( 1 ) LEAVE granted. ( 2 ) IN 1967, there was a partnership between Ramcharan Lal, Kalyan prasad, Radhey Shyam and Babu Lai Vyas. On 2-12-1976 Ramcharan Lal filed a suit praying, inter alia, for the appointment of an arbitrator and for preparation of the accounts of the partnership so as to ascertain the balance amount payable to him out of the profits of the firm. Ramcharan died in 1982. He had no children. His sister, Kalawati, applied to be impleaded as a plaintiff in the pending suit in place of Ramcharan Lai. This was allowed by the Court. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the appellant, Kalawati, during her lifetime had executed a Will in favour of the appellant which sought to convey to the appellant "the right to plead the said case" and "the right to all debts and credits as may be decided by the court". In 1996 Kalawati died. The appellant made an application for being substituted as the plaintiff in place of Kalawati as her legal representafive under the Will. The application was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the Will had merely sought to effect a transfer of a right to sue and that by virtue of Section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act such a transfer was impermissible in law. The application of the appellant being rejected by the trial court, the appellant preferred a revisional application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The revisional application was also dismissed, it appears on two grounds viz. (i) kalawati had died long back and the appellant had not applied for substitution of her legal heirs, and (ii) the right to sue did not survive to the appellant. ( 4 ) THE appeal of the appellant preferred from this impugned order must be allowed. The first reason given by the High Court proceeds on an incorrect statement of fact. The appellant was claiming as Kalawatis heir and it is nobodys case that the application for substitution had been made after any delay. ( 4 ) THE appeal of the appellant preferred from this impugned order must be allowed. The first reason given by the High Court proceeds on an incorrect statement of fact. The appellant was claiming as Kalawatis heir and it is nobodys case that the application for substitution had been made after any delay. As far as the second reason given by the High Court is concerned, the court does not say why the right which Kalawati had to sue did not survive to the appellant, and, given the circumstances of the case, we are unable to find any reason in support of the second conclusion of the High Court. ( 5 ) THE trial court also erred in rejecting the application of the appellant because of the provisions of Section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. As we have noted above, Kalawati had not only sought to transfer the mere right to represent her case in the pending litigation to the appellant but had also given the appellant her interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. For these reasons, the decision of the High Court is set aside. The application for substitution filed by the appellant must be allowed, however, leaving the question of the validity and genuineness of the Will open. Let the appellant be substituted in place of Kalawati in the pending proceedings and the suit be proceeded with in accordance with law. ( 6 ) THE appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.