P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful plaintiff, aggrieved by the reversing Judgment made in a. S. No. 169/89 on the file of Additional chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad had preferred the present Second appeal. The respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal are defendants 1 and 2 in the suit o. S. No. 179/82 on the file of III Additional judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad at secunderabad. ( 2 ) THE parties are referred to as plaintiff and defendants as arrayed in the original suit for the purpose of convenience. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff instituted the suit o. S. No. 179/82 on the file of III Additional judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad at secunderabad praying for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 6-1-1978. The 1st defendant filed written statement and also additional written statement. The 2nd defendant remained ex parte. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties Issues and additional Issues were settled and on behalf of the plaintiff, P. W. I was examined and Exs. A-1 to A-19 were marked. On behalf of the 1st defendant, D. W. I and D. W. 2 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Court of first instance had decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 6-1-1978. Aggrieved by the same, the 1st defendant preferred A. S. No. 169/89 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City civil Court, Secunderabad as against the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant as well and the appellate Court on appreciation of the questions of fact and questions of law, had reversed the said Judgment and decree of the Court of first instance and aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred the present second Appeal. Submissions of Sri P. Venugopal. ( 4 ) SRI P. Venugopal, learned Counsel representing the appellants/plaintiff had taken me through substantial questions of law raised in the Second Appeal and also the substantial questions of law framed by this court while admitting the Second Appeal. The learned counsel submitted that the approach of the appellate Court in appreciating the evidence available on record is totally erroneous. The counsel further contended that the evidence of P. W. I and Exs. The learned counsel submitted that the approach of the appellate Court in appreciating the evidence available on record is totally erroneous. The counsel further contended that the evidence of P. W. I and Exs. A-1 to A-19 are clear which establish the case of the appellant as plaintiff and hence negativing the relief of specific performance is definitely bad in law. The learned counsel also pointed out the findings which had been recorded by the appellate Court and had submitted that in the light of the stand taken by the 1st defendant admitting the execution of the agreement of sale Ex. A-1, it is for him to explain the circumstances and the 1st defendant miserably failed in doing so. The learned counsel also pointed out that none concerned with Ex. A-1 were examined by either of the parties. It was further pointed out that Ex. B-3 valuation certificate is of no consequence since the same was obtained long after Ex. A-1 and hence on the ground of inadequacy of consideration also the relief for specific performance cannot be negatived. The learned counsel also had pointed out the circumstances by taking this court through the recitals of Ex. A-1, Ex. A-3 and Ex. A-4. The learned counsel also pointed out that for both the notices exs. A-5 and A-8, there was no reply and this itself shows that the stand taken by the 1st defendant/1st respondent is unsustainable. Submissions by Sri Chandresh: ( 5 ) SRI Chandresh, the learned counsel representing Sri Nalini Kumar on behalf of the 1st respondent/1st defendant made the following submissions. The learned counsel had taken me through the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also by the appellate Court throughly and had pointed out that the reversing of the Judgment and decree of the Court of first instance by the appellate Court is on well justifiable grounds. The learned counsel also pointed out that the circumstances definitely clearly establish that Ex. A-1 came into existence as a security to the loan transaction and it was never intended to be acted upon or to be treated as an agreement of sale. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to paragraph 11 of Ex. A-1 and had submitted that the evidence of P. W. I definitely is contrary to paragraph 11 of Ex. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to paragraph 11 of Ex. A-1 and had submitted that the evidence of P. W. I definitely is contrary to paragraph 11 of Ex. A-1 and in this view of the matter, it can be taken that the appellant/plaintiff had not approached the Court with clean hands and on this ground alone, the discretionary relief of specific performance may have to be negatived and rightly it was done so by the appellate Court. The learned counsel also had pointed out that though to Ex. A-8 there was no reply, Ex. B-2 reply notice was issued to Ex. A-5 and Ex. B-2 and the issuance thereof was proved by examining D. W. 2. The learned counsel also had pointed out to the recitals in Ex. A-1, Ex. A-3 and also the stand taken by the plaintiff in Exs. A-5 and a-8 and the stand taken by the 1st defendant in Ex. B-2. The learned counsel also further relying upon Ex. B-3 had contended that though the valuation certificate is of the year 1988, ten years after Ex. A-1, definitely it will throw light on the valuation of the property and at any rate even if the stand of the plaintiff has to be accepted, the value cannot be the same as on the date of Ex. A-3 and the date of Ex. A-1, Ex. A-3 being a sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 29-3-1974 and Ex. A-1 being an agreement of sale dated 6-1-1978 executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff. The learned counsel also made elaborate submissions relating to the circumstances why the 2nd defendant also joined the execution of Ex. A-1 along with the 1st defendant. The learned counsel also pointed out that if Ex. A-3 sale deed was acted upon, there was no necessity of the 1st defendant executing Ex. A-1 since the owner of the property, the 2nd defendant alone at the best could have executed Ex. A-1. The learned counsel also had pointed out the receipt passed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the plaintiff. A-3 sale deed was acted upon, there was no necessity of the 1st defendant executing Ex. A-1 since the owner of the property, the 2nd defendant alone at the best could have executed Ex. A-1. The learned counsel also had pointed out the receipt passed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions placing strong reliance on Section 20 of the Specific relief Act, 1963 and had pointed out that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the court of first instance had totally erred in granting the relief and the appellate Court is well justified in reversing the same. The learned counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions to the effect that the granting of the relief of specific performance is only a discretionary relief. While concluding, the learned counsel also pointed out that at any rate these are all questions of fact and the final Court of fact - the appellate court, had appreciated all the facts and circumstances and had recorded correct findings which need not be disturbed in the present Second Appeal, especially in view of the limitations imposed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel also had placed reliance on certain decisions in this regard. ( 6 ) HEARD both the counsel and perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the Court of first instance and also the findings recorded by the appellate Court. ( 7 ) THE substantial questions of law which arise for consideration in this Second Appeal are as follows; (1) Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in treating Ex. A-1 as a loan transaction? (2) Whether the conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court are contrary to the findings and based on misreading of evidence? (3) Whether the Court below was justified in holding that Ex. A-1 is a contemporaneous document disentitling the plaintiff to seek a relief for specific performance of the agreement? ( 8 ) THE factual matrix in short as reflected from the respective pleadings is as hereunder. ( 9 ) THE appellant/plaintiff had submitted that the leasehold interest in plot No. 36 of the premises bearing No. 7-2-184 to 186 situated at Ghasmandi Secunderabad, originally belonged to Veesamsetty lingaiah, Veesamsetty Suryanarayana and veesamsetty Venkateshwar Rao. ( 8 ) THE factual matrix in short as reflected from the respective pleadings is as hereunder. ( 9 ) THE appellant/plaintiff had submitted that the leasehold interest in plot No. 36 of the premises bearing No. 7-2-184 to 186 situated at Ghasmandi Secunderabad, originally belonged to Veesamsetty lingaiah, Veesamsetty Suryanarayana and veesamsetty Venkateshwar Rao. The said persons sold it under a registered sale deed dated 16-4-1956 to Hazarilal and his sons, the plaintiff and defendants herein. They have been in possession and enjoyment as absolute owners from the date of purchase. Mr. Hazarilal, the father of the parties to the suit died intestate on 27-7-1975. His share devolved on his sons equally. During the lifetime of late Hazarilal, the 1st defendant sold his share in the suit property to the 2nd defendant under a registered sale deed dated 29-3-1974. Subsequently, the 2nd defendant received a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 as entire consideration and both the defendants executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to transfer the undivided 1/5th share of the 1st defendant in the said property. In the said agreement, the 1st defendant declared that he ceased to have any right or interest in the said building and he had agreed to sell not only his 1/5th share, but also all further rights therein in favour of the plaintiff in consideration of the defendants having received Rs. 15,000. 00 from the plaintiff. Thus, even though the agreement stated that the defendants had agreed to sell their undivided 1/5th share, the defendants are bound to sell not only the undivided 1/5th share, but also the share of Hazarilal that devolved on defendants on his death. It was further pleaded that on 1-12-1981 the plaintiff gave a notice of demand calling upon the defendants to execute a sale deed and for extension of leasehold interest in respect of plot No. 36. The plaintiff further gave a notice on 16-1-1982 calling upon the defendants not only to transfer an undivided 1/5th share in the property, but also the additional 1/20th share which devolved on the 1st defendant on the death of Hazarilal. The 1st defendant received the notice on 20-1-1982 but failed to send any reply notice. The plaintiff had always been and is willing to perform his part of the agreement, but the defendants are avoiding to execute the sale deed. The 1st defendant received the notice on 20-1-1982 but failed to send any reply notice. The plaintiff had always been and is willing to perform his part of the agreement, but the defendants are avoiding to execute the sale deed. ( 10 ) THE 1st respondent/1st defendant filed written statement with the following allegations. It was pleaded that in view of the dissolution of the partnership business wherein the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant through his wife had interest, the 1st defendant owned to the 2nd defendant a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 which the 2nd defendant was pressing for payment. The original dissolution deed is in the custody of the plaintiff. As the 1st defendant did not have the means to pay the same in cash, he ostensibly transferred his1/5th share in the said property by sale deed dated 29-3-1974 to the 2nd defendant as a security against the debt of Rs. 15,000. 00 due to him. Simultaneously with the sale deed, an agreement of reconveyance and a rental agreement was executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant. As the 1st defendant could not clear the debt within the period of three years stipulated in the agreement of reconveyance, a fresh agreement of reconveyance for a duration of four years from 31-3-1977 was concluded between the defendants 1 and 2 on 17-7-1977. The 1st defendant did not realize that the 2nd defendant with ulterior motive included a right of reconveyance in favour of the nominees also in the agreement of reconveyance dated 17-7-1977. It is therefore obvious that the sale deed dated 29-3-1974 was not an out and out sale but only a cover of security for the debt of the 1st defendant. Despite the existence of the agreement of reconveyance dated 17-7-1977, the 2nd defendant began insisting on the settlement of his outstanding amount of Rs. 15,000. 00 towards the end of 1976 itself on the plea that he wanted the money for the expenses of the marriage of his daughter. On account of the insistence of the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant had no other alternative but to request the plaintiff for monetary assistance in the shape of loan of Rs. 15,000. 00 free of interest to enable the 1st defendant to pay the said amount to the 2nd defendant. On account of the insistence of the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant had no other alternative but to request the plaintiff for monetary assistance in the shape of loan of Rs. 15,000. 00 free of interest to enable the 1st defendant to pay the said amount to the 2nd defendant. At that time, the plaintiff insisted on sufficient security and suggested that the 1st defendant along with the 2nd defendant should execute an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff in respect of the undivided 1/5th share of the 1st defendant in the said property. In accordance with the plaintiff s stipulation, the 1st defendant executed the agreement to sell on 6-1-1978 and on the same day received the loan of rs. 15,000/- from the plaintiff. An entry to this effect was also made in the day book of the plaintiff. The 1st defendant paid the said amount of Rs. 15,000. 00 to the 2nd defendant and an entry to this effect is found in the day book of the 1st defendant. The consideration of Rs. 15,000. 00 stated in the agreement of sale is totally inadequate and bears no relation to the existing market value of the 1st defendant s undivided 1/5th share in the property. As on the date of agreement of sale the entire property was worth not less than Rs. 8 lakhs. No steps whatsoever were taken for the transfer of the leasehold interest despite the agreement to sell, but on the other hand a joint application was made on 27-11-1981 by the plaintiff, defendants and one Nandkishore to the Estates Officer for transfer of the lease of the suit property. It is not correct that the share of Hazarilal devolving upon the defendants is also part and parcel of the security under the agreement of sale. As a matter of fact no possession of any part of the premises in the possession of 1st defendant was delivered to the plaintiff. It was denied that the plaintiff had any cause of action for the suit on 1-12-1981 or on any subsequent date. The plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed except repayment of the loan of rs. 15,000/- borrowed by the 1st defendant. It was denied that the plaintiff had any cause of action for the suit on 1-12-1981 or on any subsequent date. The plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed except repayment of the loan of rs. 15,000/- borrowed by the 1st defendant. ( 11 ) AN additional written statement also was filed and on the strength of the pleadings, Issues had been settled and as already specified supra, the suit was decreed by the Court of first instance and the same was reversed by the appellate Court. ( 12 ) THE plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 are brothers and sons of Hazarilal. Hazarilal had four sons - 2nd defendant, plaintiff, 1st defendant and one nandkishore. The suit house is a building and the leasehold of the land was taken from nizam Government and the same was purchased by Hazarilal and the sons assisted jointly from M/s. Vissamsetty lingaiah, Suryanarayana and another under registered sale deed dated 16-4-1976, marked as Ex. A-2. The 1st defendant executed and sold his 1/5th undivided interest in favour of the 2nd defendant under a registered sale deed dated 29-3-1974 marked as Ex. A-3. Subsequent thereto, defendants 1 and 2 executed Ex. A-1 sale agreement dated 6-1-1978 agreeing to sell away the 1/5th undivided interest in the suit house of the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff. It is pertinent to note that the sale consideration both in Ex. A-3 and ex. A-1 is Rs. 15,000. 00. The sale consideration of Rs. 15,000. 00 relating to Ex. A-1 was paid to the 2nd defendant under Ex. A-4 receipt. No doubt a notice Ex. A-5 was issued and ex. A-8 is yet another notice. The reply notice is marked as Ex. B-2. No doubt, P. W. I had taken a stand that no reply was given. But d. W. 2, a practicing Advocate, one Sri balchand was examined who had deposed about the aspect of the issuance of reply notice and service thereof on the plaintiff. Except the evidence of P. W. I and D. W. I, there is no other evidence relating to Ex. A-1 transaction. But d. W. 2, a practicing Advocate, one Sri balchand was examined who had deposed about the aspect of the issuance of reply notice and service thereof on the plaintiff. Except the evidence of P. W. I and D. W. I, there is no other evidence relating to Ex. A-1 transaction. The 2nd defendant was set ex parte and hence the findings had been recorded by both the Courts below, the court of first instance decreeing the suit and the appellate Court reversing the same, on appreciation of evidence of these contesting brothers only, the other brother being set ex parte. It is pertinent to note that P. W. I deposed in cross-examination that it is not true to say that in para 11 of Ex. A-1 it is mentioned that the sale deed and agreement of reconveyance dated 17-7-1977 were handed over to him. Para 11 of Ex. A-1 reads as hereunder:"the vendors 1 and 2 have this day handed over the said sale deed dt. 29-3-1974 and the agreement to reconvey dated 17-7-1977 executed by the vendor No. 1 in favour of the vendor No. 2 in respect of the l/5th (one fifth) undivided share of the vendor No. 2 in the said building to the vendee in pursuance of this Agreement to sell the same to the vendee and the vendee shall hold the same for ever. "ex. A-4 receipt reads as hereunder:"received a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 (Rupees fifteen thousand only) in cash from Sri Sampathlai, on of late hazarimal, as full consideration for the sale of the 1/5th share of Shamlal son of Hazarimal, in building bearing nos. 7-2-184 to 186 constructed on the lease land bearing plot No. 36, ghasmandi, Secunderabad, which is agreed to be sold to Sampathlai s/o. Hazarimal as per Agreement of this date". The appellate Court on appreciation of ex. A-1, A-3 and A-4, had recorded findings in detail and had arrived at a conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, ex. A-1 came into existence only by way of security towards loan transaction and the same was never intended to be acted upon as an agreement of sale in between the parties. It is pertinent to note that the sale consideration referred to in Ex. A-3 is rs. 15,000/- and the sale consideration ex. A-1 also is only Rs. 15,000. 00. A-1 came into existence only by way of security towards loan transaction and the same was never intended to be acted upon as an agreement of sale in between the parties. It is pertinent to note that the sale consideration referred to in Ex. A-3 is rs. 15,000/- and the sale consideration ex. A-1 also is only Rs. 15,000. 00. Apart from this aspect, the unnatural conduct of the plaintiff also had been well discussed while dealing with Ex. A-11, Ex. A-13 and Ex. A-14. Though there is some delay in obtaining ex. B-3, the appreciation of the market value and the raising of prices also had been taken into consideration and the conduct of the plaintiff had been well discussed in detail by the appellate Court and ultimately had arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance. In M. Veera Raghavaiah v. M, China Veeraiah it was held that specific performance is a discretionary relief as declared by Section 20 (1) of the Specific relief Act and the court is not bound to grant the relief merely because it is lawful to do so and at the same time the Section cautions that the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary and that discretion has to be sound and reasonable and should be guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Reliance also was placed on Tandra venkatasubrahmanayam v. Vegesana viswanadharaju in this regard. While pointing out the limitations relating to the appreciation of evidence and the question of fact, reliance was placed on Gavigowda v. Kalegowda and Ramdeo v. Smt, Ramdulari. ( 13 ) EX. B-1 is the application given by d. W. I along with the brothers to the collector, Hyderabad for renewal of lease. Ex. B-2 is the reply notice and Ex. B-3 is the valuation certificate. The issuance of Ex. B-2 was proved by examining D. W. 2. In the said reply notice, the same stand was taken by the 1st defendant as taken by him in the present written statement in the suit. Ex. A-2 is the sale deed executed by Lingaiah and others in favour of the plaintiff and defendants and their father dated 16-4-1956. Ex. A-3 is the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 29-3-1974. Ex. Ex. A-2 is the sale deed executed by Lingaiah and others in favour of the plaintiff and defendants and their father dated 16-4-1956. Ex. A-3 is the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant dated 29-3-1974. Ex. A-1 is the agreement of sale dated 6-1-1978. Ex. A-4 is the receipt passed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Ex. A-5 is the office copy of the notice. Ex. A-6 and Ex. A-7 are postal acknowledgments. Ex. A-8 is yet another notice. Ex. A-9 and Ex. A-10 are the postal acknowledgment and returned postal cover. Ex. A-11 is the office copy of the letter given by the plaintiff before the Sub-Registrar. Ex. A-12 is the original rental agreement executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant. In fact, reasons in detail had been recorded even in relation to ex. A-12 in arriving at a conclusion that ex. A-1 was executed only as a security in connection with a loan transaction. Ex. A-13 and Ex. A-14 are telegrams. Ex. A-15 and ex. A-16 are counter foils of Ex. A-13 and ex. A-14. Ex. A-17 and Ex. A-18 are acknowledgments of Ex. A-13 and Ex. A-14 and Ex. A-19 is the receipt for Rs. 2. 00 issued by P and T Department. ( 14 ) THE clear and specific stand taken by the 1st defendant explaining the circumstances under which Ex. A-3 was executed and subsequent thereto due to pressure under what circumstances Ex. A-1 also was brought into existence had been discussed in detail by the appellate Court. On appreciation of the recitals of Ex. A-3, ex. A-1 and also Ex. A-4, coupled with the evidence of both P. W. I and D. W. I, the findings recorded by the appellate Court that Ex. A-1 transaction was never intended to be acted upon as an agreement of sale and came into existence only as security for the repayment of the loan, are all findings of fact based on evidence and the appreciation of evidence is in proper perspective and hence the findings recorded cannot be said to be in any way perverse or based on no evidence or based on any inadmissible evidence. I had also given my anxious consideration by going through the oral evidence available on record apart from the documentary evidence. I had also given my anxious consideration by going through the oral evidence available on record apart from the documentary evidence. Hence, the findings recorded to the effect that Ex. A-1 was never intended to be acted upon as an agreement of sale and it came into existence only in connection with a loan transaction and it is only a contemporaneous document disentitling the plaintiff to seek the relief of specific performance need not be disturbed in any way in the present Second Appeal and in the light of the reasons referred to supra and also in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, I do not see any merit in the second Appeal and accordingly the Second appeal is dismissed. But however, in view of the relationship between the parties, this court makes no order as to costs.