M. Karpagavinayagam, J.: This is second application seeking for bail and suspension of sentence pending appeal against the conviction under Sec. 302, I.P.C. 2. It is strenuously contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the dying declaration given by the deceased, wife of the accused, to the Judicial Magistrate, Doctor and Police against her husband, the accused, have not been corroborated by the independent materials and the trial Court has not taken into consideration the statement of the accused before the Doctor that the accused sustained injuries while he was trying to save the deceased and as such, he has got a chance for success in the appeal and consequently, he is entitled to be released on bail. 3. On going through the records, it is seen that the accused/husband poured kerosene on the body of the deceased and set fire to her. She has given a dying declaration to the Judicial Magistrate which was attested by the Doctor. The Investigating Officer also has recorded a statement from the deceased which was treated as a complaint. It is also seen from the records that the deceased within three days died due to burn injuries. Therefore, the questions as to whether this evidence is sufficient and the same has been corroborated by the other materials and whether the dying declaration given by the deceased could be relied upon in view of the statement of the accused to the Doctor, are all the matters to be considered by this Court at the time of final disposal. Therefore, we are of the view that this is not a fit case for granting bail pending appeal. Hence, the application is dismissed. 4. Before parting with this case, we have to record our note of anguish over the conduct of Mr.C. Deivasigamani, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. It is noticed from the records that he filed bail application earlier and the same was dismissed on 5.8.2002 by this Court on the ground that the counsel was absent. The learned counsel has not cared to file an application for restoration of the said petition by giving reasons for default. On the other hand, the learned counsel has filed the present petition seeking for the grant of bail by merely mentioning that the earlier application was dismissed for default. There is no reason given for such default. 5. When Mr. On the other hand, the learned counsel has filed the present petition seeking for the grant of bail by merely mentioning that the earlier application was dismissed for default. There is no reason given for such default. 5. When Mr. Deivasigamani, the learned counsel was confronted with the failure on his part in mentioning the reasons for his default in this petition, he casually stated that he had to attend the other Court and as such, he did not attend the Division Bench. When this Court asked him whether it is a mistake on his part or whether he is realising his mistake, he was going on to say that he had to attend the other Courts and therefore, the earlier application was dismissed for default and that was the reason that he filed the second application. This Court repeatedly asked the counsel whether it was a mistake on his part for having not attended the Court and whether he was realising for the said mistake, but he did not incline to accept that it was his mistake. On the other hand, he justified saying that he had other works in the other Courts. We repeatedly asked him to accept his mistake and express his regret for his failure in his duty from attending the Court for arguing the bail application, that too before the Division Bench, However, he did not prefer to express his regret. On the other hand, the learned counsel made emphatic submission as if he had never committed any mistake and he need not express regret for the same. This conduct of the counsel Mr. Deivasigamani pained this Court very much. 6. Further, even though the earlier application was dismissed for default on 5.8.2002 itself, the present application has been filed in April 2003, nearly after eight months, without either filing an application for restoration of the earlier application or without filing a fresh application immediately after dismissal of the bail application for default. 7. Deivasigamani pained this Court very much. 6. Further, even though the earlier application was dismissed for default on 5.8.2002 itself, the present application has been filed in April 2003, nearly after eight months, without either filing an application for restoration of the earlier application or without filing a fresh application immediately after dismissal of the bail application for default. 7. When the counsel was asked about the delay in filing the fresh application, he would submit that a fresh application has been filed immediately after the dismissal of the earlier application on 5.8.2002 without any delay and the office returned the papers for compliance and therefore, the papers were submitted after compliance and only due to the delay in the office, the application which was filed without any delay has been numbered by the office belatedly and as such, there is no delay on his part. 8. On going through the records, it is noticed that the said statement is false. The fresh application has been filed not immediately after the dismissal of the earlier application for default on 5.8.2002. The petition has been signed by the counsel for the petitioner only oh 7.4.2003 and the same has been filed only on that day and the seal of the office in the application shows that it has been presented on 7.4.2003 and thereafter, it has been numbered without any delay. 9. The conduct of Mr. Deivasigamani, the counsel, in allowing the application to be dismissed for default by not making his appearance; in not expressing regret for his absence before this Court in the earlier application; in showing unwillingness to ask for excuse for his absence before this Court and his false statement before this Court that he immediately filed the second application would clearly indicate that he neither showed any interest to his client’s cause nor prepared to give any respect to this Court. 10. This Court has been noticing the attitude of Mr. Deivasigamani, the counsel, who is invariably misbehaving before this Court on various occasions. We also understand, due to his misbehaviour in the other Division Bench, his cases are being posted before this Division Bench. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench of this Court earlier passed strictures over his misbehaviour before this Court and warned him. Deivasigamani, the counsel, who is invariably misbehaving before this Court on various occasions. We also understand, due to his misbehaviour in the other Division Bench, his cases are being posted before this Division Bench. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench of this Court earlier passed strictures over his misbehaviour before this Court and warned him. In the judgment in Crl.A.No. 29 of 1999 rendered on 24.2.2003, the Division Bench of this Court was constrained to make the following observation against him: "Thus, this Court has felt that Mr.C. Deivasigamani, the counsel has misbehaved without giving any respect to the feeling of this Court. As such, this Court is constrained to express displeasure over the conduct of Mr.C. Deivasigamani, the counsel, which is termed as obnoxious. Though we initially thought of taking appropriate action against the said counsel by imposing some costs on him over the behaviour before this Court, we refrained ourselves from doing the same with the fond hope that the counsel would not behave in the nauseating manner at least in the future. While recording this note of anguish in this judgment over the conduct of Mr.C. Deivasigamani, we are constrained to give a warning to the said counsel to behave properly in future or else, he would be dealt with suitably." 11. It is also noticed that in one other appeal, namely in Crl.A.No. 773 of 2000, this counsel Mr.C. Deivasigamani, who is the counsel on record for one of the accused, did not appear by committing default and therefore, this Court was constrained to appoint an amicus curiae and ultimately, after hearing the amicus curiae counsel, the matter was disposed of on 20.2.2003. 12. Thus, Mr.C. Deivasigamani has got a chequered career in repeatedly showing lack of interest to his client and disrespect to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the conduct of Mr.C. Deivasigamani, the counsel is quite unprofessional and unethical. Hence, there is no other alternative except to take action against the said counsel. 13. The Supreme Court in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003)2 S.C.C. 45 would in unequivocal and strongest terms condemn the attitude of the counsel in showing lack of interest to his client and the attitude in being indifferent towards the Court. 14. Hence, there is no other alternative except to take action against the said counsel. 13. The Supreme Court in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003)2 S.C.C. 45 would in unequivocal and strongest terms condemn the attitude of the counsel in showing lack of interest to his client and the attitude in being indifferent towards the Court. 14. The lawyer has a duty and obligation to cooperate with the Court in the orderly and pure administration of justice. Members of the legal profession have certain social obligations also and the practice of law has a public utility flavour. It must be remembered that an advocate is an officer of the Court and enjoys special status in society. Advocates have obligations and duties to ensure smooth functioning of the Court. They owe a duty to their clients. Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of the counsel towards the Court or disregard by the Court of the privileges of the Bar. 15. In the light of the well established principles, mentioned above, we are constrained to take some action against Mr.C. Deivasigamani, the counsel appearing for the petitioner. There are three options open to this Court. Firstly, the counsel has committed a professional misconduct by not appearing in the earlier application for bail and allowed the application to be dismissed for default and therefore, the matter could be referred to the Bar Council for taking appropriate action against the counsel. Secondly, the way in which the counsel represented in a challenging tone before this Court refusing to express regret or about his realisation of mistake would clearly indicate that he is not prepared to give any respect to this Court and for this, this Court could initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court. Thirdly, in order to make the counsel to feel the pinch over his conduct, he could be directed to pay costs to some Association. 16. It is informed to this Court that the counsel is hailing from Coimbatore and practising both in Coimbatore and in Chennai. If the matter is referred to the Bar Council or contempt proceedings are initiated against him, the result would likely to affect his professional career. Being a young lawyer, this Court sincerely wants him to be corrected and does not want to spoil his professional career. If the matter is referred to the Bar Council or contempt proceedings are initiated against him, the result would likely to affect his professional career. Being a young lawyer, this Court sincerely wants him to be corrected and does not want to spoil his professional career. Therefore, we do not want to adopt first and second options. It would be appropriate to adopt third option by directing him to pay costs hoping that this sort of direction would at least make him to become alright in the future whenever he appears for the parties before any forum. 17. Accordingly, Mr.C. Deivasigarnni, the counsel is directed to pay costs of Rs. 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand), i.e., Rs. 5,000 each to the Bar Association and to the Advocates Association, Coimbatore, within one month from today. He is also directed to obtain the receipts from the respective Associations at Coimbatore and file the same before this Court. 18. Post the matter on 20.6.2003 for reporting compliance.