KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) ON December 2, 2003, I heard the matter in the absence of the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. S. K. Kapoor, and passed an order directing to file affidavits and to continue interim order for a period of eight weeks after X-mas vacation or until further order whichever is earlier. On the same day at the request of Mr. Kapoor, I agreed to hear the matter on the subsequent days without recalling the above order. I made clear to learned counsel that in the event the submission and argument of learned Additional Solicitor General warranted vacating and modification or recalling of my order dated December 1, 2003, I might do so. ( 2 ) AS such the matter was heard on December 5, 2003, and December 9, 2003, respectively. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General contends that this application should be dismissed in limine, if not possible at this stage then the interim order granted by this court should be vacated. He says the notice issued by the officer is not justiciable as in exercise of statutory power he has issued, because he has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the assessment year of 1999-2000. The formation of opinion of the officer's reason to believe is his subjective satisfaction. Necessary permission has been obtained from the Commissioner of Income-tax. Not only is the Assessing Officer satisfied, the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax concerned is also satisfied with the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer that the same are sufficient to issue such notice. This court should not examine the correctness, sufficiency, and adequacy of the reasons in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THEREFORE, when all the pre-conditions for issuance of this notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act are found to have been fulfilled the court will certainly not interfere with this proceeding. His further contention is that the reasons should not be divulged for the interests of the Revenue. The asses-see has already submitted returns pursuant to the notice, on receipt thereof. So, whatever grievance and contentions in relation to the impugned notice or on merit are raised here, can be argued before the Assessing Officer. His further contention is that the reasons should not be divulged for the interests of the Revenue. The asses-see has already submitted returns pursuant to the notice, on receipt thereof. So, whatever grievance and contentions in relation to the impugned notice or on merit are raised here, can be argued before the Assessing Officer. Moreover, even if an order is passed against the petitioner in this proceeding for reopening, the petitioner has got alternative remedy. ( 5 ) HE contends that this application is absolutely pre-mature on the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case and rather the petitioner has already acquiesced in this notice submitting to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer. In support of his contention, he has relied on the following decisions of various courts reported in ITO v. Biju Patnaik ; Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO ; Discount and Finance House of India Ltd. v. S. K. Bhardwaj, CIT [2003] 259 ITR 295 (Bom); ITO v. Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. 2003 ; Rajan Products v. Union of India ; Mulchand Rampuria v. ITO 2003 ; Surat City Gymkhana v. Deputy CIT ; Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Deputy CIT 2003 Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) ; [2003] 1 SCC 72 and Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy CIT 2003. ( 6 ) DR. Pal, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits in reply to the argument of Mr. Kapoor that it is no longer res integra that the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act (under Section 34 of the old Act) is justiciable. He contends that the Assessing Officer gets jurisdiction to issue notice for the purpose of reopening of assessment of any relevant assessment year only on the statutory conditions being fulfilled, namely, firstly, he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, secondly, the reasons have to be recorded meaning thereby existence of reasons is sine qua non to issue such notice. When an assessee challenges the notice contending that there exists no reason then the Assessing Officer has the obligation to divulge or communicate the same. When an assessee challenges the notice contending that there exists no reason then the Assessing Officer has the obligation to divulge or communicate the same. He contends in this case in spite of demand such reasons are not supplied as such it is open for the court to examine whether there exists any or for that matter whether the reasons even if any, recorded have rational nexus to the formation of the opinion, this can only be done on production of record or by filing affidavits. ( 7 ) HE contends further that in this case after regular assessment order was passed, on January 3, 2003 (sic), a notice of rectification dated December 24, 2002, was issued by respondent No. 2 under Section 154/155 of the Income-tax Act. The petitioner replied to the said notice dated December 24, 2002, and explained that there was no mistake that requires rectification under Section 154 of the said Act, and it was requested to stop this proceedings. Therefore, there could be no reason for reopening when the rectification proceeding has indeed been initiated and the same is pending. ( 8 ) HE contends further that in order to cover up misuse of power by issuing notice under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act the present notice under Section 148 has been issued. Therefore, this cannot be enquired into and/or examined properly by this court till affidavits are filed showing this course of action is legitimate. This has been settled by the large number of decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts. According to him, an order passed by me on December 2, 2003, is perfectly lawful one and the same is in consonance with the established principles of law laid down by the large number of Supreme Court decisions. As far as the question of acquiescence is concerned neither the same nor the principle of estoppel is applicable as the jurisdiction of the officer concerned and further legality, validity of the notice have been challenged, as against the provision of the statute, the principle of estoppel or acquiescence does not apply. As far as the question of acquiescence is concerned neither the same nor the principle of estoppel is applicable as the jurisdiction of the officer concerned and further legality, validity of the notice have been challenged, as against the provision of the statute, the principle of estoppel or acquiescence does not apply. ( 9 ) HIS further contention is that though there are decisions of the Supreme Court in recent times rendered by two learned judges holding on different facts and circumstances, apparently contrary to what has been held previously, but those judgments ought not to be followed in view of the fact that the larger Bench of the Supreme Court has decided and settled the contrary view and those judgments were not considered by the Bench of the two learned judges subsequently. It is settled position of the law that the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court shall always be preferred to the smaller one. In support of his contention, he has relied on the decisions of various courts reported in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. ITO ; Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. ITO and Comunidado of Chicalim v. ITO [2001] 247 ITR 271 (SC); Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO ; ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. ; ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das ; Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. ; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha ; Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. ITO ; CIT v. Tri-lok Nath Mehrotra [1998] 231 ITR 278 (SC); CESC Ltd. v. Deputy CIT (No. 1) 2003 and Smt. Uma Devi Jhawar v. ITO 2003. ( 10 ) HAVING heard the respective contentions and submissions of learned counsel and gone through the petition at this stage the question appears to me for answering is as to whether on the facts and circumstances of this case this court will interfere with the notice or not. It is the settled position of the law that in exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court will not interfere with any proceedings of a quasi-judicial nature particularly when this is initiated under expressed provision of the statute and which in its turn provides for a complete code for adjudicating machinery, provided of course such action is initiated in lawful and proper exercise of jurisdiction. ( 11 ) THE learned Additional Solicitor General says that this notice once issued in exercise of jurisdiction is not justiciable and I think he is right in principle. Now the question is whether he has done so on the facts and circumstances of this case. So, the decisions cited by him in support of the proposition have to be carefully applied and the same in my view are for guidance for general application. The notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), has to be issued only when the conditions mentioned in Section 147 of the said Act are satisfied meaning thereby lawful assumption of jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer (at least in this case) will be inferred when he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax was escaped assessment in any assessment year. ( 12 ) WHEN the assessee doubted that there could be reasons for the belief of the Assessing Officer concerned, I think it is the obligation of the officer concerned to divulge the reasons and until then he cannot proceed with the reopening. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Kapoor, learned Additional Solicitor General that the reasons should not be divulged to the assessee for the interests of the Revenue. It appears from the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court as well as the High Court that not only must there exist reasons for formation of the belief that income has escaped the assessment but they must have also rational connection or relevant bearing with the materials for formation of the belief. This rational connection postulates that there must be direct nexus or live link between the material coming to the notice of the Income-tax Officer and the formation of his belief that there has been escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment in the particular year because of his failure to disclose fully and truly of materials (ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das. This judgment of the Supreme Court has been delivered after considering the judgment of the five-judge Bench of the same court rendered in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191. This judgment of the Supreme Court has been delivered after considering the judgment of the five-judge Bench of the same court rendered in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191. By a Division Bench judgment of this court rendered in the case of Smt. Uma Devi Jhawar v. ITO 2003 the aforesaid principle has been followed and held that when the authority of the officer who issued notice under Section 148 of the Act, is challenged, it is for the Income-tax Officer to satisfy this court that the aforesaid conditions have been satisfied. The expression "reason to believe", means that there is a reason coupled with the belief. If there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, on such reasons no one properly instructed on the facts of the case could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income-tax Officer could not have had reason to believe. In such a case the notice issued by him would be liable to be struck down as being invalid and without jurisdiction. The materials having a natural nexus to the formation of the belief will have to be disclosed by the Income-tax Officer. He can do so by filing an affidavit. ( 13 ) MR. Kapoor has placed reliance on a judgment of the learned single judge of this court on the question that once the notice is issued by the Income-tax Officer under Section 147 of the Act, no court has jurisdiction if such notice discloses the belief of the Income-tax Officer that there are reasons to reopen. It appears in the judgment reported in Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy CIT 2003, the learned single judge did not consider the earlier decision of the Supreme Court nor discuss though referred to, the judgment reported in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO and also decisions quoted above. The learned single judge has reiterated the position that once the condition mentioned in Section 147 of the Act having been fulfilled then it confers jurisdiction upon the officer concerned. So, his Lordship has not laid down any new principle. This judgment is also inapplicable, because factually in that case affidavits were filed disclosing reasons. ( 14 ) HERE is a case whether this court will entertain the writ petition at this stage or not. So, his Lordship has not laid down any new principle. This judgment is also inapplicable, because factually in that case affidavits were filed disclosing reasons. ( 14 ) HERE is a case whether this court will entertain the writ petition at this stage or not. Similarly other decisions relied on by Mr. Kapoor, the learned Additional Solicitor General, reported in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO ; Gurera Gas Cylinders Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 258 ITR 170 (Pandh) and ITO v. Biju Patnaik are of no assistance at this stage. These decisions are reiteration of the earlier decisions as to whether the writ court will interfere with the notice under Section 147 of the Act if this is validly and lawfully issued. In the case here as the assessee has questioned as to whether there exists any material for formation of belief by the officer concerned that there has been escapement of the income in the assessment. In this case from the impugned notice it appears that the officer concerned has stated that he has reason to believe but such reasons or material have not been divulged nor communicated despite being asked therefor. Pursuant to my earlier order the records of this case have been produced and I have seen the same and in my view there exist materials for formation of the opinion but another condition, viz. , whether such formation of belief has nexus with the material to reach the conclusion that income has been escaped from the assessment, is to be seen to have been fulfilled. ( 15 ) NONE of the decisions cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General lays down that the assessee is not entitled to be informed with the reason. Rather in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of a larger Bench (supra) it has been held that the assessee is entitled to be supplied with the reason in the event he challenges the notice. Recording reasons and divulging thereof to the assessee, if asked for, are also necessary as safeguard against arbitrary and improper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly because of the present provision of Section 147 of the said Act which in my view leaves enough room for arbitrary exercise of power. Recording reasons and divulging thereof to the assessee, if asked for, are also necessary as safeguard against arbitrary and improper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly because of the present provision of Section 147 of the said Act which in my view leaves enough room for arbitrary exercise of power. It is a settled position of the law that the decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court even if rendered earlier on the same point will prevail over the decision of the smaller Bench of the same court delivered at a later point of time. In support of this proposition, Dr. Pal has rightly drawn my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha. ( 16 ) THE next question is whether the writ petitioner is estopped from challenging the impugned notice after having submitted to the jurisdiction of the officer by filing returns or not. Dr. Pal has appropriately argued as against the provision of the Constitution and the statute principle of acquiescence or estoppel does not apply. Here the petitioner has filed the writ petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer concerned to reopen the assessment on the plea that there exists no reason and there could be no material for formation of opinion that any income of the petitioner has escaped assessment in the relevant year at the initial stage. Therefore, the question of the principle of estoppel or acquiescence did not and does hot arise. Now, when the reasons have been divulged to this court and in view of established principle of law that the assessee is entitled to be communicated with the reasons, I think the following course of action in this case would meet the justice for the time being. ( 17 ) IN a fairly recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in GKN Drive-shafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 19 ; [2003] 1 SCC 72, 73, the Supreme Court was pleased to direct to give the guidelines as to what should be done when the notice is issued. In paragraph 5 it has been said as follows (page 20):"however, we clarify that when a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file return and if he so desires to seek reasons for issuing notices. In paragraph 5 it has been said as follows (page 20):"however, we clarify that when a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file return and if he so desires to seek reasons for issuing notices. The Assessing Officer is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. On receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file objections to issuance of notice and the Assessing Officer is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons have been disclosed in these proceedings, the Assessing Officer has to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding with the assessment in respect of the abovesaid five assessment years. " ( 18 ) DR. Pal submits that the reasons could be divulged by affidavit but I am of the view this cannot be an inflexible rule that the affidavit must be filed. When the reason has been divulged to this court the same must be communicated to the assessee in this case, the petitioner. The impugned notice was issued in the month of August, 2003, and the petitioner rightly or wrongly filed its returns demanding disclosure of reasons, however, such reason was not communicated. As I have already observed that the assumption of jurisdiction depends upon the existence of the reasons followed by communication thereof to the assessee if the notice is challenged, the Income-tax Officer cannot proceed with the assessment under Section 147 of the Act unless reasons are communicated. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, I direct the officer concerned to communicate the reasons on which he has formed his opinion. The petitioner would be entitled to take further objection and, to explain before the officer that the material cannot form rational basis and/or nexus with the formation of belief. The said officer shall decide this issue first and thereafter shall proceed with the reassessing if it is warranted. Thus, the interim order passed earlier is modified to the extent as above. ( 20 ) AFFIDAVIT-IN-OPPOSITION be filed within three weeks after X-mas vacation and reply two weeks thereafter. ( 21 ) LIBERTY for mentioning for hearing. The said officer shall decide this issue first and thereafter shall proceed with the reassessing if it is warranted. Thus, the interim order passed earlier is modified to the extent as above. ( 20 ) AFFIDAVIT-IN-OPPOSITION be filed within three weeks after X-mas vacation and reply two weeks thereafter. ( 21 ) LIBERTY for mentioning for hearing. ( 22 ) IN the event this proceeding is not dropped and if any adverse order is passed against the petitioner then no step shall be taken without leave of the court.