JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:---Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records. The Award dated 9-4-1999 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. CJIT-2/51 of 1998 is sought to be challenged as being contrary to the provisions of law. 2. While assailing the impugned award the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the finding arrived at regarding the completion of 240 days as well as 120 days relates to the period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 and not the period preceding the order of reference and therefore, direction issued by the Industrial Tribunal is contrary to the provisions of law, besides being that the respondent was employed as a casual workman and not to fill any vacancy in a permanent post. Reliance is also sought to be placed in the decision in the matter of (Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar)1, reported in 2002(8) Supreme Court Cases 400 in support of the contention that the workman had not established his case for the grant of relief in the matter and secondly, in the matter of (State of T.N. and another v. M.R. Alagappan and others)2, reported in 1997 Supreme Court Cases (L S) 1079 in support of the contention that the respondent being casual workman engaged on need basis, there was no question of direction by the Industrial Tribunal for re-instatement of the workman in service with continuity in service and for payment of back wages. On the other hand, the impugned award is sought to be justified contending that the petitioner had not produced any evidence in support of his case, while the defence of the respondent was duly supported by the evidence on record. Further it is sought to be contended that in writ petition the petitioner is not entitled to seek interference in the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal unless the findings are perverse and that the findings in the case in hand are neither perverse nor contrary to the materials on record. Reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. and another)3, reported in 1984(II) L.L.J. 10 . Reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. and another)3, reported in 1984(II) L.L.J. 10 . Further placing reliance in the matter of (Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi)4, reported in A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 422, it is contended that continuous service does not mean that it should be continuously from day-to-day during the year but it can be during any period of one year, and what is necessary is to ascertain whether in a year the employee has worked for 240 days. Further placing reliance in the decision in the matter of (G.P. Doval v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P.)5, reported in A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 1527, it is submitted that the finding arrived at by the Labour Court in relation to the completion of 240 days pertaining to period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 cannot be found fault with on the ground of laches or delay in approaching the Court. 3. Perusal of the impugned award apparently discloses that the relief of re-instatement with continuity of service with back wages has been granted to the respondent in a reference made for adjudication on the point as to whether the action of the petitioner-management in terminating his service w.e.f. 1-7-1994 was without following the procedure and was justified or not. The said relief has been granted basically on two grounds viz. that the respondent had completed 140 days service during the period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 and therefore, was entitled for protection in terms of section 25 (sic section 25-F) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called as "the said Act") read with section 25(b) (sic section 25-B) of the said Act and secondly, on the ground that he has completed 120 days during the said period and therefore termination could not have been effected without issuing 15 days notice. 4. It cannot be disputed that unless the findings arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal are either perverse or not borne out from the record, there could hardly be any occasion for interference in writ jurisdiction. 4. It cannot be disputed that unless the findings arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal are either perverse or not borne out from the record, there could hardly be any occasion for interference in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, it would be necessary to ascertain from the records whether the finding relating to completion of 240 days and for entitlement of benefit in terms of section 25(f) (sic section 25-F) of the said Act read with section 25(b) (sic section 25-B) thereof is justified and secondly, as to whether on account of completion of 120 days, termination without issuing a notice can be said to be illegal. 5. Bare reading of sections 25(f)(b) (sic sections 25-F 25-B) of the said Act would disclose that for the purpose of calculation of continuous service in a year, the period of one year has to be "twelve calender months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made." This would disclose that such period has to be in the year preceding the dispute giving rise for a reference. In the case in hand, reference was pertaining to the termination of services w.e.f. 1-7-1994, it is therefore, necessary to ascertain whether 240 days or 120 days service was completed by the respondent during the period of one year preceding the said date i.e. 1-7-1994. Bare reading of the impugned award discloses the period considered to by the Industrial Tribunal is from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989. The said period is apparently much prior to the period of one year preceding the date with reference to which the calculation was required to be made. Being so, the finding regarding the completion of service for 240 days as well as for 120 days apparently discloses illegality and perversity on the part of the Industrial Tribunal, which in turn justifies interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 6. In Jitendra Singh Rathor case the Apex Court was dealing with a matter wherein employee was Librarian with Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. He was removed from the services on payment of month's salary. In the complaint under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Industrial Tribunal had come to the finding that though the charge of mis-conduct within the meaning of Clause 16(p)(i)(a) of the Standing Order was established, punishment of termination of service was not warranted and therefore, had ordered re-instatement. In the complaint under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Industrial Tribunal had come to the finding that though the charge of mis-conduct within the meaning of Clause 16(p)(i)(a) of the Standing Order was established, punishment of termination of service was not warranted and therefore, had ordered re-instatement. In writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court had quashed the direction for re-instatement and in lieu of re-instatement had quantified the compensation at Rs. 15,000/-. The Apex Court while setting aside the said order of the High Court, observed that--- "Under section 11-A of the Act, advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior Court, it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate Tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it." In the background of the peculiar facts of the case before the Apex Court, it was ruled that--- "Ordinarily it is not for the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence to substitute one finding for another and similarly one punishment for the other. It is not to be understood as denial of this power to the High Court in every type of cases. It is not to be understood as denial of this power to the High Court in every type of cases. It is sufficient for the present purpose to hold that on the facts made out, the approach of the High Court was totally uncalled for and the manner in which the compensation was assessed by vacating the order of reinstatement is erroneous both on facts and in law." The decision having been given in the peculiar set of facts and the observations made therein being flowing from those facts, and even though the general proposition of law laid down therein is binding upon this Court, the said decision of the Apex Court can be of no help to the respondent to restrict the interference of this Court in the impugned award in the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. In Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi case while dealing with the case of termination of services of driver and peon by the Principal of the Institution and considering that the main grievance of the employees was that the termination of service was in violation of section 25(f) (sic section 25-F) of the said Act, the question whether the employees can be said to have been retrenched within the meaning of the said section was replied by the Apex Court observing that--- "Every department of the Government cannot be treated to be industry. When the appointments are regulated by the statutory rules, the concept of industry to that extent stands excluded. The petitioners were not appointed to the posts in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the basis of need of the work. They are temporary employees working on daily wages. Their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees." 8. Further in Essen Deinki case while reiterating the decision in (Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani)6, reported in 2002(3) S.C.C. 25 , has held that the burden of proof regarding working of 240 days lies upon the employee in event of denial of such fact by the employer. Further in Essen Deinki case while reiterating the decision in (Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani)6, reported in 2002(3) S.C.C. 25 , has held that the burden of proof regarding working of 240 days lies upon the employee in event of denial of such fact by the employer. While holding so the Apex Court has reproduced the ruling in S.T. Hadimani case which reads thus:--- "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." 9. In Surendra Kumar Verma's case, the Apex Court after taking into consideration the effect of Act 36 of 1964 held thus:--- "Act 36 of 1964 has drastically changed the position. Section 2(eee) has been repealed and section 25-B(2) now begins with the clause "where a workman is not in continuous service...........for a period of one year". These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year." 10. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year." 10. The rulings of the Apex Court referred to above would disclose that merely because temporary employee working on daily wages is engaged on the need basis, he does not acquire a right to claim relief in terms of section 25(f) (sic section 25-F) of the said Act. The burden of proving the fact that the employee has rendered services for 240 days in a year lies upon employee when such claim is denied by the employer. The completion of 240 days has to be in the year preceding the termination of the employee to avail the benefit under section 25(f) (sic section 25-F) read with section 25(b) (sic section 25-B) of the said Act. For the purpose of computation of period of 240 days in a year, it is not necessary for the employee to be in service of the employer for the whole one year and secondly that the period of 240 days may not be a period of continuous 240 days and it is sufficient if total number of 240 days is calculated with reference to a period of twelve months. In other words, an employee should render service for total number of any 240 days in a period of continuous 365 days. 11. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand the evidence laid by the respondent and summarised by the Industrial Tribunal in the impugned award discloses that the respondent had worked with the petitioners-establishment for the following periods:--- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Serial No. Period Nature of employment and places ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. 21-4-1988 to 30-6-1988 at V.T. catering 2. 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 at Dadar catering 3. 6-4-1990 to 30-6-1990 at V.T. catering 4. 2-5-1991 to 30-6-1991 at V.T. catering 5. 3-4-1993 to 30-4-1993 at V.T. catering 6. 16-5-1993 to 30-6-1993 at V.T. catering 7. 7-4-1994 to 30-6-1994 at V.T. catering ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Undisputedly, the claim of the respondent regarding termination of service was w.e.f. 1-7-1994. The above periods disclose that the last period during which the respondent was employed was from 7-4-1994 to 30-6-1994 and prior to that he was stated to have been employed from 16-5-1993 till 30-6-1993. 7-4-1994 to 30-6-1994 at V.T. catering ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Undisputedly, the claim of the respondent regarding termination of service was w.e.f. 1-7-1994. The above periods disclose that the last period during which the respondent was employed was from 7-4-1994 to 30-6-1994 and prior to that he was stated to have been employed from 16-5-1993 till 30-6-1993. The relevant period of one year for consideration, therefore, to ascertain whether the employee had rendered services for continuous 240 days during such period was from 1-7-1993 to 30-6-1994. Apparently, during the said period, the respondent had been in employment as per his own say for the period from 7-4-1994 till 30-6-1994. In other words, he was in continuous employment as per his own say during the said period for total number of 85 days. The Industrial Tribunal, however, has referred to the period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 to consider whether the respondent had completed 240 days in a year. As already seen above, such a computation is clearly contrary to the provisions of law and in violation of law laid down by the Apex Court. Apparently, therefore, finding regarding completion of continuous service for 240 days is perverse and illegal and cannot be foundation to contend that the award does not require interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 12. As regards the finding of the Industrial Tribunal in relation to completion of 120 days, here again the period referred to is from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989. For the reasons stated above this finding is also to be held as perverse and not sustainable. 13. As regards the finding of the Industrial Tribunal regarding failure on the part of the petitioner to serve 15 days notice on the ground that completion of 120 days service, as already seen above the said finding was based on completion of 120 days during the period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989. The grievance of the employee in the matter was pertaining to termination of service w.e.f. 1-7-1994. Being so, the termination which took effect from 1-7-1994, by no stretch of imagination can have any relationship with the services rendered during the period from 7-8-1988 to 14-5-1989 but in order to claim the benefit of the provision regarding the requirement of the service of notice of 15 days, it ought to have been shown that the employee had completed 120 days during the period of one year preceding 1-7-1994. As already seen above during the period of twelve months prior to 1-7-1994 the workman had not completed the services for more than 85 days. Being so, in the absence of completion of 120 days, there was no occasion for the workman to claim that his service could not have been terminated without serving notice of 15 days and findings of the Industrial Tribunal holding the termination of service to be bad on that count also is liable to be set aside. 14. The contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent that even the period of 240 days or 120 days in the years previous to the year preceding the date of termination is to be considered and in that regard reliance placed in the decision of the Apex Court in G.P. Doval case needs to be considered before parting with the matter. In G.P. Goval the Apex Court has held thus-- "A grievance was made that the petitioner have moved this Court after a long unexplained delay and the Court should not grant any relief to them. It was pointed out that the provisional seniority list was drawn up to March 22, 1971 and the petitions have been filed in the year 1983. The respondents therefore submitted that the Court should throw out the petitions on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. It was said that promotions granted on the basis of impugned seniority list were not questioned by the petitioners and they have acquiesced into it. We are not disposed to accede to this request because respondents 1 to 3 have not finalised the seniority list for a period of more than 12 years and are operating the same for further promotion to the utter disadvantage of the petitioners. Petitioners went on making representations after representations which did not yield any response, reply or relief. We are not disposed to accede to this request because respondents 1 to 3 have not finalised the seniority list for a period of more than 12 years and are operating the same for further promotion to the utter disadvantage of the petitioners. Petitioners went on making representations after representations which did not yield any response, reply or relief. Coupled with this is the fact that the petitioners belong to the lower echelons of service and it is not difficult to visualise that they may find it extremely difficult to rush to the Court." Placing reliance on the said observation by the Apex Court in G.P. Doval case, the learned Advocate for the respondent has contended that the Industrial Disputes Act is a beneficial legislation for the labour and therefore, the requirement of completion of 240 days should not be interpreted to be restricted to the year preceding the date of termination. The question of interpretation of any provision of law can arise only when such provision in the statute is either vague or ambiguous or in a given situation it justifies interpretation thereof. If one reads the provision of law contained in section 25(b)(2) (sic section 25-B(2)) of the said Act it clearly requires the continuous service to be within a period of one year "preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made". This is further clear from the decision of the Apex Court as well as of this Court including decision is S.T. Hadimani's case wherein it was clearly observed that it is for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had infact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. The law being well settled and the provisions of law are also very clear in that regard, question of interpretation of the provisions of law in the manner proposed by the learned Advocate for the respondent does not arise at all. In that respect, it is immaterial whether the statutes is beneficial legislature to the labour or not. 15. In the result therefore, the petition succeeds. The impugned award is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondent is held not to be entitled for any relief. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition succeeds. -----