Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 689 (KAR)

KHATHIJABI v. ST. JOSEPH S CHURCH, BAJPE, MANGALORE

2003-08-19

S.R.BANNURMATH

body2003
S. R. BANNURMATH, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH this revision petition is posted for admission, as both the sides are represented by Counsel and at their request matter is taken up for final disposal. ( 2 ) THE brief facts giving rise to the present proceedings are as follows: the respondent herein-St. Joseph's Church, Bajpe, represented by parish Priest had filed ejectment suit (O. S. No. 1019 of 1993) against its tenant Sri S. K. Ismail whose wife is the present petitioner. It is not in dispute that such ejectment suit was filed after issuing notice of termination as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It appears, during the pendency of the suit, the tenant expired and to bring his legal representative on record, an application was filed. However, as the original tenant himself had raised question regarding maintainability of the suit, the same was considered by the Trial Court and on finding that the suit is not maintainable, permitted the landlord, respondent herein, to withdraw the plaint. After such order, the respondent filed small causes case which was numbered as S. C. No. 5 of 1996 against Sri S. K. Ismail who was deceased by then. On noticing that small causes case has been filed against a dead person, the respondent filed an application under Order 23, Rule 1 of the CPC seeking permission of the Court to withdraw the proceedings of small causes case with liberty to file afresh which is allowed by the Court and thereafter Small causes No. 20 of 1998 came to be filed. After issuance of the notice to the respondent and considering their rival contentions, the Small causes Court by the impugned order dated 5-2-2003 upheld the contentions of the respondent and ordered for eviction of the petitioner. Hence, the present revision petition. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the ejectment order passed by the Small Causes Court is contrary to law inasmuch as there was no notice of termination issued to the petitioner as is mandatorily required. He also contended that since the Small Causes No. 5 of 1996 was filed against a dead person, the court could not have permitted the respondent to withdraw the suit and further permit him to file the present case. He also contended that since the Small Causes No. 5 of 1996 was filed against a dead person, the court could not have permitted the respondent to withdraw the suit and further permit him to file the present case. In this regard he contended that as Ismail, the predecessor in title of the petitioner was already dead when S. C. No. 5 of 1996 was filed, any order passed in that proceeding was illegal as the proceeding stood abated by operation of law and hence as the order was passed against the dead person whose legal representative is the petitioner, such order would not have been inured to the benefit of the respondent. In this regard, the learned Counsel has relied upon the decision in the case of Makhan Lal v Mst. Chandravati. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent argued in support of the findings of the Small Causes Court inter alia to contend that merely because the original contractual tenant is dead and the petitioner herein being his legal representative continues in his possession of the premises 'does not ipso facto mean that contractual tenancy is continued with her also. He contended that once there is termination of tenancy of Ismail (deceased), his possession thereafter is not by virtue of being a statutory tenant but as in view of the protection given by the law namely, he cannot be evicted without due process of law. On these among other grounds, he prayed for dismissal of the civil revision petition. The learned Counsel has relied upon the decision in the case of mohan Lai Goela and Others v Siri Krishan and Others. ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsels on both the sides in detail, as well as perused the impugned order. ( 5 ) SO far as requirement of notice of termination on the legal representative of the tenant is concerned, in my view, as is well- settled, once the contractual tenancy is terminated by the notice prescribed under section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act (in the present case by issuance of notice as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act), the possession of such person continuing after the termination of tenancy would be by virtue of protection given to him under the law namely, he cannot be evicted unless evicted under the due process of law. After the death of such person who was tenant and whose tenancy was terminated or not, the legal representatives of such person inherit the right to a limited extent, in the sense, though the right of tenancy is terminated, they are permitted to remain in possession again till evicted under the due process. In this sense, it cannot be said that the legal representatives in such cases inherited a right of tenancy. It is only a right to remain in possession after the termination of the tenant. Only exception to this would be if there is fresh contractual tenancy between such legal representatives and the landlord i. e. , if there is fresh contractual tenancy created by mutual understanding between the parties then, the legal representatives of the original tenant continues to be in possession by virtue of his independent right as a tenant and not as inheriting the right of the original tenant. ( 6 ) IN the present case undisputedly, the tenancy of Ismail, the original tenant has been terminated by issuance of notice by the respondent and after his death, there is no fresh contractual lease or tenancy created between the present petitioner and the respondent. Hence, the right to continue, existing in the petitioner is a right in a limited sense namely, the right to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy (of the original tenant Ismail) till evicted under the due process of law. As such, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that without issuing fresh notice of termination, the petitioner could not have been ordered for eviction from the premises in question. ( 7 ) INSOFAR as next contention is concerned namely, regarding illegality in the proceeding between the parties in O. S. No. 1019 of 1993 and s. C. No. 5 of 1996, it is to be noted that when O. S. No. 1019 of 1993 was filed, the tenant Ismail was very much alive and in fact it was he who challenged the maintainability of this suit. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the suit, he expired and even though the respondent filed an application to bring his legal representative on record, the same was not considered immediately. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the suit, he expired and even though the respondent filed an application to bring his legal representative on record, the same was not considered immediately. However, it is to be noted that considering the basic objections of the original tenant, the Court gave a finding that the suit itself was not maintainable and possibly because of this reason it did not pass any order on the L. R application. I do not find anything illegal in this order except to note that it was irregular on the part of the trial Court to dispose of the case without considering the legal representative application. The Small Causes No. 5 of 1996 was filed against a dead person and realising this mistake, the respondent sought permission of the Court under Order 23, Rule 1 of the CPC to withdraw the same with liberty to file fresh proceedings and the Small Causes Court had approved this prayer. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that when the small causes case was filed against the dead person, no order could have been passed by the Court affecting the interest of the dead person or his legal representatives. In this regard, it is to be noted that there is no order passed by the Small causes Court against the dead person or affecting his right. The order passed by the Small Causes Court was innocuous, in the sense, it is the prayer of the respondent itself that the small causes case is not maintainable, has been upheld. The Court has permitted him to withdraw those proceedings with a liberty to file fresh proceedings by curing the defect under Order 23, Rule 1 of the CPC and accordingly by that order, the present proceedings have been initiated by them. I do not see any illegality with regard to this aspect. Considering all these contentions, the Small Causes Court in my view has rightly rejected the contentions of the petitioner herein. It has also considered the case on merits in its proper perspective and found that the tenancy has to be terminated by ordering ejectment order. ( 8 ) ON considering the case in detail on merits, I do not see any illegality or perversity in the impugned order and hence find that the petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be rejected. ( 8 ) ON considering the case in detail on merits, I do not see any illegality or perversity in the impugned order and hence find that the petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be rejected. ( 9 ) AT this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioner prays some more breathing time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the premises. The learned Counsel has prayed for a period of two years time from today for handing over the vacant possession. This prayer is opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondent. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner is an old lady and there is no other legal representative, in my view, it would be just and proper to grant time of 8 months from today to vacate the premises. The other part of the impugned order except the time granted for vacating the premises, stands. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the petition is rejected. ( 11 ) IN the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs. --- *** --- .