ORDER Vikramaditya Prasad, J. 1. Ms. Poonam Singh, the District Superintendent of Education, Jamshedpur, appears in person along with the records of the departmental proceeding in this case. It appears that on the last date, Rs. 100/- was imposed upon the respondent as costs in CWJC No. 3730/ 2000(R), considering certain statements, which led to the adjournment of the case on that date. Today, the respondents say that the said cost be exempted. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents is warned not to make any such statement in future, if he is not very sure of that. As there was no privity of communication between the Officer and this Court on that date, the Officer concerned is not liable to pay the cost. She is exempted and set at liberty to go. 2. These writ petitions, have been filed for quashing that part of the order dated 21.9.2000, whereby and whereunder one annual increment of the petitioners has been stopped with cumulative effect and for payment of salary for about seven months prior to suspension. 3. Both the petitioners were the Teachers in Muchiasai Middle School, Bahragora. On certain charges, they were departmentally proceeded and before submission of the charge-sheet, they had already been put under suspension. The Enquiry Officer was directed to conclude the enquiry within the prescribed period and the petitioners were directed to submit explanation within a week of the receipt of the charge-sheet. 4. As the pleas taken in the writ petitions were that the enquiry was not conducted fairly, the proceeding book of the enquiry was called, in the context of which, the District Superintendent of Education appeared today. It is relevant to state here that earlier CWJC No. 2187/2000(R) had been filed, in which the State had appeared through S.C.I, By order dated 25.7.2000, the Court had declined to interfere with the order of suspension on the ground that the departmental enquiry was in progress and the Court had directed to conclude the enquiry within a period of six months from the date of that order. Though, JC to SC-I appeared on that date, but the SC-I did not state that the enquiry had already been concluded. No counter-affidavit had been filed on behalf of the State. The Enquiry Report has been made Annexure in these two writs, vide Annexure B to the counter-affidavit of both the cases. Though, JC to SC-I appeared on that date, but the SC-I did not state that the enquiry had already been concluded. No counter-affidavit had been filed on behalf of the State. The Enquiry Report has been made Annexure in these two writs, vide Annexure B to the counter-affidavit of both the cases. This Annexure shows that the enquiry had already been concluded on 22.7.2000, meaning thereby, before the order was passed in the aforesaid writ petition. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that had this enquiry been concluded on that date, then this could have been brought to the notice of the Court, while earlier writ petition was being disposed of. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that non-disclosure of this fact of conclusion of the enquiry on that particular date showed that the enquiry was not at all concluded till that date and therefore, this enquiry report, Annexure-B, is a suspected document. 5. I find that the Proceeding Book has very haphazardly been maintained. There is no order-sheet worth the name showing as to on which date what enquiry was made; so one has to contend with the different communications and different recordings made by the Enquiry Officer. Even in face of such state of enquiry proceedings, arguments raised by the learned counsel appearing for the State are as follows :-- (i) Since the petitioners had pleaded that they were present in the office of the R.E.O., but no written instruction was produced which was issued by the R.E.O., nor any attendance was marked in the RE.O. Office; therefore, the plea of the petitioners that they were in the R.E.O. office during the relevant period proved falsified. (ii) The enquiry was made from the villagers with regard to the collection of Rangdari Tax, assault on teachers and all the villagers had denied this. (iii) At the time of inspection, the petitioners were found absent and therefore, considering these things, the impugned order was passed, which is quite fair. 6. (ii) The enquiry was made from the villagers with regard to the collection of Rangdari Tax, assault on teachers and all the villagers had denied this. (iii) At the time of inspection, the petitioners were found absent and therefore, considering these things, the impugned order was passed, which is quite fair. 6. The question to be answered is whether after initiation of a Departmental Enquiry, it was appropriate on the part of the Enquiry Officer to make an enquiry from the villagers or from the teachers in absence of the petitioners and whether it was also appropriate on the part of the Enquiry Officer not to examine the RE.O. and to give an opportunity to the petitioners to substantiate their claims of their presence in that office after cross-examining the RE.O. 7. All these facts on which the impugned order is based would have been made the basis, forming the charge-sheet, but once the charges are framed, then the rule of natural Justice requires that the opportunity be given to the proceedee to be present at the time of verification of the records or at the time of examination of the witnesses so that he is in a position to cross-examine the witnesses. A number of villagers have been examined allegedly by the Enquiry Officer, but all behind the back of the petitioners. 8. Under Rule 10 of the Bihar Rajya Rajkiyakrit Parambhik Vidyalaya Sikchhak (Sthanantaran Evam Anusasonik Karbai) Neyamabali, 1994, an appeal against the order of the Establishment Committee (in this case the impugned order has been passed by the Establishment Committee) lies before the Divisional Commissioner. Admittedly, this provisions has not been resorted to by the petitioners. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that since the principles of natural justice has been violated because of the examination of the witnesses being the back of the petitioners, the writ lies even in the face of the alternative remedy being available against the order impugned. Admittedly, this provisions has not been resorted to by the petitioners. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that since the principles of natural justice has been violated because of the examination of the witnesses being the back of the petitioners, the writ lies even in the face of the alternative remedy being available against the order impugned. I have no hesitation in saying that the rules of natural Justice has been violated in this case, which is self- proved from the fact that all the proceeding has been conducted in absence of the petitioners and the records that were produced at least have not clearly shown that these petitioners were asked to be present at a particular time or at a particular place where the enquiry was to be conducted. True it is that some documents can be verified and resolution can be based on that, but even at the time of examination of these documents, the petitioners are required to be present so that they can give their own interpretation of that documents. In that view of the matter, I agree that the writ petition is maintainable in the circumstances aforesaid. The impugned order are consequently set aside. Since it appears to me that the Enquiry Officer was completely novice and unaware of the procedure of conducting of a departmental proceeding, it is further directed that the departmental proceeding be concluded afresh within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order by giving opportunities to the petitioners to be present during the enquiry. After that enquiry, the competent authority under the Rules may pass appropriate order. The departmental records that were produced today are returned to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. So far as the payment of salary prior to the suspension period is concerned, that will be paid within two months hereinafter and the District Superintendent of Education present in the Court undertakes that it will be paid. 9. With the aforesaid observations/ directions, these writ petitions are allowed.