Builders Association of India v. Jharkhand State Agriculture Marketing Board
2003-06-18
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Order S. J. Mukhopadhaya, J.- The petitioner is an Association of Builders-Contractors. It has challenged the Office Order No. 215 dated 10th December, 2002 issued by the Managing Director of the Jharkhand State Agriculture Marketing Board, Ranchi (for short - Marketing Board), whereby and whereunder, criteria have been laid down while giving administrative approval for construction of P.C.C. Roads of the Terminal Marketing Yard at Pandara, District - Ranchi. The grievance of the petitioner is that in place of Contractors, it has been decided and ordered to complete the work through the groups of local villagers. Consequential decision taken on 18th December, 2002 allotting the P.C.C. Road Construction works, in question in favour of three groups of local villagers has also been challenged by the petitioner. 2. Before discussion of the principal question involved in this case, it is necessary to say a few words about the interrelation between the Marketing Board and the Market Committees functioning thereunder. 3. The Marketing Board is a body corporate by the name of Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board perpetual succession and common seal with power to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any such property, subject to the prescribed conditions and restrictions, and is competent to do all other things necessary for the purposes for which it is established under section 33B of the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960. For every market area, the State Government, by a Notification, establish a Market Committee under section 6 of the Act, 1960. The Marketing Board has power and function of superintendence and control over the working of the Market Committees and other affairs thereof including programmes undertaken by such Market Committees for the development of Markets and market areas under sub-section (1) (i) of section 33J of Act, 1960. The Marketing Board has also power to supervise and guide the Market Committees in the preparation of plan and estimate of construction programmes undertaken by the Market Committees as per sub-section (2) (ii) of section 33J. The Marketing Board has its own fund generated as per section 33C of Act, 1960. Similarly, there is a separate fund for every Market Committees. 4. There are separate provisions made for execution of contracts by Market Committees and execution of contracts by Marketing Board.
The Marketing Board has its own fund generated as per section 33C of Act, 1960. Similarly, there is a separate fund for every Market Committees. 4. There are separate provisions made for execution of contracts by Market Committees and execution of contracts by Marketing Board. While execution of contracts by the Marketing Board are required to be made as per section 33K, such execution of contracts is required to be entered into by the Market Committee (s) as per section 31 of the Act, 1960, which are quoted hereunder: "33K. Execution and registration of contracts etc.-Every contracts or assurance of property on behalf of the Board shall be in writing and executed by such authority and in such manner as may be provided by regulations." "31. Execution of contracts.-(1) Every contract required to be entered into by the Market Committee shall be in writing and signed on behalf of the Market Committee by its Chairman and (Vice-Chairman and Secretary) of the Committee. (2) No contract other than a contract executed as provided in sub-section (1) shall be binding on the Market Committee." 5. In the present case, the work related to P.C.C. Road Construction of Terminal Marketing Yard of Pandara, Ranchi of Krishi Utpadan Bazar Samiti, Pandara, Ranchi (Respondent NO.3 - for short Market Committee). The construction to be made out of the fund of Market Committee, Ranchi is evident from Clause (iii) of impugned Order No. 215 dated 10th December, 2002. The programme has been undertaken by the Market Committee for the development of its markets and market areas is also evident from the aforesaid Office Order No. 215 dated 10th December, 2002. The Marketing Board having power of superintendence and control over the working of the Market Committees including the programmes undertaken by such Market Committee for development of the markets and market areas and for preparation of plan and estimate of construction programme undertaken by the Market Committee as per section 33J, approval has been given by the Marketing Board, Ranchi vide impugned Order No. 215 dated 10th December, 2002. 6. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the decision taken to complete the construction programme through groups of local villagers is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 A of the Constitution of India. 7.
6. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the decision taken to complete the construction programme through groups of local villagers is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 A of the Constitution of India. 7. According to the counsel for the petitioner, a Government contract and the P.W.D. Code envisages award of contract through the process of tender. It cannot be awarded whimsically and capriciously by surpassing the tender process to a group of selected persons of their choice. The registered Contractors have their right to the livelihood which is now being jeopardized in the present case. The action of the Respondents is whimsical, arbitrary and capricious, in nature. It is stated that the petitioner has a Sub committee functioning within the Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board and its members Contractors are registered with the Bihar State Agricultural Marketing Board. The Bihar State agricultural Marketing Board, vide its Order No. 389 dated 18th July, 1998 came out with a policy decision to register the Contractors for carrying out various kinds of construction works for the Marketing Board. A rule was framed known as Contractor Registration Rule, 1988, as per which, all the works of Marketing Board should be done through the Registered Contractors of different class. 8. The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted in the present case. It has already been pointed out that the work is not of the Marketing Board, but is of Market Committee, Ranchi. It is the Market Committee, Ranchi which is doing the construction work in question. 9. In this background, neither the provisions of 33K of Act, 1960 relating to Execution and Registration .of Contracts, nor the 1988 non-statutory Rule shall be applicable in the present case. 10. The only question arises whether the decision taken by the Respondents to get the work done through the group of local villagers is whimsical, arbitrary and unreasonable having no nexus with any object sought to be achieved or not. The Courts including the Supreme Court all the time deprecated the highhandedness, discriminatory and arbitrary action of the State. In the case of Ramana vs. International Airport Authority of India (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628), the Supreme Court held as follows: "21. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14.
The Courts including the Supreme Court all the time deprecated the highhandedness, discriminatory and arbitrary action of the State. In the case of Ramana vs. International Airport Authority of India (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628), the Supreme Court held as follows: "21. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14. It is now well settled as a result of the directions of this Court in E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)2 SCR 348 : (AIR 1974 S.C. 55.5) and Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978)1 S.C.C. 248 : AIR 1978 S.C. 597 ) that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and in ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory: it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential; element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterize every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must confirmed to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory." 11. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the Respondents wanted to favour any individual or a group of individual. It merely decided to get the work done through the group of local villagers. Almost a similar matter fell for consideration before this Court in the case of Ganesh Sahu VS. State of Jharkhand, reported in 2002(2) J.L.J.R. 545 . That was a case where the Market Committee took a policy decision to do away with the system of appointing contractors on the basis of open auction for collecting market fee, there being frequent complaints of extortion, forcible collection etc. having been received. It was felt that a Village Hat being the primary market where farmers and artisans from adjoining villages bring their agricultural produce for sale, to have active involvement of and participation of villagers in the management of the Hat to serve the aim and object of the Act in a better way.
having been received. It was felt that a Village Hat being the primary market where farmers and artisans from adjoining villages bring their agricultural produce for sale, to have active involvement of and participation of villagers in the management of the Hat to serve the aim and object of the Act in a better way. In the larger interest of the local farmers, not only to ensure their larger involvement in the affairs of the market Committee but also to prevent evasion of market fee, it was desirable to collect fee through the group of local villagers themselves, who will be in a better way to monitor every transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural produce in the Hat entrusted to them. This court upheld the decision of market Committee in involving the local villagers and entrusting the task and responsibilities of collection of Market fee and sale of agricultural produce in place of Contractors. 12. The Market, in question, is meant for villagers of adjoining villages to bring and sell their agricultural produce. The market fee is collected from them as fee or rent. The fund is to be utilized for development of market and to give better facilities to the villagers who bring their agricultural produce for sale or those who come for purchase. The P.C.C. Roads which is being constructed in pursuance of impugned Order No. 215 dated 10th December, 2002 will be utilized by the adjoining villagers who will come to sell their agricultural produce or will come to purchase. In this background to assure that best of the work is done at the minimum cost, if the villagers are involved in participation in the management of the Hats by asking them to construct road, it would serve the aims and objects of the Acts in a better way. For that if a classification is made between the Contractors and the group of villagers of the adjoining villages to entrust the job of construction of P.C.C. Roads, it cannot to alleged to be arbitrary. 13. In the present case, a valid classification having been shown by the Respondents between the general Contractors and the group of villagers, no interference is required at the instance of the Contractors. 14.
13. In the present case, a valid classification having been shown by the Respondents between the general Contractors and the group of villagers, no interference is required at the instance of the Contractors. 14. This apart, three sets of group of five villagers having already been selected for the works in question, as evident from decision dated 18th December, 2002, but none of such-villagers having been made party, no relief can be granted. 15. There being no merit, the writ petition is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order, as to costs.