Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity, `the Act) challenges order dated 18.8.1983 passed by the Appellate Authority, Amritsar accepting the appeal of the tenant-respondent in which the order dated 16.3.1981 passed by the Rent Controller, Amritsar was impugned. This Rent Controller on an application filed by the tenant-respondent under Section 4 of the Act seeking fixation of fair rent has concluded that no documentary evidence to prove the rate of rent of the demised shop in the year 1938-39 was produced and that there has been improvement in the locality after 1938-39. On the aforementioned basis, the Rent Controller has given the finding that both the ingredients of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act have not been fulfilled and, therefore, the basic rent of the demised shop could not be fixed. The Rent Controller further concluded that the shop in dispute is taken by the tenant-respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 250/- and in the absence of fixation of basic rent, the agreed rent has to be considered as fair rent with regard to the demised shop. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant-respondent filed an appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act before the Appellate Authority, Amritsar. The Appellate Authority after detailed discussion reached the conclusion that the shop must be in existence in the year 1938-39 and the claim of the landlord-petitioner that the shop was constructed in the year 1945-46 has been proved to be wrong. The rent of the demised shop in the year 1940 was Rs. 22/- and the same should have been considered as the basic rent. The findings of the Rent Controller were thus reversed. The aforementioned conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Authority is based on the house tax assessment register produced by the tenant-respondent showing that M/s. Bhai Sahib Singh Avtar Singh used to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 264/- per annum and there was no specific denial in this regard. The copy of the assessment register has been placed on record as Ex.AW-2/1. In this regard the view of the Appellate Authority reads as under :- ".......... 264/- per annum and there was no specific denial in this regard. The copy of the assessment register has been placed on record as Ex.AW-2/1. In this regard the view of the Appellate Authority reads as under :- ".......... I have considered the submission of the learned counsel and in my view when there was a specific reference to the possession of the shop by Mohan Singh at a particular time and the rate of rent being paid by him and also to M/s. Sahib Singh Avtar Singh, it was the duty of the respdt. to make a clear denial whether the premises in dispute were infact occupied by these persons at any time or not. In the circumstances, it must be concluded that the denial so far as the possession of the premises at certain times by Mohan Singh and Bhai Sahib Singh and Avtar Singh is concerned, is not specific and the presumption must be drawn against the respondent." 2. The learned Appellate Authority also rejected the stand of the landlord- petitioner that the demised shops were constructed in the year 1945-46 in the following words :- "...... There is merit in the submission of the learned counsel. Having regard to the nature of the plea in the written statement, what can be inferred is that the stand of the respdt. is that shops were constructed in the year 1945-46. It will not be possible to deduce that earlier to the said period, there were certainly shops there and the same were demolished at any stage and then the shops were reconstructed. If such had been the stand of the resptd., that the shops which were in existence before the year 1945-46 were demolished and were re-constructed, then clear allegation would have been made in the written statement." 3. Concluding that the demised shop existed in the year 1938 and would be fetching the basic rent of Rs. 22/-, the Appellate Authority recorded the following findings :- "Now, it is to be seen whether the shop in question did exist in the year 1938 or not. My attention is invited to Ex.AW2/1 which is certified copy of the property tax register. This relates to the year 1941-42. The owner of the shop has been mentioned to be Akal Takhat Darbar Sahib. The area has been mentioned to be Akali Market where the present shop is situated. My attention is invited to Ex.AW2/1 which is certified copy of the property tax register. This relates to the year 1941-42. The owner of the shop has been mentioned to be Akal Takhat Darbar Sahib. The area has been mentioned to be Akali Market where the present shop is situated. It has been rightly pointed out by Shri Grover that Bhai Sahib Singh Avtar Singh have been mentioned to be the tenants at serial No. 14 of the list and the annual rent has been mentioned to be Rs. 264/-. The learned counsel further points out that it is in the statement of AW2 Shamsher Singh that the properties were assessed to property tax for the first time in Amritsar in the year 1940. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that it is evident from Ex.AW2/1 that the shop in dispute did exist in the year 1940 and that is why it was assessed to property tax. His submission is that the plea of the respdt. that the shop was constructed in the year 1945-46 is thus false. I find merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. The area where premises are located and other particulars and furthermore the appearance of the name of Bhai Sahib Singh Avtar Singh clearly indicate that the contention of the appellant is well founded and the property was certainly in existence some time before the year 1940. It must also be concluded that the monthly rent of the premises at that time was only Rs. 22/-." 4. Apart from the above mentioned evidence the Appellate Authority has taken into consideration the statement of AW-4 Naresh Kumar who is a shopkeeper in the same area and a tenant under the landlord-petitioner. Reference has also been made to the statement of Faqir Chand AW-6, another shopkeeper of the same locality occupying shop No. 52, who is also a tenant of the landlord- petitioner. The Appellate Authority on the basis of over-whelming evidence reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller in the following words :- "The learned Rent Controller concluded that there have been improvements in the locality on the ground that the witnesses have admitted that there are pucca roads and there is electricity in the Akali Market, where the shop is located. This does not have any meaning. This does not have any meaning. There is no evidence to show that the premises in dispute were not having electricity in the year 1938-39 or soon thereafter. There is also no evidence that the pucca roads were not in existence at that time. I find that some of the witnesses have rather deposed that the nature of the business originally used to flourish in the market which was not the position now. Thus, it cannot be said that as at present, the area has considerably developed. I am of the view that the conclusion drawn by the learned Rent Controller was not justified and the evidence clearly points out that some time in the year 1940, the rent of the shop was only Rs. 22/-. The shop must have been in existence some time before that. This conclusion can be reached in view of the fact that the stand of the respdt. that the shop was constructed in the year 1945-46 has been proved to be wrong. The respdt. who could be in possession of the entire accounts of rents for all these year has withheld the accounts and the presumption must also be drawn against the respdt. on this account. I am, therefore, of the view that Rs. 22/- should be considered to be the basic rent for the premises as the same must be the prevailing rate of rent or of the premises similarly situated in the year 1938. The finding on issue No. 1 is accordingly reversed. In view of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Sec. 4 of the Act, giving the maximum concession to the respondent (holding that the premises may have been constructed after Ist January, 1939), I allow an increase of 50% on the basic rent. Thus, the fair rent would come to Rs. 33/- per month." 5. Mr. Inderpreet Singh, learned counsel for the landlord-petitioner has argued that the learned Rent Controller has rightly concluded that it was possible to fix the basic rent during the 12 months prior to 1.1.1939 as required by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the order of Rent Controller was well reasoned and deserved to be upheld. According to the learned counsel, the order of Rent Controller was well reasoned and deserved to be upheld. The learned counsel has pointed out that it was the duty of the tenant-respondent to prove its case by leading cogent evidence and the Appellate Authority has committed error of law and facts by presuming that denial of entries in the house tax assessment register Ex.AW-2/1 is an admission of the fact that prior to 1.1.1939 the rent of the similar building in the area used to be Rs. 262/- per annum. 6. Mr. Hemant Sarin, learned Sarin, learned counsel for the tenant-respondent, has argued that there is cogent evidence led by the tenant-respondent to show that the basic rent in the locality was Rs. 264/- per annum which would be Rs. 22/- p.m. The learned counsel has further pointed out that the aforementioned stand of the tenant-respondent is fully supported by AW-4 Naresh Kumar and AW-6 Faqir Chand. Therefore, the basic ingredients envisaged by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of Act have been fulfilled. The learned counsel maintains that accordingly under sub-section (5)(ii) of Section 4 of the Act, an increase of 50% has been given by fixing the fair rent at Rs. 30/- per month. 7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record as well as the orders of the Appellate Authority, I have reached the conclusion that the order passed by the Appellate Authority does not call for any interference. The relevant portion of Section 4 of the Act reads as under :- "4. Determination of fair rent. - (1) The Controller shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land fix the fair rent for such building or rented land after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit. The relevant portion of Section 4 of the Act reads as under :- "4. Determination of fair rent. - (1) The Controller shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land fix the fair rent for such building or rented land after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit. (2) In determining the fair rent under this section, the Controller shall fix a basic rent taking into consideration - (a) the prevailing rates of rent in the locality for the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the twelve months prior to the 1st January, 1939; and (b) the rental value of such building or rented land if entered in property tax assessment register of the municipal, town or notified area committee, cantonment board, as the case may be, relating to the period mentioned in clause (a); xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (5) In fixing the fair rent of non-residential building or rented the Controller may allow, if the basic rent - (i) in the case of a building in existence before the 1st January, 1939, or in the case of rented land - (a) does not exceed Rs. 50/- per mensem, an increase not exceeding 37-1/2 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs. 50/- per mensem, an increase not exceeding 50 percent on such basic rent; (ii) in the case of a building constructed after the 1st January, 1939 - (a) does not exceed Rs. 50/- per mensem, an increase not exceeding 50 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs. 50/- per mensem, an increase not exceeding 100 per cent on such basic rent. (6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle the Controller to fix the fair rent of a building or rented land at an amount less than the rent payable for such building or rented land under a subsisting lease entered into before the first day of January, 1939." 8. (6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle the Controller to fix the fair rent of a building or rented land at an amount less than the rent payable for such building or rented land under a subsisting lease entered into before the first day of January, 1939." 8. A perusal of the above referred provisions shows that the Rent Controller has been given power to fix the fair rent by taking into consideration the prevailing rate of rent in the locality for the same and similar accommodation in similar circumstances during 12 months preceding 1.1.1939 and the rental value of such building if entered in the House tax assessment register in respect of the period twelve months prior to 1938. If the Rent Controller is able to determine the basic rent by taking into consideration the aforementioned factors, then he can allow 50 per cent to 100 per cent increase as provided by sub-section (5)(ii) of Section 4 of the Act. 9. If the aforementioned provision is applied to the facts of the instant case, it has been proved on record that the rental value of similar accommodation in similar circumstances according to property tax assessment register of the municipal committee was Rs. 264/- per annum as shown in the document Ex.AW-2/1 which is the property tax assessment register of Municipal Committee, Amritsar. The aforementioned entry has been supported by the statements of AW-4 Naresh Kumar and AW-6 Faqir Chand and others. Therefore, I do not find any legal infirmity in the view taken by the Appellate Authority warranting interference of this Court under sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act. 10. Even otherwise the jurisdiction of the revisional Court under sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act would not extend to jurisdiction of a regular appellate Court and distinction between the revisional power and the Appellate power has to be maintained even under sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act which deals with the revisional power of this Court reads as under :- "15. Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government. Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act which deals with the revisional power of this Court reads as under :- "15. Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government. - (1) to (4) xx xx xx (5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such an order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." 11. The above mentioned provision is pari materia to sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 and the same came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 1 : 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 507 (SC). Dealing with the revisional powers of the High Court, their Lordships observed as under :- "Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 141 (SC) : (1999) 6 SCC 222 held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an over is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2(1998) 8 SCC 119 it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2(1998) 8 SCC 119 it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. A perusal of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below." 12. Similar view has been taken in the case of Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 (Suppl) 2 SCC 345 : 1994(1) RCR(Rent) 495 (SC) and Bhool Chand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments, (1991) 1 SCC 343 : 1990(2) RCR(Rent) 694 (SC). Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Act also fell for consideration in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201 : 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 480 (SC). Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Act also fell for consideration in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201 : 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 480 (SC). Placing reliance on Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhary, AIR 1963 SC 698; State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co., AIR 1965 SC 1585 and Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499, their Lordships pointed out the distinction between the revisional power under the Rent Act and the appellate power which reads as under : "From the use of expression "Legality or propriety of such order or proceedings" occurring in sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under the Act is wider that the powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is confined to jurisdiction, but it is also not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions are perverse or based on no evidence or based on a superficial and perfunctory approach. If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the aforementioned well- recognised principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision. That being so unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are wholly perverse and erroneous which manifestly appear to be unjust there should be no interference." (emphasis supplied by me) 13. From the above enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that despite wider nature of power of revision with the High Court under the Rent Act than the power of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a distinction has to be maintained between a revision and an appeal. From the above enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that despite wider nature of power of revision with the High Court under the Rent Act than the power of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a distinction has to be maintained between a revision and an appeal. The grounds, of revisions are limited and can be summed up as under : (a) Findings are perverse; (b) Findings are bald and without evidence; (c) Findings are based on perfunctory and superficial approach; (d) Findings are wholly unreasonable; (e) Findings cannot be reversed by re-assessing evidence merely because a view different than the one recorded by the Courts below is possible; (f) Powers of revision under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act do not extend to power of regular appeal." 14. When facts of the instant case are examined in the light of the above principles enunciated by Supreme Court, no doubt is left that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are based on evidence of the house tax assessment register Ex.AW-2/1, statements of various witnesses AW-2 Shamsher Singh, AW-4 Naresh Kumar and AW-6 Faquir Chand. The findings are not perverse or perfunctory. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.