Judgment S.N.Jha and A.K.Verma JJ. 1. This writ petition arises from an award of the Labour court. 2. The Reference was in the following terms: "Whether the termination of services of Sri Suresh Mishra Seasonal Cane Clerk is proper and justified ? If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief ?" The Labour court, Muzaffarpur, to which Reference was made, came to the conclusion that the workman i.e. Suresh Mishra was a temporary employee. He was engaged for doing the job of punching cane receipts which came to an end and accordingly his service was terminated. His termination was thus justified. The workman has approached this Court challenging the award. 3. The case of the petitioner-workman is that he was appointed as Seasonal Cane Clerk in the Cane Department, Marhowrah Factory Branch of Cawnpore Sugar Works Limited on 01.12.1976. He worked during the crushing seasons 1976-77 (from 1.12.1976 to 16.3.1977), 1977-78 (from 9.12.1977 to 15.5.1978) and 1978-79 (from 27.11.1978 to 14.4.1979). In terms of the classification of workman in the Certified Standing Orders, as he had worked during three crushing seasons, his status was that of permanent seasonal workman. However, in the next crushing season, 1979-80, he was retrenched without any rhyme or reason or without any notice and complying with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (in short the Act) and/or the Certified Standing Orders (in short the Standing Orders). While he was retrenched, his juniors such as Mithilesh Singh were retained. There has been violation of Clause 39 of the Standing Orders and Sections 25F and 25G of the Act. 4. At the out set Sri Manan Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners, did not seriously press the alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. He canvassed the petitioners case on the analogy of Mithilesh Singhs case and laid stress on the alleged violation of other provisions, namely, Clause 39 of the Standing Orders and Section 25G of the Act. With reference to documents he sumbmitted that Mithilesh Singh had been retained in employment in violation of the mandate of Section 25G of the Act containing the principle of last come first go. In this regard he placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of J.K. Iron and Steel Co. With reference to documents he sumbmitted that Mithilesh Singh had been retained in employment in violation of the mandate of Section 25G of the Act containing the principle of last come first go. In this regard he placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V/s. Its Workmen, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1288, and Suraj Prakash Bhandari V/s. Union of India, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 958. Shri Mishra submitted that in view of the fact that the Company has gone in liquidation and winding up proceeding is pending in the Allahabad High Court, he would not claim re-instatement, rather he would be satisfied if the Court awards him compensation. In this regard he referred to a decision in the case of Sain Steel Products V/s. Naipal Singh and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2401. 5. Sri K.N. Gupta appearing for the Management submitted that the petitioner has been held to be a temporary employee by the Labour court and the finding of fact cannot be set aside by this Court in writ jurisdiction. He too by referring to the provisions of the Standing Orders submitted that the petitioners status being that of a temporary workman, he was not entitled to any notice or payment in lieu of notice. He submitted that the petitioner was a temporary employee engaged for doing a particular job which was not continued in 1979-80 crushing season. It was a case of nonrenewal of the engagement coming within the ambit of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act taking the petitioners termination out of sweep of retrenchment as defined in Section 2 (oo) and, also, making the provision of Section 25G inapplicable. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that he worked in only three crushing seasons during which he performed a particular type of job, namely, punching of cane receipts. The punching of cane receipts was introduced by the Management on experimental basis and the same was discontinued in the crushing season 1979-80. The petitioner was naturally not engaged in that season. Counsel submitted that Section 25G of the Act is attracted only in the case of retrenchment of an employee belonging to a particular category of workmen in the establishment. Neither the termination amounts to retrenchment as indicated above, nor any person in the category of the petitioner was retained. The petitioner was naturally not engaged in that season. Counsel submitted that Section 25G of the Act is attracted only in the case of retrenchment of an employee belonging to a particular category of workmen in the establishment. Neither the termination amounts to retrenchment as indicated above, nor any person in the category of the petitioner was retained. In fact the work he had done in the previous seasons was itself discontinued. It is not the case of the petitioner that any employee junior to him and doing the same work had been retained in employment while his service was terminated. It was submitted that Section 25G is not attracted in case of termination of an employee. There should be retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) and employees at large in the particular category. Only then the principle of last come first go is to be followed. 6. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the submissions put forward on behalf of Management appear to be well founded. 7. Clause 3 of the Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, having statutory force, categorises the workmen in five categories, namely, permanent, seasonal, temporary, probationers and substitutes. Under Clause 4 a permanent workman is a workman who is engaged on a work of a permanent nature, who has satisfactorily completed a probationary period, if any, in the same or any other occupation in the mill. A seasonal workman under Clause 5 in engaged only for the crushing season provided that if he is on retainer, he is liable to be called for work at any time and for any period in the off season. A temporary workman, as defined in Clause 6, is one who is engaged for work of a temporary or casual nature or to fill in an essentially temporary need of extra hands on permanent seasonal or temporary jobs. 8. It is not necessary to notice the definition of other categories of workmen. The plea that the petitioner was a confirmed seasonal Clerk is belied by the fact that he himself filed application to confirm him in employment. He cannot also be treated as a seasonal employee for the reason that no case was made out in the written statement that he was on a retainer as required in Clause 5 of the Standing Orders. He cannot also be treated as a seasonal employee for the reason that no case was made out in the written statement that he was on a retainer as required in Clause 5 of the Standing Orders. In his evidence in court the petitioner did claim that retaining allowance was being paid to him. The Labour court, however, declined to accept his case on the ground that there was no such pleading in the written statement and his evidence was just an afterthought. In absence of any pleading on the point of retaining allowance, the petitioners case of being a seasonal workman cannot be accepted. If that ia so, his case would not come under the purview of Clause 39 of the Standing Orders. Clause 39 lays down that the employment of any permanent workman under sub-clause (a) may be terminated by one months notice or payment in lieu of notice. The seasonal workman can be terminated under sub-Clause (b) by seven days notice or payment of wages in lieu of notice. The employment of temporary workman besides a probationer, substitute and apprentice may be terminated by the manager without any notice or any payment in lieu of notice. The Petitioner not being a permanent or seasonal workman within the meaning of Clauses 4 and 5 of the Standing Orders, the requirement of notice or notice pay under Clause 39 was not applicable in his case. Therefore, termination of the services of the petitioner without payment of compensation cannot be questioned. i find substance in the contention that the petitioners case would fall under Clause 40 of the Standing Orders which permits termination without any notice or any payment in lieu of notice. Indeed, as indicated above, the thrust of the petitioners argument was non-compliance of Section 25G of the Act though reference was also made to noncompliance of Clause 39 of the Standing Orders, as mentioned above. 9. Indeed, as indicated above, the thrust of the petitioners argument was non-compliance of Section 25G of the Act though reference was also made to noncompliance of Clause 39 of the Standing Orders, as mentioned above. 9. The word retrenchment has been defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act as follows : "2 (oo) retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination or the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminal under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health." From the above it would appear that all cases of termination of services would be retrenchment except those as a measure of punishment by way of disciplinary action the termination falling under subclauses (a), (b), (bb) or (c). It is to be mentioned here that sub-clause (bb) was inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act by Amendment in 1984 to keep the contract employees i.e. those engaged on contract basis out of the purview of retrenchment. As a result of the said amendment, cases of termination of the services of the workman as a result of non-renewal of contract of employment, amongst others, would fall out of the reach of retrenchment. 10 In the instant case the petitioner was engaged to do a particular job which was introduced as an experimental measure and he worked in three crushing seasons. After the work was discontinued he was not engaged. It was thus a case of non-renewal of contract of employment coming within the ambit of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act.i.e. in one of the excepted categories and therefore did not amount to retrenchment making the provisions of Section 25G inapplicable altogether. As indicated above, in order to attract Section 25G, it is essential that there should be retrenchment of an employee. As indicated above, in order to attract Section 25G, it is essential that there should be retrenchment of an employee. It is also essential that other employees in the same category of employment to which he belongs are available in employment. In such a situation, the employee who was employed last in that category ordinarily is supposed to be retrenched. The word category in our opinion refers to the type of work performed by the workman at large and not categories, such as, permanent, seasonal, temporary and so on. The petitioner having been employed for doing a particular job, namely, punching of cane receipts, it has to be held that he was a Punching Clerk. In absence of any averment that any other person employed for doing the same job has been retained, no question of observance of Section 25G arises. In our view, it was a case of termination of employee simplicitor and the Management was not required to observe the last come first go rule which is the spirit of Section 25G of the Act. Thus, we are in agreement to the counsel for the Management that there was no violation of Section 25G of the Act. 11. The decisions relied upon by the petitioners counsel were rendered on their own facts. In J.K. Iron Steel Co. Ltd.s case the action of Management in giving preference to particular branch of clerical work was held to be improper and smacking of mala fide. Suraj Prakash Bhandaris case was a case of the appellant being singled out and the retrenchment in the fact of the case was held to be invalid. The case of Sain Steel Products was cited on the point of compensation. The termination of the petitioner not having been found to be unjustified, the question of passing any order on the point of compensation does not arise. 12. In view of the above discussions we come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour court does not suffer from any perversity, illegality or arbitrariness to warrant interference in writ jurisdiction. The petition must therefore fail and the same, is accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs.