ORDER 1. THE APPELLANT WAS WORKING AS A CLASS IV EMPLOYEE WITH THE RESPONDENT. HIS SERVICES WERE REGULARISED ON 2-1-1990. ON 6-6-1990, HE GAVE THREE MONTHS NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT SEEKING VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT. HIS OFFER OF VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT WAS ACCEPTED BY THE RESPONDENT ON 5-9-1990 AND THE SAME WAS COMMUNICATED ALSO. HOWEVER, LATER, THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT WAS WITHDRAWN ON FINDING THAT HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO TAKE VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT. THE APPELLANT APPROACHED THE RESPONDENT WITH A REQUEST TO ALLOW HIM TO JOIN DUTY ON 3-3-1992. WHEN NOTHING WAS HEARD FROM THE RESPONDENT, HE APPROACHED THE HIGH COURT BY FILING A WRIT PETITION ON 9-5-1995 SEEKING DIRECTION TO THE AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT HIM TO JOIN DUTY AND ALSO TO PAY ALL ARREARS OF SALARY. THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ALLOWED THE WRIT PETITION AND DIRECTED THE RESPONDENT TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO JOIN DUTY. PURSUANT TO THE SAID JUDGMENT, THE APPELLANT REJOINED DUTY ON 20-11-1997. THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DID NOT GRANT ANY WAGES FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS OUT OF SERVICE, PURSUANT TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF HIS VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT. AGGRIEVED BY THAT PART OF THE JUDGMENT REFUSING ARREARS OF SALARY, THE APPELLANT FILED LETTERS PATENT APPEAL BEFORE THE HIGH COURT, WHICH CAME TO BE DISMISSED THEREBY AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE. HENCE, THIS APPEAL. 2. MR. K. SUKUMARAN, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE APPELLANT, CONTENDED THAT THE HIGH COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT GRANTING RELIEF TO THE APPELLANT WITH REGARD TO ARREARS OF SALARY FROM THE DATE OF HIS VOLUNTARY D RETIREMENT TILL HE REJOINED DUTY; THERE WAS NO FAULT ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT INASMUCH AS HE OFFERED TO JOIN DUTY BUT THE RESPONDENT UNREASONABLY DID NOT ALLOW HIM TO JOIN DUTY; AND IN SPITE OF SEVERAL REMINDERS AND REQUESTS, WHEN NOTHING WAS DONE, HE HAD TO APPROACH THE HIGH COURT BY FILING A WRIT PETITION ON 9-5-1995. HE URGED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF "NO WORK, NO PAY" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT INASMUCH AS HE WAS READY AND WILLING TO JOIN DUTY BUT IT IS THE RESPONDENT WHICH DID NOT PERMIT HIM TO JOIN DUTY. 3. PER CONTRA, LEARNED COUNSEL REPRESENTING THE RESPONDENT MADE SUBMISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT. HE URGED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF "NO WORK, NO PAY" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT INASMUCH AS HE WAS READY AND WILLING TO JOIN DUTY BUT IT IS THE RESPONDENT WHICH DID NOT PERMIT HIM TO JOIN DUTY. 3. PER CONTRA, LEARNED COUNSEL REPRESENTING THE RESPONDENT MADE SUBMISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT. ACCORDING TO HIM, THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AS WELL AS THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT WERE RIGHT IN REFUSING ARREARS OF SALARY TO THE APPELLANT AS HE DID NOT WORK DURING THAT PERIOD. 4. NO DOUBT, THE APPELLANT WENT ON MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE RESPONDENT BETWEEN 3-3-1992 AND 9-5-1995 BUT NOTHING PREVENTED HIM FROM APPROACHING THE HIGH COURT FOR SEEKING RELIEF WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD. HE CANNOT CLAIM ARREARS OF SALARY FROM 3-3-1992 TILL HE ACTUALLY JOINED DUTY BUT THE APPELLANT IS CERTAINLY ENTITLED TO ARREARS OF SALARY FROM THE DATE HE APPROACHED THE HIGH COURT BY FILING A WRIT PETITION ON 9-5-1995 AND EVEN AT THAT STAGE, THE RESPONDENT OUGHT TO HAVE ALLOWED THE APPELLANT TO JOIN DUTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESPONDENT CONTESTED THE WRIT PETITION AND, ULTIMATELY, THE JUDGMENT WAS PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT, AS ALREADY STATED ABOVE. 5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DIRECT THE RESPONDENT TO PAY ARREARS OF SALARY TO THE APPELLANT FROM 9-5-1995 TO 20-11-1997. THE IMPUGNED ORDER STANDS MODIFIED TO THIS EXTENT. 6. THE CIVIL APPEAL IS, ACCORDINGLY, DISPOSED OF. 7. NO COSTS.