ORDER 1. Heard counsel on both sides. 2. The management, the petitioner in CWJC No. 454 of 2000 on the file of this Court is the appellant in this appeal. Respondent No. 2 herein, was employed as a painter by the appellant-management. According to the management, the work man absented himself from duty with effect from 17.9.1987. The same was unauthorized absence. On 22.9.1987, respondent No. 2 sent in an application for leave for two days and the reason given was family trouble: The application did not contain the home address of the workman in terms of Clause 15 of the Standing Orders. So, on 26.9.1987, the workman was informed that his application for leave was not in proper form and he was, called upon to report for duty and further informed that action will be taken against him if he continued to be absent. He did not report for duty. No further application for leave was also sent by the workman. Therefore, in terms of Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders, the management issued a notice dated 16.10.1987 calling upon respondent No. 2 to rejoin duty within one month of that notice, to explain the reason for his absence meanwhile and informed him that, otherwise the consequence of Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders will follow. The said notice was sent by registered post to the home address of the workman as available in the records of the management. It was also published in the Notice Board. There was no response from the workman. Consequently, on 3.12.1987, an order was passed to the effect that respondent No. 2 is deemed to have abandoned his employment and informing him that his name was struck off from the roll. The workman, raised a dispute and the question was whether the action of the management in removing the workman was proper. 3. The workman contended that he had been implicated in a criminal case, had been arrested and had only been released on bail on 8.12.1987 and that was the reason for his absence. The said reason was communicated to the management. Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders relied on by the management for deeming him to be not in service, was unconstitutional since it was violative of natural justice. The workman was, therefore, entitled to be reinstated in service. The said reason was communicated to the management. Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders relied on by the management for deeming him to be not in service, was unconstitutional since it was violative of natural justice. The workman was, therefore, entitled to be reinstated in service. The management resisted this claim by pointing out that the workman had unauthorisedly absented himself and in terms of Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders, the action taken by the management was proper. Before the Labour Court, the management also offered to adduce evidence in support of its action. The Labour Court following a decision of the Supreme Court in (1989) 6 SCC 538, Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan purported to hold that Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders was invalid since it violated the principles of natural justice and in view of the circumstances available, the removal of the workman was not proper. It, therefore, ordered the reinstatement of the workman with back wages. The management sought to challenge the decision of the Labour Court in the writ petition but the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground that since removal was in terms of Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders and without conducting an enquiry, there was no illegality in the award passed by the Labour Court. Feeling aggrieved, the management has come up in this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders was in part materia with the Clause and the bipartite agreement that was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision in Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association, (2000) 5 SCC 65 . In that decision, according to counsel, it was held that the provision for giving of notice to the workman and giving him an opportunity to join duty was sufficient compliance with natural Justice and the ratio of the decision in Uptron India Ltd. cannot be applied to such a case. He also pointed out that the position has been reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab and Sindh Bank v. Sakat-tar Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 214 . He therefore, submitted that the very basis of the decision of the Labour Court was wrong and the learned Single Judge was clearly not justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine. He therefore, submitted that the very basis of the decision of the Labour Court was wrong and the learned Single Judge was clearly not justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submitted that the principle of natural justice has been violated in this case since no notice was given to the workman even as per Clause 15 of the Standing Orders and In the light of the facts discussed by the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge was justified in not interfering with the award. 5. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions. We find that the decision of the Labour Court is essentially based on its conception that Clause 15 of the Standing Orders is Invalid and any action taken thereunder must be treated to be illegal. In the light of the subsequent decisions in Syndicate Bank and Punjab and Sindh Bank this approach and conclusion by the Labour Court Is unsustainable. We find that Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders is in pari materia with the Clause that was involved in the Syndicate Banks case and in Punjab and Sindh Banks case. This Clause provides for an opportunity to the workman to come and resume duty and contemplates the issuance of a notice in that behalf. Clause 15 of the Standing Orders, therefore, satisfies the requirements of natural justice as observed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decisions. Therefore, it has to be held that the management was entitled to take valid action in terms of Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders. Therefore, the finding that the management was not justified in taking action under Clause 15(x) rendered by the Labour Court must be found to be unsustainable. We hold that the management was entitled to take action under Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders and any action taken thereunder must be deemed to be legal and valid, if it is complied with. 6. We hold that the management was entitled to take action under Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders and any action taken thereunder must be deemed to be legal and valid, if it is complied with. 6. There is controversy before us as to whether the notice contemplated by Clause 15 of the Standing Orders was duly sent by the management, whether the workman had tried to inform the management that he was arrested and that was the reason for his absence from duty prior to the issuance of the order dated 3.12.1987 and whether the workman had made any further valid application for leave before any action was taken by the management under Clause 15(x) of the Standing Orders. We find that the Labour Court has not properly considered those aspects or has not considered those in its proper perspective. There is no clear finding by the Labour Court as to whether the letter said to have been sent by the management was in fact sent, whether it was duly addressed and whether it was received by the workman. There is also no clear finding on whether notice contemplated by Clause 15 of the Standing Orders was sent by the management to the home address of the workman available with the management. If it was so sent, obviously, it must be held that there was proper notice since the workman did not leave his leave address. Since we find that these factual aspects require to be properly considered on the basis that Clause 15 is valid and the management is entitled to take action on the basis of that provisions, we think that it is necessary to send back the proceedings to the Labour Court for a proper decision after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce any evidence that they may want on the aspects that have not become relevant in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. 7. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge. We quash the award of the Labour Court dated 11.9.1998 in Reference Case No. 29/94 and remand the proceedings to the Labour Court for a proper decision in accordance with law and in the light of the findings above, after giving a further opportunity to the parties of adducing evidence in the case.