ORDER : Ruma Pal, J. Leave granted. 2. The respondent appears on caveat and has made arguments before us. 3. We are of the view, that the order impugned in this case dated 16-4-2003 cannot be sustained. The undisputed facts appear to be that the appellant Bank had filed an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") for recovery of a sum of Rs. 11.87 crores together with interest thereon against the respondents. An application was also filed for interim relief. An ex parte interim order had been passed on 22-10-2001 by the Tribunal in terms of Prayer 7(b) of the application of the appellant for interim relief. Prayer (b) reads as follows: "That pending hearing and final disposal of the suit, by an order of injunction of this Hon’ble Court, the defendants be restrained from in any manner dealing with, realising, alienating, parting with or creating any encumbrance over the hypothecated/mortgaged securities, hypothecation of goods and book debts described in Exts. B-5 and B-6 hereto and the mortgaged immovable property, more particularly described in Exts. F, G, H, I and J hereto." 4. An application was filed by the respondents contending that Exts. I and J mentioned in Prayer (b) described the properties which had not been mortgaged to the appellant Bank. The Tribunal disposed of the application of the respondents by the order dated 17-5-2002 in which it said: "It is true that the two flats were not mortgaged with the applicant Bank; there is no law which says that the injunction can be granted only in respect of mortgaged property. On the contrary, as per law, if the property is mortgaged it cannot even otherwise be alienated or encumbered and there is in fact no need of such injunction in respect of mortgaged property. However, in order to secure property which is not mortgaged, it is all the more necessary to pass such order so as to safeguard the interest of the applicant Bank. Be that as it may, presuming that Defendants 4 and 5 are exclusive owners of their respective flats, they are personally liable to repay those dues which were existing till the date of their retirement. Huge amount of over Rs. Be that as it may, presuming that Defendants 4 and 5 are exclusive owners of their respective flats, they are personally liable to repay those dues which were existing till the date of their retirement. Huge amount of over Rs. 11.00 crores is to be recovered and, therefore, the properties of Defendants 4 and 5 would also be liable to be attached if the recovery certificate is ultimately issued and other available properties are found insufficient to satisfy the claim. If these properties are not secured by an order of injunction, there would be hardly anything to recover from Defendants 4 and 5." 5. In the circumstances, the order of injunction granted on 22-10-2001 was confirmed. The respondents preferred an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Appellate Tribunal") and the Appellate Tribunal heard the matter in some detail and thereafter dismissed the appeal. The respondents then approached the High Court by way of a writ petition. The High Court admitted the writ petition and issued rule nisi on 16-4-2003. The High Court issued an order granting interim relief in terms of Prayer (b) of the writ petition which virtually allowed the writ application. In Prayer (b), the respondents had asked that the order dated 22-10-2001 insofar as it related to Exts. ?I? and ?J? should be vacated. 6. We are of the view that the High Court erred in passing an ad interim order which effectively disposed of the writ application of the respondents. Besides, the only reason given for passing the order dated 16-4-2003, and virtually setting aside the decision of the Appellate Tribunal as well as that of the Tribunal, was that the appellant Bank had "knowingly made a misstatement regarding mortgage of property Exts. ?I? and ?J? and even now there is no regret or apology for the same". While the misstatement in Prayer 7(b) by the appellant may have warranted the refusal to grant ad interim relief, in the circumstances of the case, the Court should have gone into the merits of the matter and decided whether the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal were correct in continuing the interim injunction in respect of the two properties in question. 7. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to the fact that subsequent to the impugned order, the operation of which had been stayed by the High Court itself for a period of two weeks, an application had been filed by the appellant before the Tribunal for extension of the stay which had been granted by the High Court. The Tribunal rejected the application. The appellant then approached the High Court. The High Court rejected the application on the ground that the appellant's conduct in approaching the Tribunal for extension of the stay was an attempt to overreach the High Court and was also high-handed. It was also noted that the appellant had not disclosed anything about their attempt to move the Tribunal before the High Court. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that this order of the High Court rejecting the application of the appellant for extension of the stay granted by the impugned order should have been placed before this Court and that since it has not been done this Court should not interfere with the order dated 16-4-2003 under Article 136 of the Constitution. 8. We are of the view that the stay granted by the High Court of the order dated 16-4-2003 initially on 16-4-2003 itself had already expired when the special leave petition was filed and would not have a material bearing in deciding the ultimate outcome of this appeal. Therefore, the fact that the High Court refused to extend the stay granted by it on 16-4-2003 is not really a material fact, the non-mentioning of which should entail the dismissal of the appeal. The non-production of the order of the High Court refusing to extend the stay may have been relevant had the appellant based its claim for relief before this Court on the basis of the interim stay granted on 16-4-2003. It has not. 9. Since the impugned order is an interim order, we are of the view that the matter should be disposed of here and now. The interim order granted by the High Court on 16-4-2003 cannot be sustained for the reasons earlier stated. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. The operation of the order of the Tribunal will continue until the writ petition is heard and disposed of by the High Court. 10. The interim order granted by the High Court on 16-4-2003 cannot be sustained for the reasons earlier stated. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. The operation of the order of the Tribunal will continue until the writ petition is heard and disposed of by the High Court. 10. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court.