ORDER Arun Mishra, J. Petitioner Housing Co-operative Society is challenging the acquisition of petitioner's land for the purpose of 'plantation of trees', acquired for the requirement of Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (here in after referred to as BMHRC) which is a hospital established mainly for the purpose of treatment of gas tragedy victims which took place due to release of gas from Union Carbide, Bhopal. Notification (Annexure P-19) u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred as the Act) was issued on 27-6-2002. The petitioner submitted an objection u/s 5(A) and raised several issues on 8-7-2002. The objections under section5(A) were rejected. The declaration u/s 6 was published on 23-11-2002. The purpose mentioned in the notification issued u/s 4 and declaration made u/s 6 in tree plantation for the purpose of BMHRC. It is averred in the petition that petitioner is a registered co-operative housing society having its bye-laws (Annex. P. 2). There are 785 members of the petitioner/society. 500 of them are severely affected by Bhopal Gas Tragedy and are displaced persons belonging to the weaker section of the society. Petitioner had purchased 23.08 acres of land from Smt. Mewa Bai, Ganesh Ram and Daulat Singh vide registered sale deed (P-3) dated 27-4-2000. The name of the petitioner was mutated in Khasra (P/4). In master plan (P-5) the land in dispute is marked to be used for residential purpose. To the same effect Certificate (P-6) was issued by the Joint Director Town and Country Planning Authority on 7-7-2000. Diversion of land was allowed by the Sub Divisional Officer by order (P-7) dated 4-10-2000. Plan (P-8) of the colony was sanctioned by the Joint Director Town and Country Planning Authority on 8-12-1995. 340 plots were allotted to the members as per list (P. 9). Colonizer licence (P/10) was granted by Municipal Corporation on 23-2-2001 under the relevant Rules. It is further averred in the writ application that Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre is an establishment of and being run by a trust. BMHRC is in possession of 80 acres of land provided by the State Government and on which the Bhopal Memorial Trust has already established the Hospital and Research Centre and an extensive vacant area is available to BMHRC. BMHRC has certain plans of expansion in future and for which purpose they are interested in getting more and more land in their possession. BMHRC has certain plans of expansion in future and for which purpose they are interested in getting more and more land in their possession. They have a plan for establishment of Post Graduate Teaching Institute. A meeting took place on 17-4-2001 with the State Government Official to resolve the issues of the BMHRC. Minutes (P-11) circulated vide letter dated 24th April 2001 mentions that acquisition of land is necessary for future expansion for establishment of Post Graduate Teaching Institute. Agenda (P-12) indicates that acquisition of additional strip of land 100 meters of width along with the western boundary of BMHRC was required for future expansion of Post Graduate Teaching Institute. Similar discussion is reflected from P/13 dated 15-4-2002 which mentions discussion point with the Chief Secretary, in the letter (P-14) of BMHRC dated 10-5-2002 also mentions that the land is required for future expansion of Post Graduate Teaching Institute. BMHRC wrote a letter (P/15) to the Collector in furtherance of said purpose a letter (P-16) dated 23-5-2002 was issued by the Secretary Government of M. P. Revenue, addressed to the Collector, Bhopal to take action on priority in view of the need of BMHRC. Petitioner has relied on spot inspection report (P-17) in which it is mentioned that certain portion is lying vacant within the campus of the hospital. Proceedings (P-18) of Land Acquisition Officer are collectively filed to indicate that there is no proper application of mind and need is for the future expansion and for establishment of Post Graduate Institute and not for plantation of trees. It is averred in the petition that Collector Bhopal acting on his own accord directed the Land Acquisition Officer to submit proposal for acquisition of land comprising of 100 Meters strip on three sides around the hospital. Thereafter the action for initiating the acquisition proceedings has been taken by Land Acquisition Officer leading to the issuance of notification u/s 4 and inquiry u/s 5A and declaration u/s 6. On the letter (P-21) of minister it is mentioned that the proposal was neither just nor proper. Objections which were raised were dealt with by the Land Acquisition Officer in the order dated 26-10-2000. The objections were not forwarded to the State Government and Collector cum Ex-officio Deputy Officer has proceeded to issue declaration u/s 6. On the letter (P-21) of minister it is mentioned that the proposal was neither just nor proper. Objections which were raised were dealt with by the Land Acquisition Officer in the order dated 26-10-2000. The objections were not forwarded to the State Government and Collector cum Ex-officio Deputy Officer has proceeded to issue declaration u/s 6. It is further averred in the petition that purpose of housing of the petitioner/society is an eminent public purpose and the purpose of BMHRC of tree plantation is frivolous and artificial, the tree plantation cannot be legally and justly regarded as public purpose. Collector has exercised power of appropriate Government. Appropriate Government and the Collector cannot be one and the same person as regards repository of power under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Before issuing notification u/s 4(1) of the Act State Government has not recorded the satisfaction and the satisfaction recorded by the Collector cannot be said to be a satisfaction of the State Government. Thus, the notification is ab-initio, void and nullity. The plantation of trees is not a public purpose u/s 3(6) of the Act. None of the clause of section 3(f) provides that land can be acquired for plantation of trees as such, the entire process of acquisition is without jurisdiction. Decision to issue declaration u/s 6 has not been taken by the State Government. The decision taken by the Collector cannot be said to be decision of the State Government for the purpose of section 6. It is the ground raised that petitioner's land is reserved for residential purpose in the master plan thus in view of the bar created u/s 26 of Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, no person or authority is entitled to change the use of the land. Thus, the acquisition by which purpose of the master plan is going to be changed is illegal and contravenes the master plan. The prayer is made for quashing the notification u/s 4, order rejecting the objection u/s 5A and declaration issued u/s 6. Respondents No. 1 to 3 State Government, Collector and Land Acquisition Officer in their return contended that the hospital has been established for the victim of Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The purpose of the trust are mentioned in trust deed (R-1). Report (R-2) of Nazul Surveyor was called for. Objections have been heard and decided in objective manner. Respondents No. 1 to 3 State Government, Collector and Land Acquisition Officer in their return contended that the hospital has been established for the victim of Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The purpose of the trust are mentioned in trust deed (R-1). Report (R-2) of Nazul Surveyor was called for. Objections have been heard and decided in objective manner. Thereafter declaration u/s 6 has been issued. There is no mala fide or colourable exercise of power in acquiring the land. Map (R-5) of BMHRC, provides that the strip of land is reserved for plantation of trees and not for construction of post graduate teaching institute. Over this particular piece of land there is no proposal of construction of post graduate teaching institute. The power under sections 4 5, 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act have been delegated to the Collector. Respondent No. 4 BMHRC has also filed a return contending that hospital is an outcome of the direction of the Apex Court in the judgment delivered on 3rd October 1991 in Civil Appeal No. 3187/1988. It was directed to the State Government to provide suitable land free of cost. Other directions were also issued by the Apex Court for bearing financial burden for a period of 8 years to the Union Carbide Corporation. Further directions were issued by the Supreme Court on 14-2-1994 and an empowered committee was constituted to provide land to the hospital. In furtherance of the aforesaid public purpose it was decided to acquire strip 100 meter in width along with western boundary of the BMHRC. The said land is exclusively required for the purpose of tree plantation and for no other purpose an amount of Rs. 20 lacs has been deposited as per cheque (R/4-1), remaining part of the return of the State Government has been adopted. A rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner contending that there is breach of mandatory provisions of sections 4, 5(A) and section 6 of the Act. There is no material to support tree plantation scheme. An additional return has been filed by the respondents 1, 2 and 3 reiterating that the need is basically for plantation which is a public purpose. The order sheets (R-7) of Land Acquisition Officer have been filed. Letters R/8, R-9 and R-10 of BMHRC have been placed on record to indicate that the land was required for the purpose of tree plantation. The order sheets (R-7) of Land Acquisition Officer have been filed. Letters R/8, R-9 and R-10 of BMHRC have been placed on record to indicate that the land was required for the purpose of tree plantation. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised following submissions: (i) The Collector and the appropriate Government cannot be the same for the purpose of sections 4, 5Aand 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The decision taken by the Collector or Commissioner cannot be said to be a decision of appropriate Government. The notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6 are bad in law. (ii) That the acquisition is not for the purpose of tree plantation, but for future expansion and is for post graduate teaching Institute for which purpose land has not been acquired. Thus, the acquisition is illegal and liable to be quashed. (iii) That the land is reserved in the master plan for the residential purpose thus acquisition for tree plantation is bad in law. (iv) That the purpose of the petitioner housing society is equally important to provide houses to gas victims. Thus, the acquisition is bad in law. (v) There is adequate land with the BMHRC for tree plantation. Thus, there is no need for acquisition. 13-A. Shri R.S. Jha, Dy. Advocate General appearing for respondents No. 1 to 3 has submitted that acquisition is for public purpose. The hospital has been established for the purpose of treatment of gas tragedy victims being hospital and research centre, tree plantation is a public purpose. The power of collector under the Act conferred on and is exercised by Deputy Collectors and the power has been delegated to Collectors of the Deputy Secretary of the State Government for the purpose of sections 4, 5 6, 7 and 17 as per notification (R-6). Thus, the decision is taken by the appropriate Government. The objections were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and decision to issue declaration u/s 6 and notification under section4 has been taken by Collector in addition there is direction issued by the Secretary Department of Revenue of State Government to take action for the need of BMHRC. A letter of request was received from the BMHRC that strip of the land in question is needed for tree plantation. A letter of request was received from the BMHRC that strip of the land in question is needed for tree plantation. He has further submitted that the acquisition is for the public purpose, it is not open to the petitioner to submit that the acquisition is not for the public purpose. Master plan cannot come in the way of the land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the requirement of BMHRC exists for the land in question. Thus the writ petition has no merit and it deserves dismissal. Shri Sanjay Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 BMHRC has supported the submissions of respondents No. 1 to 3 and he has contended that there are letters on record and material exists to support the need of the land and no interference is called for in the writ petition. I take up second submission first for consideration. It has been strenuously submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the acquisition is not for tree plantation and tree plantation cannot be said to be public purpose. The hospital in question has been established pursuant to the direction of the Apex Court and is supposed to be an outstanding hospital and research centre. It is not in dispute that hospital has been established and is functioning. The need of tree plantation in my opinion is a supreme public purpose and I am unable to agree with the submission that need of tree plantation is not a public purpose. Public purpose is defined in section 3(f) of the Act. Public purpose includes the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing health or slum clearance scheme, need of tree plantation is inherent in the definition of public purpose as defined u/s 3(f)of the Act. Purpose of health includes need of tree plantation and it is covered as well under several other purpose enumerated in section 3(f).p> Coming to the other limb of the second submission that acquisition is not for the purpose of tree plantation but for future expansion of Post Graduate Teaching Institute which is not a need in praesenti. Thus the acquisition is bad in law. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the documents P-11 dated 24th of April, 2001 in which it is mentioned that certain land around the hospital has to be acquired for post graduate teaching institute. Thus the acquisition is bad in law. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the documents P-11 dated 24th of April, 2001 in which it is mentioned that certain land around the hospital has to be acquired for post graduate teaching institute. Collector was directed to intimate the cost to be incurred in acquisition. He has relied on BMHRC letters P-12 and P-13 dated 15-4-2002 and letter P-14 dated 10-5-2002, letter P-15 dated 4-7-2002, to submit that acquisition is for the purpose of post graduate teaching institute. He has also relied on the order dated 22-6-2002 of Land Acquisition Officer in which there is mention of letter dated 23-5-2002 of Revenue Secretary, State Government and there is also reference to the letter dated 24-4-2002. Counsel has emphasized that before the Land Acquisition Officer there was no material to draw inference that the land is required for tree plantation. He has also relied on the letter (P-16) dated 23-5-2002 of the Revenue Secretary, in which there is reference to the letter dated 10-5-2002. In letter (P-14) dated 10-5-2002 it is mentioned that the land is required for future expansion of post graduate teaching institute. In above letters it is mentioned that there is need for future expansion of post graduate teaching institute. However, it is clear that the note of Land Acquisition Officer which was approved by the Collector that Land Acquisition Officer has also considered the letter of BMHRC dated 24-4-2002, in which there is a clear mention of need for tree plantation. In letter dated 26-2-2002 it is mentioned that the acquisition of land is for 'tree plantation'. In letter dated 24-4-2002 subject matter is shown as tree plantation around the BMHRC. These letters are addressed to the Collector and Nazul Officer. Thus, it is clear that there was material placed before the State Government prior to issuance of notification u/s 4 that western side strip is required for the purpose of tree plantation. Petitioner himself in his representation P-20 submitted to the Minister Gas Rehabilitation, and mentioned in para 8 that the Collector Bhopal in letter dated 19-11-2000 directed acquisition of the land for the purpose of 'tree plantation'. Thus, it is clear that purpose of tree plantation was mentioned by the Collector in letter dated 19-11-2000 also. Petitioner himself in his representation P-20 submitted to the Minister Gas Rehabilitation, and mentioned in para 8 that the Collector Bhopal in letter dated 19-11-2000 directed acquisition of the land for the purpose of 'tree plantation'. Thus, it is clear that purpose of tree plantation was mentioned by the Collector in letter dated 19-11-2000 also. It is not something new, which came up the objection has also been considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and has been rejected on 26-10-2002. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and Others, it has been laid down that if acquisition is made for the public purpose. Requirement for public purpose may change from time to time but the change will not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. Following observations have been made by the Apex Court in para 6: 6. Besides, the question as to whether a particular scheme framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public authority and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of the public. In Collectors of 24 Collectors of 24 Parganas and Others Vs. Lalit Mohan Mullick and Others, , the Apex Court has observed that when an acquisition is proposed for a public purpose and the purpose is shown to be a public purpose, courts usually frown upon light hearted attacks on the validity of the notification by going behind the same. In the said decision respondent Lalit Mohan Mullick whose land was acquired, adopted an unusual method of fishing out information regarding starting of a hospital for crippled children by looking into the files and discovering letters which came into being subsequent to issue of notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6. The idea of providing hospital for crippled children must have occurred to the officers concerned subsequently. The idea of providing hospital for crippled children must have occurred to the officers concerned subsequently. It would be idle to depend upon such internal communication, which is normally not available to the party whose property is acquired and to contend that the notification is bad. The notification cannot be faulted on the ground that the purpose disclosed in the letters was one different from the public purpose disclosed in the notification. Putting up of a hospital for crippled children is a public purpose connected with the rehabilitation of displaced persons. The original object of acquisition proceedings is generally termed as 'resettlement' which would mean their rehabilitation. By rehabilitation what is meant is not to provide shelter alone. The real purpose of rehabilitation can be achieved only if those who are sought to be rehabilitated are provided with shelter, food and other necessary amenities of life. It would be for the authorities concerned to think of providing various amenities for the displaced persons in the process of rehabilitation. To provide a hospital for the disabled and for the crippled children of such displaced persons squarely comes within the concept of the idea of rehabilitation and consequently of settlement of the refugees. In Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, , it was held that absence of material to show that the purpose stated in the notification was not true or real, acquisition cannot be struck down on ground of mala fides in law, as contended by Shri Shrivastava. The Apex Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) has laid down that in certain situations, such as acquisition of land for public purpose, the court acting in the interest of justice while exercising their discretionary power for grant of injunction/stay order should keep this aspect in mind and all other modes of relief should be considered in balancing of competing interest. In Union of India and Others Vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and Others, , the Apex Court has held that the construction of the District Centre for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. It is well settled law that land sought to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose. In Union of India and Others Vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and Others, , the Apex Court has held that the construction of the District Centre for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. It is well settled law that land sought to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for District Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be public purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification u/s 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a colourable one. The notification u/s 4(1) could not have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. The notification u/s 4(1) cannot be quashed on the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in quashing the notification on the ground of change of user. The second submission raised by petition fails in view of above discussion. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, , the Apex Court has held that land acquired for a public purpose may be used for another public purpose on account of change or surplus thereof. The acquisition validly made does not become invalid by change of the user or change of the user in the scheme as per the approved plan. In the instant case the land is presently required for the tree plantation. The contention of the petitioner is that in future this land is going to be used for expansion of BMHRC. On the basis of this apprehension in my opinion it is not open for this Court to quash acquisition which is valid for tree plantation and material exists to support the acquisition for tree plantation. Coming to the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner which is based upon the definition of appropriate Government as defined u/s 3(e) of the Act, learned senior counsel has submitted that appropriate Government means the State Government and as per section 4 of the Act decision has to be taken by the appropriate Government i.e. State Government that land is needed for public purpose and then the Collector shall comply with it. Expanding the submission learned counsel has referred to section 5A of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 5A provides objection to be filed before the Collector, Collector shall give opportunity of hearing and then Collector has to make report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections and decision of the appropriate Government i.e. State Government shall be final. It is further submitted that section 6 of the Act requires that appropriate Government has to be satisfied on the basis of report of the Collector submitted, only then a declaration u/s 6 be made under the signature of the Secretary to State Government or some officer duly authorised to certify the order. Learned counsel submits that as envisaged under sections 4, 5Aand 6Collector has to be distinct entity from the appropriate Government and the power of the Collector as provided under sections 4, 5A and6 have been conferred with Deputy Collectors, however, Deputy Collector exercises the power of Collector and when report is submitted u/s 5A i.e. to be treated as the report of the Collector and required to be considered by the State Government, and not by the Collector. Thus, it is submitted that the decision taken by the Collector is ab-initio, void and illegal and consequently notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6 falls down and be quashed. In the instant case it is not in dispute that the powers of the Collector have been conferred on the Deputy Collector and Deputy Collectors are authorized to act as Land Acquisition Officer and to determine the compensation. Powers have been conferred on the Collector of the Deputy Secretary by the State Government by notification (R-6). Following notification was issued by the State Government on 3-5-1985. No. F-1-107-VII-N-2-B-83. Powers have been conferred on the Collector of the Deputy Secretary by the State Government by notification (R-6). Following notification was issued by the State Government on 3-5-1985. No. F-1-107-VII-N-2-B-83. --Pursuant to the authority vested in me as per item (1) of instruction No. 2-A of the Supplementary Instructions under rule 13 in part V of the (Madhya Pradesh Government Rules of Business) made by the Government of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, I, B. R. Yadav, Minister-in-charge, Revenue Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh hereby direct and authorise any one of the following officers, namely: (i) Collector, "ex-officio" Deputy Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh in Revenue Department, (ii) the Commissioner, "ex-officio" Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh in Revenue Department, to dispose of cases concerning land acquisition by using powers under sections4, 5,6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The disposal by any such Deputy Secretary or Secretary shall be deemed to be the disposal by the Government. The submission raised by the learned counsel that this notification (R-6) is bad in law and based on the provisions of sections4, 5A and 6 of the Act cannot be accepted. Division Bench of this Court in case of Gajanand and Others Vs. State of M.P. and Others, , repelled similar submission that such satisfaction was arrived at by Collector/Commissioner, not by State Government the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground of satisfaction was not arrived at by 'appropriate government'. The business of the Government is required to be transacted in the name of Governor, it is not possible or practicable that all such business was dealt with by him or by Council of Ministers. In Gajanan (supra), it has been held: 33. In State of M.P., Governor had made Rules of Business and Rules of allocation of Business and had also issued instructions thereunder. Under Rule 4 of BAR he had put Revenue Department under the charge of a Minister. He had further allotted business of land acquisition to the Revenue Department. The Revenue Minister was authorised to delegate the power for disposal of any item of business to the Secretary of the Department under Rule 2-A of the Supplementary Instructions issued Rule 13 of Business Rules. He had further allotted business of land acquisition to the Revenue Department. The Revenue Minister was authorised to delegate the power for disposal of any item of business to the Secretary of the Department under Rule 2-A of the Supplementary Instructions issued Rule 13 of Business Rules. Similarly the government had declared in terms of Entry 49 of Business Allocation Rules that General Administrative Department would be entitled to designate ex-officio officers and in exercise whereof it had notified the Revenue Commissioners and Collectors as ex-officio Secretaries/Deputy Secretaries to take decisions in land acquisition matters on behalf of the Government. All this showed that power to deal with land acquisition subject flowed down to Secretary/Deputy Secretary of the Revenue Department or any other official who was declared/appointed/designated so ex-officio for the purpose and once such appointed ex-officio Secretary (Revenue Commissioner) was asked to dispose of land acquisition matters by the Minister-in-charge under Rule 2-A of supplementary instructions, he assumed the jurisdiction to deal with such matters and all his actions and decisions become that of the Government. The question of delegation of such power has been answered in Gajanan (supra) as under : "33A. Mr. Asudani's reliance on AIR 1957 Mad 48 to suggest that Minister's order to empower ex-officio Secretary (Revenue Commissioner) was invalid as it was not a Government order and that such power could not be delegated by him is wholly misconceived. It is true that a Minister's instruction or direction does not partake the character of a Government order unless formalised in conformity with the Rules of Business but in the present case no such Government order was required to be passed to vest the requisite power in the Revenue Commissioner. It is also fallacious to contend that the Minister could not delegate such power because Governor alone could do that. Once Governor himself had empowered the Minister to ask the Secretary to deal with and dispose of any item of business under the rules, it tantamounted to delegation of power by the Governor himself. We are also not impressed by the submission that such power could be delegated only to "a Secretary" perhaps implying Secretary of the Department. This overlooks a situation where a department may have more than one Secretary and the Minister could delegate the power to any of them. We are also not impressed by the submission that such power could be delegated only to "a Secretary" perhaps implying Secretary of the Department. This overlooks a situation where a department may have more than one Secretary and the Minister could delegate the power to any of them. In the instant case Collector has exercised the power of appropriate Government and Deputy Collector has forwarded the objections and submitted the report to the Collector and Collector has exercised the power u/s 6, I find no impropriety in the same. In A. Sanjeevi Naidu, etc. Vs. State of Madras and Another, , it has been held that there can be allocation of business for convenient transaction of business. The particular official can be designated to decide any particular submission. It is not necessary that each and every decision should be taken by cabinet or by an individual minister. The said decision has been taken by various official at various levels. When those officials discharge the functions allotted to them, they are doing so as limbs of the Government. In Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, , their Lordships considered the issue of notification u/s 4 of West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act. The satisfaction of the Government contemplated u/s 4. The issue of notification is not personal satisfaction of the Governor as it is not item of business with respect to which Governor is, by or under Constitution is required to act in his discretion and West Bengal Government Rules of Business Rules 19 and 20, issue of notification u/s 4 and satisfaction to be arrived at that land is required or is likely to be required for public purpose are matters which do not fall within item 18 of standing order No. 2 and, therefore, are not require to be dealt with by Minister himself, notification issued by Assistant Secretary by virtue of order issued by the Secretary under Standing Order No. 5 is valid. Thus, the notification under sections4 and 6 cannot be said to be invalid. In case of Raipur Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Thus, the notification under sections4 and 6 cannot be said to be invalid. In case of Raipur Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, , the Division Bench of this Court has laid down that function performed u/s 68(d)(2) of Motor Vehicles Act of hearing objections to the scheme and of approving or modifying it is essentially administrative, though the process of hearing objections is quasi-judicial, such function can be delegated in accordance with Rules of Business made under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India. I find that provision of sections 4, 5A and 6 have not been contravened by conferring the powers on Collector and Commissioner of the appropriate Government as discussed above. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in Mela Ram and Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others, in which it was admitted position that under the rules of business the Collector was not authorized to certify the orders of the Government. Thus, the High Court of Rajasthan held that declaration made on the satisfaction of Collector was invalid, however, in the instant case notification (R-6) clearly mentions that under instruction 2A of the Supplementary Instruction under Rule 13 in part V of M.P. Government Rules of business made by the Government of M.P. in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 166, the power has been conferred with Commissioner and Collector and disposal of the matter under sections 4, 5, 6 7 and 17 shall be deemed to be disposal by the State Government. The Delhi High Court in Shori Lal Jain Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Others, , considered the question of satisfaction of Lt. Governor. There was no delegation to Lt. Governor to the Secretary. The secretary had seen the file and declaration was made even without it placing before the Lt. Governor. Hence, the notification was quashed. Here the power has been conferred with Collector, thus the act cannot be said to be unauthorized. The decision of the Delhi High Court is distinguishable. Thus, the second submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that exercise of power by Collector is unauthorized and notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6are bad in law, is rejected. Third submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner be now adverted to. The decision of the Delhi High Court is distinguishable. Thus, the second submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that exercise of power by Collector is unauthorized and notification u/s 4 and declaration u/s 6are bad in law, is rejected. Third submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner be now adverted to. It has been submitted that there is a master plan and from map (P-5) it is clear that area in question is reserved for residential purpose. Thus, the land cannot be acquired for tree plantation and same can be used for residential purpose, as per master plan the land acquisition is in derogation to section 26 of M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973. In my opinion the needs are ever changing, acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act cannot be made dependent on the master plan. The Apex Court in S.S. Darshan Vs. State of Karnataka and others, , has held that notification u/s 4 cannot be challenged on the ground that purpose of acquisition is different than permitted land use under Master plan. The Supreme Court has considered the said question in para 11 thus: 11. The last submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the user of the acquired land shown in the master plan being different, there cannot be a conversion of the user except in accordance with the provisions for making the change in the land use. It is not a case of change of user by the owner of the land but one of acquisition by the State under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This argument also had no merit. The Apex Court in Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, has considered that the land validly acquired for a public purpose may not be for the same purpose or use as mentioned in Master Plan or Zonal Plan if acquisition is for a purpose different from the type of user mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan. The Apex Court has held that acquisition cannot be quashed on this ground. In para 22 acquisition has been dealt with thus: 22. The Apex Court has held that acquisition cannot be quashed on this ground. In para 22 acquisition has been dealt with thus: 22. As pointed out in the above judgments, there is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor will be the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act, seeking permission to change of land use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. On the principle stated in Aflatoon case it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from the competent authority under the Development Act concerned for change of land use are different from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter. This Court has followed the decision of the Apex Court in case of S.S. Darshan vs. State of Karnataka (supra) and similar contention was raised in Nimar Textile Mills Ltd. Vs. The Land Acquisition Officer and Others, and in Laxmi Bai Tiwari and ors. vs. State of M.P., W.P. 6592/2000 decided on 21-9-2001 a similar view was taken. Coming to the fourth submission, raised by the learned senior counsel Shri Shrivastava, that the need of the housing co-operative society is on high pedestal than the need of the BMHRC. The members of the society who are gas affected are also to be benefitted by the BMHRC including the other members of the society. Coming to the fourth submission, raised by the learned senior counsel Shri Shrivastava, that the need of the housing co-operative society is on high pedestal than the need of the BMHRC. The members of the society who are gas affected are also to be benefitted by the BMHRC including the other members of the society. Looking from this angle also the challenge to the acquisition is misconceived the need of BMHRC is supreme for providing treatment and is for public purpose. The need of the members of the petitioner/society is for housing. In my opinion need of the BMHRC is supreme. The land is required for the purpose of tree plantation which is a public purpose. The need is to maintain environment of the hospital is which patients are treated and trees are essential for maintaining the health and environment and human existence. Thus, the need exist. The petitioner/society had purchased the land in the year 2000. There is mention in the representation (P-20) that Collector wrote a letter in November, 2000 for acquisition of the land for tree plantation for BMHRC. The land of a cooperative society can also be acquired as held by the Supreme Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. and Another Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Others, . It was lastly contended that the vacant land is available on which tree plantation can be made. It is not for the petitioner to point out how the land is to be utilised, which piece of land is to be used for which purpose, has to be seen by the authorities concerned. I find nothing illegal in the acquisition. It is not shown that land possessed by the BMHRC is more than the requirement. There is no objective pleading to that effect and I am not satisfied with the submission raised has any factual foundation, even otherwise scope of interference on a such submission is not much. On merits submission is baseless. In view of the foregoing discussions, I find no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. Resultantly the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed