( 1 ) 1. We have the learned Addl. SPP on merits as also on I. A. I the reason being that this court is obliged before issuing notice to the accused in an appeal against acquittal, to do a prima facie assessment for purposes of being satisfied that there are reasonably good prospects of the order of acquittal being interfered with. We are required to point this out because of the basic position in criminal jurisprudence which starts with a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and once the accused is acquitted by the trail court this presumption gets reinforced and the Supreme Court had occasion to point out that it is almost on par with a double presumption of innocence. The accused has faced the rigors of a trail and we do concede that if the order of acquittal is unjustified or if it is even vulnerable, that in cases of consequence the High Court would be obliged to issue notice to the accused, hear the accused and decide as to whether or no the order of acquittal should be sustained. Experience has however shown, that in the majority of cases where the trial court acquits the accused that the State almost mechanically prefers and appeal against acquittal. Apart from assessing the merits, often times there are other compelling circumstances such as where the victim is a child or a woman or where the offences are heinous and antisocial, the State invariably proceeds on the footing that the order of acquittal does require a second look. Even in this class of cases, the High Court is conscious of the fact that once the notice is issued or if the appeal is admitted that the accused is at the receiving end and therefore, out of a sense of responsibility the issuance of notice will have to be confined only to those cases where at the admission stage the High Court is genuinely satisfied that there are reasonably good chances of success as far as the State is concerned. One important factor which the court takes into cognizance is the fact that in many cases such as the present one the accused person is a rustic villager, that the accused is a person of very modest means or the accused belongs to the weaker sections of society and the issuance of notice puts the accused under such immense pressure because the accused has virtually no capacity to enter upon a defence. While it is true that this court will provide an amicus curiae Counsel, we need to also consider those situations wherein the accused appears before the Court purely in order to void an adverse verdict but the accused is put through tremendous economic and mental trauma which the court is virtually unaware of only because the accused might have sold almost all the earthly possessions purely out of fear in order to engage a defence. These are all considerate factors which this court needs to place in the forefront and therefore, do the scrutiny exercise or rather an indepth examination at the admission stage itself. ( 2 ) WE have heard the learned Addl. SPP both on I. A. I as far as delay is concerned and on merits. For the reasons set out I. A. I is allowed. The delay is condoned. Coming to the merits, it is submitted that undoubtedly the trial court has recorded a finding that the motive which has been adduced by the prosecution borders on absurdity. It is contended that there was an illicit live affair between the mother of the accused and some other person in the village who happens to be P. W. 7 who incidentally has denied it and so has the mother. The prosecution case is that the deceased who was a 10 year old shepherd boy is supposed to have been a go between in this illicit affair. What the learned Counsel submits is that in criminal cases motive is not of any consequence and he reminds us of the legal position that even in cases where the prosecution is unable to determine the motive, that if the evidence makes out a sufficiently sustainable case that a conviction is tenable. We do not dispute this proposition, and we have therefore examined rest of the evidence de hors the so-called motive. We do not dispute this proposition, and we have therefore examined rest of the evidence de hors the so-called motive. ( 3 ) THE strongest evidence that is relied upon is the so-called extrajudicial confession which is attributed to the accused. The trail court has very correctly scrutinized this evidence and what is observed is that the conduct of the complainant is totally unacceptable in so far as if the accused had for no ostensible reason confessed to the witness that he had murdered the deceased along with his juvenile companion, there is no reason why the accused would not have been apprehended and more importantly as to why the witness would not have straightaway gone to the police. More importantly, the learned Trial Judge is right when he points out that the moment such a disclosure has been made the normal human conduct would have been to proceed to the spot where the body is alleged to have been concealed, but this does not also take place. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel has also relied on the remaining evidence, which according to him though not in the nature of eye-witness evidence, is strong circumstantial evidence. We have also examined all these circumstances quite apart from the extra judicial confession coming all the way upto the recovery of the rope with which the accused is alleged to have tied the deceased and the recovery of the chopper with which the accused is alleged to have slit the throat deceased and we do find that under each of these heads, the evidence is far from conclusive, far from reliable and totally unacceptable. ( 5 ) WHILE giving due credit to the learned trial Judge who has analysed every single head of evidence without exception and has recorded findings which in our opinion are absolutely correct, we need to add that as far as the medical evidence is concerned the learned Trial Judge has found that the doctor who has conducted the postmortem has done a haphazard job and that even this crucial evidence is unacceptable. We do find that in this crucial evidence does not assist the prosecution, principally because there are admission from the doctor that she had not even signed the postmortem report. In totality therefore, despite a very strenuous effort having been put in by the learned Addl. We do find that in this crucial evidence does not assist the prosecution, principally because there are admission from the doctor that she had not even signed the postmortem report. In totality therefore, despite a very strenuous effort having been put in by the learned Addl. SPP we have very carefully visualized the possibility of setting aside the acquittal and replacing it by an order of conviction and in our considered view, such an eventuality will have to be totally ruled out. The circumstantial evidence is required, in keeping with the well settled legal position to lead to one and only one ostensible conclusion that is in consonance with the guilt of the accused and having very carefully examined this evidence, we find that it does not lead to that conclusion because each of the circumstances or the links in the chain as is the requirement of law are not strong enough in themselves nor do they lead to the ostensible conclusion of guilt. ( 6 ) IT is true that this is a rather gory offence where a young boy has been brutally or rather savagely murdered but as often happens, the quality of the investigation leaves much to be desired and in this background the Prosecutor before the trial court was obviously handicapped. The record that has emerged has failed to establish the charges and consequently the accused has been acquitted. ( 7 ) THERE is one area that we need to deal with because in almost 8 out of 10 cases wherein the acquittal has been recorded the trial courts have repeatedly made observations to the effect that there is no independent evidence. Even in this case, the learned trial Judge has relied on the observations of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC. 942 and AIR 1984 S. C. 1622, while the proposition canvassed which is to the effect that the evidence of parties and witness must be scrutinized carefully and that in such situations the court must look for independent corroboration which is a well-defined principle of law; however, this board principle is not to be carried to extreme or absurd lengths. 942 and AIR 1984 S. C. 1622, while the proposition canvassed which is to the effect that the evidence of parties and witness must be scrutinized carefully and that in such situations the court must look for independent corroboration which is a well-defined principle of law; however, this board principle is not to be carried to extreme or absurd lengths. The term partisan or the term interested pre-supposes the fact that the party harbors a strong discernible bias against the accused or on the other hand that the party is very closely linked with the victim or that it is demonstrable that the party would swing heavily on behalf of for any of a variety of reasons in favour of the victim and against the accused. In the majority of cases we have come across situations wherein the injured persons have given reliable and straightforward evidence which is fully supported and corroborated by the medical evidence despite which an unsustainable observation is made that for want of independent evidence or independent corroboration the accused is acquitted. This approach is downright wrong and unsustainable because that category or class of evidence is not a partisan or biased evidence and consequently the observation that independent evidence is essential and must be forthcoming is totally unjustified. The courts are required to be more realistic, and if as happens in the majority of relatively minor criminal offences the prosecution witnesses are basically honest and credible and if there is no valid well defined ground on which that evidence can be rejected, then it is virtually a miscarriage of justice and a wrong legal practice to enter an order of acquittal on the ground that despite this material, independent evidence is still necessary. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position after a very careful and through review of the record, after considering the legal position as submitted by the learned addl. SPP we record the conclusion that the order of acquittal in this case was fully justified. The appeal fails on merits and stands dismissed. ( 9 ) THE Registrar General to circulate a copy of this judgment to all the subordinate criminal courts in the State. --- *** --- .