JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners on 10.7.2001 against the respondents with the prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned ex-parte judgment and award dated 14.6.2000 (Annex.P/4) passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 1) by which he on a reference made by the Government of Rajasthan held that termination of services of the respondent No. 2 Mahipal Singh with effect from 6.11.1992 was not proper and valid and thus, ordered reinstatement of respondent No. 2 and also awarded 50% back wages till he was reinstated, be quashed and set aside. 2. The case of the petitioners as put forward by them in this writ petition is as follows:- Through Notification dated 8th September, 1999, the Labour Department of the Government of Rajasthan made a reference to the learned Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 1) to the effect whether the termination of the services of the respondent No. 2 Mahipal Singh with effect from 6.11.1992 was proper and valid and on receipt of that reference, the respondent No. 1 learned Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar registered the case being No. 71/99 and issued notices to the petitioners and respondent No. 2. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 Mahipal Singh through application (Annex.P/1) filed his claim before the respondent No. 1 learned Labour Court stating inter-alia that he was appointed as Assistant Secretary by the petitioners on 17.10.1989 and since his appointment, he worked continuously on that post upto 6.11.1992, but on 6.11.1992 his services were terminated orally by the petitioners and before terminating his services, compliance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the ID Act") was not made and, therefore, action of the petitioners terminating the services of the respondent No. 2 was wholly illegal and unjustified. Hence, it was prayed that the order terminating his service w.e.f. 6.11.1992 be quashed and set aside and he be reinstated in service.The petitioners appeared before the respondent No. 1 learned Labour Court on 9.12.1999 through Nand Kishore Sharma, Secretary, Gram Panchayat Sardargarh and thereafter, the learned Labour Court fixed the case for 25.3.2000, but on that day, nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioners and, therefore, the learned Labour Court ordered ex-parte proceedings against the petitioners.The learned Labour Court framed three issues and after recording the evidence of the respondent No. 2, passed the impugned ex-parte judgment and award dated 14.6.2000 (Annex.P/4) in the manner as indicated above holding inter-alia:- (i) That the respondent No. 2 before 6.11.1992 had worked in the employment of the petitioners for more than 240 days. (ii) That termination of services of the respondent No. 2 amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. (iii) That before terminating the services of the respondent No. 2, the provisions of Section 25F of the ID Act were not followed. (iv) That the termination of services of the respondent No. 2 with effect from 6.11.1992 was bad in law. Aggrieved from the said ex-parte judgment and award (Annex.P/4) dated 14.6.2000 passed by the learned Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar, the petitioners have directly approached this Court Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India instead of going first before the learned Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and award (Annex. P/4). 3. In this writ petition, the following submissions have been made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner:- (i) That it was wrong to say that the services of the respondent No. 2 were orally terminated by the petitioners, but the fact is that the respondent No. 2 himself voluntarily left the job of the petitioners and in these circumstances, no question of retrenchment arises. Hence, the impugned judgment and award Annex. P/4 passed by the learned Labour Court are wholly illegal and cannot be sustained. Hence, the impugned judgment and award Annex. P/4 passed by the learned Labour Court are wholly illegal and cannot be sustained. (ii) That on point of passing of ex-parte judgment and award (Annex.P/4), it was submitted that the case was listed on 9.12.1999 and on that day, the case was ordered to be fixed for 31.1.2000 and since on that day, there was strike, the case was ordered to be listed on 25.3.2000 and the petitioners were never informed about the date of 25.3.2000, when ex-parte proceedings were ordered against them and, thereafter, the case was fixed for 14.6.2000 when the impugned ex-parte, judgment and award were passed and since petitioner were not informed that ex-parte proceedings were ordered against them on 25.3.2000 and also not informed about the date of 14.6.2000, therefore, the order dated 25.3.2000 ordering ex-parte proceedings against the petitioners and ex-parte impugned judgment and award (Annex.P/4) passed by the learned Labour Court cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment and award dated 14.6.2000 (Annex. P/4) passed by the learned Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and gone through the materials available on record. 6. There is no dispute on the point that in Rajasthan, separate Rules known as Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of 1958") have been framed and Rule 22A of the Rules of 1958 provides for setting aside ex-parte decision and the same is quoted here:- "22-A. Setting aside ex parte decision. - (1) On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part, an ex parte decision. (2) The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on an application, extend the time of fifteen days as prescribed in sub-rule (1) on sufficient cause being shown. (3) Applications under sub-rules (1) and (2) shall be supported by an affidavit." 7. (2) The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on an application, extend the time of fifteen days as prescribed in sub-rule (1) on sufficient cause being shown. (3) Applications under sub-rules (1) and (2) shall be supported by an affidavit." 7. There is also no dispute on the point that the petitioners instead of taking recourse to Section 22A of the Rules of 1958, they directly approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. The question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances, just mentioned above, this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should interfere with the ex-parte impugned judgment and award (Annex.P/4) dated 14.6.2000 passed by the learned Labour Court (respondent No. 1) or not. 9. Before proceeding further, some thing should be said about the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not sit or act as an appellate Authority over the actions of the subordinate authorities or tribunal. 11. The exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary one. 12. The High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution would be restricted to interference in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law, and would be exercised most sparingly in cases where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. 13. The power of general superintendence conferred by Article 3227 involves a duty on the part of the High Court to keep all courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and they do it in a legal manner. This means that the High Court can interfere in cases of - (a) Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction. (b) Refusal to exercise jurisdiction. (c) Error of law apparent on the face of the record, as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction. (d) Violation of principles of natural justice. (e) Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or discretion. (f) Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material. 14. (c) Error of law apparent on the face of the record, as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction. (d) Violation of principles of natural justice. (e) Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or discretion. (f) Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material. 14. In the present case, a bare perusal of the impugned judgment and award (Annex.P/4) dated 14.6.2000 passed by the learned Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar reveals that the learned Labour Court first framed issues and, thereafter, recorded the evidence of the respondent No. 2 and after discussing each and every point decided the issues in an analytical manner on the basis of evidence produced before it and thus, gave categorical findings to the effect that the respondent No. 2 has completed 240 days in a calender year, the termination of services of the respondent No. 2 amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act and before terminating the services of the respondent No. 2, the provisions of Section 25F of the ID Act were not followed by the petitioners and thus, the termination of the services of the respondent No. 2 with effect from 6.11.1992 was not proper and valid. These findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse. No illegality has been committed by the learned Labour Court in holding that the termination of service of the respondent No. 2 was bad in law. Thus, no interference is called for with the above findings of facts recorded by the learned Labour Court. 15. So far as the question whether the ex-parte proceedings against the petitioners were ordered by the learned Labour Court without any basis, is concerned, it may be stated here that even as per the impugned judgment and Award Annex. Thus, no interference is called for with the above findings of facts recorded by the learned Labour Court. 15. So far as the question whether the ex-parte proceedings against the petitioners were ordered by the learned Labour Court without any basis, is concerned, it may be stated here that even as per the impugned judgment and Award Annex. P/4 and the averments made in the writ petition, it is very much clear that when the learned Labour Court issued notices to the petitioners, in compliance of that, they first appeared before the learned Labour Court on 9.12.1999 through Nand Kishore Sharma, Secretary, Gram Panchayat Sardargarh and thus, it cannot be said that the notices were not served on the petitioners and therefore, it is a case where it can easily be concluded that the petitioners were duly served before the ex-parte proceedings were ordered against them by the learned Labour Court. 16. When this being the position it was the duty of the petitioners to pursue the case vigilantly before the learned Labour Court and it appears that ex- parte proceedings were ordered against the petitioner by the learned Labour Court because of negligence on the party of the petitioners themselves. 17. It may be stated here that ex-parte orders are generally set aside when a party was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the case was called for hearing or summons were not duly served. In the present case, summons were duly served on the petitioners as they themselves appeared before the learned Labour Court and had the ex-parte proceedings would have been ordered on the very day on 9.12.1999 when they appeared through Nand Kishore Sharma, the petitioners could have said that they had sufficient cause, but since in the present case, after 9.12.1999, the case was listed for 2-3 times before the learned Labour Court and ultimately, the impugned judgment and award was passed by the learned Labour Court on 14.6.2000 and in these circumstances, it can easily be said that the petitioners had no sufficient cause for setting aside the ex-parte judgment award (Annex.P/4) passed by the learned Labour Court. 18. For the reasons stated above, no case for interference with the impugned judgment and award Annex. 18. For the reasons stated above, no case for interference with the impugned judgment and award Annex. P/14 dated 14.6.2000 in exercise of poowers under 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is made out and therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.Accordingly, this writ petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. *******