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2003 DIGILAW 709 (JHR)

Samir Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand

2003-06-19

LAKSHMAN URAON

body2003
Judgment Lakshman Uraon, J.-This Criminal Revision has been preferred by petitioner Samir Kumar Jha, accused in Kadma PS Case no. 198 of 2002 (G.R. No. 2144 of 2002) under Sections 420/379 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 1.4.2003 passed by learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum at Jarnshedpur affirming the order dated 5.3.2003 passed by learned A.C.J.M., Jamshedpur holding that the petitioner on the day of production was above 18 years with reference to the date of birth mentioned in the certificate holding the petitioner not a juvenile within he meaning of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 3. The prosecution case is that some persons hired a 'Bolero' vehicle bearing no. JH-05 C/4430 on 28.10.2002 for going to Bokaro. On their way, the persons, who had hired the vehicle, made the driver (informant) unconscious by injecting injection and took away the vehicle which was later on recovered and the complicity of this petitioner came into light in course of investigation. Petitioner surrendered before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur on 18.2.2003 in connection with Kadma PS Case no. 198 of 2002 and prayed bail by filing bail application u/s. 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. He prayed that he was juvenile and minor at the time of the alleged occurrence i.e. 25.10.2002, as his date of birth is 8.1.2005 (sic) as per school certificate. The prayer was dismissed by the learned A.C.J.M., Jamshedpur on 5.3.2002. Against that order, petitioner preferred Cr. Appeal bearing no. 12 of 2002 which was also dismissed by order dated 1.4.2003 by the learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur holding that the petitioner was above 18 years of age on the day of his production. 4. Assailing the orders of both the learned Courts below, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Courts below have not considered the prayer after proper inquiry. It was also submitted that the learned Courts' below did not consider the principle and view of the Hon'ble the Apex Court held in Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1982 S.C.C. (Cr.), 396 paragraphs 28 and 29 in which it was clearly held that the age of the accused reckoned with reference to the commission of offence. It was also submitted that the learned Courts' below did not consider the principle and view of the Hon'ble the Apex Court held in Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1982 S.C.C. (Cr.), 396 paragraphs 28 and 29 in which it was clearly held that the age of the accused reckoned with reference to the commission of offence. Under such situation it cannot be said that the issue which was the subject matter of Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar reported in 2000 (5) SCC, 488 was not involved in the case of Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan as has been opined by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order. The learned Court below did not consider the law laid down as principle held by the larger Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court in case of Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan in previous judgment could not be distinguished nor discussed in the case of Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar which was passed by a smaller Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court. It was argued that in Arnit Das's Case, the issue was not the subject matter of date of occurrence or date of production of accused for the purpose of determining of juvenile, rather it was subject matter of application of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and 2000. The learned Court below has erroneously viewed by upholding 2000 (2) Cr. 344, S.C. passed by a Division Bench which was in conflict with the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in 1982 S.C.C. 396 passed by a Full Bench and until and unless the 1982 S.C.C. 396 is overruled by a larger Bench, it is binding. It was further submitted that the learned Court below ought not to have passed the impugned order until & unless it was distinguished from 1982 S.C.C. 396 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court held that day of the occurrence of an offence is the date which should be considered for holding a person juvenile and not the day of appearance. It was further submitted that the learned Court below ought not to have passed the impugned order until & unless it was distinguished from 1982 S.C.C. 396 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court held that day of the occurrence of an offence is the date which should be considered for holding a person juvenile and not the day of appearance. Learned Court below failed to consider the relevant facts & provisions of the Act of 1986 and of 2000 that Section 21 of the old Code and Section 15 of the Act of 2000 clearly indicate that if on inquiry, the competent authority is satisfied that "juvenile has committed an offence", then notwithstanding the provisions in any other law the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act have to be applied. As held in the case of Umesh Chandra, the purpose of Act being protection of certain minors who commit criminal offence will be better served by reckoning the relevant age with reference of the date of commission of offence. Even if for some reason, accused, who was a juvenile on the date of occurrence, appears before the competent authority belatedly, it would not be just & proper to deny the benefits of such social legislation only because of late production of late appearance of the accused when offence is found to have been committed by a juvenile. The judgment in the case of Umesh Chandra being a larger Bench, has to be held as binding in preference to latter judgment in the case of Arnit Das because in the latter case, a conflicting view has been taken without any consideration of earlier judgment in case of Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan by a larger Bench. On these grounds, it was prayed to allow this revision by setting aside the order dated 1.4.2003 passed by learned Sessions Judge, East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur affirming the order dated 5.3.2003 passed by learned A.C.J.M., Jamshedpur in G.R. No. 2144 of 2002 (Kadma PS Case no. 198 of 2002). 5. In this case, the alleged occurrence took place on 28.10.2002 and the date of birth as per school certificate of the petitioner is 1.1.1985. He voluntarily surrendered in the Court of learned A.C.J.M., Jamshedpur on 18.2.2003. 198 of 2002). 5. In this case, the alleged occurrence took place on 28.10.2002 and the date of birth as per school certificate of the petitioner is 1.1.1985. He voluntarily surrendered in the Court of learned A.C.J.M., Jamshedpur on 18.2.2003. Both the Courts below found that on the date when he first appeared in the Court, he had completed 18 years of age on 1.1.2003 i.e. prior to his surrender for the first time in the Court of learned A.C.J.M. on 18.2.2003. On careful consideration of the relevant fact and the provisions of the Act of 1986 and 2000, I find that Section 21 of the old Act and Section 15 of the Act of 2000 clearly indicate that if on inquiry, the, competent authority is satisfied that "juvenile has. committed an offence", then notwithstanding the provisions in any other law, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act have to be applied. Of course a determination of the age by the competent authority has to be done only on appearance of the accused before such authority, but as held in case d Umesh Chandra, the purpose of the Act being protection of certain minors who commit criminal offence, will be better served by reckoning the relevant age with reference to the date of commission of the offence. Even if, for some reason, accused who was a juvenile on the date of occurrence, appears before the competent authority belatedly, it would not be just & proper to deny the benefits of such social legislation only because of late production or late appearance of the accused when offence is found to have been committed by a juvenile. The judgment in the case of Umesh Chandra being the larger Bench, has to be held as binding in preference to latter judgment in the case of Arnit Das, because in the latter case, a conflicting view has been taken without any consideration of the earlier judgment of a larger Bench. 6. The fact of this present case is very similar to the fact that when the alleged offence was committed on 28.10.2002 and the date of birth of this petitioner as per school admission certificate is 1.1.1985, then without any doubt, he was under 18 years of age. When he surrendered on 18.2.2003 in the Court of learned A.C.J.M., East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur, by that time he had crossed the age of 18 years. When he surrendered on 18.2.2003 in the Court of learned A.C.J.M., East Singhbhum at Jamshedpur, by that time he had crossed the age of 18 years. In view of the fact that on the day of commission of offence which is the crucial day for determining in holding the petitioner juvenile, there is no difficulty in holding that he was juvenile on the day of occurrence, but had crossed the age of 18 years when he surrendered in the learned Court below. As the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is a social legislation, it should not be denied to this petitioner because of his latter surrender in this Court below after completing 18 years of age, rather the crucial date for determining a juvenile is the date when the alleged occurrence was committed. 7. In view of my above considered opinion, I find merit in this criminal revision which is allowed. The impugned orders of both the learned Courts below are set aside and it is ordered that the petitioner was a juvenile on the day of alleged occurrence. Hence he was a juvenile within the meaning of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 whose case falls for trial within the jurisdiction of Juvenile Justice Court.