ORDER D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.— Petitioner-company claims to have come into existence by effecting change of name by following the procedure contemplated under Section 21 of the Companies Act, 1956 by changing its earlier name Prasad Garments Private Limited, into the present name Prasad Technology Park Private Limited. Petitioner is aggrieved by certain stamp duty demanded from them by the Respondent-authorities in respect of the transaction known as supplementary agreement dated 24th April, 2000 entered into between the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board the 3rd Respondent known as "Lessor" and the Petitioner-company known as "Lessee". 2. Petitioner company is disputing its liability to pay the demand of Rs.1,45,100/- towards stamp duty and a fine of Rs.5/- as per order dated 26th October, 2000 as determined by Deputy Commissioner of Stamps, the 2nd Respondent herein. 3. Though it appears the stamp duty was paid under protest during the pendency of the writ petition and subject to the final orders of this Court in this writ petition. Writ petition has been subsequent amended including the prayer for refund of the amount of Rs.1,45,105/-. 4. The validity of this levy is challenged in the context of the factual background which is as under. 5. That the company by name Prasad Garments Private Limited was incorporated on 5th day of 1995. In four of this company was leased Plot No. (s) 97 in Sy. Nos. 152 in the E.P.I.P. (Whitefield) Industrial Area within the village limits of Hoodi Hobli Krishnarajapuram, Taluk Bangalore South, Bangalore District by the 3rd Respondent-Board as per lease-cum-sale agreement dated 5th March, 1999 (copy at Annexure-B). Possession certificate in this regard was also issued on 25th June, 1997 (copy at Annexure-C). 6. It appears that subsequently the company could not start its activities of manufacturing garments for which the company had been incorporated and in respect of which industrial activity, the land had been allotted in favour of this company by the 3rd Respondent-Board, such company wanted to change its line of activity and in that context changed its name to the present version and in fact the Registrar of Companies had issued a certificate to this effect evidencing incorporation of the Company in the present name as per his certificate dated 4.2.2000 (copy at Annexure-A). 7. 7. It is the stand of the Petitioner that in the light of the change of name of the original company a supplementary agreement came to be entered into between the Lessor M/s. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and the present company now known as Lessee as per the subsequent agreement dated 24th April, 2000 and this was presented for registration paying stamp duty worth Rs. 100/- and it was at this stage that the authorities sought to impound the same and also put the Petitioner on notice having regard to the value of the subject matter of the instrument the proper stamp duty has not been paid and it was sought to be realised. 8. Petitioner resisted this move and putforth its objection. The same having not found favour with the authorities and having culminated in the order dated 26.10.2000 calling upon the Petitioner to pay the stamp duty as indicated earlier the present writ petition is filed praying for quashing of this order and for consequential mandamus to the authorities to refund the amount. During the pendency of the writ petition the supplementary agreement has been registered as per the interim order of this Court on the Petitioner paying stamp duty under protest. 9. Petitioner though has a remedy of appeal has sought to bypass the same on the premise that the case involves important questions of law concerning the interpretation of the provisions of the Companies Act and Stamp Act. 10. I have heard Sri S.V. Giridhar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Learned Counsel has put forth a two fold submission. Firstly it is submitted that the supplementary agreement dated 24th April, 2000 is not an instrument in the nature of conveyance which purports to transfer any interest in the immovable property and on the other hand it is only a document recognising the existing position as a result of certain change brought about in a manner permitted by law particularly under the provisions of the Companies Act and as such it cannot be construed as an instrument which attracts stamp duty within the meaning of the Stamp Act and as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act. The alternative submission is that the provisions of Section 45-A under which a show-cause notice had come to be issued for non payment of proper stamp duty on the instrument is not attracted in the present case as the provisions are attracted only in the case where the instrument has been not stamped by correct value of the stamp by suppression of the true value of the property in question, that in the present case there is no such suppression at all much less the question of value of the property involved being understated and invoking these provisions are required to be quashed. Learned Counsel elaborating his submission draw the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the company and that the only change that has been brought out is the name of the company from M/s Prasad Garments Private Limited to M/s. Prasad Technology Park Private Limited. Learned Counsel submits that the supplementary lease cum sale agreement is only as a sequel to the change in the name of the company and in recognition of this and it does not in fact conveyed any property which is the basic requirement for subjecting the instrument to stamp duty. Learned Counsel has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submission. AIR 1995 All. 192 (F.S. Abdulgayum Vs. Manindra Land and Building Corporation Limited and Anr.). AIR 1954 Mad. 802 (D. Srinivasaiah Vs. Vellore Varalakshimi Bank Limited). Economic Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, W.B. and Others, AIR 1970 Cal 389 . In the first of these cases the stand on the part of a Judgment debtor, who had suffered a decree in a suit filed by a company, whose name was altered during the pendency of the suit, that the decree cannot be enforced against him by the company in it's altered name was negatived by the Court holding that a change in the name of a company brought about during the pendency of the suit does not affect the rights of the company. 11. 11. The second of the cases referred to above the view taken by the Madras High Court was in an execution petition that had been levelled in the name of the company as it stood earlier cannot be dismissed on the ground that it can be recognised under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 16 Code of Civil Procedure and not by any other mode. The Court after noticing the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Companies Act the corresponding provision to Section 21 of the present Act was of the view that the change in the name does not bring about or affect any legal proceedings that had already ended in the name of the company in its earlier name and that can still be continued in the same name even without resort to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 16 Code of Civil Procedure. 12. In the third of the cases the Calcutta High Court was of the view that the attachment of the income tax authorities on the deposit of the Assessee which deposits were in a bank continue to remain attached even when the company's name has changed subsequently and that it was not necessary to issue fresh notice to the company in its new name for re-determining the liability by passing fresh assessment order and such change in the name automatically cannot relieve the attachment on the deposits. 13. In the present case the stand of the Petitioner-company was that it has come into existence in substitution for the company as it stood earlier and by the procedure followed as per Sections 21 and 23 of the Companies Act. It may be so. If that were to be the case it could have claimed whatever consequences that follow in law. But unfortunately for the Petitioner the supplementary agreement sought to be registered as entered into between the 3rd Respondent-Lessor and the Petitioner-Lessee with the terms of the lease being the same as had been in the earlier lease deed that had come to be executed in favour of the Petitioner-company in its earlier name as evidenced by the agreement dated 5th March, 1999. These terms are sought to be incorporated into the subsequent agreement which is known as supplementary agreement dated 24th April, 2000. The agreement is also sought to be registered. These terms are sought to be incorporated into the subsequent agreement which is known as supplementary agreement dated 24th April, 2000. The agreement is also sought to be registered. Though no doubt that the necessity for the agreement is due to the change in the name of the company from M/s. Prasad Garments Private Limited to M/s. Prasad Technology Park Private Limited for the purpose of Stamp Act there is nevertheless a lease cum sale deed executed by the 3rd Respondent in the name of the Petitioner-company as per supplementary agreement dated 24th April, 2000. When the Petitioner produced the said supplementary agreement for registration on a stamp paper of Rs.100/- problem arose for it. The further question raised is that it is not as though the Petitioner claim the consequences that follow in law on the change of its name as provided under Sections 21 and 23 of the Act without anything further, Petitioner was not content with the same. But on the other hand requested the 3rd Respondent-Board to execute a supplementary lease cum sale agreement and also wanted that to be duly registered. It cannot be gain said this supplementary lease agreement is also an instrument under which the Petitioner claims certain leasehold rights from the Board. To that extent it cannot be escape from the liability under the provisions of the Stamp Act. It is no doubt that it may look very inequitable that the Petitioner is called upon to pay the stamp duty, but in the matter of taxation there is no scope for equity and sympathy. It is the letter of law that has to prevail. 14. I am also of the view that I cannot accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that no interest has passed under the instrument in question, that it is not a transfer in the true sense of the word. This instrument was executed at the instance of the Petitioner and at its request and is evidence of such transfer of interest which the Petitioner can claim under the 3rd Respondent. May be for whatever reason Petitioner might have done it but the fact remains that the Petitioner-company got the instrument executed at its request and from the 3rd Respondent. This instrument was executed at the instance of the Petitioner and at its request and is evidence of such transfer of interest which the Petitioner can claim under the 3rd Respondent. May be for whatever reason Petitioner might have done it but the fact remains that the Petitioner-company got the instrument executed at its request and from the 3rd Respondent. In these circumstances it cannot escape payment of stamp duty which is payable on an instrument of this nature, which purports to transfer interest in the property covered under the agreement. I do not find any illegality or lacuna in the order passed by the 2nd Respondent calling upon the Petitioner to pay stamp duty. 15. In the circumstances writs as prayed for either for quashing or for directions cannot be issued. 16. Writ petition dismissed.