and in its wisdom, it has left the manner of its investigation to be carried out by the Vigilance Cell to be an open question. The manner of investigation need not be strictly in accordance with the exact words of the Supreme Court as reproduced hereinabove and that merely because the investigation is not carried out strictly in accordance with the wordings of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove that by itself would not vitiate the final order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee, which would be subsequently passed after giving full opportunity to a claimant the petitioner to put forward his case regarding his caste, to receive the copy of the Vigilance Cell Report with all annexrues and even to point out the lacuna, if any in the Vigilance Cell Report and its enclosures, before the Scrutiny Committee. Thus, however, would not mean that the Vigilance Cell has a licence to carry out an investigation which is slipshod, negligent or unfair". Though the learned Single Judge was dealing with the situation regarding non compliance of direction No.5, whereby the investigation in the social status of the candidate was not done, the learned Single Judge found that such non compliance cannot vitiate the finding recorded by the Committee. We respectfully concur with the view taken by both the Single Judges in the judgments referred to above. 17. We may refer to the contentions of Shri Golegaonkar, learned Counsel. He contended that as the petitioner has married to a person belonging to "Chhatri" caste and she is having no basic documents, this Court should draw an inference that she belongs to "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. Shri Golegaonkar contended that the tribe claim of the petitioner was not challenged by the committee on the ground that she belongs to some different caste or tribe than that of her husband and, therefore, she can acquire the social status of her husband. This contention has little merit as the burden heavily lies on the petitioner to establish her social status independently as she is claiming the privilege given by the Constitution to the backward class citizens. This contention has little merit as the burden heavily lies on the petitioner to establish her social status independently as she is claiming the privilege given by the Constitution to the backward class citizens. A person who really belongs to a backward class is only entitled to the benefit and privileges given by the Constitution. As the petitioner has not produced any basic documents pertaining to her family in which she was born, she, on the basis of the fact of her marriage with a Scheduled Tribe person, cannot claim that status even though there is no challenge by the other side i.e. committee. It is for the petitioner to establish her claim before the committee on her own as it is recognised by several judicial pronouncements that, by marriage, the caste or tribe cannot change. Reliance can be placed on the ratio laid down in the case of Mrs. Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University and others, 1997(1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 618 = AIR 1996 SC 1011 . The petitioner has to stand or fall on her own case and she cannot take benefit of the fact of her marriage with a Scheduled Tribe person and claim the privileges. We are making this observation on the backdrop of undisputed fact as the petitioner has not produced any basic document from her family of birth. Even otherwise also, we noted that the committee has rightly observed that her father-in-law could not establish the characteristics of "Chhatri" community. It is to be noted that when there are no basic documents, the another way of proving the caste claim is from judging the traits or apply the affinity test. The committee has found that the petitioner has failed to establish the traits, characteristics, and affinity to "Chhatri" Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, considering the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of Ganesh s/o Gulabrao Suroshe vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (1997) 4 SCC 340 , as the petitioner has failed to establish her claim, the Committee, in our opinion, has properly appreciated whatever documents and other evidence on record and came to the proper conclusion. As the finding of the Committee is based on evidence on record, we, in our jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, cannot interfere with the said order. As the finding of the Committee is based on evidence on record, we, in our jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, cannot interfere with the said order. Therefore, in our view, the petitioner has not demonstrated before us as to how all or any of the findings are perverse and not based on any evidence on record. It is for the petitioner establish her case. As the petitioner has failed to establish it, we cannot reappreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion. In our considered view, the judgment and order of the committee requires no interference. There is no substance in the petition. Rule discharged, however, there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.