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2003 DIGILAW 706 (PAT)

Shankar Prasad Das v. State Of Bihar

2003-07-15

CHANDRAMAULI KR.PRASAD

body2003
Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 6.1.2001 passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Gaya in Trial No. 632 of 2000 whereby he has taken cognisance of the offence under sections 498A, 494 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and directed for issuance of process. 2. Short facts giving rise to the present application are that opposite party no. 2 filed complaint case no. 196 of 1998 in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sherghati alleging commission of offence under sections 498A, 494 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate referred the case for investigation to the police under section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on that basis Sherghati P.S. Case No. 203 of 1999 was registered. 3. According to the informant she was married to petitioner no. 1 Shanker Prasad Das in the year 1983 according to Hindu rites. According to her, after the marriage she went to her Sasural and lived with her husband for six months but as the father of the informant could not fulfil the illegal demand of dowry of her husband and his family members i.e. petitioners no. 2 to 9, she was driven out from her matrimonial home in the year 1984 but all her ornaments were retained by the petitioners. According to her since she was driven from her matrimonial home, she is living with her father in the district of Gaya. Informant has further alleged that her husband had married another lady in conspiracy with other accused persons. 4. Police after investigation submitted chargesheet against the petitioner and the learned Magistrate on consideration of the same took cognizance of the offence and directed for issuance of process. 5. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of the petitioners draws my attention to the first information report and submits that according to the informant herself the date, place and time of occurrence had been mentioned as 6.3.1993 at Deoghar and in that view of the matter, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Gaya has no jurisdiction to try the offence and on this ground alone the order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed. 6. I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Roy. 6. I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Roy. True it is that in column of place of occurrence the informant has stated that the same had taken place at Deoghar but in the same column she had further stated that occurrence had taken place subsequent thereto. For ascertaining the jurisdiction the allegation made in the first information report has to be seen. In the first information report the informant has clearly stated that on failure of her father to fulfil the illegal demand of dowry, her husband and other family members, who are opposite party nos. 2 to 9 before this Court, after retaining all her ornaments, driven her out from her matrimonial home and since then she is living with her father. Thus the cruelty meted out to the informant still continues at Gaya where she is living with her father. In my opinion, the allegation made in the first information report reveals continued offence of maltreatment to the complainant at Gaya and as such Gaya court shall have jurisdiction to try the offence. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sujata Mukherjee V/s Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [ (1997) 5 SCC 30 ]. In the said case in paragraph 7 the Supreme Court has held as follows : "Despite service being effected on the private respondents, no one has appeared for any of the accused respondents. We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and directed the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case. Since the matter is pending for long, steps should be taken to expedite the hearing. The appeals are accordingly allowed." 7. Mr. Roy then submits that the cognizance of offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is bad on account of the bar put by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appeals are accordingly allowed." 7. Mr. Roy then submits that the cognizance of offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is bad on account of the bar put by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not have the slightest hesitation in rejecting the submission of Mr. Roy. It is relevant here to state that by the impugned order the learned Magistrate had not only taken cognizance of the offence and directed for issuance of process under sections 498A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but also under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 7 years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 468 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly contemplates that period of limitation in relation to offence which may be tried together shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with more severe punishment. Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment of 7 years which can be tried along with other offence and in that view of the matter section 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not remedy attracted. 8. There is yet another reason to decline the relief to the petitioners. Petitioner earlier came to this Court for quashing of the criminal prosecution which was registered as Cr. Misc. No. 1534 of 1999 and the same has been dismissed on 15.1.2000. Petitioner in paragraph 2 of the application stated that they have not filed any application either before this Court or the Sessions Judge against the impugned order. The dismissal of the earlier application filed by the petitioner was a relevant fact which they have chosen to conceal and as such I am of the opinion that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands and that also disentitles them the relief. 9. in the result, I do not find any merit in this application and it is dismissed accordingly.