LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,MANGALORE v. FREDRICK NORONHA
2003-08-19
S.B.MAJAGE, S.R.NAYAK
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) M. F. A. No. 622 of 2000 is filed by the acquiring authority, whereas m. F. A. No. 462 of 2000 is filed by the beneficiary. Both these appeals are directed against the common judgment and award dated 30th October, 1999 in L. A. C. No. 52 of 1987 on the file of the Court of Principal Civil judge (Senior Division) and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mangalore (for short, 'the Civil Court' ). By the impugned award, the Civil Court has determined the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follows: the State in exercise of its eminent domain power, acquired 2 acres 84 cents of land comprised in Sy. No. 549/a of Attavar Village, Mangalore for a public purpose, to wit, for construction of a building complex for the Geological Survey of India to house its offices by issuing Section 4 (1) notification dated 16-6-1983 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act' ). The Land Acquisition Officer after conducting award enquiry and placing reliance on the sales statistics, by his award dated 2-7-1986, determined the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 2,00,000/- per acre. In addition to this, the Land acquisition Officer awarded compensation separately for 30 coconut trees at the rate of Rs. 9,800/- per tree. The owners of the acquired land, not being satisfied with the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition officer, sought reference of their claim for higher rate of compensation to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. The Civil court, on reference, awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre. In addition, the Civil Court also awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 9,800/- per tree towards 30 coconut trees. The Civil Court also awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per cent of land for 46 cents of lands under the head 'injurious affection' apart from the statutory benefits. The said award of the Civil Court was called in question both by the Union of India and Geological Survey of India in M. F. A. Nos. 3184 and 2739 of 1999.
5,000/- per cent of land for 46 cents of lands under the head 'injurious affection' apart from the statutory benefits. The said award of the Civil Court was called in question both by the Union of India and Geological Survey of India in M. F. A. Nos. 3184 and 2739 of 1999. This Court after clubbing both the appeals, by its common judgment and award dated 17-8-1999, allowed the appeals and set aside the award passed by the Civil Court and remanded the proceedings to the Civil Court for determination of the correct market value of the acquired land. ( 3 ) AFTER remand, the Civil Court placing reliance on Exhibit P. 5 which is a sale deed executed in the course of execution of a decree in favour of the decree-holder itself, under which 30 cents of land comprised in R. S. Nos. 1272, 263, 749/2 and T. S. No. 213/2 was sold for a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, determined the market value at the rate of Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre, The Civil Court has not awarded any compensation towards trees or under the head 'injurious affection'. Nevertheless, again, the acquiring authority as well as the beneficiary have preferred these appeals and have contended that the compensation awarded by the Civil Court is highly excessive and not in accordance with law. ( 4 ) WE have heard Sri K. P. Asokumar, learned Additional Government advocate for land acquisition for the appellants and Sri G. S. Visweswara, learned Senior Counsel for the landowners. ( 5 ) THE learned Government Advocate would contend that there is absolutely no evidence on record on the basis of which, Exhibit P. 5 could be regarded as a comparable sale transaction; therefore, the Civil Court has seriously erred in law in placing reliance on Exhibit P. 5. The learned Government Advocate, alternatively, would contend that even otherwise, the Civil Court ought not to have placed reliance on Exhibit p. 5 because in Exhibit P. 5, only 30 cents of land, that too, in two bits, was conveyed, whereas in this case an extent of land admeasuring 2 acres 84 cents has been acquired for construction of offices of the Geological survey of India. The learned Standing Counsel for Government of india, who appeared for the appellant in M. F. A. No. 462 of 2000, has adopted the arguments of the learned Government Advocate.
The learned Standing Counsel for Government of india, who appeared for the appellant in M. F. A. No. 462 of 2000, has adopted the arguments of the learned Government Advocate. ( 6 ) SRI G. S. Visweswara, on the other hand, at the outset, pointed out that the Civil Court has not awarded any compensation towards 30 coconut trees under the head "injurious affection". Therefore, even assuming that the compensation awarded by the Civil Court is little more and on higher side, that would compensate denial of compensation towards coconut trees and, therefore, there was no ground to interfere with the award. Sri G. S. Visweswara, would next contend that the land conveyed under Ex. P. 5, in all material aspects, is comparable to the acquired land in this case. Elaborating the above contention, Sri G. S. Visweswara would point out, after drawing our attention to the exami- nation-in-chief and cross-examination of P. W. 2, who is General Power of attorney holder of claimants 1 to 22, that both the lands are situate nearer to the railway station and abutting the main road leading to mangaladevi Temple which is in the midst of highly developed locality of mangalore City. Sri G. S. Visweswara would also contend that the principle of deducting any percentage of the value towards developmental charges would not arise in the present case. The land covered under Ex. P. 5 and the lands acquired in these cases are for the same purpose that is for the purpose of housing the offices/building purpose and since the construction would not involve any layout planning and carving outhouse sites and selling the same to individual buyers, no deduction need be made towards developmental charges. Sri G. S. Visweswara would contend that both the lands are already developed which are fit for housing purposes. He would also incidentally contend that though the land covered by Ex. P. 5 conveyance is converted land, that would not hardly make any difference, because the land acquired in both the cases are already fit for the housing purposes. ( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties, the only point that arise for our decision is whether the market value determined by the Civil Court at the rate of Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre is excessive.
( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels for the parties, the only point that arise for our decision is whether the market value determined by the Civil Court at the rate of Rs. 15,00,000/- per acre is excessive. ( 8 ) BEFORE dealing with the above question, we may usefully notice the principles governing valuation of the lands acquired for non-agricultural purposes. Sections 23 and 24 of the Act stipulate factors that need to be taken into account and those that need to be eschewed while determining compensation payable to the owners of the acquired land. The Apex court in a catena of decisions over the past four and half decades and more have evolved principles and norms for determination of compensation of the lands compulsorily acquired by the State in exercise of its eminent domain power under the Act or under any enabling statute. One of the principles discernible from the pronouncements of the Apex Court is that while determining compensation for larger extent of land, price paid for or compensation determined by the Court for smaller parcels of land do not provide a safe and defendable basis. At the same time, it is also discernible by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any better evidence, even transactions involving conveyance of smaller extents of land pr blocks of land which are comparable in terms of point of time and the locus would become relevant. ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court in Administrator General of West Bengal v collector, Varanasi, observed thus. "the determination of market value of a piece of land with potentialities for urban use is an intricate exercise which calls for collection and collation of diverse economic criteria. The market value of a piece of property, for purposes of Section 23 of the Act, is stated to be the price at which the property changes hands from a willing seller to a willing, but not too anxious a buyer, dealing at arms length. The determination of market value, as one author put it, is the prediction of an economic event, viz. , the price outcome of a hypothetical sale, expressed in terms of probabilities. Prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantages and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best, evidence of market value.
, the price outcome of a hypothetical sale, expressed in terms of probabilities. Prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantages and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best, evidence of market value. Other methods of valuation are resorted to if the evidence of sale of similar lands is not available". ( 10 ) THIS Court in Jade Basappa (dead) by L. Rs and Others v Assistant commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Hospet, Bellary District, held:"the approach of the Courts while dealing with the case of an agriculturist,. . . . . . . . . . . , is to average and round off the figure, the acceptance always being on a little higher side rather than on the lower side. The object has not been to end up with the State paying more money, but to take note of the fact that whatever amount that the landowner seeks is a one time compensation, the computation of which must never be grudgingly done because even a generous compensation is more than offset by the real land value in the hands of the acquirer, and that consequently the lands have always a tremendous potential both for actual financial yield and capital appreciation". ( 11 ) K. S. SHIVADEVAMMA and Others v Assistant Commissioner and land Acquisition Officer, Davanagere and Another, a Division Bench of this Court held:"it is clear that, if reasonably the land acquired has a potentiality for urban use, said benefit should be extended to it while awarding compensation. Lands in the outskirts of an expanding city has every tendency to become ripe for building use in course of time. Court has to make a reasonable exercise to find out the market value by reference to the existing material, unless the material on record is absolutely useless to find out the value of similar lands. If the value of comparable land, is of small size, appropriate deduction has to be made after applying the said rate, when a hypothetical building layout is imagined to work out the market value of the acquired land.
If the value of comparable land, is of small size, appropriate deduction has to be made after applying the said rate, when a hypothetical building layout is imagined to work out the market value of the acquired land. A few decisions also indicate that, Court may take note of the value of land which may not be in the very locality but, situated in a nearby locality, provided, it is comparable to the acquired land with regard to the potentiality. If the available market rate is of some recent past, appropriate escalation rate may be applied to estimate the rate as on the date of the preliminary notification. No doubt, the entire exercise by the Court would be indirectly guided by the Court's own judicial sense as to what would have been a reasonable value for the land in question, at the relevant point of time". ( 12 ) THIS Court in Alisab (deceased) by L. Rs v Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Bellary, dealing with factors to be considered in determining the compensation and onus of fixing fair compensation observed thus. "it is the onus of the State acting through the Land Acquisition officer to fix the fair compensation in the first instance. Though the law assumes that the Land Acquisition Officer will act correctly, the law also makes provision for revision of the figure awarded, by the Court, and experience has shown that in almost every case, the Courts had even required to intervene by stepping up the compensation. It is true that if the original awarded amount is disputed that the onus lies on the claimant and that on such basic issues as the question as to how must grain or other agricultural produce a particular piece of land yielded in a particular year is concerned, that it is the landowner who is the best person to testify. If one were to take not of the fact that for purposes of obtaining some more money that there would be a natural tendency to exaggerate, a Court will go by the prevailing standards and figures and as far as these are concerned, if independent evidence is not forthcoming then some reliance of a considerable degree will have to be placed on the figures which the State comes out with".
( 13 ) IN deciding what shall be the actual market value of the acquired land, the Court, whether it is Reference Court or the Appellate Court, would be well-advised to remind itself that the question as to what is the market value of the acquired land in whatever form and at whosoever behest, a dispute may be brought before the Court, it is essentially a question of fact and such question should be answered by the Court on the basis of the substantive legal evidence placed before it. It is trite that such question could not be answered solely on the basis of any straight-jacket formulae ignoring the merits of individual cases. ( 14 ) IN the premise of the above well-settled principles, let us proceed to examine the merits of the present case. It is fairly well- established by the legal evidence adduced in this case, that the acquired land and the land covered by Ex. P. 5 are nearer to Mangalore Railway Station; both the lands a but the main road leading to Mangaladevi Temple, a well known temple which is situated in the heart of the city zooming with commercial and business activities. Under Ex. P. 5, the decree-holder himself has purchased 30 cents of land in two bits in execution of the decree passed by the Civil Court. Therefore, the value fetched for 30 cents of land under Ex. P. 5, could be a valid and defendable basis for determining the market value of the acquired land in this case. In this case, the entire extent of land was acquired for a specific purpose, i. e. , for raising a building complex to house the offices as well as to provide residences to the officers of the Geological Survey of India. Neither the land under Ex. P. 5 nor the acquired land, involve any development as such before they are put into the use for which they are acquired. Further, it needs to be noticed that the land covered by Exhibit P. 5 is not a developed house site; it is a large block of land admeasuring 30 cents out of which number of house sites can be carved out. In that view of the matter, we find considerable force in the contention of Sri G. S. Visweswara that the transaction under Ex.
In that view of the matter, we find considerable force in the contention of Sri G. S. Visweswara that the transaction under Ex. P. 5 document is a compara- ble sale transaction which could be taken into consideration for fixing the market value of the acquired land in this case. Therefore, we cannot take any exception to the Civil Court placing reliance on Ex. P. 5. ( 15 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, if the acquired land requires development before putting the same into use for which it was acquired, the deduction towards developmental charges is a must. On the other hand, if the court finds that the acquired land does not involve development as such, before the same is put into use, for which it was acquired, simply because the market value of such land determined on the basis of the earlier comparable sale transaction involving lesser extent of land, the court would not be justified in deducting any sum towards developmental charges. In this case, we are satisfied that the land covered under ex. P. 5 as well as the land acquired in the present cases, do not involve any development before they are used for the purpose for which they were acquired. We do not agree with the contention of the learned Government advocate that in deciding the potentiality of the acquired land as on the date of Section 4 (1) notification, the expenses to be incurred by acquiring authority or beneficiary before putting such land into use for which it was acquired, is not a germane factor for the decision making. It is trite, in assessing the potentiality of the acquired land and fixing the market value of such land basing on a comparable sale transaction, undoubtedly that consideration should be taken into consideration in the decision making particularly when the acquired land as well as the land covered by the comparable sale transactions do not involve any development as such before the same is put to use for the purpose for which it is acquired. ( 16 ) IN conclusion, we do not find any substantial ground to interfere with the impugned award. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs.
( 16 ) IN conclusion, we do not find any substantial ground to interfere with the impugned award. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs. ( 17 ) SRI G. S. Visweswara at the conclusion of the hearing would submit that though the landowners are entitled to statutory benefits such as additional market value and interest on solatium the same was not awarded by the Civil Court, because, at that point of time, the entitlement of the owners to those benefits was in dispute and the law was not settled. Sri G. S. Visweswara would submit that by virtue of the judgment of the Apex Court in Sunder v Union of India, the owners are entitled to those benefits and, therefore, the Court can grant those benefits to the owners of the acquired land though they have not filed appeal or cross-objections. The above prayer of the landowners was strongly opposed by the learned Government Advocate. Learned Government Advocate would maintain that though the entitlement of the owners to additional market value and interest on solatium cannot be disputed, this Court cannot grant those reliefs in the absence of appeal or cross-objection filed by the claimants-owners. In support of his contention, learned Government Advocate would place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Choudhary Sahu (dead) by L. Rs v State of Bihar. Sri G. S. Visweswara, in support of the entitlement of the landowners to claim additional market value as well as interest on solatium would cite the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills limited v State of Gujarat. ( 18 ) IT is trite, the entitlement of the owners of the acquired land to additional market value as well as interest on solatium in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunder's case, supra, cannot be and is not disputed. The Apex Court in Choudhary Sahu's case, supra, in paras 12 and 13 held thus:"12. The object of this rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution.
The object of this rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The rule does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the Appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this rule will be confined to those cases where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this rule the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of other laws, viz. , the law of limitation or the law of Court fees etc. ". ( 19 ) THE above observation of the Apex Court has to be understood and applied having due regard to the context in which that observation was made by the Apex Court. The appellant in that case was a 'landholder' in terms of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. A notice under Section 8 (1) of the Act was issued to the appellant/petitioner calling upon him to submit return with all the particulars of the land held by him. The appellant in response to the said notice filed his return. On the basis of the verification report, the Additional Collector came to the conclusion that the appellant/petitioner was entitled to 5 units and accordingly ordered for the publication of the draft statement under Section 10 of the Act. The appellant/petitioner was again served with notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and in response thereof, he filed an objection laying inter alia a claim for 15 units for reasons enumerated therein. The Collector considered the objection filed by the appellant/petitioner and by his order dated 23rd February, 1975 ordered allotment of 12 units to the appellant/petitioner. The appellant/petitioner feeling aggrieved went up in appeal before the Commissioner of the Division.
The Collector considered the objection filed by the appellant/petitioner and by his order dated 23rd February, 1975 ordered allotment of 12 units to the appellant/petitioner. The appellant/petitioner feeling aggrieved went up in appeal before the Commissioner of the Division. The State of Bihar submitted to the order and did not go up in appeal. Despite service of notice on the respondents, they failed to appear before the Appellate authority. The appeal was heard on 27th of April, 1976 and a final order was passed by the Commissioner on 14th of May, 1976. The Commis- sioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Collector and remanded the case to the Collector for disposal according to law. The supreme Court, in the fact situation of that case, having noticed that the grounds on which the order of the Collector was assailed before the commissioner did not include any challenge to the finding recorded by the Collector regarding units allotted to the appellant, took exception to the action of the Commissioner in upsetting that finding of the Collector by virtue of the power conferred on him under Order 41, Rule 22 of the CPC. ( 20 ) WE are at a loss to understand how the above ruling of the Apex court laid down in the context of that case, could come to the aid of the learned Government Advocate to support his contention. It is not that this Court's power under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC is invoked by the landowners to upset any finding recorded by the Civil Court. The entitlement of the owners of the acquired lands to additional market value and interest on solatium is not in dispute. If that is so, in order to grant the relief of awarding additional market value and interest on solatium, the court need not upset any finding recorded by the Civil Court. As already pointed out supra, by the time the Civil Court passed the impugned award, the law was not settled as to the entitlement of the owners to seek additional market value and interest on solatium and that was the reason why the Civil Court did not grant those reliefs.
As already pointed out supra, by the time the Civil Court passed the impugned award, the law was not settled as to the entitlement of the owners to seek additional market value and interest on solatium and that was the reason why the Civil Court did not grant those reliefs. ( 21 ) BE that as it may, we do not find any necessity to dilate this aspect any further because of the judgment of the Apex Court in Shree vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited's case, supra. In that case, the Apex court held that the statutory benefits such as additional market value and interest on solatium could be claimed at any stage of the proceedings under the Act and that the claimants need not file separate appeal or cross-objection, and they can claim those benefits even in the appeal filed by the State. It is trite, this appeal is a continuation of the same proceedings pursued by the owners before the Civil Court for compensation at higher rate and, therefore, the ratio of the above judgment squarely applies to the claim now put forth by the claimants-owners. Furthermore, if the State and State authorities do not dispute the entitlement of the owners of the acquired land to statutory benefits, such as, additional market value and interest on solatium, it will be totally unreasonable and arbitrary on the part of the State and State authorities to deny such benefits to the owners on technical grounds. Postulates of article 14 of the Constitution condemn such attitude of the State. The parties, particularly when the State is the party, should win or lose on substantial grounds and not on technical tortures. Looking from any angle, it is a fit case where the Court should grant additional market value and interest on solatium to the owners of the acquired land though they have not filed separate appeal or cross-objection against the impugned award passed by the Civil Court. In that view of the matter, we direct the State to pay additional market value as well as interest on solatium in accordance with law, if not already paid. --- *** --- .