Judgment :- 1. Is there any conflict between the two Division Bench decisions of this court in Payyannur Educational Society v. Narayani (1995 (1) KLT 621) and in Easow Easow v. Rajan Kallippara Thekkeveetil and Ann (1999 (1) LLJ 263)? Has the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 erred in holding that the appellant was liable to pay compensation to respondents 1 to 7? These are the two short questions that arise for consideration in this appeal. A few facts as relevant for the decision of this case may be briefly noticed. 2. On August 5, 1987, the appellant and the ninth respondent executed an agreement. It is Ext.B7 on the record. By this agreement, the appellant gave his land comprised in R.S.50/2, situated in Keezhalloor Amsom on lease for a period of three years commencing from August 6,1987 to the ninth respondent. Resultantly, the ninth respondent was entitled to quarry and take 'stone' out of the land by engaging coolies for a period of three years. 3. It appears that the ninth respondent had started the work of quarrying 'granite' from the land. On December 2,1987, blasting was being done. There was a heavy vertical landslide. A heap of granite stone virtually buried the body of Sri. K.V. Kumaran, who was working as a cooly. He was taken to the Government hospital and then to the Medical College. Despite effort, he could not be saved. The quarry proved to be his grave. 4. In April, 1988, the widow along with her six children filed a petition for the grant of compensation. Initially, only the Society was impleaded as a party. It was pleaded that the deceased Kumaran was employed with the society. Subsequently, the appellant and respondent No.9 were impleaded as opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. 5. The respondents contested the claim and pleaded that the Society had got nothing to do with the land or quarrying. Similarly, even the other respondents had controverted the claim. The parties produced their evidence. 6. On behalf of the claimants, the widow appeared as AWL A co-worker had appeared as AW2. On the opposite side, the President of the respondent Society appeared as RW1. The present appellant who had given the land on lease was RW2. The ninth respondent appeared as RW3. Sri. P.P. Raveendran, the Secretary of the Society had also deposed before the Commissioner. On the opposite side, the President of the respondent Society appeared as RW1. The present appellant who had given the land on lease was RW2. The ninth respondent appeared as RW3. Sri. P.P. Raveendran, the Secretary of the Society had also deposed before the Commissioner. Certain documents were also tendered. 7. On an examination of the evidence the Commissioner found that "it is admitted and undisputed that opposite party III (the 9th respondent) was running the quarry as per Ext. B7 agreement and the accident took place while he was running the quarry Admittedly, opposite party IInd is the owner of the quarry, who has leased the same to opposite party IIIrd for a good amount for conducting business for three years on executing Ext.B7. It has, therefore, to be viewed in such a way that as opposite party IIIrd was doing a business by running the quarry taking on lease, opposite party IInd was doing a similar business by leasing the quarry to opposite party IIIrd." On this basis, the appellant as well as respondent No.9 were held liable to pay compensation. The amount of compensation was assessed as Rs.67,776/-. 8. Aggrieved by this award the second respondent in the claim petition has filed the present appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the finding as recorded by the Commissioner is totally contrary to the evidence on record. No reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that the appellant was the employer or that he was liable to pay any compensation. On behalf of the claimants Mr. Surendranath has contended that the appellant was engaged in the business of quarrying and by virtue of the provisions of S.12 he was the Principal Employer. Thus, the Commissioner has committed no error in holding him to be liable to pay compensation. 9. The short question that arises for consideration is: Did the Commissioner err in taking the view that the appellant was liable to pay the compensation? 10. The case commences with the execution of the agreement, Ext.B7. A perusal of this document shows that the appellant had agreed to give the land on lease to the ninth respondent "for quarrying and taking stones out of it, by engaging coolies for a period of three years". 10. The case commences with the execution of the agreement, Ext.B7. A perusal of this document shows that the appellant had agreed to give the land on lease to the ninth respondent "for quarrying and taking stones out of it, by engaging coolies for a period of three years". For this purpose, the ninth respondent had undertaken to "pay the consideration of Rs.10,800/- for quarrying from the land for three years ". It was in pursuance of this agreement that the appellant had parted with the land and handed it over to the ninth respondent at an annual rent of Rs.3,600/- only. Thereafter, the appellant had nothing to do with the quarrying or the employment of coolies. It has not even been suggested that he had any share in the profits of the business of quarrying. 11. Mr. Surendranath contends that by virtue of the provisions of S.12 of the Act the appellant should be deemed to be the Principal Employer. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Narayani's case (supra). 12. A perusal of the provisions of the Act shows that employer has been defined in S.2(1)(e) to include a "person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service". Under S.3 the employer is liable to pay compensation for any personal injury "caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" . Thus, it is apparent that the liability of the employer arises only when there is a contract of service between him and the workman and such a workman suffers an injury during the course of employment. Not otherwise. 13. The issue is: Did the appellant employ the deceased? Neither in the claim application nor during the course of evidence it was even suggested that the appellant had, at any stage, employed Kumaran to work for him. In fact, the pleaded cases was that the quarry belonged to the Society. The deceased was working for the Society. At a later stage the appellant and the ninth respondent were impleaded. Still further, during the course of her testimony, the first respondent had not even suggested that her husband was ever employed by the appellant. In fact, she stated that he was a member of the Kannur District Karinkal Workers' Union. The deceased was working for the Society. At a later stage the appellant and the ninth respondent were impleaded. Still further, during the course of her testimony, the first respondent had not even suggested that her husband was ever employed by the appellant. In fact, she stated that he was a member of the Kannur District Karinkal Workers' Union. She had further stated that "the statement contained in the written statement of the opposite party to the effect that Kumaran was not a quarry worker and the opposite party has not conducted Nallani quarry is not correct." In fact, on January 23, 1990, when her statement was recorded the appellant was not even a party to the proceedings. It is, thus, clear that there was no suggestion by the claimants at any stage that there was a relationship of employer and employee between the appellant and her husband. Still further, it also deserves mention that the appellant had appeared as RW2 on March 16, 1992. He had clearly stated that he had not "conducted the quarry". He had given the land "to a person named 'Vinodan' as per the agreement, for conducting quarry Land was given to Vinodan for conducting the quarry for three years. I have no connection with persons who worked in the quarry." He was cross examined by the counsel for the first respondent - the claimant. It was never suggested that he was the employer of the deceased - Kumaran. This is clear from the record. 14. In view of the above, it is established that the claimants had never pleaded that Kumaran was employed by the appellant. Can he be still held liable to compensate? It is well settled that a court or an authority has only to find the case as pleaded by the parties. It cannot find a new case for any side. In the present case, even if the pleadings are ignored, there is not even an iota of evidence to show that there was any relationship of employer and employee between the appellant and the deceased. 15. Mr. Surendranath contends that the provision of S.12 is applicable. Is it so? 16. It is undoubtedly clear that the Act was enacted to provide social security to the workmen and their dependents. The object was to provide for payment "by certain classes of employers to their workmen" by way of compensation for injury. 15. Mr. Surendranath contends that the provision of S.12 is applicable. Is it so? 16. It is undoubtedly clear that the Act was enacted to provide social security to the workmen and their dependents. The object was to provide for payment "by certain classes of employers to their workmen" by way of compensation for injury. The Act embodies a piece of social legislation. Its provisions have to be liberally construed. The declared 'object' has to be kept in view. For this purpose, the court shall normally lean in favour of the claimant so that the declared objective is achieved. It is in this background that the provision contained in S.12 has to be considered. 17. By S.12 the Legislature has brought even a person who enters into a contract with another, for the purpose of execution of any work which is originally part of his own trade or business within the definition of an employer. In other words, as held in Narayani's case, S.12 has "stretched the contours of the word 'employer' wider so as to include the person contracting with another person for carrying out the work of the former". It is indeed so. However, the question that still remains is: Was the appellant carrying on the work of quarrying? Despite being repeatedly asked, learned counsel for the claimants has not been able to refer to even a suggestion in the cross examination or otherwise in the statement of any of the witnesses to the effect that quarrying was ever the trade or business of the appellant. The record does not even show that he has been engaged in the business of quarrying even for a day. 18. Mr. Surendranath referred to the agreement by which the appellant had let out the land for quarrying. This, in our view, would not make quarrying itself as part of his business or trade. Giving the land on lease may be the business of the appellant. Not quarrying. 19. The matter may be looked at in another way. It can happen that a person lets out an industrial shed to another so as to enable him to install and run an industrial unit. The lessee may put up a machine and start manufacturing different items. There may be an accident which may even prove fatal. Not quarrying. 19. The matter may be looked at in another way. It can happen that a person lets out an industrial shed to another so as to enable him to install and run an industrial unit. The lessee may put up a machine and start manufacturing different items. There may be an accident which may even prove fatal. In such a situation, can it be said that the lessor or the owner of the property would be engaged in the business of manufacturing or to be treated as the Principal Employer as contemplated under S.12? We are of the considered view that even if the owner is engaged in the business of real estate or letting out the property, he cannot be said to be engaged in manufacturing of any item. Similar appears to be the position in the present case. Thus, even by giving a liberal construction to the provision in S.12, we are unable to hold that the appellant was engaged in the trade or business of quarrying so as to be liable to pay any compensation to the claimants. 20. Mr. Surendranath has also attempted to point out that there is a conflict in the judicial opinion as recorded in Narayani's case and in the later decision in Easow's case. 21. We have examined both the decisions. In Narayani's case the factual position appears to be that the Society was running an educational institution. It had engaged a contractor for the purpose of excavating earth. The contractor had engaged labourers for the purpose of executing the job. The sale proceeds of earth were being paid to the educational society. In the background of this factual position, it was clear that the Society was the direct beneficiary of the work of excavation. It was getting the price. Thus, the Court had taken the view that the Society was the Principal Employer. It was held liable to pay compensation to the claimants. This was a decision on the basis of facts. Similar is the position in the later decision. We find that both the decisions were given in the light of the evidence as adduced by the parties. So far as the provisions of the Statute are concerned, there was no conflict of judicial opinion so as to call for any clarification. This was a decision on the basis of facts. Similar is the position in the later decision. We find that both the decisions were given in the light of the evidence as adduced by the parties. So far as the provisions of the Statute are concerned, there was no conflict of judicial opinion so as to call for any clarification. The statement of law as given in Narayani's case was never doubted or deviated from in Easow's case. Even otherwise, it clearly embodies the correct enunciation of law. We find no reason to take a different view. 22. Mr. Surendranath has contended that the scope of interference by the Court with the finding of fact is limited by the provisions of S.30. There is no quarrel with this proposition. However, the substantial question of law that arises in this case is: Could the Commissioner have fastened the liability on the appellant when there was no claim either in the pleadings or during the course of evidence against him? We find that the Commissioner had recorded a finding against the appellant despite the fact that in the pleadings there was not even a suggestion that the relationship of employer and employee ever existed between the two. Stiff further, there was no evidence at all to make out such a relationship between the parties. In this situation, we find that the view taken by the Commissioner was totally contrary to the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties. Thus, it cannot be sustained. 23. In view of the above, it is held that:? (1) there is no conflict between the decisions rendered by the two Division Benches of this Court in Narayani's case and in Easow's case. Both the cases were decided on the basis of the evidence on record; and (2) the Commissioner under the Act had only to find the case as pleaded by the parties. In the present case, the Commissioner held the appellant to be liable, despite the fact that there was no evidence to show that the relationship of employer and employee existed between the two. It had clearly erred in doing so. 24. Resultantly, the order passed by the Commissioner cannot be sustained. 25. This brings us to another aspect of the matter. It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the claimants that they are poor. It had clearly erred in doing so. 24. Resultantly, the order passed by the Commissioner cannot be sustained. 25. This brings us to another aspect of the matter. It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the claimants that they are poor. It is also pointed out that the appellant had already deposited the amount awarded by the Commissioner in the year 1992. During the long period of eleven years, this amount has not been disbursed to the claimants. It was not even deposited in a bank. The result is that they have continued to suffer and the value of money has gone down. So far as the parties are concerned, the money has yielded no return. Not even interest. 26. This factual position had been pointed out to the Bench during the course of hearing on December 11, 2002. At that stage, the case was adjourned to enable the counsel for the ninth respondent to find out if he was willing to pay 50% of the amount. Today, counsel for the ninth respondent has appeared and stated that she has no instructions. 27. It appears that the ninth respondent is intentionally avoiding his liability. In fact, even in the course of testimony, he had taken the plea that whatever money was paid by the purchaser or the owner of the quarry, was shared by all the workmen. Thus the suggestion sought to be made by him was that there was no relationship of employer and employee between him and the deceased. However, it is an admitted position that the ninth respondent has not challenged the order passed by the Commissioner. No argument has been addressed even during the hearing of this appeal. It has not even been suggested that he was not liable. 28. Mr. Surendranath submits that the ninth respondent has already sold one-sixth of his right in the property. Thus, it may be difficult for the claimants to recover the amount from him. 29. Keeping in view the plight of the claimants, we have persuaded the counsel for the appellant to give one-half of the amount of the deposit already made to them so that they can get some immediate relief. He has agreed to do so. Thus, out of the amount of Rs.67,776/-, deposited by the appellant, one-half of the amount shall be refunded to him immediately. He has agreed to do so. Thus, out of the amount of Rs.67,776/-, deposited by the appellant, one-half of the amount shall be refunded to him immediately. The other half shall be paid to the claimants forthwith. However, it is clarified that the appellant shall be entitled to recover the amount as paid by him to the claimants from the ninth respondent. Equally, even the claimants shall be entitled to recover the remaining amount from the ninth respondent. Subject to the above, the appeal is allowed. It is held that the appellant was not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants. There will be no order as to costs.