( 1 ) IN all these petitions the question crops up once again whether the proceedings in a suit should be stayed under Sec. 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (`the Act' for short) when a plea is taken by a party litigant that he is a tenant of the land in question even though the court in the said suit is not called upon to decide any of the issues that are barred from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Sec. 133. ( 2 ) IN C. R. P. 2950/00, C. R. P. 2533/02 and C. R. P. 1248/03 the defendants have challenged the impugned orders of the court-below refusing to stay the proceedings in suits filed by the plaintiffs for the relief of permanent injunction. ( 3 ) IN C. R. P. 1779/03 and C. R. P. 4809/01 the challenge is to the order of the court-below refusing to stay the proceedings in suits filed by plaintiffs for possession of the suit property. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides in all these petitions. ( 5 ) SOME of the counsel appearing for the parties drew attention to the fact that similar matter in C. R. P. 3852/2000 and C. R. P. 3877/2000 have been referred to the Division Bench by a learned Single Judge of this court and these matters also may be referred to the Division Bench for decision. But having heard these revisions for some time I find that in the light of the decision in THOMAS ANTONY vs VARKEY VARKEY, (2000) 1 SCC 35 touching the point in issue in these revision, there is no need for referring these revisions to a Division Bench for determination. The learned Single Judge thought it fit to refer the matter to a Division Bench in the light of the conflicting views expressed in two decisions of this court viz. , in MALLAYYA v. PUTTAPPA, 1976 (1) Kar. L. J. 369 and B. V. SUBBACHARI v. B. K. JOYAPPA, I. L. R. 1994 KAR, 2505 touching the questions in issue. But the very issue having been dealt with and determined by the Apex Court in the case of Thomas Anthony, supra, I do not find it necessary to refer these revisions also to the Division Bench for decision. ( 6 ) SEC. But the very issue having been dealt with and determined by the Apex Court in the case of Thomas Anthony, supra, I do not find it necessary to refer these revisions also to the Division Bench for decision. ( 6 ) SEC. 132 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in certain matters. The bar as enunciated in Sec. 132 is as follows:"132. Bar of jurisdiction.- (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, an officer authorised under sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Sec. 83 the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 7 ) CERTAIN questions which are required to be exclusively decided by the Tribunal are stipulated in Sec. 133 of the Act. These questions are:"133. Suits, proceedings, etc. , involving questions required to be decided by the Tribunal.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force,-- (i) no civil or criminal court or officer or authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land decide the question whether such land is or not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March, 1974;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the bar is only against deciding the questions (i) whether land is or is not agricultural land and (ii) whether person claiming to be in possession of land is or is not tenant. The question that arises for consideration in these petitions is whether the civil court should refuse to proceed with the suit filed for bare injunction or for possession on the ground that the defendant is claiming occupancy rights before the Tribunal. The jurisdiction to decide a suit filed for permanent injunction or for possession, without doubt, vests in the civil court. The jurisdiction to decide a suit filed for permanent injunction or for possession, without doubt, vests in the civil court. Such a dispute cannot be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal or any other officer authorised by the State Government. Civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and free access to the courts of general jurisdiction has to be readily inferred unless expressly or impliedly debarred. It is nobody's case that the civil court's jurisdiction is barred in the matter of adjudicating a dispute relating to possession or permanent injunction. It may be that the question of tenancy may crop up incidentally at the trial of the suit from the defence put up by the tenant setting up the claim of tenancy or the tenant himself may come up with the suit for permanent injunction when his possession is threatened by the true owner. In MALLAYYA vs. PUTTAPPA, 1976 (1) KLJ 369 a Division Bench of this court was seized of a matter in which the plaintiff filed the suit for injunction claiming to be in possession of the suit land in his capacity as tenant. Plea of tenancy was taken as a defence in a suit filed for permanent injunction. The Division Bench of this Court in examining whether the suit has to be barred under Sec. 133, made the following pertinent observations:"it follows that in order to decide the case on hand it is absolutely necessary to decide the question whether the plaintiff is a tenant or not for a just disposal of the case. Sec. 133 provides that when the question before the Civil Court is whether the person, claiming to be in possession, is or is not a tenant of the suit land from prior to 1-3-1974, then the court shall stay such suit in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same for decision. Section 133 applies to all such cases irrespective of the fact that the person who claims to be the tenant is a plaintiff or a defendant. "but, in TARABAI v. KRISHNA PANDURANG POWAR, (1972) 1, Mys. L. J 216 this court held that in a suit for injunction the only issue that arises for decision is whether the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the land in question and that the question whether the plaintiff is a tenant of the suit land would not arise for decision. L. J 216 this court held that in a suit for injunction the only issue that arises for decision is whether the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the land in question and that the question whether the plaintiff is a tenant of the suit land would not arise for decision. In RUSHYASHRINGABHATTA v. S. G. NAGENDRA and OTHERS, ILR 2003 KAR 1643 which was disposed of on 29th November, 2002 the question has been concluded with these observations:"for the above reasons, even if any application was filed by the contesting defendants purporting to be under Section 77a of the Act, the same could not have been a ground for either staying the proceedings in the suit or to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Mere filing of an application in Forum 7a, even if its frivolous or malafide, ipso facto cannot be a ground for forcing the Civil Court to stay the proceedings before it. "the decision in Rushyashringabhatta, supra, also relied upon the decision in THOMASANTONY vs. VARKEY (2000) 1 SCC 35 wherein the Apex Court dealing with the very same issue, laid down the law as under:"while making a reference to the Tribunal mandatory the legislature cannot be said to have intended that even a patently frivolous, mala fide and illegal plea of tenancy taken by a party merely to delay the proceedings and to remain in possession of the property is also to be referred to the Tribunal. The statutory provisions, in our considered view, envisage a case where a bonafide and legally sustainable plea of tenancy is taken by the party, that question shall be referred to the Tribunal. . "the Apex Court enunciating the law further, observed:"we reiterate that a Civil Court is not obliged to make a reference to the Land Tribunal as per Section 125 (3) of the Act merely because a party has raised a contention that he is a tenant or a Kudikidappukaran, and the Civil Court has power to consider whether such contention has been raised without any legal foundation or with only the intention to gain time by protracting the litigation. If the Civil Court is of opinion that there is not even a remote possibility of the plea being upheld the Court can proceed to dispose of the suit without resorting to the circumlocuted route via the Land Tribunal. If the Civil Court is of opinion that there is not even a remote possibility of the plea being upheld the Court can proceed to dispose of the suit without resorting to the circumlocuted route via the Land Tribunal. "the latest position in law, therefore, is predominantly in favour of the courts proceeding with the suits filed for reliefs which do not directly involve questions reserved by the statute for the consideration of the Tribunal. Courts appear to hold the view that even where the issue of tenancy arises incidentally either out of the defence taken by the defendant or in a suit filed by the plaintiff-tenant for permanent injunction or possession, on the ground of tenancy, the same can be gone into incidentally to record a finding on the question of lawful possession in order to decide the suit for possession or permanent injunction. ( 8 ) SUCH a conclusion can be supported also on the ground that the valuable rights of a owner of the land should not be put on hold or kept in abeyance on the mere assertion by a defendant that he is a tenant of the suit land. That the decree of the civil court will not bind the ultimate order of the Tribunal bestowing on the tenant the occupany rights is not a circumstance that could be urged against the civil court adjudicating upon the questions, other than those to be decided by the Tribunal, coming up before it in a properly instituted suit. It is so because in the event of the land being declared as a tenanted land, by operation of law, the tenanted land would vest in the Government as on 1. 3. 1974 and any decree obtained by the plaintiff-owner of the land against the defendant-tenant would become invalid and rights, if any, that accrued to him under the decree would also get wiped out and, therefore, the tenant's interest would not be adversely affected. If the civil court gathers the opinion that the tenancy issue may be decided in favour of the tenant by the Tribunal, it could protect the interests of the tenant by appointing a Receiver while proceeding with the suit. If the civil court gathers the opinion that the tenancy issue may be decided in favour of the tenant by the Tribunal, it could protect the interests of the tenant by appointing a Receiver while proceeding with the suit. On the contrary putting-off of the adjudication of the claim made by the owner of the land in a suit for permanent injunction or possession for an unduly long period till the matter of tenancy is ultimately decided by the Tribunal and the appellate authority would work undue hardship on the rightful owner of the land if the claim of the tenant is found to be untenable and is ultimately rejected by the Tribunal. For, in that event, it would amount to denying to the rightful owner the valuable right of protecting his possession from unwanted interference by a person having no right whatsoever over the land. Examined in this angle, the interests of the parties would be best served by the civil court adjudicating upon the questions arising in a suit for permanent injunction or for possession rather than by putting the proceedings before the civil court on hold till a finding is reached by the Tribunal on the tenancy issue. Matters of tenancy usually pending for so many years that it would not be prudent to condemn the litigants to a situation where both of them could assert rights over the suit land with the court remaining a mute spectator unable to resolve it one way or the other because the matter is seized of by the Tribunal on a related question. ( 9 ) IN the result, I find no merit in these revisions and, they are accordingly dismissed --- *** --- .