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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 678 (MP)

Jugraj Singh Markam v. Dhannulal Maravi

2003-05-07

A.K.MISHRA

body2003
ORDER 1. Petitioner in this writ petition assails the order P-2 passed by the Collector, Balaghat, holding the no confidence resolution to be illegal and also holding the order dated 26.7.2002 with respect to the appointment of the Presiding Officer as illegal. 2. It is averred in the petition that petitioner is a Panch of Gram Panchayat Kareli, Tehsil Baihar, District Balaghat and holding the charge of the post of Sarpanch. Respondent No. 1 was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kareli. No-confidence motion was moved against Sarpanch Shri Dhannulal Maravi/respondent No. 1. The resolution was passed by 2/3rd majority. Presiding Officer held that no-confidence motion has been duly passed against the Sarpanch. However, Sarpanch preferred dispute u/s 21(4) of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993. In the dispute, it was submitted, notice was not despatched before seven clear days of the meeting. As such the order of SDO is illegal and in violation of the mandatory provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules for no-confidence motion. Modification in the order of appointment of Presiding Officer was made. The Presiding Officer was changed on 26.7.2002 which was not informed to the Sarpanch or Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. When the order of appointment of Presiding Officer was modified on 26.7.2002, seven clear day's time ought to have been given from 26.7.2002. It is averred that said dispute was not filed within the period of limitation before the Collector. The Collector has passed the order P-2 dated 18.10.2002 and resolution has been declared to be illegal. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. It is submitted that dispute was not preferred within 7 days. The period of 7 days is prescribed under Rule 3 for despatch of notice not for the service, therefore, the findings of the Collector that notice was not of seven clear days is bad in law. Petitioner has relied on the decision of the Shrinarayan Tiwari and others v. State of M.P. and others [ 1998(1) JLJ 124 ], to submit that when a person has participated in the meeting, is not entitled to raise the objection after the resolution of no-confidence has been passed. No objection was raised before the meeting by the Sarpanch, hence, the order of the Collector is bad in law and deserves to be set aside. 3. No objection was raised before the meeting by the Sarpanch, hence, the order of the Collector is bad in law and deserves to be set aside. 3. A return has heen filed by respondent No. 1 Shri Dhannulal Maravi contending that against the order P-2 passed by the Collector an appeal was preferred by petitioner before the Addl. Commissioner and thereafter withdrawal application R-2 was filed on 29.11.2002. This fact has been suppressed by the petitioner. Respondent No.1 had filed W.P. No. 4373/2002 before this Court. This Court as per order R-3 dated 16.8.2002 directed respondent No.1 to file the dispute before the Collector. After obtaining the certified copy of the order dispute was filed before the Collector, Balaghat and the Collector has passed the order R-2 on 18.10.2002. The SDO has asked the petitioner to handover the charge as per letter R-4 dated 11.11.2002, hence, to retain charge petitioner his filed this writ petition. It is further contended that opportunity of speaking putting objection and showing explanation to no-confidence was .not assigned to the respondent No. 1. The order passed by the Collector is proper. No interference is called for. Respondent No. 1 has submitted in the return dated 15.1.2003 that notice R-8 was received on 27.7.2002 on the same very date of the meeting. Notice was not dispatched seven clear days before meeting: 4. Shri Pradeep Naveriya, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the order passed by the Collector is illegal. He has submitted that as respondent No.1 had participated in the meeting as such cannot raise the grievance of non-despatch of the notice, even if despatch of notice was not seven clear days before the date of the meeting. No prejudice has been caused. He has further submitted that by making amendment in the appointment of the Presiding Officer on 26.7.2002 no prejudice has been caused by not sending the intimation prior to 3 days as required. He further submitted that since all the Panchas were given opportunity to speak the finding recorded by the Collector that Sarpanch was not given 0pp0l1unity of explaining the charges and who actually moved the motion is of not much importance as the resolution has been carried out with due majority. 5. He further submitted that since all the Panchas were given opportunity to speak the finding recorded by the Collector that Sarpanch was not given 0pp0l1unity of explaining the charges and who actually moved the motion is of not much importance as the resolution has been carried out with due majority. 5. Shri K.L. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. l-Sarpanch, has submitted that there was serious defect though receipt of the notice before seven days of meeting is not necessary requirement but "despatch of notice" prior to seven days is absolutely necessary and is "mandatory" which has not been done in the instant case. The meeting was held on 27.7.2002. Notice was despatched on 20.7.2002. Both the terminal days have to be excluded, thus, notice was of short period only six days. The despatch was not before seven days. Sarpanch was not given opportunity to explain the charges as found by Collector. Nobody as la matter of fact moved the no-confidence motion; it is not mentioned in the resolution who moved. The intimation was received by the Sarpanch on the date of the meeting i.e. 27.7.2002. As despatch was not prior to seven days, substantial prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in the facts of the case and further the Presiding Officer was' changed just on the eve of the meeting of which intimation was required to be given as per rules prior to 3 days, thus for the various reasons recorded by the Collector, the order P-2 is proper and calls for no interference. 6. Shri R.S. Jha, learned Dy. AG. appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 2 and 3, has submitted that in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P. and others, 2000(r) JLJ 253, even if there was non-compliance with the provisions of the despatch of notice prior to seven days as the petitioner has participated and there was no prejudice caused, and no confidence motion which was duly carried out cannot be invalidated on the ground that notice was not despatched as required under rule 3(3) of the M.P. Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-sarpanch Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Viruddh A vishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). 7. 7. The main question which arises for consideration is whether a notice under rule 3(3) of the 'Rules having not been despatched prior to seven clear days which is mandatory under the Rules whether the meeting held on 27.7.2002 can be said to be legal and valid and the second question is whether in view of the findings on facts recorded by the Collector, interference is called for in the writ petition particularly in view of the findings recorded by the Collector, Sarpanch/respondent No. 1 was not allowed to explain the charges and it is not specifically mentioned who moved the resolution. 8. First I take the main submission with respect to' non-compliance of rule 3(3) of the Rules. Rule 3(3) is quoted below: "3(3) On receiving the notice under sub rule (1) the prescribed authority shall satisfy himself about the admissibility of the notice with reference to section 21(3), 28(3) and 35(3), as the case may be. On being thus satisfied, he shall fix the date, time and place for the meeting of the Gram Panchayat, Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat, as the case may be, which shall not be more than fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The notice of such meeting specifying the date, time and place thereof shall be caused to be despatched by him through the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat or Chief Executive Officer of the Janpad or Zila Panchayat, as the as may be, to every member of the Panchayat concerned seven days before the meeting." 9. First requirement is that the prescribed authority shall fix the date, time and place of the meeting and second requirement is that date of the meeting shall not be more than 15 days from the date of the receipt of said notice. Third requirement is the notice of such meeting "shall be caused to be despatched" by him through the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat to every member of Panchayat concerned "seven days before the meeting". Obviously the prescribed authority has to satisfy himself about the admissibility of the notice with reference to section 21(3) of the Panchayat Act. Third requirement is the notice of such meeting "shall be caused to be despatched" by him through the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat to every member of Panchayat concerned "seven days before the meeting". Obviously the prescribed authority has to satisfy himself about the admissibility of the notice with reference to section 21(3) of the Panchayat Act. Section 21(3) of the Act reads thus: "21(3) No confidence motion shall not lie against the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch within a period of -- (i) one year from the date on which the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch enter their respective office: (ii) six months preceding the date on which the term of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, as the case may be, expires; (iii) one year from the date on which previous motion of no-confidence was rejected." 10. Division Bench of this Court in Raghuvans Prasad v. Mahendra Singh 1968 JLJ 125, considered section 56(3) of the M.P. Municipalities Act which provided seven clear days' notice of the meeting should be given; for computing the period of seven days both terminal days are to be excluded and election held in meeting commenced on a notice not giving seven clear days, was held to be illegal. In Raghuvans Prasad's case a notice was despatched on 31st March, 1967 and the election meeting commenced on 7th April, 1967. It was held that provision about 'seven clear days' notice for the meeting is a mandatory one and in the computation of that period ''both the terminal days have to be excluded", that is, the date of despatch and date of meeting. Reliance was placed on Rambharoselal v. State AIR 1955 Nagpur 35. The meeting on 6 days notice was held to be invalid and the election of respondents No.1, 2 and 3 was declared to be invalid on this ground. Para 9 of Raghuvans Prasad v. Mahendra Singh is quoted below : "In the present case, the notices of the meeting which the Collector convened, were despatched on 31st March 1967. In the return filed by the Conector, there is no categorical denial of the averment made by the petitioner that the notices were despatched on 31st March 1967. All that has been said on this point in paragraph 8 of the return is that the notices were despatched within the period prescribed. In the return filed by the Conector, there is no categorical denial of the averment made by the petitioner that the notices were despatched on 31st March 1967. All that has been said on this point in paragraph 8 of the return is that the notices were despatched within the period prescribed. The election meeting clearly commenced on 7th April 1967, the date fixed for the filing of the nomination papers and their scrutiny, for it was on that date that the process of election commenced, (See N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal AIR 1952 SC 64 . The provision about seven clear days' notice for the meeting is a mandatory one and in the computation of that period both the terminal days have to be excluded. (See Rambharoselal v. The State AIR 1955 Nagpur 35. It is thus manifest that the mandatory provision contained in section 56(3) about seven clear days' notice of the meeting was not complied with. It is true that rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (President and Vice•-Presidents) Election Rules, 1962, which provides that the presiding authority shall specify in the notice of the meeting the time and place so fixed, is silent about the period of notice for the meeting at which the election is to be held. But this rule does not in any way override section 56(3). It has to be read with section 56(3) and, so read, it necessarily follows that the presiding authority must despatch to every Councillor notice of meeting seven clear days' before the meeting. As this was not done in the present case, the election meeting which commenced on 7th April 1967 was invalid and so also was the election held at that meeting which continued even on 8th April 1967. The election of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 must, therefore, be declared to be invalid on this ground." 11. What follows from Raghuvans Prasad v. Mahendra Singh that both terminal days, date of despatch and meeting are to be excluded for seven clear days of the notice. Rule 3(3) of Rules is pari materia to section 56(3) which was considered by the Division Bench of this Court, thus, in the instant case notice was short by one day and was not despatched seven clear days before the meeting. Rule 3(3) of Rules is pari materia to section 56(3) which was considered by the Division Bench of this Court, thus, in the instant case notice was short by one day and was not despatched seven clear days before the meeting. The despatch is analogous to the word "issued" under rule 3(3); issuance or despatch of the notice is sufficient; receipt of the notice before seven days is not necessary. 12. Full Bench of this Court in Bhuli Dewangan V. State of M.P. 2000(2) JLJ 253 = 2001(2) MPLJ 372 , on matter being referred considered the question of difference of opinion in the Gayasuddin Khan v. Gram Panchayat, Village Tal 1971 JLJ 286 . Correctness of the decision in Akbar Khan v. S.D.O. Mandleshwar 1997(2) Vidhi Bhasvar 284, also came for consideration in the context of decision in Sharda Bai V. State of M.P. 1998(1) JLJ 399 = (1997) 2 MPLJ 291 . Full Bench of this Court in Bhuli Dewangan (supra) has approved the decision in Akbar Khan v. SDO Mandleshwar (supra) in "invalidating" the result of no-confidence motion on the ground of "non-despatch of the notice of meeting 7 days in advance", but other observations contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment based on the decision in Gayasuddil1 (supra) cannot be held as correctly interpreting the language of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994. The Division Bench decision in the case of Gayasuddin (supra) and the Single Bench decision in Akbar Khan (supra) to the extent indicated above have been overruled. In Akbar Khan v. SDO Mandleshwar, esteemed brother N.K. Jain, J. has held that requirement of despatch of 7 days notice is mandatory, in case it is not fulfilled, it cannot be said that there was any valid meeting or that the motion of no-confidence was carried out in accordance with law. In para 9 of Akbar Khan v. SDO Mandleshwar (supra) it was held: "9. It will be thus seen that requirement of 7 days notice is mandatory and the same having been not fulfilled in the instant case, it cannot be said that there was any valid meeting or that the motion of no-confidence was carried out in accordance with law." 13. In Bhuli Dewangan v. State of M.P. (supra) above decision in para 9 of Akbar Khan has been approved. In Bhuli Dewangan v. State of M.P. (supra) above decision in para 9 of Akbar Khan has been approved. The main question for consideration before Full Bench was whether 'service of notice' on the members seven days in advance of the date scheduled for considering the no-confidence motion it has been held in the context of Panchayat Act that every non-compliance of a provision is not enough to render the act as illegal and act done may be valid in para 15 this Court held that: "The general rule is that non-compliance of mandatory requirement results in nullification of the Act. There are, however, several exceptions to the same. If certain requirements or conditions are provided by statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by him if no public interest are involved and in such a case the act done will be valid even if the requirements or conditions have not been performed. This appears to be the reason for learned C.K. Prasad J. in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P. 1997(2) MPLJ 175 = 1997(1) Vidhi Bhasvar 49 which was followed by R.S. Garg, J., in Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa 1998(2) JLJ 113 for holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the rule in fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of the motion of no-confidence would not invalidate the whole proceedings." 14. Full Bench of this Court has approved decision in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P. 1997(1) Vidhi Bhasvar 49 = 1997(2) MPLJ 175 , and in Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa 1998(2) JLJ 113 . It has been held that second part of the rule requiring "despatch of the notice" of meeting, yet in every case of challenge to the proceeding of no-confidence motion either before the Collector or this Court, it would still be open to the Col1ector or this Court to find out whether in a given case non-compliance of any part of the rule has in fact resulted in any failure of justice or has caused any serious prejudice to any of the parties. In a given situation even for non-fulfil1ment of mandatory requirement, the authority empowered to take a decision 'may refuse to nullify' the action on the ground that no substantial prejudice had been caused to the party affected or to any other party which would have any other substantial interest in the proceeding. It has to be seen in every case whether any prejudice has been caused or otherwise resulted in failure of justice. In Muku Bai v. State of M.P. 1999(1) Vidhi Bhasvar 4 = 1998(2) MPLJ 661 meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion was not called within 15 days from the date of the notice. It was held meeting cannot be held to be invalid if held beyond 15 days time. The decision of Mahesh Pd. Choudhary v. State of M.P. 1997(2) JLJ 397 has also been. approved in which it was held that the requirement of law is not for "delivery of the notice" of the meeting "but is for causing the notice to be despatched". It was not the allegation that the notice was not despatched within the time required by law. In para 7 it has been held thus: "7. The requirement of law is not for delivery of the notice of the meeting but is for causing the notice despatched. It is not the allegation that the notice was not despatched within the time required by law. Thus, this point has also no substance and is accordingly rejected." 15. No conflict was found by Full Bench in Bhuli Dewangan (supra) with the decision in Srinarayan Tiwari v. State of M.P. 1998(1) MPLJ 427 = 1998(1) JLJ 124 . In Srinarayan Tiwari v. State of M.P. it was held that if a notice was not despatched before seven days before the meeting, the motion of no-confidence if passed is invalid. The view in Sharda Bai Khatik v. State of M.P. 1997(2) MPLJ 291 = 1998(1) JLJ 399 , has been approved and no conflict has been found with Srinarayan Tiwari v. State of M.P. (supra). In Sharda Bai Khatik v. State of M.P. (supra) it has been held that seven clear days has been prescribed for "despatch of the notice" to the members, "time for receipt of notice has not been prescribed". In Sharda Bai Khatik v. State of M.P. (supra) it has been held that seven clear days has been prescribed for "despatch of the notice" to the members, "time for receipt of notice has not been prescribed". Full Bench has overruled the decision in Gayasuddin (supra) in which view was taken that despatch 'before seven days is not enough', 'service should be made before seven clear days. Raghuvans Prasad v. Mahendra Singh (supra) has been referred to in Full Bench and it has been held that "mandatory requirement" is of despatch of the notice of the meeting to every councillor clear seven days before the meeting; receipt before seven days is not necessary. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision in Hariwat Tekam (Smt.) v. State of M.P. and others 2003(1) JLJ 65 . In the said case notice was purported to be issued on 21.9.2001. Meeting was scheduled to be held on 28.9.2001. In Hariwat Tekam v. State of M.P. (supra) record of the proceedings of the meeting was considered. As it transpires 'many times an issue was discussed' and at 'every juncture the petitioner participated', 'disputed the allegations' and 'addressed the meeting', 11 "members cast their votes in favour of the motion and one vote was cast against the motion. On a close scrutiny of the proceeding Court observed that it is absolutely luminescent that on every issue the petitioner was allowed to speak and to convince the other members. It cannot be said that basic tenet of democracy has been crucified and the order passed by the Collector was affirmed. In Hariwat Tekam v. State of M.P. (supra) in para 15 and 16 it has been held: 15. Now to the factual matrix. It is urged with vehemence by Mr. R.N. Singh that if the petitioner as well as other members were informed seven days in advance she could have convinced them that the situation did not exist to oust her from the office by taking recourse to no-confidence motion but she, was deprived of that benefit. Now to the factual matrix. It is urged with vehemence by Mr. R.N. Singh that if the petitioner as well as other members were informed seven days in advance she could have convinced them that the situation did not exist to oust her from the office by taking recourse to no-confidence motion but she, was deprived of that benefit. It is apposite to notice here in the case of Muku Bai (supra) the Division Bench referred to the decision rendered in the case of Balramdas v. Commissioner, Raipur 1984 MPWN 336 where the Division Bench held that in a no-confidence motion Sarpanch and Up-sarpanch as the case may be has a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceeding of meeting in which the no-confidence motion is being discussed and such a right is not an empty formality inasmuch as it enables the Sarpanch to give his point of view and if possible to dissuade the Panch as from voting against him. The Division Bench relying on the same came to hold that a right to address the House cannot be denied to such person as it is also a valuable right. The Bench further opined that this requirement is mandatory and, therefore, Sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch should be given right to speak when such, a motion is brought against him. I have referred to the aforesaid decision only to show that a person has a right to convince the members of the Janpad Panchayat. In the case at hand the petitioner received the notice as endorsed by her in Annexure A-7 on 23.9.2001. The meeting was held on 28.9.2001. The record of the proceeding of the meeting has been produced before this Court. On a perusal of the proceeding it transpires that 12 members of the Janpad Panchayat were present in the meeting on the scheduled time. Their presence was recorded in the register of the Janpad Panchayat. On a perusal thereof it transpires that the 11 persons had signed the proposal for no-confidence and the petitioner who was present in the meeting had also addressed the meeting. As it transpires many times an issue was discussed and at every juncture the petitioner participated, disputed the allegations and addressed the meeting. 11 members cast their votes in favour of the motion and one vote was cast against the motion. As it transpires many times an issue was discussed and at every juncture the petitioner participated, disputed the allegations and addressed the meeting. 11 members cast their votes in favour of the motion and one vote was cast against the motion. It is perceptible that all the members including the petitioner had signed in the proceeding. It is noteworthy to slate here Mr. Rakesh Jain who has entered appearance on behalf of the interveners submitted that 11 members had cast votes against the petitioner. Mr. R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel has pointed out that the Vakalatnama in favour of the four persons has been filed. The said aspect melts into insignificance in view of the record produced by the competent authority who presided over the meeting and signatures put in the proceeding. In my considered opinion whether there is Vakalatnama in favour of the four or ten persons is inconsequential as the original record has been made available to this Court. 16. In view of the aforesaid factual senario, the heart of the matter is whether any substantial prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. On a close scrutiny of the proceeding it is absolutely luminescent that on every issue the petitioner was allowed to speak and to convince the other members. It cannot be said that basic tenet of democracy has been crucified and the petitioner has been deprived of the opportunity which has resulted in success of the no-confidence motion. Taking stock of the fact situation in proper perspective, weighing the material brought on record and regard being had to the submissions canvassed by Mr. R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, I am of the considered opinion that there is no tinge of doubt that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. In fact, there is no shadow of shade. Consequently, I perceive no error in issuance of notice contained in Annexure A-7 and the subsequent action taken in furtherance thereof and the eventual result that came into existence in the meeting held on 28.9.2001 and I unhesitatingly conclude, the entire action is impeccable and deserves the stamp of approval of this Court." 17. In Bhuli Dewangan (supra) it has been held that non-compliance of the mandatory provisions cannot nullify every act. It has to be seen in the case what prejudice has been caused. In Bhuli Dewangan (supra) it has been held that non-compliance of the mandatory provisions cannot nullify every act. It has to be seen in the case what prejudice has been caused. Full Bench has also approved the decision in Akbar Khan (supra) and also has relied upon Raghuvans Prasad (supra). The decision in Srinarayan Tiwari has also not been overruled. In the above decision view has been taken in the facts of the case that if the provision of rule 3(3) of the despatch before seven days has not been followed, meeting held is invalid. In view of the decision of the full bench in Bhuli Dewangan (supra) referred above, it is clear that it has been laid down that meeting can be invalidated if despatch of notice for meeting is not before seven days of the date fixed for meeting. 18. Division Bench of this Court in Sheokumar v. Municipal Committee Rajnandgaon 1964 JLJ 249 , considered the provisions of section 47 of the Municipalities Act, 1961 which requires ten clear days notice of the meeting must be given and the meeting was held to be invalid as ten clear days notice was not given as required u/s 47(2) of the Municipalities Act, 1961. Another Division Bench of this Court in Bapusingh v. Gram Panchayat, Panwadi and others 1977(1) MPWN 468, held that Rule 4 of the Gram Panchayat (No-confidence motion against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch) Rules, 1964 requires notice of meeting must be 'despatched seven clear days before the meeting'; meeting held in contravention of Rule 4, the resolution carrying the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner must be 'struck down'. Under the terms of Rule 4, seven clear days 'must' intervene between the date of despatch of the notice and the date of the meeting. The notice in that case was despatched on 22nd September 1975 while the meeting was held on 27th September 1975. The resolution was struck down on the ground of in contravention of Rule 4. 19. In the instant case, it has been found by the Collector that respondent No.1 was not allowed to speak. 'Right to speak is a valuable right'. It is provided in rule 5(4) that after the motion is moved the 'mover shall first speak' on the motion and thereafter other members may, if they so desire, speak on the motion. 19. In the instant case, it has been found by the Collector that respondent No.1 was not allowed to speak. 'Right to speak is a valuable right'. It is provided in rule 5(4) that after the motion is moved the 'mover shall first speak' on the motion and thereafter other members may, if they so desire, speak on the motion. Under section 5(5) on the conclusion of the debate on the motion, the Presiding Officer shall call the members present in the meeting one by one and shall give them ballot paper duly signed by him to indicate its authenticity, to cast his vote for or against the motion. 20. The prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as notice was not despatched before seven clear days which is mandatory. Petitioner was not informed of the charges also on the basis of which no-confidence motion was moved and Collector has found that prejudice has been caused. Law prescribed mode that, notice of seven days should be despatched before seven days otherwise the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that notice may be of even 24 hours and in case participation is there meeting cannot be said to be a valid meeting. Meeting has to be convened in accordance with the rules. I Whatever that may be in the instant case, finding is that prejudice has been found to be caused to the petitioner in the order P-2 by the Collector on discussion of various aspects which calls for no interference. 21. In Muku Bai v. State of M.P. (supra) right to speak has been held to be valuable right. Collector on facts has found in the instant case that in addition to the non-despatch of the notice of seven days before the meeting prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It has been found that at the time of no-confidence resolution, Sarpanch was not allowed reasonable opportunity of explaining the charges against him. On facts, it has been found that respondent No.1 was not allowed to speak and was not informed of the charges and it is also found by the Collector that who moved the motion has not been mentioned in the resolution. On facts, it has been found that respondent No.1 was not allowed to speak and was not informed of the charges and it is also found by the Collector that who moved the motion has not been mentioned in the resolution. In view of the findings recorded by the Collector and considering the fact that notice was not despatched before seven days, which has also invalidated the meeting, I am not inclined to make interference in the writ petition. However, as held in Akbar Khan (supra) as there was no proper notice of the meeting it would be open to bring fresh no-confidence motion and bar created under sub-section 3 of section 21 shall not come into play and it would be open to the competent authority to convene the fresh meeting to consider no-confidence motion in accordance with law. 22. Resultantly, I find no interference is called for in the order passed by the Collector. Writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.