K. A. PUJ, J. ( 1 ) THE present petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN. B. K. 20 of 1984 decided on 29. 03. 1990 reversing the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar in Tenancy Case No. 100/3/1983 dtd. 28. 02. 1983 and the order passed by the Deputy Collector, Anjar on 03. 04. 1983 in Tenancy Appeal No. 4 of 1983. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had made an application before the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar to decide that he was the tenant of the agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 88 and Survey No. 89 of village Meghper - Kumbardi, Tal. Anjar contending that though he was cultivating the said lands his name was not being entered in the Village Form No. 7/12. After examining the witnesses and after assessing the evidence brought on record, the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar by his judgment and order dtd. 28. 02. 1983 decided the case as contemplated under Section 100 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "act") and held that the petitioner was the tenant of the lands bearing Survey No. 88 and 89 as it was proved to have been cultivated by the petitioners. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order of the Special Mamlatdar, the respondent company have preferred an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Anjar (Kutch) in Tenancy Appeal No. 4/1983 which was subsequently converted into a Revision Application and came to be decided by the judgment and order passed on 03. 04. 1983, holding that the case tried by the Special Mamlatdar was in accordance with law and parties have sufficient opportunities to produce their evidence and there was no reasonable ground to interfere with the said judgment of the Special Mamlatdar and, therefore, confirmed the order of the Special Mamlatdar holding that the petitioner was the tenant of the lands in question. ( 4 ) BEING further aggrieved by the said order of the Deputy Collector, the respondent company preferred Revision Application No. TEN. B. K. 20/84 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Tribunal vide its order dtd. 29. 03. ( 4 ) BEING further aggrieved by the said order of the Deputy Collector, the respondent company preferred Revision Application No. TEN. B. K. 20/84 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Tribunal vide its order dtd. 29. 03. 1990 had allowed the said Revision Application and quashed the orders passed by the authorities. ( 5 ) IT is this order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which is under challenge before this Court in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) THE petition was admitted and ad-interim stay as to possession was granted on 20. 06. 1990. Heard Mr. S. K. Jhaveri, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. A. R. Thaker, learned advocate appearing for the respondent. Mr. Jhaveri has challenged the order of the Tribunal mainly on two grounds. The order of the Tribunal is not sustainable on legality as well as on merits. As far as legal challenge to the said order is concerned, Mr. Jhaveri has submitted that the Tribunal has revision powers against an order of the Collector and those powers are limited to order of the Collector being contrary to law or failure on the part of the Collector to determine some material issue of law and when the Collector has exercised his revisional powers under Section 110 of the Act,it was not open to the Tribunal to entertain this Revision Application. He has further submitted that the Deputy Collector had acted in excess of jurisdiction when he decided that no appeal lies before him as it was not open to the aggrieved party to prefer a Revision Application under Section 110 of the Act. The powers under Section 110 can be exercised suo moto by the Deputy Collector only when no appeal has been filed within the prescribed period or on reference made by the State Government. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Jhaveri, it therefore presupposes that an appeal would lie against an order of the Special Mamlatdar and when it held that no appeal lies from that order, it is apparent that no revision could be preferred under Section 111 and the order passed by the Tribunal is null and void. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Jhaveri, it therefore presupposes that an appeal would lie against an order of the Special Mamlatdar and when it held that no appeal lies from that order, it is apparent that no revision could be preferred under Section 111 and the order passed by the Tribunal is null and void. He has submitted that the petitioner was declared as tenant under Section 100 (2) of the Act by the Special Mamlatdar and against that order, the appeal cannot be filed before the Collector. An appeal can be filed before the Collector under Section 107 of the Act. The Collector cannot exercise his power under Section 110 by converting the said appeal into revision. Mr. Jhaveri has therefore submitted that the order passed by the Collector is a nullity or nonest and against that order, Revision cannot be filed before the Tribunal under Section 111 of the Act. In support of his submissions, he has relied on the decision of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Urban Development Trust, Jaipur V/s. Gokul Narain and another reported in AIR 1996 S. C. 1819 wherein it is held that a decree passed by the Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on any other ground which caused to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such Court is nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up wheneverit is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the Court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. The Honble Supreme Court has also referred its earlier two decisions in the case of Sushilkumar Mehta V/s. Govindram Bohra (Deceased) through his LRs. (1990) 1 SCC 193 ) and Jaipur Development Authority V/s. Radhe Shyam (1994) 4 SCC 370 ) and thereafter it was observed that nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the Court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. If the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court or the Court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order of the decree. If the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court or the Court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order of the decree. Its nullity can be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceedings since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the Court. Based on these observations, Mr. Jhaveri has submitted that the Collector has no power or authority to decide an appeal or revision as no appeal lies against the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar under Section 100 (2) of the Act and when no appeal lies, even if it is filed, it is not open for the Collector to convert the said appeal into revision and to decide the matters. Since the order of the Collector is assailed in the revision before the Tribunal which is a nullity or nonest at law, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the said order of the Collector. Mr. Jhaveri has therefore submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal requires to be quashed and set aside on this legal issue. ( 8 ) AS far as the merits of the case is concerned, Mr. Jhaveri has submitted that both the Special Mamlatdar as well as the Collector have considered the relevant materials on record and after examining the witnesses as well as after making proper assessment and evaluation of the evidence produced before them, both the authorities have taken a concurrent view that the petitioner is a tenant of the land in question. He has further submitted that the respondent has not laid any evidence with regard to the cultivation of land by the person other than the petitioner. On the contrary, it has come on record that the respondent company has never indulged itself with the cultivation of land in question. In this view of the matter, it is established beyond any doubt that the petitioner had been cultivating the land over the years and keeping this fact in mind, both the authorities below have considered the petitioner as deemed tenant. Mr. Jhaveri has, therefore, submitted that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was therefore not justified in coming to the conclusion that even if the Panipatrak entries are to be believed, it is clearly seen that there is no tenant on this land. Mr. Jhaveri has, therefore, submitted that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was therefore not justified in coming to the conclusion that even if the Panipatrak entries are to be believed, it is clearly seen that there is no tenant on this land. The order of the tribunal is, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, learned advocate Mr. A. R. Thaker appearing on behalf of the respondent has strongly supported the order passed by the Tribunal. He has submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is absolutely in accordance with the provisions of law and in conformity with the legal propositions laid down by this Court. The order of the Tribunal can neither be assailed on legality nor on merits. As far as the legal issue raised by the petitioner is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. A. R. Thaker that the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar, Anjar on 28. 02. 1983 cannot be, strictly speaking, as the order passed under Section 100 (2) of the Act. Section 100 deals with the duties of Mamlatdar and Sub-section 2 thereof empowers the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is a tenant or a permanent tenant. However, Section 6 of the Act deals with persons deemed to be tenants and Section 7 deals with permanent tenants. In the present case, the petitioner has made an application to the Mamlatdar for entering his name in the record of rights. Such an application was treated as having been made under Section 110 (2) of the Act which deals with record of rights of ordinary tenants. The order of the Special Mamlatdar, therefore, is treated to have been passed under Section 8 of the Act and that order is appealable under Section 107 (1) (b) of the Act. The Collector is, therefore, not right in saying that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar treating the said order as having been passed under Section 100 (2) of the Act. The Collector is, therefore, not right in saying that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar treating the said order as having been passed under Section 100 (2) of the Act. He has further submitted that even if it is held that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Special Mamlatdar under Sec. 100 (2) of the Act, in view of the provisions contained in Section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (as extended to Kuchchh area) the appeal filed before the Deputy Collector is maintainable as it is manifest from the clear reading of Section 203 that an appeal is provided against any decision or order passed by a Revenue Officer under the Code or any other law for the time being in force, to that officer immediately superior in the absence of any express provision of the Code or any law for the time being in force, to the contrary. If it is accepted that the impugned order passed by the Special Mamlatdar deciding the status of the petitioner as deemed tenant is not made appealable under the Act, in that case it can be contended that the Provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code will be attracted. In absence of any express provision in the Act about appeal or revision, obviously, therefore, Sec. 203 of the Code would be attracted and, therefore, an appeal is competent under Section 203 of the Code against the impugned order of the Mamlatdar and if the appeal is competent before the Deputy Collector, there is no question of converting the said appeal into revision and the order passed by the Deputy Collector in the said appeal can certainly be challenged before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under Section 111 of the Act. Mr. Thaker has, therefore, submitted that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Act and since the order passed by the Deputy Collector cannot be considered as nullity or nonest at law, the revision is competent and the order passed in the said revision by the Tribunal is also legal and tenable. Mr. Thaker has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Morabia Nagji Jechand of Rapar V/s. Hathi Shivubha Hamirji of Mokha and Anr. Mr. Thaker has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Morabia Nagji Jechand of Rapar V/s. Hathi Shivubha Hamirji of Mokha and Anr. reported in 1996 (2) G. C. D. 633 (GUJARAT) wherein it is specifically held that any decision or order passed by Revenue Officer is appealable under Section 203 of the Code to officer immediately superior unless express barred under the Code or any law in force. ( 10 ) SO far as the merits of the matter is concerned, Mr. Thaker has submitted that the tribunal has rightly considered this aspect and it has come to the conclusion that the landlord - tenants relationship could not be established by the petitioner. It was also not proved that he has been cultivating the land for 8 to 10 years. Even the evidence of alleged Form No. 7/12 shows the cultivation only for 3 to 4 years. The tribunal has also found the deposition of the Talati as most unreliable. It was recorded by the Tribunal that Talati has not been visiting field to field but only posted himself at different parts of the Simada and made oral inquiries with persons near about as to who was cultivating particular field. The Tribunal has, therefore, held that the order passed by both the lower authorities are clearly illegal and improper and while exercising its powers under Sec. 111 of the Act which provides for the scope of revision if the orders of the Collector are contrary to law or the Collector has failed to determine some material issues of law, has quashed and set aside the orders passed by the authorities below. In support of this contention, Mr. Thaker has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Saiyad Usman Rahemantulla V/s. Saiyad Noor Karim Taj and others reported in 1994 (1) G. C. D. 825 (GUJARAT) wherein this Court has held that the first condition for becoming a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act is that a person should be lawfully cultivating a land or lands in question. A person can be said to be lawfully cultivating a land only when he derives a valid title thereto from another person. No valid title even by way of tenancy rights can be derived from a trespasser. A person can be said to be lawfully cultivating a land only when he derives a valid title thereto from another person. No valid title even by way of tenancy rights can be derived from a trespasser. Here in the present case also, there was no valid title derived by the petitioner so far as the land in question is concerned. The fact of cultivation by the petitioner is also not proved. Hence, the petitioner can be treated as a trespasser and he cannot be declared as a deemed tenant under Section 6 of the Act. In this view of the matter, Mr. Thaker has submitted that the Tribunals order should not be interfered with by this Court while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) AFTER having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and after having gone through the rival contentions urged by them as well as after having perused the records and evidence as well as after having considered the authorities cited before me, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal does not call for any interference. The submissions of Mr. Jhaveri to the effect that the order passed by the Deputy Collector is a nullity or non est at law and since the revision was filed against such an order under Sec. 111 of the Act cannot be considered to be a valid Revision, do not carry any weightage in the eye of law as it does not appear to be correct that the order passed by the Deputy Collector is a nullity or non est at law. First of all, looking to the provisions contained in the Act, an appeal is certainly maintainable against the order passed by the Deputy Collector as the said order can as well be treated as the order passed under Section 8 of the Act and any order passed under Section 8 of the Act is appealable under Section 107 (b) of the Act. Even otherwise, if no appeal or revision is provided against the order passed under Section 100 (2) of the Act, in that case, appeal can certainly lie before any superior officer who is Collector in the present case by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 203 of the Code. Even otherwise, if no appeal or revision is provided against the order passed under Section 100 (2) of the Act, in that case, appeal can certainly lie before any superior officer who is Collector in the present case by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 203 of the Code. As such, it is not warranted to convert the appeal filed by the present respondent before the Deputy Collector into a revision as for all practical purposes it is an appeal and order passed in the said appeal can certainly be assailed in the Revision before the Tribunal. Even if it is to be treated as the Revision, in that case, despite the fact that the appeal is filed the said appeal is not competent in the eye of law and in that case, the order passed by the Deputy Collector can be treated as the order passed by him while suomoto exercising his revisional jurisdiction under Section 110 of the Act. An order passed by him under Section 110, if it is contrary to law or if he has failed to determine some material issues of law, or if there was substantial defect in following the due procedure provided by the Act, which has resulted into miscarriage of justice, the same can be challenged before the Tribunal under Section 111 of the Act. Taking any view of the matter, the order passed by the Deputy Collector cannot be treated as the order which is nullity or nonest at law. The Revision is competent before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Act. ( 12 ) EVEN on merits also, the Tribunal has correctly come to the conclusion that the petitioner cannot be declared as a deemed tenant as the fact regarding cultivation by him is not proved and there was no evidence which leads to the conclusion that he was cultivating the land for the period of last 8 to 10 years. The evidences which were produced by him before the lower authorities are self serving evidences and depositions on which the reliance was placed, were recorded only with a view to serve the petitioners purpose. The tribunal has also specifically recorded that the Talati has not visited the site and made remarks only on hear say evidence. The evidences which were produced by him before the lower authorities are self serving evidences and depositions on which the reliance was placed, were recorded only with a view to serve the petitioners purpose. The tribunal has also specifically recorded that the Talati has not visited the site and made remarks only on hear say evidence. In any case, this Court while exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit over the judgment and decision of the Tribunal especially when the finding arrived at by the Tribunal is not perverse nor it is improper, unlawful or unreasonable looking to the facts and circumstances. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal and hence the challenge made to the said order in this petition is without any merits or substance. Hence, the petition is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. ( 13 ) SINCE the petition is dismissed, interim relief granted by this court earlier is automatically vacated. Mr. Jhaveri makes a request to this court that the said interim relief may be extended for the period of 4 weeks as the petitioner wants to challenge the present order before a proper forum. Mr. Thaker has objected to the extension of the said interim relief. However, looking to the facts that the interim relief is in operation for the last about 13 years, in the interest of justice, the said interim relief is extended for the period of four weeks from today. .