M. NARAYANA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS judgment, according to law, arises out of a Criminal Appeal, filed by the sole appellant, against the sole respondent-State of A. P. , under sub-section (2) of S. 374, Cr. P. C. , 1973, questioning the validity and legality of the adjudications made by, and set forth in para 2, infra. ( 2 ) JUDGMENT, dated 21-6-2002, of the court of the VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, made in S. C. No. 417/2001, of its file. ( 3 ) PERUSED the material papers of the record. ( 4 ) ARGUMENTS were heard of the learned counsel for the sole appellant and the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the sole respondent-State. ( 5 ) THE sole appellant in this Criminal appeal corresponds to the sole accused in the said SC No. 417/2001, of the file of the said Trial Court. The sole respondent herein corresponds to the sole complainant therein, being represented by the Inspector of Police, Chilkalaguda Police Station. ( 6 ) THE parties are, hereinafter, referred to, with reference to their respective descriptions before the said trial Court, in that Sessions Case, unless, otherwise, so specified. ( 7 ) THE Inspector of Police, Chilkalaguda police Station, filed a charge sheet, against the sole accused, in the committal Court, being the Court of the X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, under S. 376 (2){f) of ipc inter alia, alleging, as under : (A) The sole accused is aged about 18 years and is a student of Intermediate course and resident of Secunderabad. (B) The alleged victim of the offence (P. W. 3) is a tender aged girl, aged about 5 years and is a resident of Secundarabad. (C) P. Ws. 1 and 2 are the parents of the said victim girl (P. W. 3 ). (D) The sole accused and his parents are the tenants in the house of P. Ws. 1 and 2 in secunderabad, occupying different portions of the same house. (E) The accused developed intimacy with the said minor girl (P. W. 3) by giving chocolates. On 18-1-2001, around 4. (D) The sole accused and his parents are the tenants in the house of P. Ws. 1 and 2 in secunderabad, occupying different portions of the same house. (E) The accused developed intimacy with the said minor girl (P. W. 3) by giving chocolates. On 18-1-2001, around 4. 00 p. m. , the accused took the victim girl to the terrace of the house, tempting her with a chocolate and later removed the underwear of the victim girl and unzipped his pants, made the victim girl to sit on his lap and committed rape, due to which the victim girl cried with pain in the vagina. (F) The accused threatened the victim girl not to reveal the incident. Due to fear, she did not inform to her parents. On 19-1-2001, when the victim was taken by her mother, she had noticed blood stains on the cut drawer and also on the vagina. On enquiry, the victim had informed about the acts of the accused. (G) Immediately, the parents of the victim tried to get treatment to the victim by a private Doctor, but nobody has given treatent to her, but advised them to approach police. (H) The report given by P. W. 1, father of the victim girl, was registered by the Police, chilkalaguda, as Crime No. 15/2001, against the sole accused, under Section 376 (f) of IPC, and, later, was investigated into. (I) In the process of such investigation; the victim girl, as well as, the accused were got medically examined, as required and certificates in respects thereof were obtained. Also different P. Ws. were examined and their police statements, under Section 16 (3), Cr. P. C. 1973, were recorded. (J) Because, the Investigation revealed, that, the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 376 (2) (f), IPC the charge sheet was filed against him, accordingly, for punishing him, thereunder. ( 8 ) THE said Committal Court, after registering the said charge-sheet as P. R. C. No. 33/2001, of its file, had, later, committed the case, to the Metropolitan Sessions judge, Secunderabad. ( 9 ) THE said Court of Session, after registering the said P. R. C. as SC No. 417/2001, of its Sessions Division, had, later, made over the same to the said trial Court, for trial and adjudication thereof, according to Law. ( 9 ) THE said Court of Session, after registering the said P. R. C. as SC No. 417/2001, of its Sessions Division, had, later, made over the same to the said trial Court, for trial and adjudication thereof, according to Law. ( 10 ) BEFORE the said trial Court, because, the sole accused pleaded not guilty of the sole offence and charge framed against him, and, both, punishable under Section 376 (2){f), IPC and claimed to be tried in respect thereof, the said trial Court tried the said SC No. 417/2001, following the procedure prescribed in Chapter XVIII, Cr. P. C. 1973, for trial of a Sessions case, in the process whereof, it recorded the oral evidence of p. Ws. 1 to 8, and exhibited the documentary evidence, by way of Exs. P. 1 to P. 6 and exhibited M. O. 1, and, later, after due arguments there-into, finally, adjudicated thereupon, by its now impugned judgment, dated 21-6-2002, set forth in para 2, supra, as under: i. Finding the sole accused guilty of the offence and charge, both, punishable under Section 376 (2) (f), IPC; 11. Consequently, convicting the sole accused, in respect thereof, under sub-section (2) of Section 235, Cr. P. C. 1973; and iii. However, instead of sentencing the sole accused under the said Section 376 (2) (f), IPC ordered detention of the sole accused in the A. P. Borstal School, nizamabad, for a period of three years, for the purpose of reforming himself for getting proper training therein, etc. ( 11 ) AGGRIEVED thereby, and, questioning the, validity and legality, thereof, the sole accused filed the present Criminal Appeal, as set forth in paras 1 and 2, supra. ( 12 ) THE State of A. P. did not file any independent Criminal Appeal, questioning any part, or, parts, of the said impugned judgment, on any aspect, or aspects. ( 13 ) HENCE, the points for consideration and determination by this Appellate Court, in this Criminal Appeal, will be, as under: (1) Whether the impugned judgment and the conviction and detention in Borstal school, etc. , set forth in para 2, and 10 (III), supra, are unsustainable, either at fact, or, law, and hence, are liable to be set aside, in toto, or, modified, or, interfered with, in any manner? (2) To what reliefs? , set forth in para 2, and 10 (III), supra, are unsustainable, either at fact, or, law, and hence, are liable to be set aside, in toto, or, modified, or, interfered with, in any manner? (2) To what reliefs? ( 14 ) NO additional oral, or, documentary evidence, is sought to be adduced before this appellate Court, by either party. ( 15 ) ARGUMENTS were heard as set forth in para 4, supra. ( 16 ) POINT No. 1 : The brief, material, required, facts and circumstances of the case, are, all, set forth in the earlier paragraphs. ( 17 ) AS aforesaid, the sole accused and his parents are the tenants in the house of p. Ws. 1 and 2. ( 18 ) THE alleged victim girl is aged about 5 years, as on the date of the offence. The accused was aged about 18 years, as on the date of the offence and was a student of Intermediate course. ( 19 ) THE victim girl was examined as P. W. 3 inter alia, she deposed, that, the accused took her to the upstairs, stating that he will give her chocolate and removed her underwear, and that, the accused did not give a chocolate. She could not furnish the other details. ( 20 ) P. W. 1 is the father and P. W. 2 is the mother, both of P. W. 3. They are aged, respectively, 28 years and 25 years. Inter alia, both of them deposed, that P. W. 3 informed them about the accused committing the said offence against her and the details thereof, etc. P. W. 1 exhibited the report given by him to the Police as Ex. P. 1. M. O. 1 is identified as the underwear of P. W. 3. They were cross- examined, at length, for the accused. ( 21 ) AFTER considering the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2, I am of the opinion, that, their evidence is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. ( 22 ) BECAUSE, they are parents of the victim P. W. 3, she could not have disclosed the same to any other persons, who cannot be closer to her, at that tender age. ( 23 ) I see no valid, or, tangible reason or reasons, as to why P. Ws. ( 22 ) BECAUSE, they are parents of the victim P. W. 3, she could not have disclosed the same to any other persons, who cannot be closer to her, at that tender age. ( 23 ) I see no valid, or, tangible reason or reasons, as to why P. Ws. 1 and 2 tender false evidence, as they did, against the accused, unless, the same is thoroughly truthful, It cannot be conceived, even remotely that the parents of P. W. 3 aged about 5 years, will go to such an extreme, or extremes! of extreme extent to tender such false evidence as that their tender aged daughter (P. W. 3) of 5 years age was raped by the son of the tenant, being the accused, aged about 18 years, taking all risks in respect of the future of the girl and reputation of the family etc. Much more so, when no enmity, or, ill will, much less, tangible, is elicited, or, substantiated, against the accused, or, in between P. Ws. 1 and 2, and the accused and his parents. Nor, any reasons for P. Ws. 1 and 2, to tender such false evidence against the accused are made out. There is also no reason, much less tangible for P. Ws. 1 and 2, who are no other than the natural parents of P. Ws. 3, to project, or, employ their minor daughter, aged about 5 years to tender such false evidence in respect of her, apart from making herself (P. W. 3) of tender age, to depose, that, she was raped, or sexually offended by the accused and the like. Nor, is there any reason, for P. W. 3, the tender aged girl, to tender such false evidence, for herself on her own volition. 23a. So, therefore, I am fully satisfied with the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 as that when the same read together conclusively prove that the accused committed rape on p. W. 3, read with the definition of rape contained in Section 375, IPC. ( 24 ) P. W. 4 is the then Assistant Professor of Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. He deposed about examination of P. W. 3 (victim girl) on 22-1-2001 and found small abrasion of about 1 cm, on the inner surface of the left lebia minora, healing not bleeding, and exhibited the Preliminary Report in respect thereof as Ex. P. 2. Ex. ( 24 ) P. W. 4 is the then Assistant Professor of Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. He deposed about examination of P. W. 3 (victim girl) on 22-1-2001 and found small abrasion of about 1 cm, on the inner surface of the left lebia minora, healing not bleeding, and exhibited the Preliminary Report in respect thereof as Ex. P. 2. Ex. P. 3 is the Final report. Ex. P. 4 is the report of the Direct or, forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad. By way of cross-examination, his evidence has not been impeached, substantially. The alleged offence occurred on 18-1-2002, around 4. 00 p. m. while the medical examination took place on 22-1-2001. Hence, it cannot be expected of the semen being detected on item No. 1, or, slides, etc. P. W. 4 deposed, that, the possibility of sexual assault cannot be ruled out. ( 25 ) P. W. 8 is the then Civil Assistant surgeon, Department of Forensic Medicine, Gandhi Medical College, Secunderabad, inter alia, he deposed about medical cxamination of the accused in respect of his potency and issue of Potency Certificate, ex hibited as Ex. P. 6. This material proves, that, the accused is potent, etc. ( 26 ) P. W. 5 is the then Sub-Inspector of police of the said Police Station. He deposed about registration of Ex. P. 1 of P. W. 1 as crime No. 15/2001 under Section 376, IPC against the accused, and exhibited the original FIR Issued in respect thereof as Ex. P. 5. ( 27 ) P. W. 6 is the then Inspector of Police. He deposed about the investigation made by him into the crime. He was cross- examined, at length, for the accused. ( 28 ) P. W. 7 is the successor-Inspector of police of P. W. 6. He deposed about receipt of medical certificates, etc. and filing of charge-sheet against the accused. ( 29 ) THE foregoing medical evidence, as well as, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3, corroborate each other and proved conclusively, the guilt of the sole accused of the alleged offence punishable under- Section 376 (2) (f) of IPC. The trial Court, accordingly, rightly recorded a finding in respect thereof. ( 30 ) THE alleged offence occurred on 18-1-2001 at 4. 00 p. m. Ex. P. I was given to the police on 22-1-2001 at 1. The trial Court, accordingly, rightly recorded a finding in respect thereof. ( 30 ) THE alleged offence occurred on 18-1-2001 at 4. 00 p. m. Ex. P. I was given to the police on 22-1-2001 at 1. 30 p. m. The intervening period is almost 4 days less 2% hours. However, it is well settled Law, that, delay itself is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, in case the same is duly explained to the satisfaction of the Court. 30a. It is the duty of the Court, to go to the core of the truth of the case of the prosecution and the core of the truth of the evidence of different witnesses. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 will disclose, that they were not disclosed by P. W. 3, about the offence, immediately. As deposed by them in their chief and cross-examinations, P. W. 3 (victim) herself did not inform them immediately about the offence. Also, later, first, they took P. W. 3 to a Private Doctor, and later, to the Public Doctor, and so on and so forth. It is already found, that, P. Ws. 1 and 2, as well as P. W. 3 have no reasons or, whatsoever, to tender false evidence against the accused, that too, of such nature of sexual offence against the minor girl (P. W. 3), who is no other than the natural daughter of P. Ws. 1 and 2. 3ob. So, I am satisfied with the explanation for the delay offered by the prosecution, ( 31 ) HENCE, the accused was rightly convicted by the said trial Court, for the said offence under Section 376 (2) (f), IPC. 31 A. However, as set forth in sub-para iii of Para 10, supra, the said trial Court did not sentence the accused, thereunder, but, instead, directed his detention in the A. P, borstal School, etc. Questioning this, the state did not file any Independent appeal, as aforesaid. Hence, this became final. ( 32 ) THE provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, have no application, whatsoever, to the case on hand and the accused, because, that Act came Into legal force on 28-2-2001, while the alleged offence by the accused is proved to have been committed on 18-1- 2001, I. e. long prior to the (sic) Into operation of the said Act. Hence, the accused cannot claim any benefits of any of the provisions, If any, of that Act. ( 33 ) SO, therefore, as on the date of the proved offence on 18-1-2001, the Juvenile justice Act, 1986 was in force, and hence, the accused will be governed by the provisions thereof, If at all, it so does. 33a. Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the said Juvenile Justice Act of 2000, postulates, that any action taken under the said act of 1986 shall be deemed to have been taken under the New Act of 2000, etc. ( 34 ) SUB-SECTION (h) of Section 2 of the said Juvenile Justice Act of 1986, defines the "juvenile" as a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years. According to the prosecution, the accused was aged about 18 years, as on the date of the offence. The evidence of P. W. 8 the said Government Doctor as well as the certificate issued by him in respect of the accused and exhibited as ex. P. 6, recorded the age of the accused as 17 years, as on the date of his examination 25-1-2001 after making required medical examination of the accused In respect thereof. 34a. So, therefore, when the accused is aged 17 years, he cannot be described as juvenile within the meaning and contemplation of the said sub-section (h) of Section 2 of the said Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. Hence, the provisions of that Act have no application to the case on hand, and, hence, the accused cannot claim the benefits, if any, under any of the provisions of that Act also, ( 35 ) THE learned Counsel for the sole accused has relied upon AIR 1982 SC 1297 : (1982 Cri LJ 1777) (Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir ). After considering the same, vis-a-vis, facts and circumstances prevailing in the case, on hand, I am of the opinion, that, on the face of It, this Ruling has no application to the case, on hand. ( 36 ) THE learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the sole respondent-State relied upon (1997) 8 SCC 720 : (1998 Cri LJ 390) (Bhola bhagat v. State of Bihar ). ( 36 ) THE learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the sole respondent-State relied upon (1997) 8 SCC 720 : (1998 Cri LJ 390) (Bhola bhagat v. State of Bihar ). ( 37 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and the nature and the manner In which the offence was committed by the accused, against a tender aged girl of 5 years who is no other than the daughter of his neighbour, that too, being their landlord, I am of the opinion, that the direction given by the trial Court, to detain him in the A. P. Borstal School for three years is fully Justified and warranted, according to Law. 37a. The period of three years detention is also fully justified and perfectly warranted by Law and the provisions of the A. P. Borstal Schools Act, 1925. 37b. Under sub-section (1) of Section 2 of that Act, an adolescent offender is defined, inter alia, as a person of not less than 16 years and not more than 21 years of age. Under Section 8 of that Act, inter alia, an adolescent offender can be directed to be detained In the Borstal School for a term which shall not be less than two years and shall not exceed five years, but, in the case, extending beyond the date on which the adolescent offender will in the opinion of the court, attains the age of 23 years. 37c. In the case on hand the accused was aged 17 years and was an adolescent, as defined, as on the date of offence on 18-1 -2001. He will attain the age of 23 years in 2007. 37d. While so, the said trial Court ordered his detention for three years I. e. not less than two years and not more than five years as prescribed by the said Section 8. The period of three years detention directed by the trial Court will expire In the year 2004 and in any case, will not be beyond 2007. So, the detention ordered by the trial Court is perfectly valid and legal. ( 38 ) I see no reasons, whatsoever, to reduce the period of detention from three years to any lesser extent, which, in no case, cannot be less than two years, as per the said section 8 of that Act. So, the detention ordered by the trial Court is perfectly valid and legal. ( 38 ) I see no reasons, whatsoever, to reduce the period of detention from three years to any lesser extent, which, in no case, cannot be less than two years, as per the said section 8 of that Act. ( 39 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to apply to the case on hand, the provisions either of Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 of Cr. P. C. 1973. ( 40 ) HENCE, the impugned judgment of the trial Court, as also the conviction and the detention of the accused in the Borstal school ordered thereby are all valid and legal and do not suffer from any factual, legal or inherent illegality or infirmity so as to warrant this Appellate Court, to interfere there- with on any such ground or grounds. ( 41 ) HENCE, the impugned judgment and the conviction etc. imposed by the trial Court as set forth in para 10 supra, are liable to be confirmed, in toto and, hence, the Criminal Appeal is liable to be dismissed in toto as is being done, hereunder. ( 42 ) HENCE, the High Court doth hereby adjudicate upon the Criminal Appeal, dismissing the same, in toto. Appeal dismissed.