( 1 ) THE orders of the Tribunal constituted under the A. P. Co-operative Societies Act (for short the Act ), in confirming the orders passed by the 2nd respondent under section 60 (1) of the Act are under challenge. ( 2 ) THE undisputed facts are that in an enquiry conducted under Section 51 of the act, the petitioner who was the Ex-President of the 3rd respondent - society, along with the Secretary, was found to have caused some loss to the society in various transactions. Basing on the report of the enquiry Officer, the 2nd respondent issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner. The petitioner offered his explanation and having considered the explanation, the 2nd respondent passed an order fixing the liability. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed an appeal. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the 2nd respondent and hence the present writ petition. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner sri Raghavacharyulu mainly raised two contentions. Firstly, he contended that three successive enquires under Section 51 of the act have been conducted and the same is contrary to the law laid down by a learned single Judge of this Court in C. H. W. C. S. Ltd. v. Commr. of Handlooms and Director of handlooms and Textiles. Secondly he contended that no independent enquiry had been conducted before fixing the liability, as held by the Division Bench of this court in ch. Sanyasinaidu v. Dy. Registrar of Co-op societies. With these contentions, he sought for setting aside the order of the Tribunal. ( 4 ) AS regards the first contention it is to be seen from the order of the Tribunal that the supervising officer over the Enquiry officer had examined the report of the enquiry Officer and raised certain issues and in pursuance of the same, reports dated 17-11-1997 and 6-1-1998 were submitted clarifying those aspects. Admittedly no further evidence was taken for the purpose of submitting the said enquiry reports. Therefore, it is clear that no three successive enquiries or de novo enquiries were conducted and only clarifying the issues raised by the supervising authority, comprehensive reports were submitted to the 2nd respondent - Deputy Registrar. The Tribunal basing on the material available on record, rightly held that no three successive enquiries were conducted. Therefore, it is clear that no three successive enquiries or de novo enquiries were conducted and only clarifying the issues raised by the supervising authority, comprehensive reports were submitted to the 2nd respondent - Deputy Registrar. The Tribunal basing on the material available on record, rightly held that no three successive enquiries were conducted. Hence, I do not find any hesitation to agree with the finding of the Tribunal on this aspect. ( 5 ) FURTHER from the decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner is Murali Tobacco company s case (1 supra), it could be seen that the learned Judge found fault with conducting of three successive enquiries, since those enquiries were conducted without assigning reasons. However, in the said judgment it was held that the theory of double jeopardy, which is a principle applicable to convictions in criminal law as provided in the Constitution, may not be applicable to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings. ( 6 ) IN the instant case as already noted, basing on the material available on record, the Tribunal has given a categorical finding that no three successive enquiries were conducted and that the three reports sent were only to clarify the objections raised by the higher authorities. Hence, the principle laid down in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, cannot be made applicable to the present set of facts. ( 7 ) COMING to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no independent enquiry was conducted, it could be seen that no doubt this court held that the enquiry under Section 51 or 52 of the Act is only an administrative one and that an independent enquiry has to be necessarily conducted, since the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under Section 121 of the act. But considering the facts and circumstances of that case, the Division Bench in Ch. Sanyasinaidu s case (cited 2 supra) held that no further opportunity need be given, inasmuch as the opportunity that was given to the petitioner therein was felt to be sufficient and reasonable. ( 8 ) COMING to the present case, it is on record that the 2nd respondent called for an explanation from the petitioner and accordingly the petitioner offered his explanation denying all the allegations, item-wise. ( 8 ) COMING to the present case, it is on record that the 2nd respondent called for an explanation from the petitioner and accordingly the petitioner offered his explanation denying all the allegations, item-wise. No doubt mere calling for an explanation may not amount to conducting an independent enquiry. But it is to be seen that when the petitioner has offered his explanation denying or refuting all the allegations item-wise, relating to different transactions, it is only a matter of verification of records that remains and there was no need to adduce any oral evidence further. The adequacy or reasonableness of the opportunity accorded, should be tested basing on the facts and circumstances, including the nature of explanation submitted and the issues involved. When once the verification of the records clinchingly reveal that the explanation offered by the petitioner is not convincing or that there is clear negligence or misconduct on the part of the petitioner, and to fix the liability if it is felt that there is no need to receive any evidence, then such verification tantamount to or constitute an independent enquiry. In other words the necessity of conducting an independent enquiry by way of examining the witnesses etc. , would arise only when the issues involved are so contentious or complicated or that in order to refute the same there is necessity of adducing any evidence. ( 9 ) IN the present facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioner and the same has been availed of by the petitioner and hence the law laid down by the Division Bench of this court in the decision cited 2 supra, need not strictly be made applicable to the present set of facts. ( 10 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.