N. K. JAIN, C. J. ( 1 ) IN view of the order dated 29-7-2003, passed by the Chief Justice, this Reference was placed before us on 14-8-2003. The Division Bench vide order dated 7-7-2003 had referred these matters to the Full Bench regarding the maintainability of the revision petition in the context of the provisions made in the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called the mv Act), Karnataka Private Educational In stitutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 (now Karnataka Education Act, 1983) (hereinafter called the Education Act) and the railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1989 (hereinafter called the RCT Act) for consideration afresh in view of the two earlier decisions rendered, one by Full Bench in Excellent education Society v. Shahida Begaum (Writ appeals Nos. 1101/03/1987) pertaining to education Appellate Tribunal as the order is amenable to Sec. 115, C. P. C. , disposed of on 30-5-1989 and the other decision of the division Bench of this Court in Mrs. Noreen r. Srikantaiah v. Dashrath Ramaiah, AIR 1985 Kant 208 wherein the question regarding maintainability of revision petition has not been examined. The decision passed by the single Judge/division Bench held that the Tribunal is not a Court and other decisions are held per incuriam. C. R. P. 3487/ 98, 3488 and 3501 of 1998 have been referred to a larger Bench on 18-1-1999 regarding maintainability of the revision petitions. It is also to be seen that in C. R. P. 1378/99 and connected matters pertaining to Education matter, the decision of Full bench dated 30-5-1989 has been followed and the cases were disposed of on 25-2-2002. The matters were placed before the three Judges Bench on 29-7-2003 as per the direction of the Chief Justice. It is also to be seen that in C. R. P. 1378/99 and connected matters pertaining to Education matter, the decision of Full bench dated 30-5-1989 has been followed and the cases were disposed of on 25-2-2002. The matters were placed before the three Judges Bench on 29-7-2003 as per the direction of the Chief Justice. The Full bench observed that it could not sit in judgment on the decision of a co-ordinate Full bench and observed that it would be appropriate that the matters are considered by the Larger Bench of five Judges, ( 2 ) THE question referred is :"are Tribunals established under the motor Vehicles Act, the Karnataka Private educational (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 now the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 and the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, courts subordinate to the High Court for purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure?" ( 3 ) WE shall now consider the argument of the learned counsel in their respective cases, that the Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and a revision lies. ( 4 ) SRI Sanjay Gowda, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in M. F. A. No. 1869/1997 pertaining to Railway Act, submits that earlier Civil Court or a Claims commissioner was competent to consider such cases before the establishment of the railway Claims Tribunal. He submits that to reduce the burden of cases, the Railways claims Tribunal was constituted and after the establishment of the Tribunal, all the cases are being dealt with by it. In view of sec. 23 (2) of the RCT Act, no appeal lies against the interlocutory orders. He submits that when no appeal is maintainable, automatically a revision is maintainable as provided under Section 115 of CPC. He relied on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad high Court in Bal Gopal Das v. Mohan singh, AIR 1964 All 504 . ( 5 ) SRI Srinivas Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in CRP 1758/2000 and connected matters pertaining to Education Act, submits that the Educational Tribunal Act is a new and distinct act, and earlier to the establishment of the tribunal, the power was exercised by a District Court and as such a revision lies as per Section 115 of CPC. He relied on the decision of Karnataka High Court in General Manager, KSRTC, Central Offices v. Smt. Housamathi Shidramappa Saladagi, ilr 2000 Kant 170 and the decision of Patna high Court in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 Patna 49. ( 6 ) SRI Sowri Raju, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C. R. P. Nos. 940/1998 and 751 /1998 pertaining to M. V. Act, submits that the Tribunal could not have fastened the liability on the petitioners without appreciating the pleadings and the award requires modification since no appeal is provided under Section 173 (2), if the amount is less than Rs. 10,000/-, certainly revision will lie. Therefore, this revision is maintainable. He relied on the decision rendered in Housamati C. Dharmappas case (ILR 2000 Kant 170) (supra ). He also submits that though there is a divergent opinion, but as the point was not considered in other decisions, therefore this Court has to consider and decide the same, in absence of any provision for appeal, revision is maintainable under C. P. C. He also submitted that in similar matters in C. R. P. Nos. 3487/98, 3488 and 3501 of 1998, the learned single Judge while referring the issue regarding maintainability of the revision petitions to a larger Bench, also considered articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution. The learned counsel further submitted that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Excellent Education Societys case pertaining to education matter is the correct law and needs no interference and the same view is also applicable to other Tribunals. ( 7 ) NOW, we shall consider the arguments of the respective counsel for the opposite side who argue that the Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to High Court and Sec. 115, c. P. C. cannot be invoked. ( 8 ) SRI Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in M. F. A. No. 1895/1997 submits that by mere exercise of jurisdiction, power or authority as exercised by the civil Court, the Tribunal by itself cannot be a Court subordinate to High Court so as to invoke Sec. 115, C. P. C. and no revision lies against the order of the Tribunal. The learned counsel further submits that as the jurisdiction of Civil Court has been taken away, the revision power which are exercised from the cases decided by the Civil Court and in the absence of any special provisions in the R. C. T. , no revision lies, as the R. C. T. cannot be said to be a Civil Court which is clear from the definition in Sec. 3 of C. P. C. , so also Sec. 9 provides that Courts shall try all civil suits unless barred. He also submits that in view of the constitutional scheme Article 227 cannot be equated with revision and can only be invoked for general power of superintendence over all the courts and Tribunals. Therefore, the same analogy is not applicable to Sec. 115, C. P. C. He further submits that the various orders passed by the learned single Judge as referred to above is the correct legal position as no revision lies in the absence of any specific provision in the special enactment itself. He relied on the decision of Five Judges bench of the Supreme Court in Associated cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 wherein the Apex Court has laid down certain tests to determine whether a body is a Tribunal. ( 9 ) SRI Nanjundaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in M. F. A. 1895/1997 submits that the Tribunal is not a Court and any order passed by the R. C. T. cannot be revised under Section 115, C. P. C. He submits that so far as power of R. C. T. with respect to matters such as summoning of witnesses, requiring discovery and production of documents, issuing commissions, etc. is concerned it does not mean that the Tribunal would automatically have all powers of the Civil Court. He relied on sections 18, 23, 25 and 28 of R. C. T. Act. He further submits that the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M/s. I. T. I. Ltd. v. M/s. Siemens Public Communications Networks Ltd. , AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002 AIR Kant HCR 1738) and in the case of sadhana Lodhs case are not applicable as each Act has to be looked as per its own enactment. He further submits that the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in M/s. I. T. I. Ltd. v. M/s. Siemens Public Communications Networks Ltd. , AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002 AIR Kant HCR 1738) and in the case of sadhana Lodhs case are not applicable as each Act has to be looked as per its own enactment. The learned counsel further submits that under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, appeal is an exceptional civil jurisdiction, so also when there is exclusive bar, Article 227 cannot be invoked. Therefore, the observation of the Supreme Court in the decision in Sadhana Lodhs case (AIR 2003 SC 1561) (supra) cannot be taken advantage of. The learned counsel submits that single Bench decision referred to above is the correct view and the decisions in housamati C. Dharmapas case (ILR 2000 kant 170) and in Mrs. Noreen R. Srikantaiah v. Dasarath Ramaiah, AIR 1985 Kant 208 are per incuriam. The decision in Revanappa v. Gunderao, AIR 1983 Kant 164 and various decisions of different High Courts and of Apex Court were considered. On that basis, it was rightly held that the Tribunals are not Courts amenable to revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench in Mrs. Noreens case (AIR 1985 sc 208) (supra) wherein the issue was regarding transfer of a case from one Tribunal to another Tribunal and thus overruling this decision ignoring the principle laid down by the constitutional Bench, is not correct. Therefore, the Full Bench decision of this Court in Excellent Education Society (supra) is liable to be set aside and is overruled. ( 10 ) SRI Satish M. Doddamani, learned government Advocate submits that the legislation made a departure due to the present situation and there is a radical change. He submits that both the Tribunal and the court derive power from common source of sovereign State and what is necessary to be seen is whether a Tribunal is a Court in strict sense. He submits that for the purpose of CPC, a District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court inferior to District Court and the Small Cause court is subordinate to the High Court and district Court. The learned Government advocate submits that the power of revision under Section 115 of C. P. C. can be exercised by the High Court where no appeal lies. The learned Government advocate submits that the power of revision under Section 115 of C. P. C. can be exercised by the High Court where no appeal lies. Records can be called by the High Court in cases arising out of original suits and other proceedings before the Court subordinate to it. He submits unless the order challenged is one passed by the Civil Court and of a civil nature, the same cannot be said to order revisable under Section 115 of c. P. C. He submits that in the absence of any such provision in the Tribunals Act, an order passed by the Tribunal is not revisable invoking Section 115 of CPC, which does not include the word Tribunal, and therefore, the scope of the provisions of the special enactments against the order passed by the tribunal cannot be enlarged. He submits that as there is an special enactment passed under the statute to deal with particular cases with limited grounds of challenge the scope of the provisions cannot be enlarged so as to seek revision of order of the Tribunal under Section 115 of C. P. C. or even file a writ petition invoking the supervisory powers of the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submits that the order, passed under the EAT Act or the MV Act which do not provide for any special provision to appeal, cannot be sought to be revised invoking Section 115 of C. P. C. He therefore, submits that the view taken in the Division Bench decision and the other decisions based on Full bench decision in Excellent Education Societys case (supra), is not the correct view. ( 11 ) THE question involved is a short one but has a far reaching effect. Before dealing with the issue, deciding the controversy as to whether the Tribunals are Courts subordinate to High Court so as to maintain revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure or not and appreciating the respective arguments to the contentions of the parties, it will be appropriate to extent the relevant sections of C. P. C. and different Acts. Civil Procedure Code3. Civil Procedure Code3. Subordination of courts : For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil court of a grade inferior to that of a District court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District court. SEC. 115. Revision : The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears : (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise a jurisdiction so illegally or with material irregularity; the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. 2. The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the high Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. 3. A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. (Explanation : In this Section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.)SEC. 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred : The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. (Explanation I: A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. (Explanation I: A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation II: For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place ). The Railways Claims Tribunal Act. 1987 section 3 deals with the establishment of railway Claims Tribunal and S. 4 deals with the composition of Claims Tribunal and benches thereof. Section 13 deals with jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims tribunal. SECTION 15. Bar of jurisdiction: On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to the matters referred to in subsections (1) and (1a) of Section 13. SEC. 18. Procedure and powers of Claims tribunal: (1) The Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the claims Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its enquiry. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall decide every application as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall be decided on a perusal of documents, written representations and affidavits and after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced. SEC. 23. Appeals : (1) Save as provided in sub-sec. (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located. (2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the order appealed against. Section 28 has overriding effect. Motor Vehicles Act. (2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the order appealed against. Section 28 has overriding effect. Motor Vehicles Act. 1988 section 165 deals with the establishment of Claims Tribunal Sec. 165 (3) states that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he is or has been a Judge of High Court or is or has been a District Judge or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High court or as a District Judge. Section 169 deals with the procedure and powers of claims Tribunal in holding any inquiry u. / sec. 168, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf following such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sec. 169 (2) reads that the Claims Tribunal shall have all powers of a civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the CPC. 173. Appeals : (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the high Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court. Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. Section 175. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees. Section 175. Bar on jurisdiction of Civil courts : Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court. The provisions of 1988 Act are similar to provisions of MV Act, 1939 except the option of claiming damage to the property exceeding Rs. 2000/- to Civil Court is deleted. In pursuance of the power vested under sec. 176 of MV Act, 1988 the State of karnataka has promulgated Karnataka motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. Rules 232 to 249 of said Rules deal with claims Tribunals (MACT ). Rule 234 deals with examination of applicant, Rule 235 deals with procedure for issue of notice to respondents, Rule 236 deals with appearance and examination of parties, Rule 237 deals with summoning of the witnesses and rule 239 states that MACT may allow any party to appear before it through a legal practitioner, Rule 245 deals with framing of issues, Rule 249 deals with judgment and award of compensation to be passed by claims Tribunal. The Karnataka Education Act. 1983 section 10 deals with Constitution of boards. Chapter III deals with enforcement of Compulsory Primary Education, Chapter xiv deals with terms and conditions of service of employees in private educational institutions. Section 94 deals with appeals. Section 96 deals with Tribunal and Sec. 96 (5) states that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of matters over which the Tribunal exercises any power under this act. ( 12 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties appearing for the petitioners and the respondents, and perused the material on record, the relevant provisions and the case law. ( 12 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties appearing for the petitioners and the respondents, and perused the material on record, the relevant provisions and the case law. ( 13 ) THE Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. case ( AIR 1965 SC 1595 ) (supra) while Considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a tribunal under Article 136 (1), laid down certain tests to determine the same and the main test is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the state/s inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to the decision in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. case (supra), the word Court and Tribunal are not synonymous. It is well settled that the word court is used to designate those forums which are set up in an organised state to exercise judicial powers of the State to maintain and uphold rights and punish wrongs that is for administration of justice and the word court would denote "ordinary Courts of Civil judicature". The judicial power of the government is exercised by establishment of hierarchy of Courts, to decide disputes between its subjects and the subjects and state. The powers, which these courts exercise, are judicial powers; the functions, which they discharge, are the judicial functions; and the decision, which they reach and pronounce, are judicial decisions. However, with the growth of civilization and problems of modern life and to avoid delay caused in disposal of cases by ordinary courts due to heavy pendency and wrangles of procedure in the Code and provision for appeals and revision under the Code and to decide disputes requiring specialised justice several tribunals have been established under various Acts, to implement administrative policy or determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. These Tribunals have also been invested with judicial power of State by divesting ordinary civil courts of the power to decide these matters which are required to be decided by the tribunal. The distinction between court and tribunal is well known and their composition and formation is distinct and separate, though both of them have similar functions to perform as tribunals are clothed with trappings of the Court. The distinction between court and tribunal is well known and their composition and formation is distinct and separate, though both of them have similar functions to perform as tribunals are clothed with trappings of the Court. Though all the Courts are tribunals all the tribunals are not courts. The distinguishing feature between the courts and tribunal or special forum is that the court is constituted by a State as a part of the normal hierarchy of Courts of civil judicature maintained by the State under its constitution exercising judicial power of the state except those which are excluded by law from their jurisdiction, whereas Tribunal is constituted under the Special Act to exercise special jurisdiction in order to decide certain controversy arising under special laws. ( 15 ) KEEPING in view the above principles and the decision of the Supreme Court in associated Cement Companies Ltd. case ( AIR 1965 SC 1595 ) (supra), we shall consider the provisions of the RCT Act, to determine whether the Railways Claims Tribunal is a court subordinate to High Court. The RCT Act has come into force w. e. f. 8-11-1989. A perusal of the preamble of the said Act makes it clear that it has been enacted for the purpose of establishment of railway Claims Tribunals, for enquiring into and determining the claims against a railway administration for loss, destruction, damages, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be carried by Railway and for refund of fares and freights or for compensation for death or injury to passengers occurring as a result of Railway accident and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 of the Act deals with establishment of railway Claims Tribunals. Section 4 deals with composition of tribunal. Section 13 deals with jurisdiction, power and authority of Claims Tribunal and Section 15 deals with the Bar of jurisdiction. Section 18 deals with procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal and Section 23 deals with the remedy of an appeal against the order of the railway Claims Tribunal. Section 28 has an overriding effect. Section 13 deals with jurisdiction, power and authority of Claims Tribunal and Section 15 deals with the Bar of jurisdiction. Section 18 deals with procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal and Section 23 deals with the remedy of an appeal against the order of the railway Claims Tribunal. Section 28 has an overriding effect. ( 16 ) A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the RCT is not an ordinary Court of civil judicature but a tribunal, and powers of ordinary court of civil judicature are taken away and invested with the tribunal and the civil Court is barred from deciding matters which are to be decided by the tribunal under the Act. Railway Claims Tribunal cannot be a court subordinate to the High Court for exercising revisional powers of this Court under Section 115 CPC. Therefore, the argument of sri Sanjay Gowda, learned counsel appearing for the Railways that when the CPC was enacted tribunals had not been established and hence the words "court subordinate" should be read as including tribunals subordinate to the High Court, has no substance. We are also unable to agree with the contention of Sri Sanjay Gowda, learned counsel that appeal is provided to the High court under Section 23 of the RCT Act against every order of the RCT except against an interlocutory order and since no appeal is provided against interlocutory order, revision would lie to the High Court under section 115 CPC. The Bal Gopals case ( AIR 1964 All 504 ) of Full Bench of Allahabad high Court is not applicable to the facts of these cases. Their Lordships found that the tribunal constituted under S. 4 of Displaced persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 is a court subordinate to High Court, and that a revision from a decision of the Tribunal lies to the High Court where an appeal does not lie. But there is a provision under S. 25 which lays down that all proceedings under the Act shall be regulated by the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. So far as the question whether the RCT is a court subordinate to High Court is concerned, in view of the above discussion, it is clear that the Railway Claims Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to High Court and we answer the question accordingly. So far as the question whether the RCT is a court subordinate to High Court is concerned, in view of the above discussion, it is clear that the Railway Claims Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to High Court and we answer the question accordingly. ( 17 ) CONSIDERING the argument pertaining to the M. V. Act, it is clear from the above provisions of the M. V. Act that separate claims Tribunals (MACT) have been established for the purpose of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles and damage to any property so arising and both, and these disputes have been divested and taken away from the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of civil judicature, in view of the bar under S. 175 of MV Act and civil courts are debarred from hearing disputes required to be resolved by MACT. However, no separate tribunals have been constituted for determination of above said claims and the said power of tribunals has been conferred upon district Judges and Civil Judges Senior Division in Karnataka. The District Courts and civil Judges while exercising powers of mact and discharging the functions as members of Claims Tribunals are not exercising powers of ordinary courts of civil judicature, which is barred under Section 175 of MV Act. Further, it is clear from the aforesaid provisions of the MV Act and the Rules thereunder that the said tribunals are not empowered to exercise all the powers of established civil Courts excepting under certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 169 of the M. V. Act clearly states that the Claims Tribunal shall follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit and the claims Tribunal shall have only those powers of a civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and enforcing attendance of witnesses of compelling the discovery of production of documents and material objects. The Rules framed under the Act prescribe the procedure to be followed while conducting proceedings and judgment and award to be passed by the tribunal as contained in Rules 232 to 249. The Rules framed under the Act prescribe the procedure to be followed while conducting proceedings and judgment and award to be passed by the tribunal as contained in Rules 232 to 249. Therefore, provisions of M. V. Act and Rules constitute a self-contained code for establishment of tribunal and determination of dispute and the extent to which provisions of the Code of civil Procedure are applicable, and therefore the District and Civil Judges while discharging their functions as Members of mact, are discharging function qua Claims tribunal and not as ordinary Courts of Civil judicature and hence the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that District Judges and Civil Judges (Sr. Dn.) as Members of mact are not "courts subordinate to the high Court" and would be discharging the function of Claims Tribunal. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel Sowri Raju, that it is a Court as District Judge is discharging the Judicial functions as Civil court, is not acceptable. ( 18 ) IN our view the reasoning of the learned single Judge in Revanappas case air 1983 Kant 164 and in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thibbegowda, ILR 1998 Kant 3733 : (1998 AIHC 4642) is correct; and in gm, KSRTC v. H. S. Saladgi, ILR 2000 Kant 170 is not correct. ( 19 ) ON the basis of the decision in darshan Devis case, AIR 1979 SC 855 the supreme Court in Bhagavati Devis case 1983 Acc CJ 123 held that District Judge functioning as Claims Tribunal under the mv Act is a court for the purpose of S. 25 cpc. That case was decided on the basis of s. 25 CPC, which enables the Supreme court to direct that any suit, appeal or other proceedings be transferred from a High court or other Civil Court in one State to a high Court or other civil Court in any other state. The said ruling has been relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court in Noreen r. Srikantaiahs case AIR 1985 Kant 208 to hold that MACT is a court subordinate to high Court for the purposes of transfer under S. 24 CPC overruling the decision in revannappas case. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of that Division Bench it cannot be held that Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims acts as a Court. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of that Division Bench it cannot be held that Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims acts as a Court. It will be appropriate to quote para 10:"however, Bhagwati Devis case 1983 Acc cj 123 (SC) now puts the points outside the pale of controversy. The matter arose in the context of the power of the Supreme Court under S. 25 to transfer suits and other proceedings, inter alia, from one "civil Court" in one State to the other "civil Court" in any other State. There is no distinction in the concept of a Court between S. 24 and S. 25 cpc. However, the requirement of the element of subordination envisaged in S. 24 so as to render the power under S. 24 exercisable is, understandably, not in S. 25. If, for purposes of S. 25 a Motor Accidents claims Tribunal is a "civil Court", it follows, a fortiori, that the Tribunal is a "court", for the purpose of S. 24 as well. It is in this context that the pronouncement in Bhagwati devis case is instructive on the aspect now under consideration. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 20 ) UNDER the circumstances, the question as to whether District Judges as Members of MACT, would be court subordinate to High Court had not come up for consideration specifically before the Supreme court. In State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, air 1979 SC 855 the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Order 33 Rule 1 cpc, would be applicable to proceedings under MACT, and in Bhagavati Devi v. I. S. Goel 1983 Ace CJ 123 the Supreme Court has held following Darshana Devis case that district Judge as Claims Tribunal under the mv Act is a court for the purposes of Section 25 CPC. ( 21 ) SECTION 173 of MV Act provides for appeal to High Court by any person aggrieved by an award of Claims Tribunal and appeal is barred only where the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees and intention of the legislature is to avoid any further appeal or revision so as to give finality to the award passed by the Tribunal. Therefore the above said decisions would not be helpful to contend that an order passed by MACT. Therefore the above said decisions would not be helpful to contend that an order passed by MACT. , is revisable u/s. 115 CPC. The Full Bench decision in anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, air 1990 Patna 49 is also based on the said decisions, and as such it is not helpful. Accordingly, we hold that MACT. , is not a court subordinate to High Court so as to maintain a revision petition u/s. 115 CPC. All the decisions of this Court taking the contrary view are consequently overruled. ( 22 ) NOW we take up the argument whether Section 115 CPC is applicable to eat cases. It is seen that EAT had been established u/s. 10 of the KPEI (D and C) Act, 1975 and later there was repeal of said Act under corresponding provisions of S. 96 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 which has come into effect from 1-6-1995. Section 96 deals with Tribunal and S. 96 (5) bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court as already stated. It is seen that the above provisions of 1983 Act are identical to S. 10 of 1975 act and a Full Bench decision of this court in M/s Excellent Educational Societys case (supra) wherein their Lordships held that an order passed by the District Judge as eat under 1975 Act is revisable u/sec. 115 cpc. , after coming into force of 1983 Act. The Division Bench of this Court in CRP No. 1378/1999 and connected cases Sri siddaganga Educational Societys case (supra) has held that provisions of the present Act are identical with those of the old Act and hence decision of Full Bench in m/s Excellent Educational Societys case holds good and hence revision under Sec. 115 CPC. , is maintainable against an order passed by EAT. It is clear from the above said provisions of the Act that pending constitution of Regular Tribunal, District Judge of each District was empowered to function as EAT and jurisdiction of ordinary courts of Civil Judicature has been taken away in respect of matters over which tribunal exercise any power under this Act. Further provisions would also make it clear that powers of EAT have not been conferred upon a court without any further limitation, but the powers under the provisions of C. P. C. vested in a Court of appeal have been conferred upon Appellate Tribunal. Further provisions would also make it clear that powers of EAT have not been conferred upon a court without any further limitation, but the powers under the provisions of C. P. C. vested in a Court of appeal have been conferred upon Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, eat also is a tribunal, and District Judge as such tribunal would be only functioning qua tribunal with limited jurisdiction and powers of appellate Court under CPC as in the case of MACT and would not be functioning as ordinary Court of Civil judicature whose powers have been barred u/s. 96 (5) of the Education Act referred to above. Therefore the only finding that can be arrived at is that EAT is not a court subordinate for exercising power of revision of this court u/s. 115 CPC. The decision of the Full bench in M/s Excellent Education Society and followed by the Division Bench in shashidars case referred to above cannot be said to be laying down correct law as in the said decision the essential distinction between ordinary court of civil judicature and tribunal has not been borne in mind and support sought from decisions of Supreme Court in Kerala Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma AIR 1977 SC 282 and in Chhagan Lal v. Indore Municipality, AIR 1977 SC 1555 , was not justified as in those cases the appellate jurisdiction had been conferred upon Courts of civil judicature without further limitation and hence it was held that all the incidents of decision of civil court would follow. Under S. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act also appeal is provided to a civil Court and hence the Supreme Court held that an order passed by appellate Court was by civil Court subordinate to High Court as decided in M/s ITI limited v. M/s Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002 AIR Kant HCR 1738) and hence said decision is also not helpful to contend that order passed by EAT is revisable u/s. 115 cpc. ( 23 ) NOW we shall take up the cases cited. ( 24 ) IN the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2003)3 SCC 524 : (AIR 2003 SC 1561), the Apex Court was dealing with a case wherein the insurer had filed a writ petition against the order of the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. ( 23 ) NOW we shall take up the cases cited. ( 24 ) IN the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2003)3 SCC 524 : (AIR 2003 SC 1561), the Apex Court was dealing with a case wherein the insurer had filed a writ petition against the order of the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In that case, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- for the death of the appellants son. The said order was challenged by the insurer by filing a writ petition before the High Court and the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Thereafter, the insurer preferred a letters patent appeal before the Division bench and the Division Bench allowed the appeal reducing the compensation to rs. 3,00,000/ -. The same was challenged before the Apex Court. The Apex Court while considering Sections 173 and 149 (2) of the motor Vehicles Act, observed that "the right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. " it was further observed that "where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High court under S. 115 CPC. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under S. 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Apex Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under S. 115 CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Apex Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order. So the petitioner cannot take advantage of this case nor it is applicable to the facts of the present case as the order passed by the Tribunal is not revisable under Section 115 of C. P. C. ( 25 ) IN Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, air 1980 SC 892 , the Apex Court was considering the appeal by special leave and four special leave petitions questioning the order of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing the five revision petitions filed under S. 115 of C. P. C. on the ground that they were not maintainable. The Apex Court, on consideration, observed : (Para 11)"the controversy whether it is open to the high Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under Section 115 of the District Court presents little difficulty. The basis for determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction. And legislative history comes to our aid. The consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide the work load of revision petitions between the High Court and the District Court and decentralise that jurisdiction. That purpose was sought to be achieved by classifying all cases into two mutually exclusive categories depending on the valuation of the suit out of which they arose. In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court would be frustrated. The scheme would in large measure, lose its meaning. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court would be frustrated. The scheme would in large measure, lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs. 20,000/-a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the high Court and the District Court for the high Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/ -. That was never intended at all. "the Apex Court, ultimately, held that an order passed under S. 25, Provincial Small cause Courts Act by a District Court is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the high Court under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. In that case it was urged by the appellant that in case the Court was of the opinion that a revision petition under S. 115, code of Civil Procedure, was not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the high Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, and with regard to this, the Apex Court observed that "we are unable to accept the prayer. A revision petition under S. 115 isa separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, and one cannot be identified with the other. This case is not helpful to the petitioners. ( 26 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramachandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 is also not applicable in the present case. The Supreme Court was considering the question whether the High Court can interfere with the order of the appellate authority under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India when a petition for revision under Section 115 of CPC against the same order had already been dismissed by that high Court. The Supreme Court, on consideration, held that in view of the filing Of the revision petition, the writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was not maintainable. The Supreme Court, on consideration, held that in view of the filing Of the revision petition, the writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was not maintainable. ( 27 ) AS a matter of fact, the question whether District Judges as Members of mact would be Court subordinate to High court has not come up for consideration specifically before the Supreme Court as stated. However, we shall now consider the cases of learned single Judge, Division bench and the Full Bench and the controversies referred to us. ( 28 ) IN Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunchaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 the question for consideration was whether Article 137 of Limitation Act (1963) applies to any petition or application filed under any act and whether the petition under Sec. 16 (3) of Telegraph Act claiming enhanced compensation falls within the scope of Article 137. While answering the question whether the petition before the District judge for compensation would be an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the division and would fall within Article 137, the Supreme court in para 20 observed that the provisions of the Telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of compensation payable under section 10 of the Act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a Court. It was also observed that in the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. It was further observed that the District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a Civil Court in dealing with applications under S. 16 of the telegraph Act. The Supreme Court while dealing with the case placed reliance on the decision in National Telephone Company limited v. His Majestys Postmaster General (1913) AC 546. ( 29 ) IN Chhagan Lal v. Indore Municipality, AIR 1977 SC 1555 it was contended that no tax could be imposed with retrospective effect and the order of the High Court directing payment of tax from April 1, 1954 is against law and that the decision of the 2nd addl. District Judge is final and the High court had no jurisdiction to interfere with it. District Judge is final and the High court had no jurisdiction to interfere with it. The Supreme Court observed that S. 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment and sub-section (1) provides that the decision of the District court shall be final. It was further observed that the plea that decision of the District court was final and that the High Court was in error in entertaining a revision petition, cannot be accepted as u/s. 115 of C. P. C. The High Court has got a power to revise the order passed by Courts subordinate to it. It was also observed that it cannot be disputed that the District Court is a subordinate Court and is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 30 ) IN Bhagwati Devi v. I. S. Goel 1983 acc CJ 123, the question was whether the supreme Court has power to transfer suits and whether Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court for the purposes of S. 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme court while placing reliance on its earlier pronouncement in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, AIR 1979 SC 855 observed:"in view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, we are of the view that the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal constituted under the M. V. Act is a Civil Court for the purposes of S. 25 of the C. P. C. We are satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor Accident claims Tribunal, Moradabad to the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi. " ( 31 ) IN State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana devi, AIR 1979 SC 855 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the High Court decision holding that pauper provisions in Order 33 of C. P. C. are applicable to proceedings before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, observed:"2. " ( 31 ) IN State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana devi, AIR 1979 SC 855 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the High Court decision holding that pauper provisions in Order 33 of C. P. C. are applicable to proceedings before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, observed:"2. The poor shall not be prised out of the justice market by insistence on court-fee and refusal to apply the exemptive provisions of O. XXXIII C. P. C. So we are distressed that the State of Haryana, mindless of the mandate of equal justice to the indigent under the Magna Carta of our Republic, expressed in Art. 14 and stressed in Art. 39a of the Constitution has sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court which has rightly extended the pauper provisions to auto accident claims. The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order xxxiii will apply to tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court finds our approval. We affirm the decision". (Emphasis supplied) ( 32 ) THE learned single Judge in K. L. Subannas case, AIR 1974 Kant 109 held claims Tribunal exercise is not correct as a court subordinate to High Court. Subsequently in Revanappas case, AIR 1983 Kant 164 decided on 2-11 -1981, the learned single Judge held that revision is not maintainable and also no binding force render per incuriam. Thereafter, in General Manager, ksrtcs case, ILR 2000 Kant 170 pertaining to M. V. Act, the learned single Judge held revision is not maintainable. The decision of the learned single Judge in panchaxaris case, ILR 1998 Kant 3748 pe taining to Education Act and the Division bench decisions in Mrs. Noreens case, (AIR 1985 Kant 208) disposed on 21-12-1984 holding revision is maintainable based on bhagwati Devis case, (1983 Acc CJ 123) (SC) (supra) and Darshana Devis case, ( AIR 1979 sc 855 ) (supra) pertaining to M. V. Act and in the case of Siddaganga Educational Society (C. R. P. No. 1378 and connected cases) disposed of on 25-2-2002 pertaining to Education Act are held per incuriam. ( 33 ) IN RCT Act, EAT Act (now Education act) and MV Act nothing has been provided as to revision against the order of the respective Tribunals invoking Sec. 115 CPC and by this itself, it does not mean that Tribunal is a Court and any order passed is amicable to revision u/s. 115 CPC. A reference can be made to the provisions of the family Court Act. The Family Courts were established by the enactment of the Family courts Act, 1984. Section 4 deals with the appointment of Judges to the Family Court. Section 19 provides for appeals and revisions against the orders of the Family Courts and sub-sec. (4) of the Section empowers the high Court to call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an order is passed under Chapter IX of the Code of criminal Procedure, with regard to the correctness, legality or properiety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding. ( 34 ) SO also in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called as Arbitration Act), the Civil Court has original jurisdiction in District Courts as well as in high Court. As per Section 2 (e) of the Arbitration Act. "court" means the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court or any Court of Small Causes. In the absence of any specific provision barring revisional jurisdiction, a revision if permissible. ( 35 ) A reference can be made to the decision in the case of M/s ITI Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 2308 : (2002 AIR Kant HCR 1738), their lordships observed that:"provisions of S. 37 of the Act of 1996 bars second appeal and not revision under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power of appeal under S. 37 (2) of the Act against order of Arbitral Tribunal granting or refusing to grant an interim measure is conferred on Court. The power of appeal under S. 37 (2) of the Act against order of Arbitral Tribunal granting or refusing to grant an interim measure is conferred on Court. Court is defined in S. 2 (3) meaning the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction which has jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . that the supervisory and revisional jurisdiction of High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is neither expressly nor impliedly barred either by the provisions of S. 37 or S. 19 (1) of the act. Section 19 (1) under Chapter V of Part I of the Act merely states that the Arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of civil Procedure. The said action has no application to the proceedings before Civil court in exercise of powers in appeal under s. 39 (2) of the Act. " ( 36 ) A reference can be made of the recent Full Bench decision of the Supreme court in S. S. Co-operative Housing Society Nagpur v. M/s. S. D. ILR 2003 Kant 3008 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2434 ) wherein their lordships held that S. 115 CPC is essentially a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not in any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any order of the subordinate court, to approach the High Court for relief. The scope for making revision under S. 115 is not linked with a substantive right. ( 37 ) IT is also seen that the Apex Court invoking Article 136 can grant special leave to appeal to Supreme Court from any order made by any Court or Tribunal. As per the constitutional scheme, also the High Court has power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals under Article 227. It is also seen that under Articles 233-237 of chapter VI of the Constitution, which deals with the Subordinate Courts, the High Court can exercise control over appointments to subordinate Courts, recruit Judges to judicial service, post and promote Judges, but nothing in this chapter empowers the High court to exercise powers of superintendence over tribunals. It is also seen that under Articles 233-237 of chapter VI of the Constitution, which deals with the Subordinate Courts, the High Court can exercise control over appointments to subordinate Courts, recruit Judges to judicial service, post and promote Judges, but nothing in this chapter empowers the High court to exercise powers of superintendence over tribunals. Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution came into existence by the 42nd Amendment w. e. f. 3-1-1977. It does not consider tribunals to be courts subordinate to the High Court under Chapter VI in Part VI. It is seen that Constitution provides for a separate Part (Part XIV-A) pertaining to administrative tribunals. Sections 323-A (2) (d) and 323-B (3) (d) provides that the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136. Under the circumstances the provisions of the Constitution also support that tribunals are not courts exercising jurisdiction of original court subordinate to High Court in strict sense of invoking S. 115 CPC. In Sampath kumar v. Union of India (1987)1 SCC 124 : ( AIR 1987 SC 386 ) and in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 ) the question referred herein was not in issue and hence those cases are not applicable. ( 38 ) ON a detailed discussion and consideration of the judicial thinking on the subject by the Courts referred to above, we are of the opinion that Court referred to in sub-sec. (1) of Section 115 of the CPC is a regular. Civil Court as contemplated in Sections 3 and 9 of CPC. It is also seen that the jurisdiction, which has been taken away from the Civil Court, has been given to the tribunal to exercise in the capacity of Tribunal and not as regular civil Courts. It is also seen that even if the Tribunals are presided over by the Judges of regular courts and exercising the judicial power and discharging judicial function, that does not make any difference on principle as they still remain as Tribunals only. Since the three respective Tribunals are excluded from exercising jurisdiction of ordinary civil court by separate enactments, in our view, the orders passed by them are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of cpc. Since the three respective Tribunals are excluded from exercising jurisdiction of ordinary civil court by separate enactments, in our view, the orders passed by them are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of cpc. ( 39 ) IN view of the above decisions and for the reasons mentioned, we are of the considered view that no revision lies and hold that Section 115 CPC is not applicable. The judgments holding that revision lies against the orders of these tribunals are overruled. ( 40 ) IN view of what we have stated, we hold that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) established under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Education Appellate Tribunal (EAT) established under KPEI (D and C) Act, 1975, now the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 and railway Claims Tribunal (RCT) established under Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 are not courts subordinate to High Court for the purpose of Section 115 CPC. Accordingly we answer the referred question in negative and hold that no revision is maintainable. ( 41 ) THE MFAs and CRPs shall be posted before the appropriate Bench for final disposal. THAKUR, J. , (For himself and H. G. RAMESH, J.): ( 42 ) WE have had the advantage of going through the Judgment in draft proposed by Honble Chief Justice. We entirely agree with the conclusion drawn by his Lordship that statutory tribunals established under special enactments are not courts subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of Section 115 of Code of Civil procedure. We wish however to add a few words of our own in support of that conclusion. ( 43 ) SECTION 115 of CPC empowers the high Court to call for the record of any case decided by any Court subordinate to it and to pass such orders as it may deem fit in situations specified therein. Apart from other limitations placed upon the exercise of that power, one of the essential requirements for the Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction is that the order sought to be revised must have been made by a Court subordinate to the High Court. Apart from other limitations placed upon the exercise of that power, one of the essential requirements for the Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction is that the order sought to be revised must have been made by a Court subordinate to the High Court. What is meant by the expression Court subordinate to the high Court and in particular whether statutory tribunals established under special enactments like the Motor Vehicles Act, the railway Claims Tribunal Act and the Education Act are Courts subordinate to the high Court for purposes of S. 115 of CPC is the only question that falls for consideration in this reference. ( 44 ) THE expression Court subordinate to the High Court has not been separately defined. But, that is inconsequential for section 3 of CPC makes the meaning of that expression more than clear while providing that,"for the purpose of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of small Causes is subordinate to the High court and District Court". ( 45 ) ON the first blush and in view of the unambiguous language employed in Section 3 supra, there ought to be no difficulty in holding that the revisional power under s. 115 is exercisable by the High Court only if a case is decided by one of the Courts referred to in Section 3 above. Since neither s. 115 nor Section 3 of the Code of Civil procedure refer to or make orders passed by statutory Tribunals revisable by the High court, the revisional jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 115 does not extend to orders passed by such Tribunals. ( 46 ) BEYOND the plain provisions of the code lies the jurisprudential angle that explains the essential difference between ordinary civil Courts and special Tribunals established for specific purposes and jurisdictions. Hidayathullah, J. , in Harinagar sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669 distinguished the Courts from Tribunals in the following words:"all tribunals are not Courts, though all courts are tribunals. The word Courts is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrongs. The word Courts is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrongs. Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the courts are there to restore the Vinculam juris, which is disturbed. "in para 32 of the judgment it is also said :"with the growth of civilisation and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights: they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts, of civil judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. . . . . . . . . [emphasis supplied] ( 47 ) IN Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. , AIR 1963 SC 874 , the court reiterated the legal position and declared that a Court in the technical sense was a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the States inherent judicial powers. It was further held that a Tribunal as distinguished from a Court exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially but it does not constitute a Court in the strict sense. ( 48 ) TO the same effect are the observations made by Bachawat, J. , in the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 where the court said (Para 40) :"xxxx xxxx By what sign or distinctive attribute are we to recognise a tribunal? In Royal Aquarium and Summer and winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, 1892-1 QB 431 at p. 446, Fry, L. J. . said that this word has not, like the word Court as ascertainable meaning in English Law. In Royal Aquarium and Summer and winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, 1892-1 QB 431 at p. 446, Fry, L. J. . said that this word has not, like the word Court as ascertainable meaning in English Law. The word cannot have the popular meaning of a Court of Justice, for obviously a tribunal contemplated by Article 136 is an authority other than a regular Court of justice. " ( 49 ) SWAMI, J. , (as his Lordship then was) in the light of the above, correct in summarising the distinction between a Civil Court and a Tribunal in Revanappa v. Gunderao, air 1983 Kant 164 in the following words, (at P. 171 of AIR) :"the striking distinction between a tribunal and a civil Court is that, in the case of a tribunal a special jurisdiction is conferred under a special enactment to perform and exercise some of the judicial functions and powers of the State; whereas in the case of a civil court, it enjoys all the judicial powers and functions of the State concerning the causes of civil nature except where its jurisdiction is specially taken away (vide Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure ). . . . . . the Claims Tribunal being a special tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction, it cannot also be held to be a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of CPC, merely on the ground that an appeal lies to the High Court against an award passed by it. " ( 50 ) THE above distinction is evident even from the constitutional scheme under which courts are distinctly different from tribunals, administrative or otherwise. Article 227 of the Constitution provides that a High court shall have the power of superintendence over Courts and tribunals. If Courts and tribunals were synonymous there was no need to provide for them separately. More importantly. Articles 233 to 237 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to exercise control over appointments to subordinate Courts, recruitment of Judges, their postings and promotion. That power so very essential for an independent judiciary at the district level is not available qua specially constituted tribunals under special enactments although Article 227 could continue to provide to the High Courts the jurisdiction to exercise superintendence over such tribunals. ( 51 ) THERE is a third angle from which the issue can be viewed. That power so very essential for an independent judiciary at the district level is not available qua specially constituted tribunals under special enactments although Article 227 could continue to provide to the High Courts the jurisdiction to exercise superintendence over such tribunals. ( 51 ) THERE is a third angle from which the issue can be viewed. The legislative intention of the enactments under which special tribunals are established is to provide for determination of specific rights and obligations arising under a special Statute by a specialised forum specially created for the purpose. The object underlying the creation of such tribunals is to provide for an alternative institutional mechanism as recognised by the Supreme Court in Sampath kumar v. Union of India (1987)1 SCC 124 : ( AIR 1987 SC 386 ) and reiterated in L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India" (1997)3 scc 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 ). Statutory tribunals are established for adjudication of a particular class of disputes which would otherwise have fallen for determination before an ordinary Civil Court and to relieve such civil Courts of their burden while simultaneously ensuring speedy justice, uniformity of approach and predictability of decisions. In the circumstances, the special enactment under which such tribunals are created invariably exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain matters that fall with in the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. In the absence of such exclusion the very purpose of creating special tribunals or fora would be frustrated. Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, Section 175 of the motor Vehicles Act and Section 96 (5) of the karnataka Education Act accordingly excludes from the jurisdiction of the Civil courts all such matters as are required to be examined and determined by the statutory Tribunals established under the said enactments. If such specially created tribunals were to be treated by a process of interpretation to be Civil Courts of ordinary jurisdiction so as to be amenable to the revisional powers of the High Court under section 115 of CPC, it would lead to patent anomalies and absurdities. The exclusionary provisions would then be rendered meaningless for even when the statute distinguishes the tribunals from Civil Courts and excludes the jurisdiction of the latter, the court would by treating the Tribunals as civil Courts rewriting the provision and in the process defeating the purpose which the legislation intended to achieve. The exclusionary provisions would then be rendered meaningless for even when the statute distinguishes the tribunals from Civil Courts and excludes the jurisdiction of the latter, the court would by treating the Tribunals as civil Courts rewriting the provision and in the process defeating the purpose which the legislation intended to achieve. ( 52 ) SUPER added to the above is the fact that the special enactments under which the tribunals are created do not extend the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil procedure to the proceedings before such tribunals. The Tribunals have the power to choose their own procedure, an attribute which distinguishes a Tribunal from the Civil court. A Civil Court cannot depart from the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil procedure while a Tribunal is not bound to follow the same. The special statutes providing for special Tribunals make the Code applicable only for limited purposes like summoning of witnesses, administration of oath and perjury etc. This makes it evident that the legislative intent behind creation of such tribunal clearly is that the same should be liberated from the constraints of procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil procedure and should be deemed to be a civil Court only for the limited purpose and to the limited extent the special enactment stipulates. For all purposes other than those specified in the enactment, the Tribunals are not Civil Courts so as to be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 53 ) LAST but not the least is the circumstance that wherever the legislature intended the orders of a special tribunal or court to be revisable, it specifically provided for the same. For instance, Section 10 of the family Courts Act treats by legal fiction a family Court to be a Civil Court vested with all powers of such a Court. In terms of Section 19 (4), an order passed by the Family court is made revisable before the High court. Unlike the Family Courts Act, none of the three enactments with which we are concerned in the instant case makes any provision for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court or vesting the tribunal with the powers of a Civil Court. Unlike the Family Courts Act, none of the three enactments with which we are concerned in the instant case makes any provision for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court or vesting the tribunal with the powers of a Civil Court. The nearest we go in that direction is in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act where Section 18 (3) provides by legal fiction that the railway claims tribunal shall have the powers of a Civil Court with respect to matters such as summoning of witnesses requiring discovering and production of documents and issuing of commissions etc. , Section 22 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act further provides that an order made by the Tribunal shall be executable as a decree of a Civil court and for the purpose, the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil court. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 22 provides for transfer of any order passed by the Tribunal to a Civil Court, which Court is then required to execute the order as if it were a decree made by that Court. Suffice it to say that wherever the legislature either intended to treat the tribunal specially constituted to be a civil Court by fiction, it made a specific provision to that effect. It also provided for revisional jurisdiction in cases where it intended that the High Court ought to exercise such jurisdiction qua the orders passed by the tribunals. The absence of a provision conferring jurisdiction upon the High Court to exercise revisional powers against the orders of the tribunals constituted under the three enactments with which we are concerned, assumes importance and clearly shows that the legislature did not intend any such jurisdiction to be exercised by the High court. ( 54 ) TWO decisions of this Court upon which heavy reliance was placed by learned counsel supporting the maintainability of revision petitions may at this stage be noticed. In Mrs. Nooren R. Srikantaiah v. Dasharath Ramaiah, AIR 1985 Kant 208 the question that fell for consideration was whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court for purposes of transfer of cases under Section 24 of the CPC from one tribunal to the other. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagawati devis case 1993 Acc CJ 123, a Division bench of this Court answered the question in the affirmative. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagawati devis case 1993 Acc CJ 123, a Division bench of this Court answered the question in the affirmative. The attention of Division bench it appears was not drawn to the Judgments of the Supreme Court in Harinagar sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar jhunjhunwala AIR 1961 SC 1669 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595 referred to earlier where the Apex Court had made a clear distinction between ordinary Courts of civil jurisdiction and statutory tribunals exercising judicial power of the State. With great respect to the Judges who comprised the division Bench in Noorens case supra, we must say that the correctness of the view expressed by them is open to doubt in the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above. The question whether statutory tribunals established under the enactments mentioned earlier are Courts subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of S. 115 in any case did not fall for consideration in the said case. In any case, if the decision in noorens case purports to lay down that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 is exercisable even qua orders passed by such tribunals, the same has not been in our view correctly decided. ( 55 ) WE may also refer at this stage to a full Bench decision of this Court in Excellent Educational Society v. Smt. J. Sahiba begum [w. A. Nos. 1101 to 1103 of 1987 dated 30-5-1989]. The Full Bench has in that case taken the view that the Education appellate Tribunal constituted under the karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 was a Court subordinate to the High Court for purposes of Section 115. While doing so, the Full bench had placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kerala State electricity Board v. Kunhliumma, AIR 1977 sc 282 and Chhaganlal v. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 1555 . Both these decisions are however distinguishable in our view. In Kunhliummas case supra, the Apex court was interpreting Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The said section inter alia provided for adjudication of disputes concerning sufficiency of compensation by the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property was situate. Both these decisions are however distinguishable in our view. In Kunhliummas case supra, the Apex court was interpreting Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The said section inter alia provided for adjudication of disputes concerning sufficiency of compensation by the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property was situate. Sub-section (4) of Section 16 provided that if any dispute arose as to the persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share the same, the telegraph authority may pay to the Court of the District Judge such amount as it deems sufficient and the District Judge after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, determine the persons entitled to receive the compensation. The Supreme Court held that the District judge was while exercising powers under section 16 of the Act doing so as a Court. That conclusion is unexceptionable if the provisions of Section 16 are read as a whole. The position in the instant case however is different. Here an appeal under Section 94 of the Karnataka Education Act is maintainable not before the District Judge or the district Court, but before a tribunal constituted under Section 96 of the said Act. A closer reading of Section 96 will show that a tribunal can comprise a person who is or has been a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a District Judge. Proviso to sub-section (2) to Section 96 however makes an arrangement pending constitution of a tribunal under sub-section (1) and prescribes that the District Judge of each district shall function as Educational Appellate Tribunal of the district. The fact remains that while exercising powers so conferred the District Judge functions not as District Judge presiding over a Civil Court, but as the Educational appellate Tribunal. The power of the tribunal are because of a specific provision made in Section 96 (3) (d) similar to those exercisable by a Court of appeal under the CPC. Clause (d) to Section 96 (3) further empowers the Tribunal to exercise all such powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the CPC as if such orders were decrees of a civil court. Clause (d) to Section 96 (3) further empowers the Tribunal to exercise all such powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the CPC as if such orders were decrees of a civil court. It is therefore evident that the legislature has conferred specific and limited powers available under the CPC upon the tribunal even when the tribunal is manned by a District Judge. If the tribunal was to be treated as a Civil Court as held by the Full bench in Excellent Education Societys case supra, there was no need for conferment of specific powers, for in such an event the tribunal would have even in the absence of such a specific conferment, been invested with such powers on account of its being a civil Court. ( 56 ) RELIANCE upon the decision of the supreme Court in Chhaganlals case ( AIR 1977 SC 1555 ) was also in our view erroneous. In that case, Section 149 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, specifically provided that an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner shallie to the district Court whose decision was to be final. That is not so in the instant case. The appeals under the Education Act do not lie to the District Court or to any other Civil court so as to make orders passed by it amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the high Court. ( 57 ) WE may before parting also refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shyam sunder Aggarwal v. Union of India 1996 AIR scw 1464 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1321 ). That was a case where the Assistant to the Deputy commissioner, Shillong and Deputy Commissioner were clothed with jurisdiction to act as Civil Courts in some parts of meghalaya. The question that arose was whether a revision would lie against an appellate order passed by the Deputy Commissioner against an order of Assistant to the deputy Commissioner making the award a rule of the Court. Answering the question in the affirmative, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that such a revision petition was maintainable since the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy commissioner had been clothed with the power to decide civil disputes in general within their territorial limits. Answering the question in the affirmative, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that such a revision petition was maintainable since the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy commissioner had been clothed with the power to decide civil disputes in general within their territorial limits. The following passage is in this regard instructive (at P. 1327 of AIR):"the respondent Union of India also preferred an appeal under S. 39 of the arbitration Act before the Deputy Commissioner accepting it as appellate Civil Court. It has already been indicated that no material has been placed before us to show that the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner or the deputy Commissioner have not been clothed with powers of civil Court for decision of civil disputes in general within the territorial limits, but they have been empowered to decide only the special category of civil disputes confined to particular tribal people. In the aforesaid circumstances, such appellate Orders having been passed by a Civil court constituted under a special Statute subordinate to the High Court, the High court does not cease to have revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. " ( 58 ) IT follows from the above that wherever special Statute confers or clothes any authority with powers of a civil Court for decision of civil disputes in general, the orders passed by such authorities would be revisable in the absence of any provision for appeal against the same. What is important is that the authority exercising the power must be constituted as a civil court for decision of civil disputes in general and not for decision of only special category of civil disputes. The tribunals in the instant case are meant to deal with only specific class of cases arising out of special enactments. They do not and cannot exercise powers vested in a civil Court for decision of civil disputes in general within the meaning of Section 9 of the CPC. Such tribunals cannot therefore be termed as Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of C. P. C. ( 59 ) WITH the above observations, We agree that the reference be answered in the negative as proposed by the Lord Chief Justice. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .