JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 14.3.2000 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4695/1994, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent writ-petitioner in terms of the order dated 16.1.1997 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2941/91 (Badri Narain Vyas & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & 5 Ors.) . Aggrieved and dissatisfied by the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants State of Rajasthan & Ors. have filed the instant special appeal. 2. The appellants State of Rajasthan & Ors., had challenged the order passed in SBCWP No. 2941/1991 along with four other writ petitions decided 10 on 16.1.1997. This Court, by the judgment dated 7.4.2003, dismissed the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan & Ors. and maintained the order of the learned Single Judge in those writ petitions. 3. The writ petitioner was initially appointed as a Gurad on daily wages basis in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner (Admn.), Commercial Taxes ts Department, Udaipur on 1.2.1990. He was assigned the duty at the Check Post. The regularly appointed Class IV employee went on leave and, therefore, the writ petitioner was assigned the duty at the Check Post, Bhuwana w.e.f. 26.2.1991 to 1.3.1991 vide order Annex.1. The Commercial Taxes Officer, Udaipur, certified that the writ petitioner had been working with the Department as a Guard (on daily wages basis) from 24.2.1990 till the date of issuing the certificate, i.e. 24.8.1991 (Annex.3). While in service with the appellants, vide order dated 8.1.1992 (Annex.4), the writ petitioner was asked to perform the election duties under the Collector, Udaipur from 9.1.1992 and in pursuance of the order Annex.4, he performed the election duties on 11.1.1992 and 12.1.1992 and even on the gazetted holidays vide Annex.5. He was relieved from the election duty by the order of the District Collector, Udaipur dated 15.1.1992 and was sent back to the Commercial Taxes Department vide order Annex.6 dated 15.1.1992. Petitioner was inter-transferred within the Department of Commercial Taxes vide order dated 7.2.1992 (Annex.7). Again, vide order dated 2.9.1992 (Annex.8), he was assigned the duty in place of the regularly appointed Class IV employee who went on leave. Petitioner was inter-transferred within the Department of Commercial Taxes vide order dated 7.2.1992 (Annex.7). Again, vide order dated 2.9.1992 (Annex.8), he was assigned the duty in place of the regularly appointed Class IV employee who went on leave. During the month of October, 1993, he was assigned the duty of Guard vide order dated 30.9.1993 (Annex.9) and again by the order dated 27.11.1993 (Annex.10), he was assigned the duty of Guard on 11th and 12th December, 1993. The appellants. by the order dated 17.5.1994 (Annex.R/3), terminated the services of the writ petitioner. Thus, from the factual-matrix, it is clear that right from the date of initial appointment, i.e. 1.2.1990 till 17.5.1994, the writ petitioner was regularly under the employment with the appellants, without any break in service. Challenging the order of termination Annex.R/3 dated 17.5.1994, he filed the aforesaid writ petition on 22.9.1994. A counter was filed by the appellant State, inter alia, stating therein that due to inadvertence, omission and mistake, the Deputy Commissioner (Admn.), Commercial Taxes Department, Udaipur (for short, "appellant No. 2"), called upon the writ petitioner for interview on 6.12.1989, vide letter dated 30.11.1989, on the basis of the Sanction Letter dated 6.11.1989 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Finance), Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Both these letters had not been produced by the appellants. It was further averred that the appellant No. 2 contacted M/s. Goliath Detectives Pvt. Ltd., Udaipur for providing the services of twelve persons on the post of Clerks on contract basis and in turn, M/s. Goliath Detectives agreed to accede the proposal sent by appellant No. 2 on 11.12.1989, vide agreement dated 11.12.1989, which was further extended upto 29.2.1992. The appellants have not produced the alleged agreement dated 11.12.1989 or the order by which it was extended upto 29.2.1992. In the letter dated 31.1.1990 sent by M/s. Goliath Detectives Pvt. Ltd. to the appellant No. 2, there is no mention of the name of the present writ petitioner. However, the termination order dated 17.5.1994 (Annex.R/3) was produced by the appellants, wherein it was stated that the services of the writ petitioner were no more required and, therefore, he was relieved w.e.f. 17.5.1994 itself. 4. Number of Lower Division Clerks were appointed by the Appellants, including Badri Narain Vyas and others. However, the termination order dated 17.5.1994 (Annex.R/3) was produced by the appellants, wherein it was stated that the services of the writ petitioner were no more required and, therefore, he was relieved w.e.f. 17.5.1994 itself. 4. Number of Lower Division Clerks were appointed by the Appellants, including Badri Narain Vyas and others. On apprehending the termination of their services, they filed SBCWP No. 2941/1991, which came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge on 16.1.1997 by the following order: "The petitioners placed heavy reliance on notification dated 12.10.1992 according to which they claim that they are entitled to be regularised. Interest of justice would, therefore, be met if these petitions are allowed and the respondents are directed not to terminate the service of the petitioners till they duly consider their cases for regularisation in accordance with notification dated 12.10.1992 (Annex.18) page 121 -I issued by the Government of Rajasthan. In the result, the petitions thus, succeed and are allowed. There will be order as to costs." 5. Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner in terms of the order dated 16.1.1997 quoted above. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge in SBCWP No. 2941/1991 noted above. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the writ petition filed by Badri Narain Vyas & Ors. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge in SBCWP No. 2941/1991 noted above. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the writ petition filed by Badri Narain Vyas & Ors. (supra) was allowed on the basis of the Notification dated 12.10.1992, by which sub-rule (10) was added to Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 (for short, the Rules, 1957"), which reads as under: "(10) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 7, all persons 15 appointed as LDCs on ad hoc basis or on daily wages basis during the period from 1.1.1985 to 31.3.1990 and are (sic) still working as such on the date this amendment comes into force shall be appointed on regular basis on availability of vacancy subject to the condition that they pass a performance test conducted by the head of the department concerned within a period of three years in accordance with the syllabus prescribed in part-IV of Schedule I. Such persons shall be allowed three chances to pass the said test to be availed within a period of three years: Provided that if a person fails to pass the said test in three chances to 25 be availed within a period of three years, he shall be liable to be removed from service." 8. The service of the writ petitioners in the case of Badri Narain Vyas and others, were governed and regulated by the provisions of the Rules, 1957. These Rules have no application in the case of the present writ petitioner. The newly added sub-rule (10) to Rule 25 of the Rules, 1957 relates to the persons appointed as Lower Division Clerks on ad hoc or daily wages basis during the period from 1.1.1985 to 31.3.1990. Hence these Rules have no application in the instant case. The cases of Badri Narain Vyas & Ors. (supra) were decided on the basis of sub-rule (10) of Rule 25 of the Rules, 1957 and the learned Single Judge allowed their writ petitions on the premises of these Rules in terms of the judgment rendered in Badri Narain Vyas (supra) and, therefore, in the instant case, the order of the learned Single Judge, on these premises, cannot be sustained. 9. 9. But the fact remains that from the material placed on record, it is 40 established that the writ petitioner was appointed on 1.2.1990 on the post of guard on daily wages basis by the appellant No. 2 and he continued in service with the appellants till he was relieved on 17.5.1994 and, thus, he has served for a period of more than four years without any break in service. The services of the writ petitioner were terminated without compliance of the 45 mandatory provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 19, 7 (for short 'the I.D. Act'). The matter pertains to the year 1994 and now about nine years have elapsed. In this view of the matter, instead of remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge for fresh decision which may consume even some more time in deciding the matter, or relegating the writ petitioner to avail alternative remedy under the I.D. Act, it would be expedient an in the interest of justice that we decide the matter once for all 10. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the writ petitioner was engaged on contract basis through M/s. Goliath Detectives Pvt. Ltd., Udaipur, is concerned, it is not tenable inasmuch as there is no material worth acceptance. Moreso, the appellants, in clear terms, s admitted in the counter filed by them that the writ petitioner was called upon for the interview on 6.12.1989. Per contra, from the various documents noticed above, it is established that the writ petitioner was appointed on 1.2.1990 on daily wages basis by the appellant No. 2 and since then he had been in the continuous employment of the appellants till he was relieved vide to order Annex.R/3 dated 17.5.1994. The relationship of 'employer' and 'employee' existed between the parties and the services of the writ petitioner were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Thus, we hold that the termination of services of the writ petitioner were in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions of Section 25-r of the I.D. Act and, therefore, bad. 11. Now the question, which arises for consideration, is : whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the relief of "reinstatement" be moulded by granting the "compensation in lieu of reinstatement". 11. Now the question, which arises for consideration, is : whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the relief of "reinstatement" be moulded by granting the "compensation in lieu of reinstatement". Where the retrenchment is found invalid, the normal rule is to pass an order of reinstatement. However, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and where there are unusual or exceptional circumstances which may warrant deviation from the normal rule of reinstatement and where it is not expedient to grant the relief of reinstatement, then in appropriate cases the "compensation in lieu of reinstatement" may meet the ends of justice. In the instant case, a long period of nine years has elapsed since the date of termination and, therefore, the compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages would serve the ends of justice. 12. In Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 95 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court has discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the circumstances of a particular case are unusual or exceptional so as to make the reinstatement inexpedient or improper. 13. In Chandu Lal v. The Management of M/s. PAN American World Airways, AIR 1985 SC 1128 , the Apex Court, instead of granting there lief of reinstatement, granted compensation. 14. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Malu Amra, AIR 1994 SC 112 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the aspect of long lapse of time between the termination and the date of Award and held that the grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement was proper. 15. In Sain Steel Products v. Naipal Singh & Ors., AIR 2001 SCW 2426 , the Hon'ble Apex Court granted a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the workman in lieu of reinstatement or back wages on the ground that there had been an inordinate delay as the services had been terminated long back. 16. In O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 337 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded the formula to award compensation equivalent to 3.33 years' salary (including allowances as admissible) on the basis of the last pay and allowances drawn by the appellant therein, to be a reasonable amount to be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as the appellant therein had served for eight years. 17. 17. In Rolston Johan v. Central Government industrial Tribunal and Labour Court & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 131 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation in full and final settlement of the claim and in lieu of reinstatement and consequential 1 benefits to the workman. 18. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, in the instant case, the reinstatement would neither be expedient nor a proper relief to be granted to the writ petitioner. He was appointed on daily wages basis without following any procedure prescribed under the Rules. If he is to be reinstated, he could only be reinstated on daily wages basis on the minimum of the wages. A period of about nine years has elapsed between the date of termination and the relief of reinstatement could be granted. The possibility of writ petitioner's remaining employed else-where during to this period of nearly nine years cannot be ruled out altogether and his reinstatement may result in further complications and administrative difficulties as that post might have been manned by some other person. Under these circumstances. the remedy of awarding a lump-sum payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement would be just. proper and adequate. Neither the writ petitioner nor the appellants disclosed the last paid wages. Under these circumstances, the formula propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 0.P. Bhandari's case (supra) cannot be applied. Hence, considering the fact that the writ petitioner remained in employment under the appellants for about four years, a lump sum 20 amount of Rs. 50.000/- (Rs. fifty thousand) as compensation in lieu of reinstatement would meet the ends of justice. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge, is modified to the extent that the writ petitioner is entitled for a lump sum amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rs. fifty thousand) as 25 - compensation in full and final settlement of all the claims of the writ petitioner and in lieu of reinstatement and consequential benefits, if any. The appellants hall pay to the writ petitioner a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. fifty thousand) within period of two months from today. On such payment, the matter shall stand concluded between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. The appellants hall pay to the writ petitioner a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. fifty thousand) within period of two months from today. On such payment, the matter shall stand concluded between the parties. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Appeals Dispose of as Above. *******